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INTRODUCTION 
Motivation for the research and  
the importance of the topic 
The most recent global financial crisis had an impact on the labour market in all 
the countries of the European Union. Unemployment rates started to increase in 
most countries in the second half of 2008 and in a few countries like Ireland, 
Greece and Spain they still continued to increase throughout 2011. The problem 
of high unemployment rates made countries focus on their labour market 
policies and the provision of active and passive labour market measures. Most 
countries adopted some special crisis measures such as extending benefits, 
enlarging the provision of active measures or developing new active measures 
in an effort to stop the increase in unemployment, reduce the duration of 
unemployment, diminish the scarring effects of unemployment, and stop the 
loss of skills among the unemployed. 
The Estonian labour market was affected by the crisis more than the labour 
markets of other countries in the European Union. By the first quarter of 2010 
the unemployment rate had grown fivefold since the second quarter of 2008 
from 4.0% to 19.8% (see Figure 1). Relatively high increases were also seen in 
the unemployment rates in the other two Baltic states during this period, with 
unemployment increasing four times in Lithuania and 3.3 times in Latvia, but 
the increases were much milder in other EU countries. However, the recovery in 
2010–2011 was also faster in Estonia than in any other EU country. The 
extreme turbulence in the labour market makes Estonia an interesting case to 
study. From Estonian data it is possible to investigate the effects of labour 
market policies on labour market outcomes and the behaviour of the un-
employed in an extremely difficult labour market situation. This thesis studies 
labour market outcomes at the micro level, particularly labour market status as 
in employment or not in employment, and wages1. 
One of the issues debated during the crisis has been the generosity of un-
employment benefits, above all the question of whether benefits should be more 
generous during an economic downturn. The main theory that explains the 
effects of unemployment benefits on labour market outcomes is search theory, 
and its importance is reflected in the award of the Nobel Prize in 2010 to Peter 
A. Diamond, Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A. Pissarides for developing 
search theory. One of the main conclusions of search theory is that more gene-
rous unemployment benefits increase the duration of unemployment and give 
rise to higher unemployment. This is the disincentive effect of unemployment 
benefits. However, extensions of search theory also predict positive effects on 
labour market outcomes. It can be shown that more generous systems can 
                                                 
1 However, labour market outcomes also include other indicators such as the supply of 
working hours or labour productivity. 
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increase job quality once the unemployment spell is over2. In addition, it is not 
clear in the search theory context, how the behaviour of the unemployed and the 
effects of unemployment benefits change in different economic situations. 
 
 
Figure 1. Labour market situation in Estonia compared to those in the other Baltic 
states and the European Union 2004–2011 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
The most straightforward and most commonly empirically substantiated effect 
of unemployment benefits predicted by search theory is that an increase in the 
amount or duration of unemployment benefits lowers the probability of a person 
exiting unemployment (for example Meyer (1990), Katz and Meyer (1990), van 
Ours and Vodopivec (2006)). In addition, during the benefit period the job 
search intensity increases, the reservation wage declines and the probability of 
exiting unemployment increases, so there is a spike in the exit rate to 
employment at the end of the unemployment benefit period. However, an 
increase in the generosity of benefits can encourage the unemployed currently 
not receiving benefits to enter employment in order to be entitled to benefits in 
the future. 
In the search model, a crisis in the economy means above all a lower job 
arrival rate. However, the effect of the crisis on the behaviour of the un-
employed is somewhat ambiguous in this model. On the one hand, a lower job 
arrival rate means fewer chances for exiting unemployment and the exit rate 
declines. On the other hand, the unemployed become less selective among job 
offers, the reservation wage decreases and the exit rate to employment 
                                                 
2 Referred to in the job search literature as post-unemployment job quality. This comprises 
the features of the accepted job that are relevant for the worker, such as wage, employment 
contract duration, and match between skills and tasks. 
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increases. Similarly, the effect of the worsened economic situation on the spike 
prior to the benefit exhaustion date is ambiguous. 
The effects of unemployment benefits and the economic situation on 
unemployment duration are thoroughly discussed in job search literature. The 
general consensus is that unemployment benefits prolong the job search and that 
the economic situation has ambiguous effects. However, in recent years the 
interaction between these two factors has also been addressed. It can be argued 
that the benefit disincentive effect can vary over the business cycle. In the 
theoretical literature regarding the cyclicality of disincentive effects, benefits 
are mostly expected to have less distortionary effects during a crisis, though the 
answer to this question is still ambiguous (see for example Krueger and Meyer 
(2002), Jurajda and Tannery (2003), Landais et al. (2010), Kroft and 
Notowidigdo (2011)). However, the empirical research in this matter is also 
scarce and the few existing studies in this field find that the disincentive effect 
might be slightly lower during a recession (Bover et al. (2002), Jurajda and 
Tannery (2003), Schmieder et al. (2010), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011)), but 
there are no studies exploring whether the disincentive effect still exists in an 
extremely bad labour market. 
In short, in the framework of search theory, unemployment benefits are 
expected to have mostly negative effects on the labour market as they increase 
unemployment duration, but these distortionary effects might be milder in a 
recession. However, extensions of search theory state that more generous 
unemployment benefits can also relax the restrictions on job search and by that 
increase the post-unemployment job quality in terms of higher wages, longer 
job duration, and better matching of job and skills. This means that 
unemployment benefits could support the job search rather than motivating 
people to stay in unemployment (Burdett (1979)). In theoretical literature, the 
beneficial effects of unemployment benefits on post-unemployment job quality 
are shown for example by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Acemoglu and 
Shimer (2000). 
While the disincentive effect of benefits has often been empirically sub-
stantiated, it is only in recent years that there has been more focus on the effect 
on post-unemployment job quality. Furthermore, the results of these studies are 
quite varied and only some of them confirm the positive effects on post-
unemployment job quality. More positive effects have been found on post-
unemployment employment duration (for example Belzil (2001), Centeno 
(2004), Tatsiramos (2009), Caliendo et al. (2009)) than on the post-un-
employment wage (for example Gangl (2002), Gangl (2006), Fitzenberger and 
Wilke (2007)). 
In conclusion, the labour market situation during recent years has brought 
more focus onto study of the effects of unemployment benefits on labour 
market outcomes. Though it has been confirmed that unemployment benefits 
extend unemployment duration, it is still both theoretically and empirically 
ambiguous as to whether this effect varies with business cycles. In addition, it 
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has not been empirically substantiated whether benefits could also increase 
post-unemployment job quality as the results so far are not unanimous. Hence 
these are the issues that this dissertation addresses. 
During recent years some literature has emerged on sanctions and 
monitoring in the unemployment benefit system (for example Abbring et al. 
(2005), Lalive et al. (2005), McVicar (2008), Svarer (2011)). The studies on 
this issue tend to find that the monitoring of job search and the application of 
sanctions if the job search effort is insufficient tend to decrease the disincentive 
effect of unemployment benefits, though sanctions might also decrease post-
unemployment job quality (Arni et al. (2009)). This shows that monitoring and 
sanctions can be important determinants of the effects of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment duration and post-unemployment job quality. 
However, the issues of monitoring and sanctioning are not dealt with empiri-
cally in this dissertation as monitoring and sanctions are used in Estonia at a 
very low level and there are no data that would allow an estimate of their effects 
on labour market outcomes. Nevertheless, the thesis sheds some light on this 
issue by providing a discussion of the effects of monitoring and sanctions 
estimated in the earlier studies in other countries. 
This thesis focuses on the effects of unemployment benefits on labour 
market outcomes. However, when assessing the system of unemployment 
benefits, it has to be kept in mind that the impact of unemployment benefits on 
the entire economy is not limited to their impact on the labour market, but the 
purpose of unemployment benefits as a social security instrument that should 
smooth the fluctuations in a person’s income and the consequences of this effect 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The scope of the thesis is depicted in Figure 2. The two main effects of 
passive labour market policies in the form of unemployment benefits on labour 
market outcomes proposed by the theory are studied. Firstly, the effect of 
prolonging unemployment duration is analysed and secondly, the effect of 
lifting post-unemployment job quality is studied. The first of these effects can 
be considered to have largely negative consequences and the second effect more 
positive consequences. As a result both the negative and positive effects on 
labour market outcomes emerging from the unemployment benefit system in 
Estonia are studied. 
Active labour market measures can also affect the duration of unemployment 
and post-unemployment job quality. However, these effects work through 
somewhat different channels than those used by passive labour market 
measures, so active labour market measures are studied in this thesis only 
inasmuch as they are part of the system of passive labour market measures, 
meaning if they are implemented as a requirement for eligibility for un-
employment benefits and basically working then like other eligibility criteria for 
benefits such as reporting of job search for monitoring. Empirically, active 
measures are included in some of the models only as controls for the corres-
ponding effects of unemployment benefits. 
5
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Figure 2. Scope of the thesis 
Note: The solid line presents those aspects that are covered in this thesis and the dashed line those 
which are beyond the scope. 
Source: author’s figure 
 
 
The aim, the research tasks and  
the hypotheses postulated 
The aim of this thesis is to study the effects of the generosity of unemployment 
benefits on labour market outcomes during a period of deep recession in 
Estonia. Estonia witnessed a sharper increase in the unemployment rate than 
any other country in the European Union, and this makes it possible to study the 
benefit effects in an extreme economic situation. The crisis period is defined in 
this thesis as the period when the unemployment rate was rising continuously, 
from the third quarter of 2008 until the first quarter of 2010. In addition, 
studying the effects of benefit generosity in the system of unemployment 
benefits in Estonia allows suggestions to be made about the design of the 
system. 
There are four main research tasks that must be completed to achieve the aim 
of this thesis. The first task is to provide a theoretical framework for the study. 
For this, an overview of search theory is presented with the focus on the effects 
of benefits on unemployment duration and post-unemployment job quality and 
the implications of this theory for business cycles. A discussion of the methods 
for studying benefit effects and an overview of earlier empirical results on 
benefit effects are also provided. 
The second research task is to provide an overview of the Estonian un-
employment benefit system. This involves describing the Estonian unemploy-
ment benefit system, its development over the years and the situation during the 
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period under study, earlier studies concerning passive labour market measures 
in Estonia, and the data available for the study. 
The remaining two tasks encompass estimating the benefit effects. The first 
is to estimate the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration 
both before and during the economic crisis. This makes it possible to compare 
the disincentive effects under different economic situations to see whether they 
are different. The last research task is to estimate the effect of benefit generosity 
on post-unemployment job quality during the crisis, and more specifically the 
effect on the post-unemployment wage and post-unemployment job duration. 
 
 
Data and methods used 
The thesis uses two main sources for its data, the database of the Estonian 
Unemployment Insurance Fund and the database of the Estonian Tax and 
Customs Board. The two databases are combined so that there are data from 
both databases for every observation. The first database provides information 
related to registered unemployment such as unemployment benefit receipts and 
participation in active labour market programmes and in addition, it contains 
data about previous employment and various socio-demographic data for the 
registered unemployed. 
The labour market outcomes are studied using wage data from the Estonian 
Tax and Customs Board. Monthly data about wages and employers have been 
available for the analysis, so the real lengths of the unemployment period and 
the employment period, and wage level are very well definable. Overall, it is an 
unusually good dataset for studying the effects of unemployment benefits as it 
covers in great detail the length of unemployment spells and employment spells, 
wage levels, the receipt of unemployment benefits, and participation in active 
measures as well as a broad range of the personal characteristics of the 
registered unemployed. 
The thesis focuses on the Estonian labour market during the last global 
economic downturn and hence the emphasis is on the labour market behaviour 
of the unemployed during the period when the unemployment rate grew rapidly 
in Estonia, from the third quarter of 2008 until the first quarter of 2010. The 
main group of people under study is those unemployed who started to receive 
unemployment benefits during the period from the third quarter of 2008 until 
the first quarter of 2009, which basically means those people who started their 
unemployment spell in the beginning of the crisis period. The entry to 
employment and the quality of the jobs accepted is studied until the first quarter 
of 2010 when the unemployment rate peaked. Though wage data for longer time 
periods are used for analysing post-unemployment job quality, only those 
people who accepted a job during the crisis period are studied. 
In addition, the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration 
is studied using data from the pre-crisis period enabling some conclusions to be 
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drawn on the magnitude of the disincentive effect during a crisis and a pre-crisis 
period. For the pre-crisis period, unemployment benefits granted in 2007 are 
studied. The wage data for those benefit recipients are combined up to the end 
of 2008. Only benefits granted in 2007 are used for the study of the pre-crisis 
period, because in earlier years there was no variation in the possible duration 
of unemployment insurance benefits and the maximum possible duration was 
180 days, but in 2007 it became possible to be eligible for unemployment 
insurance benefit for 270 days. 
The studies presented in the thesis focus above all on comparing unemploy-
ment insurance benefit recipients of 180 days and 270 days, though in some 
parts of the thesis information is also used about unemployment allowance 
recipients and the unemployed with a different possible unemployment 
insurance period due to a continuing benefit period from a previous unemploy-
ment spell. Only unemployment benefit recipients and especially unemploy-
ment insurance benefit recipients are compared, as these groups should 
otherwise be more similar and there should be lower probability for selection 
problems. The groups of unemployed without unemployment benefits differ a 
lot in observable variables from the benefit recipients. In addition, it is likely 
that they differ also in their unobservable variables. The unemployed without 
any unemployment benefits during the beginning of the registered unemploy-
ment period are only those people who have previously had only a very short 
employment period or who have been out of employment over a longer period. 
Comparison of unemployment allowance recipients with unemployment 
insurance benefit recipients can also be debatable as these are the unemployed 
who have either had a somewhat shorter previous employment period or whose 
previous employment was not terminated on the initiative of the employer. 
As the analyses cover only benefit recipients, the conclusions drawn from 
the analyses regard above all the effects of the generosity of benefits. The 
overall effect of the unemployment benefit system may be different if recipients 
are compared to the unemployed with no benefit receipts, as the behaviour of 
benefit recipients can be affected by the benefit receipt beyond the benefit 
period. This limitation mainly concerns Chapter 4 where only recipients of 
unemployment insurance benefit of 180 days and 270 days are compared, 
meaning it is possible to look only at the effects that stem from the additional 90 
days of unemployment insurance benefit.  
Three main methods are used for studying the benefit effects: Kaplan-Meier 
survival estimates, the piecewise-constant proportional hazard model, and pro-
pensity score matching. In addition, a method similar to the regression 
discontinuity design is used. This means that the change in the labour market 
behaviour of the unemployed around the cut-off point of eligibility for a 
different possible benefit period is studied. The application of this method 
lowers the potential selection problem and the method is combined with the 
three main methods of Kaplan-Meier estimates, the piecewise-constant pro-
portional hazard model and propensity score matching. 
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The effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration is explored 
using Kaplan-Meier estimates and the hazard rate model (Chapter 3). Kaplan-
Meier estimates provide a first candid look at the behaviour of the unemployed. 
The piecewise-constant proportional hazard model allows the disincentive 
effect to be quantified in a flexible model where time-varying variables can be 
taken into account.  
Two proxies for post-unemployment job quality are used in the thesis: the 
post-unemployment wage and post-unemployment job duration (Chapter 4). 
The main method for analysing the effect of unemployment benefits on the 
wage is propensity score matching, where people eligible for longer benefits are 
matched with people eligible for shorter benefits to estimate the average treat-
ment effect on the treated, measured as the difference in wages between people 
on a longer benefit and statistically similar people eligible for a shorter benefit. 
The analysis of post-unemployment job duration uses the Kaplan-Meier 
survival estimates and the piecewise-constant proportional hazard model as 
methods of duration analysis together with propensity score matching. As with 
the analysis of wage differences, propensity score matching is used to match 
people eligible for a longer benefit period with people eligible for a shorter 
benefit period to estimate the average treatment effects on the treated. 
A method similar to regression discontinuity design is applied in sections 
using data from the crisis period (3.2, 4.1 and 4.2) so that the observations close 
to the cut-off point of the eligibility for the longer unemployment benefit period 
are studied in more detail. This method cannot be applied on the pre-crisis data 
as there are too few observations. 
Though the use of administrative data in the thesis allows the employment 
and non-employment periods and wage levels to be defined very precisely, 
these data only contain information about the formal sector. This means it is not 
possible to estimate from this data whether the effect of unemployment benefits 
on labour market outcomes might be different were the shadow economy also 
considered. 
In addition, the data set available does not include data about the job search 
intensity of the unemployed. This means it is possible to shed some light on the 
issue of changes in the reservation wage during the unemployment period and 
how selective the unemployed are with regard to job offers, but it is not in 
general possible to estimate how big a role is played by changes in the job 
search activity. Similarly, there are no data about job search monitoring that 
could be used for estimating its effects on labour market outcomes. Even though 
there are data about sanctions, it is not possible to estimate their effect either, as 
it is not possible to see in the data whether a termination of benefit was imposed 
before or after a person entered employment, or whether the person did not 
come to the public employment service because they had entered employment 
or they entered employment after the benefit was terminated. 
Furthermore, the data allow study of the post-unemployment job quality 
only in terms of the accepted wage and the post-unemployment job duration, so 
6
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it is not possible to examine for example whether the accepted job is part-time 
or full-time or how well the job matches the skills of the person taking it. 
However, the post-unemployment job duration is generally considered to be a 
good indicator of job match quality. 
A more comprehensive overview of the data used in the analysis is provided 
in Section 2.3. A discussion of the methods applicable for studying unemploy-
ment benefit effects is presented in Section 1.2. 
 
 
The structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis largely follows the research tasks raised to achieve 
the aim of the thesis. The first chapter provides the theoretical framework for 
the analysis. Firstly, it gives an overview of search theory with special emphasis 
on the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration and post-
unemployment job quality and the implications of search theory in the context 
of an economic downturn. Secondly, it presents an overview of the methods that 
can be used for the analysis of benefit effects, with an overview of duration 
analysis methods and micro-econometric methods for policy evaluation. 
Thirdly, it looks at the earlier empirical studies on the effects of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment duration and post-unemployment job quality. At the 
end of the first chapter, the hypotheses postulated in the thesis are presented. 
The second chapter presents the Estonian unemployment benefit system, as 
the estimations of benefit effects in the following chapters are based on this 
system. This chapter describes the development of the system over the years 
and gives a more detailed overview of the system as it was during the period 
studied in the thesis. It also discusses the previous studies on the provision of 
passive labour market policies in Estonia. In addition, it describes the data used 
in the analyses presented in the next chapters. 
Chapters three and four provide the estimation results for unemployment 
benefit effects on labour market outcomes. The third chapter first takes a brief 
look at the effect of unemployment benefits in the pre-crisis period, and later 
covers the same issue using the data from the crisis period. The fourth chapter 
investigates post-unemployment job quality during the crisis period through the 
effect of unemployment benefits on wages and on job duration. 
The four chapters are followed by a conclusion where the results of the 
analyses of the effects of benefit generosity on labour market outcomes are 
discussed. In addition, some suggestions about the design of the system of 
unemployment benefits in Estonia are drawn in this part of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
FOR STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF 
UNEMPLOYMENET BENEFITS 
1.1. Search theory and its extensions 
1.1.1. The impact of unemployment benefits  
on unemployment duration 
In the theoretical literature concerning the effects of unemployment benefits on 
labour market outcomes, two main aspects are considered. Firstly, the effects of 
unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, and in a broader sense on 
the unemployment rate and labour supply, are considered. This aspect is 
discussed in this subsection. The other main effect considered is the effect on 
post-unemployment job quality, which is covered in the next subsection. The 
third subsection in this section studies the theory concerning these effects in the 
context of an economic downturn. 
The simplest model in which unemployment benefits can be integrated, is 
the static labour-leisure model. In this model individuals have to decide 
between employment, or wage-earning, and unemployment, or leisure. It is 
assumed that individuals can get a job at any time at a fixed wage. The exis-
tence of unemployment benefits modifies the budget constraint by reducing 
opportunity cost of leisure. So, when benefits are subsidising leisure, unemploy-
ment becomes more attractive during the benefit period and hence prolongs the 
unemployment duration (Moffitt and Nicholson 1982). 
The most common model for observing the impact of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment duration is the search model3 (for a thorough over-
view see for example Mortensen (1986), Van den Berg (1990), Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1999), Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)). This is a dynamic model in 
contrast with the labour-leisure model, as individuals cannot enter employment 
at any time but have to search for a job. Furthermore, the wage is not fixed and 
individuals only know the distribution of wages on the market. Individuals 
maximise the present value of utility over their lifetime. During employment, 
the utility consists of wages and during unemployment it consists of leisure and 
unemployment benefit. The minimum acceptable wage, which is the reservation 
wage for an individual, depends on how high the unemployment benefits are. It 
is assumed that an individual will accept any wage offer above his or her 
reservation wage. The probability of the individual receiving a wage offer de-
pends on their search intensity, so the probability of exiting unemployment 
                                                 
3 The earliest works in job search literature are usually considered to be those by Stigler 
(1961, 1962). However, the large supply of articles that can be regarded as search literature 
was produced in the 1970’s, above all by Mortensen (e.g. 1970, 1977), Pissarides (e.g. 1976, 
1979), and Burdett (e.g. 1978, 1979), and also many others. 
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equals the probability of receiving a wage offer times the probability of 
accepting it (the model itself is presented in more detail in subsection 1.1.3). 
There are three main conclusions drawn from the search model: 
1) An increase in the amount or maximum duration of unemployment benefits 
reduces the cost of a job refusal and hence the probability of exiting un-
employment decreases, meaning that unemployment duration is lengthened 
when the generosity of unemployment benefits in terms of their amount or 
maximum duration increases. This effect is called the disincentive effect or 
the adverse incentive effect4. 
2) The entitlement effect or re-entitlement effect works in the opposite direction 
to the disincentive effect. An increase in the amount or maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits encourages those unemployed people who are 
currently not entitled to unemployment benefits to accept a job in order to 
become entitled to benefits in the future. Employment gains more value 
because of a higher expected benefit later on, and hence the exit rate into 
employment increases for those unemployed currently without benefits. 
3) The exit rate into employment increases when benefit exhaustion 
approaches. As a result, there is a spike in the exit rate into employment prior 
to the end of the benefit period5. In the beginning of benefit period, the 
probability of still finding a job before the benefit is exhausted is quite high. 
During the unemployment benefit period the probability of not finding a job 
before the end of the unemployment benefit period increases, so during the 
period, individuals increase their job search intensity, while their reservation 
wage decreases and exit rate increases. After the benefit period, the exit rate 
should stay the same, as the search intensity and the job search environment 
should remain the same. If the marginal utility of leisure is independent of 
income, the exit rate should remain as high as it was at benefit exhaustion. If 
income and leisure are complements, the exit rate should shift up and then 
remain constant at a higher level. If income and leisure are substitutes, then 
it should fall and stabilise at a lower level (Meyer (1990)). Stabilisation at a 
higher level is usually assumed. 
 
In addition to these three main conclusions, there are several extensions. For 
example Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu (2001) combine the first two con-
clusions. If there is an increase in the amount of unemployment benefits, the 
reservation wage increases for those unemployed people who are in the 
beginning of their benefit period, but decreases for those whose benefit period is 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, Chetty (2008) argues that unemployment benefits increase unemployment 
duration through a “liquidity effect” as well as “moral hazard”. He shows that when the un-
employed cannot smooth consumption perfectly, then search intensity is affected by a 
liquidity effect in addition to the disincentive effect. 
5 The spike at the end of benefit period can also be explained partly by optimised timing of 
job starting dates according to a model by Boone and van Ours (2009). This suggests that 
besides the behaviour of unemployed people, the nature of jobs also matters. 
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about to end. This means that the exit rate decreases for the first group of newly 
unemployed, and increases for the others whose benefit is almost exhausted. 
The value of current benefit increases is smaller for the second group, because 
they are almost in the same situation as the unemployed who are not entitled to 
any benefit. 
There are also many extensions to the model itself that lead to different 
conclusions. Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) are highly critical of the basic 
search model. In their opinion the search model simplifies the world too much 
and its assumptions are too limiting. As the conclusions drawn from search 
theory are quite negative they think that the conclusion would be less negative if 
the theory were closer to the real world. For example, in addition to the impact 
on workers, that on employers should also be looked at in an equilibrium job 
search model. Furthermore, unemployment benefits and an individual’s labour 
market behaviour can also affect the spouse’s labour market behaviour, and this 
should also be taken into account. They believe that the assumptions of the 
theory mean that search theory describes an unemployment allowance rather 
than unemployment insurance benefit and hence the conclusions for unemploy-
ment insurance benefit from the basic search model overstate the negative 
effects. 
In recent years, the search model has been developed and made more 
realistic by considering that the unemployed can receive unemployment in-
surance benefit as well as unemployment allowances, that unemployment 
benefit rates can change during an unemployment spell and that certain condi-
tions must be met for a person to be entitled to a benefit (for example Ortega 
and Rioux (2008), Coles and Masters (2006), Albrecht and Vroman (2005), 
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001)). Job search and matching equilibrium 
models have particularly been used for these extensions. 
An example is the model by Albrecht and Vroman (2005), which takes a 
closer look at the entitlement effect. In this model, the rate of benefit is higher 
in the beginning of the benefit period and falls after a certain moment. They 
conclude that an increase in the higher rate lowers the reservation wage for 
those unemployed who are currently receiving the higher rate. If the benefit rate 
were constant, as in the original model, the reservation wage would increase 
because the value of being unemployed would increase. With time-varying 
benefit rates, a rise in the higher rate encourages the unemployed to re-entitle 
themselves to benefits, so their reservation wage falls and exit rate increases. 
Some more recent extensions of the search model also consider monitoring 
of job search and sanctioning in the unemployment benefit system. Generally 
these models expect the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits to be 
smaller when monitoring and sanctions are used6. One of the earliest works on 
the monitoring of unemployment benefits by Tsbelis and Stephen (1994) argues 
                                                 
6 A review of some theoretical and empirical studies on monitoring and sanctions is 
provided by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006a). 
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that when benefits are monitored the size of the benefit does not incur a 
disincentive effect, but the potential duration of benefits still does. Fredriksson 
and Holmlund (2006b) show that monitoring in conjunction with sanctions 
restores search incentives more effectively than time limits on the duration of 
unemployment benefits or workfare. Furthermore, Boone, Fredriksson, Holm-
lund and van Ours (2007) find that monitoring can be an effective tool even if 
search efforts are not perfectly observable and irrespective of whether or not 
there are time limits for unemployment benefit payments. Boone and van Ours 
(2006) show that monitoring and sanctions in the unemployment benefit system 
can incur an ex ante effect from the threat of sanction and an ex post effect from 
a sanction that took place, and that both these effects increase the transition 
from unemployment to employment. However, van den Berg and van der 
Klaauw (2006) conclude from their model that monitoring might cause a shift 
from informal to formal job search and so monitoring might have no effect on 
the transition rate to employment. 
To summarise the main effects of the system of unemployment benefits on 
unemployment duration according to search theory literature, the generosity of 
the system of unemployment benefits in terms of the level and potential length 
of benefits is expected to prolong unemployment duration for unemployment 
benefit recipients. However, this effect can be somewhat offset by other features 
of the unemployment benefit system such as monitoring of the job search and 
sanctions for insufficient efforts, which are basically the eligibility criteria for 
unemployment benefits. In addition, the system of unemployment benefits 
might encourage people without benefits to enter employment in order to 
become eligible for benefits in the future, so for them the prospect of potential 
unemployment benefits might shorten the spell of unemployment.  
 
 
1.1.2. The impact of unemployment benefits  
on post-unemployment job quality 
Search theory predicts that an increase in the amount or in the maximum 
duration of unemployment benefit reduces the probability of an individual 
leaving unemployment into employment through the disincentive effect. In 
addition, extensions to the theory that assume a finite unemployment benefit 
receipt period expect that the hazard of leaving unemployment rises when the 
end of the potential benefit period approaches. So in general, the conclusions 
drawn from search theory concerning unemployment benefits are rather nega-
tive as more generous benefits are assumed to increase unemployment duration. 
However, a positive impact can be found on post-unemployment job quality.  
In contrast to the static labour-leisure model where it is not possible to say 
anything about how well jobs are matched (Addison and Blackburn (2000)), the 
dynamic job search model implies that benefits could increase post-unemploy-
ment job quality. Unemployment benefit lowers the opportunity cost of job 
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search and thus relaxes the restrictions on searching. An unemployed risk-
averse person can lengthen their job search to find a better matched job, in-
creasing their utility in the long-run. This implies that unemployment benefits 
might support the job search rather than motivating people to remain 
unemployed (Burdett (1979)). A better matched job can mean a higher wage, a 
longer job duration and a better match for the person’s skills. Marimon and 
Zilibotti (1999) show in an equilibrium search-matching model that unemploy-
ment benefits help the unemployed to find jobs that match their skills better and 
that their employment is longer lasting because of this. In their model, 
unemployment benefits encourage the unemployed to wait for jobs that suit 
them better. Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) show in their model that unemploy-
ment benefits encourage risk-averse people to search for higher productivity 
jobs and firms to create these jobs, meaning that productivity gains arise from 
more generous unemployment benefit systems. In an economy without 
unemployment benefits, workers apply for low productivity jobs that are easier 
to get in order to avoid the risk of becoming unemployed. In this case, the com-
position of jobs in the economy that results would be inefficient. The beneficial 
effect of unemployment benefits on labour productivity and welfare through the 
change in the composition of jobs is also shown by Acemoglu (2001). 
Empirically, the relationships between unemployment benefits and job 
quality can be more complex to test. With regards to employment duration it 
could be expected that unemployment benefits lead to more productive and 
better matches and that better matches last longer. However, because of un-
employment benefits, job seekers may also take jobs that incur a higher risk of 
job instability, meaning potentially bad matches that lead to shorter employment 
duration (Centeno and Novo (2006)). In addition, the relationship between 
unemployment benefits and post-unemployment job duration can be affected by 
adverse selection arising from unobserved individual characteristics which 
might produce spurious estimation results showing negative correlation between 
unemployment duration and post-unemployment job duration (Belzil (2001)). 
Similarly, the problem of adverse selection could also affect estimations of the 
relationships between unemployment benefits and the post-unemployment 
wage. 
The post-unemployment wage should be raised higher by unemployment 
benefits as job seekers can search for work for longer and have more resources 
with which to search, meaning they can make more search effort. However, 
although the reservation wage declines during the benefit period because of 
approaching benefit exhaustion, it can also decline because of the expectation 
that the offer wage distribution might deteriorate over time (van den Berg 
(1990)) and hence post-unemployment wages should be ceteris paribus in nega-
tive correlation with the actual duration of unemployment (Fitzenberger and 
Wilke (2007)). A deterioration in the offer wage distribution and the arrival rate 
of offers can be expected because of stigmatisation and human capital depre-
ciation effects (Addison and Blackburn (2000)). Thus it can be concluded that 
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the impact of unemployment benefits on the post-unemployment wage also 
depends on how quickly the offer wage distribution deteriorates. 
To summarise the potential effects of the system of unemployment benefits 
on post-unemployment job quality, a more generous level and potential period 
of benefits should help the unemployed to find and accept jobs that are of 
higher quality for them, with a rise in the quality of matches between jobs and 
workers. However, the eligibility criteria in the system of unemployment 
benefits might lower post-unemployment job quality, especially if these criteria 
are too harsh. Sanctions in the benefit system usually mean a cut in the benefit 
level for some period, a suspension of benefits for a certain period or a pre-
mature termination of benefit payments. In this way sanctions directly influence 
income during unemployment, lower the reservation wage and restrict the 
function of benefits as subsidies for job search, so the unemployed might leave 
unemployment quicker, but at the cost of accepting job offers with lower 
matching quality. 
The effects of unemployment benefits on labour market outcomes for un-
employment benefit recipients are summarised in Figure 3. The system of un-
employment benefits comprises in the figure all the possible features of 
unemployment benefits, such as the level of benefits, the potential duration of 
benefits and the eligibility criteria for benefits. A more generous unemployment 
benefit system would mean that it is easier to become eligible for benefits, if for 
example there are milder criteria for previous employment duration or milder 
criteria for the reason of termination of previous employment contract, but 
would also mean that it is easier to stay on benefits if there is a lower level of 
job search monitoring and sanctioning, and lower level of activation. A more 
generous system also means shorter waiting periods, higher unemployment 
benefit levels and longer potential benefit periods, so the higher the coverage 
rate of the unemployed with unemployment benefits and the higher the amounts 
of benefits paid, the more generous the system is. 
More generous unemployment benefits are expected to decrease job search 
activity during the benefit period. To some extent this may be offset by job 
search monitoring, but overall the job search activity is still expected to be 
somewhat lower if there are unemployment benefits. Lower job search activity 
also means lower job offer arrival rates and longer unemployment duration. 
At the same time, unemployment benefits are expected to increase the 
reservation wage so that the acceptance probability of job offers decreases and 
the unemployment duration increases. This effect may also be lessened 
somewhat by the eligibility criteria in the unemployment benefit system, as the 
criteria for a suitable job offer can be fixed in the regulations so that a rejection 
of certain job offers would incur a benefit sanction. Suitable job offers can be 
described for example by wage level, geographical distance or occupational 
difference. However, while the rejection of job offers and unemployment 
duration can be lowered in this way, these regulations might also decrease post-
unemployment job quality. 
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Figure 3. The main effects of the system of unemployment benefits on labour market 
outcomes  
Source: author’s figure 
 
 
A higher reservation wage means basically that the unemployed can be more 
selective with regards to job offers and accept only those offers that they 
consider to suit them better, for example by matching their skills better or 
incurring higher productivity and wages. Finding a suitable job offer might take 
more time and prolong the unemployment spell, but at the end of the day 
productivity gains might arise in the economy. Limiting unemployment benefits 
and defining “a suitable job offer” in the regulations for unemployment benefits 
restricts the option of selecting job offers and decreases post-unemployment job 
quality. 
The effect of the higher reservation wage is very similar to the way that 
unemployment benefits can operate as a job search subsidy. As unemployment 
benefits provide income during the job search, the opportunity cost of the job 
search decreases. This basically means that it costs less for the unemployed to 
reject a less well-matched job and continue the search for a better match. 
Unemployment benefits give more time for the unemployed to find a better 
matched job, so they can help the unemployed to find the right job and increase 
their post-unemployment job quality. 
In addition, it can be argued that as unemployment benefits increase income 
during unemployment, it is possible for an unemployed person to allocate more 
resources to the job search. With no income during unemployment, some job 
search channels might not be available to the unemployed and job search 
activity might not be as productive. More funds allocated to job search lead to 
higher job offer arrival rates and if the job search channels are better targeted, 
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more suitable job offers might arrive. In this way unemployment benefits might 
also lead to higher post-unemployment quality and even shorten the un-
employment spell.  
 
 
1.1.3. The search model and the economic downturn 
The basic search model7 is a stationary model that describes the behaviour of 
unemployed people in a dynamic setting. In this model, job offers follow a 
Poisson process and arrive at rate ߛ. These job offers are drawn randomly from 
a wage offer distribution with the distribution function F(w). When a job offer 
arrives, the unemployed person has to decide whether to reject this offer and 
continue the job search or to accept the offer. In the basic model the accepted 
full-time jobs keep the same wage forever. It is assumed in the model that 
unemployed people know the job arrival rate and the wage offer distributions, 
but they do not know in advance when exactly the next job offer will arrive and 
what its wage level will be. In the initial stationary model, unemployed people 
receive unemployment benefits b during the whole period of unemployment 
(van den Berg (1990) and (2001)). 
An unemployed person maximises the expected present value of income 
over an infinite horizon, taking into account the subjective rate of discount ߜ. So 
in the stationary framework there are three constant exogenous variables 
(ߛ, ܨ(ݓ), ܾ) and one constant parameter (ߜ), which are independent of un-
employment duration or any events taking place during the unemployment 
spell. Due to stationarity and infinite horizon assumptions, the expected present 
value of search when the optimal search strategy R is followed does not depend 
on elapsed unemployment duration t. Hence the optimal strategy is constant 
during the unemployment period and there is a unique solution to the Bellman 
equation for R (van den Berg (2001)): 
1) ߜܴ = ܾ +  ߛܧ௪݉ܽݔ ቄ0,
௪
ఋ −  ܴቅ. 
Consequently, a received job offer is accepted if the wage associated with it 
exceeds ߜܴ (i.e. ߜܴ < ݓ), so the optimal strategy can be described as 
reservation wage ݓ∗= ߜܴ. A job offer is accepted if the wage exceeds the 
reservation wage, where the reservation wage is stated as follows (van den Berg 
(1990)): 
2) ݓ∗ = ܾ +  ஓஔ ׬ (ݓ − ݓ
∗)݀ܨ(ݓ).ஶ௪∗  
                                                 
7 The search model is extensively discussed by Mortensen (1986), nonstationarity by van 
den Berg (1990), and the search model with matching by Rogerson, Shimer and Wright 
(2005). 
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The hazard rate for exiting unemployment into employment λ equals then the 
probability of a person receiving a job offer times the probability of them 
accepting it (van den Berg (2001)): 
3) λ =  ߛFത(w∗), 
where ܨത(w∗) = 1 − ܨ(w∗). 
 
In this model a crisis in the labour market would mean above all a very low 
arrival rate ߛ. Mortensen (1986) shows that an increase in the job arrival rate 
increases the reservation wage but the sign and magnitude of the effect on the 
hazard of leaving unemployment and on unemployment duration are ambigu-
ous. The direct effect of a higher job arrival rate on the hazard rate is positive as 
follows directly from equation 3. However, as the reservation wage also 
becomes higher, an unemployed person becomes more selective when faced 
with more job offers and there is a negative indirect effect on the hazard of 
leaving unemployment. This means that in a crisis, the lower job arrival rate 
lowers the reservation wage, but the effect on the escape rate from unemploy-
ment is again ambiguous. The net effect of a higher or lower job arrival rate is 
the sum of the positive or negative direct effect and the negative or positive 
indirect effect (Mortensen 1986): 
4) ப஛பஓ = Fത(w
∗) − γFᇱ(w∗) ப୵
∗
பஓ , 
where డ௪
∗
డఊ = ׬ ሾݓ − ݓ
∗ሿ݀ܨ(ݓ)ஶ௪∗ /ሾδ − λሿ > 0. 
 
Though it is intuitive that a higher job arrival rate would mean shorter 
unemployment duration and vice versa, the conditions that would permit this in 
the search model are not too obvious. Sufficient conditions for wage offer 
distributions are developed in, for example, Burdett and Ondrich (1985) and 
even more generally with a larger set of possible distributions in van den Berg 
(1994). 
However, a more realistic approach to a crisis means that variables also 
change in time, above all the arrival rate of job offers, and so nonstationarity is 
needed to introduce changes in exogenous variables. In addition, a non-
stationary search model can take into account that unemployment benefits 
usually depend on the length of unemployment duration, that policy changes 
can occur to change the length or size of the benefit, or that the job arrival rate 
and the wage offer distribution can deteriorate over the unemployment spell. 
Hence the optimal strategy is not generally constant over time in a non-
stationary model. The reservation wage and hazard functions in nonstationarity 
without anticipation effects become (van den Berg (2001)): 
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5) ݓ∗(ݐ) = ܾ(ݐ) +  ఊ(௧)ఋ(௧) ׬ ൫ݓ − ݓ
∗(ݐ)൯݀ܨ(ݓ|ݐ),ஶ௪∗(௧)  
where ܨ(ݓ|ݐ) is wage offer distribution at time t. 
 
6) ߣ(ݐ) =  ߛ(ݐ)ܨത(ݓ∗(ݐ)|ݐ), 
where ܨത(ݓ|ݐ) = 1 − ܨ(ݓ|ݐ). 
 
In relation to the economic situation, the equations 5 and 6 describe a situation 
where a sudden macroeconomic shock takes place. A change in the labour 
market, particularly a change in the job arrival rate but also one in the wage 
offer distribution, is not anticipated by the unemployed people, but it is not 
always realistic to assume no anticipation effects. For example, when un-
employment is rising and the job arrival rate is declining, people might rather 
anticipate that there will also be a declining job arrival rate in the future. The 
nonstationary search model with anticipation is extensively discussed by Van 
den Berg (1990). This model assumes that unemployed people have perfect 
foresight and hence anticipate correctly changes in the values of ߛ, ܨ(ݓ) and ܾ 
in time8. In this case, there is a unique continuous solution to the Bellman 
equation for the expected present value of search when the optimal search 
strategy is followed when unemployment duration equals t: 
7) ߜܴ(ݐ) = ௗோ(௧)ௗ௧ + ܾ(ݐ) +  ߛ(ݐ)ܧ௪|௧݉ܽݔ ቄ0,
௪
ఋ −  ܴ(ݐ)ቅ. 
Characterising the optimal strategy through reservation wage function  
(as ݓ∗= ߜܴ): 
8) ௗ௪
∗(௧)
ௗ௧ = ߜݓ
∗(ݐ) − ߜܾ(ݐ) − ߛ(ݐ) ׬ ൫ݓ − ݓ∗(ݐ)൯݀ܨ(ݓ|ݐ)ஶ௪∗(௧) . 
 
The hazard of leaving unemployment in nonstationarity with anticipation: 
9) ߣ(ݐ) =  ߛ(ݐ)ܨത(ݓ∗(ݐ)|ݐ). 
Van den Berg (1990) shows that in this model an anticipated decline in b, ߛ or 
the mean or variance of F will make the value of search in the present smaller 
than without the anticipated decline. This means that the reservation wage 
decreases as the anticipated declines in the exogenous variables come closer. 
Hence when the start or the deepening of a crisis and a decline in the job arrival 
rate are anticipated, the reservation wage decreases. The same effect takes place 
when a decrease in the wage rate on the market is expected to occur. 
Van den Berg (1990) provides sufficient conditions in terms of the exoge-
nous variables to show that any anticipated shift in the exogenous variables in 
                                                 
8 It can be argued that is approach is not very realistic either as there is always some 
uncertainty in the economic environment and unanticipated changes can occur. 
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time that increases the expected discounted lifetime income makes unemployed 
people more selective about job offers. It can be shown that the reverse effect 
applies if there is a downward shift and that before the anticipated downward 
shift in the job arrival rate, the reservation wage starts declining as people 
become less selective. When the job arrival rate reaches its lower level and it is 
anticipated that the rate will stay constant, the reservation wage also stays 
constant at a lower level, if other exogenous variables stay constant. 
Though most of the search literature concentrates on the individual search 
problem and job offer acceptance decision, it is also possible to model the 
generation of the job arrival rate. The versions of the search model presented so 
far in this subsection deal with the job arrival rate as an exogenous variable. 
However, it is possible to handle the job arrival rate as an endogenous variable 
as it depends on job search intensity, or how much time and effort an un-
employed person puts into job search. The earlier works incorporating job 
search intensity usually also incorporate on-the-job search (for example 
Mortensen (1977), Mortensen (1986)). 
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) include search intensity in the model without 
on-the-job search. The job offer arrival rate is an increasing function of job 
search effort e as a greater effort should incur more offers, though the marginal 
returns of search tend to shrink. A parameter  a describes the labour market 
situation and the individual’s characteristics such as sex and age independent of 
the job search. The job offer arrival rate depends on search intensity as follows: 
10) ߛ = ߙ ߛ(݁). 
The cost of job search c is an increasing function of job search effort with 
decreasing marginal cost. If the rate of job losses (q) is also included in the 
model, the reservation wage is (Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)): 
11) ݓ∗ = ܾ − ܿ(݁) +  ஑ஓ(ୣ)ஔା୯ ׬ (ݓ − ݓ
∗)݀ܨ(ݓ)ஶ௪∗ . 
The optimal effort described through reservation wage is: 
12) ݓ∗ = ܾ +  ஓ(ୣ)ஓᇱ(ୣ) ܿ
ᇱ(݁) − ܿ(݁). 
It can be shown that a better economic environment not only increases the 
reservation wage, but also increases the effort put into the job search. When the 
labour market is doing worse, an unemployed person decreases their reservation 
wage and lowers their job search intensity. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) also 
show that a decrease in the unemployment benefit increases the job search 
effort while lowering the reservation wage. However, a simultaneous decrease 
in unemployment benefit and worsening of the economic situation have an 
ambiguous effect on the optimal job search intensity. 
Other popular ways of looking at the job arrival rate or wage distribution as 
endogenous include using equilibrium search or matching models (for example 
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Coles (2001), Burdett and Coles (2003)), or 
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what is known as the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model (for example 
Pissarides (1985), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides (2000), see a 
thorough discussion of the literature in Albrecht (2011)). These approaches also 
consider the labour demand side in the model. The problem with these models 
is that they are not very consistent with observed time series on labour markets 
in regard to economic cycles, but only explain the economy in a steady state 
(see for example Shimer (2004), Shimer (2005), Mortensen and Nagypál 
(2007), Pissarides (2009) for the discussion). 
According to Shimer (2004), generally in these models the unemployed 
person bases their decision on the job search intensity on: 1) the marginal 
increase in the probability of getting a job due to higher search intensity; 2) the 
increase in the expected present value of the income from becoming employed; 
and 3) the marginal cost of search effort. When the economy is doing worse, the 
marginal benefit of search intensity might fall because both the likelihood of 
becoming employed with the current job search intensity and the expected 
present value of income from a job are likely to decrease. Aggregate labour 
market data should reflect lower job search intensity in a decrease in labour 
market participation, an increase in people who would like to work but are 
discouraged and not actively seeking a job, or just a decrease in the search 
intensity of the unemployed still actively seeking a job. Shimer (2004) argues 
that this is not the case in the empirical data as unemployment does not decline 
when the economy slows down. Shimer (2005) argues that the inconsistency 
between the model and the data arises from the commonly used Nash 
bargaining assumption for wage determination. Pissarides (2009) looks for solu-
tions to the inconsistency in mechanisms other than wage stickiness, such as 
cyclical job separations, fixed job creation and negotiation costs, asymmetric 
information about idiosyncratic shocks, on-the-job search and non-uniform 
productivity shocks. 
In job search literature, the effects on unemployment duration stemming 
both from unemployment benefits and from the economic environment are 
discussed quite thoroughly. Although the total effect of the economic situation 
is ambiguous, benefits are expected to increase unemployment duration regard-
less of the job search environment, as more generous benefits increase the 
reservation wage and lower the job search intensity. However, in recent years 
the question of variance in the benefit disincentive effect over the business 
cycle, or the interaction between unemployment benefits and the economic 
situation, has also been addressed. Krueger and Meyer (2002) note that it is 
likely that the disincentive effect is different in different economic environ-
ments, as there might be less of an efficiency loss from reduced job search 
effort during an economic slowdown. Jurajda and Tannery (2003) argue that the 
disincentive effect is stronger in boom periods as the effect on job search 
strategies is probably stronger when the productivity of the search is higher. In 
addition, the unemployed might be more hesitant to reject job offers during a 
recession in the fear that they will not find a job before their benefits cease. In a 
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slightly less recent paper Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) develop a general 
equilibrium search model in which their calibrations show that unemployment 
benefits have more distortionary effects in more turbulent times, with the main 
driver for this being the instantaneous loss of skills caused by layoffs. 
The effect of the business cycle on the disincentive effect is more formally 
dealt with in the literature of optimal unemployment insurance. Kroft and Noto-
widigdo (2011) show in their model that there are two opposite effects shaping 
the cyclicality of unemployment duration elasticity. Firstly, the job offer arrival 
rate or labour demand is less responsive to an increase in the labour supply or 
search effort during an economic slowdown, reducing duration elasticity. This 
basically means that during times when there are low levels of available 
vacancies, the unemployed themselves cannot much affect the job finding 
probability and hence the distortionary effects of benefits on the search effort 
are lower. However, during a recession, the unemployed place higher value on 
an increase in the benefit level as they expect to receive benefits for a longer 
period and so duration elasticity increases. From this, Kroft and Notowidigdo 
suggest that the cyclicality of the disincentive effect is theoretically ambiguous. 
Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2010) consider both micro-elasticity, stemming 
from a change in an individual’s unemployment benefits, and macro-elasticity, 
the elasticity of aggregate unemployment due to changes in unemployment 
benefits, which also accounts for the equilibrium adjustment in labour market 
tightness. They suggest that micro-elasticity is acyclical and stays constant 
during recessions and booms, while macro-elasticity decreases during periods 
of high unemployment9. 
In conclusion, the behaviour of the unemployed during a recession is ambi-
guous within search theory. As the job arrival rate declines, there are fewer 
opportunities for exiting unemployment. At the same time, the unemployed 
decrease their reservation wage and become less selective about the job offers 
received, and this benefits the exit from unemployment. As unemployment 
benefits generally decrease during the unemployment spell, the unemployed 
increase their job search intensity to receive more offers, but the deteriorating 
economic environment has a restrictive effect on job search intensity and the 
total effect on behaviour remains ambiguous. In addition, even unemployment 
benefits can have cyclically different, though theoretically ambiguous, effects 
on unemployment duration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 As a consequence Landais et al. suggest that unemployment benefit generosity should be 
countercyclical and more generous during recessions, as do several others such as Kiley 
(2003) and Sanches (2008). 
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1.2. Methods for studying the effects of 
unemployment benefits  
1.2.1. Duration analysis  
With regards to studying the effects of unemployment benefits on unemploy-
ment duration, almost all the available studies use some models of duration 
analysis, the most popular being Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, the Cox 
model and the piecewise-constant proportional hazard model. In addition, 
duration models can be very similarly used for analysing post-unemployment 
employment duration. This subsection discusses how duration analysis can be 
used for studying unemployment duration. 
Stemming from the search model, the focus in duration analysis is on the exit 
rate for people leaving unemployment into employment, or the hazard rate 
framework (this framework is discussed extensively by, for example, Lancaster 
(1992), van den Berg (2001), Wooldridge (2002)10). The hazard rate is defined 
as the probability of leaving unemployment at time t on the condition that the 
individual has not left unemployment before time t: 
13) λ(ݐ) =  lim∆௧→଴
୔୰ (୲ஸ୘ழ௧ା୼௧|்ஹ௧)
୼௧ . 
The stochastic variable T is the duration of unemployment, realisation of which 
is denoted by t. The hazard function ߣ(t) is duration dependent if its value varies 
over t. If ߣ(t) is increasing, there is positive duration dependence, if it is 
decreasing, then there is negative duration dependence. Positive duration 
dependence means that the probability of exiting unemployment increases the 
longer a person has been unemployed. 
The cumulative distribution function of T is denoted by F, meaning that F(t) 
= Pr(T ≤ t), where F(0) = 0. Subtracting the cumulative distribution function 
from one gives the survivor function of T: 
14)  ܨത(t) = 1 – F(t). 
The survivor function gives the probability of staying unemployed past time t. 
The probability density function of T is denoted by f. The hazard function can 
also be defined from the survivor function and the probability density function: 
15) λ(ݐ) =  ௙(௧)ଵିி(௧) =
௙(௧)
ிത(௧) . 
The duration of unemployment and the hazard rate are usually expected to 
depend on some set of covariates. When estimating the impact of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits, the model has also to contain some variable describing 
the benefit, such as the amount of benefits, the replacement rate of benefits, or 
                                                 
10 The methodology provided by Wooldridge (2002) is followed particularly in this 
subsection. 
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the net replacement rate of benefits. In addition, the hazard rate is usually also 
assumed to depend on some characteristics of the individual and characteristics 
of the job search environment. The more commonly used covariates describing 
individual characteristics are age, gender, citizenship, education, membership of 
a minority group, marital status, younger or older children, work experience or 
tenure, previous wage, region, previous occupation and field of activity. Some 
studies have also tried to capture the effect of income other than the unemploy-
ment insurance benefit, such as income from capital, income of spouse, or 
ownership of real estate. In addition, earlier labour market behaviour can 
sometimes be included – whether the previous job was temporary or not, 
whether an individual was recently registered as unemployed, the reason for 
leaving the previous job, whether the previous job was full-time or not, or 
whether an individual is a member of a trade union or not. As the labour market 
behaviour of men and women can differ considerably in some countries, some 
studies have modelled the hazard rate separately by gender (for example 
Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu (2001)). For the same reason, some studies have 
looked at only males’ labour market behaviour (for example Bover, Arellano 
and Bentolila (2002), Narendranathan and Stewart (1993)). 
Covariates capturing the job search environment may be business cycle 
indicators, the unemployment rate of a region or the rate of vacancies of a 
region. It is also common to add dummy variables for the periods of entering 
unemployment to capture seasonal differences in duration distribution. Several 
studies have tried to take into account the calendar effects (for example Røed, 
Jensen, Thoursie (2008), Røed and Zhang (2003)). 
Adding the time-invariant covariates’ vector x in the model, the conditional 
hazard function is: 
16) λ(t; x) =  lim∆୲→଴
୔୰ (୲ஸ୘ழ௧ା௱௧|୘ஹ୲,୶)
୼୲ . 
An important group of models that model hazard rate conditional on time-
invariant covariates is the class of proportional hazard models (Wooldridge 
(2002)): 
17) λ(ݐ; ݔ) =  ݇(ݔ)λ଴(t), 
where ݇(ݔ) is a non-negative function of covariates and ߣ଴(ݐ) > 0 is the 
baseline hazard. The baseline hazard is assumed to be the same for all the 
individuals in the population. The individual hazard differs proportionately and 
is described by covariates included in the function ݇(ݔ). The most common 
method is to use the exponential function, ݇(ݔ) = ݁ݔ݌ (ݔߚ): 
18) log λ(t; x) = xβ + log λ଴(t), 
where ߚ is a vector of parameters to be estimated (Wooldridge (2002)). For 
estimating the impact of unemployment insurance benefits, the model with only 
10
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time-invariant covariates is usually not sufficient. The model that is usually 
called a proportional hazard with time-varying covariates does not help either: 
19) λ൫t; x(t)൯ =  k൫x(t)൯λ଴(t). 
In this model the covariates vary over time as some function of time, but this is 
usually not the case with unemployment insurance benefits. One way to get 
around this problem is to use the data as grouped data. Sometimes, when the 
unemployment spells are measured in weeks or months, is the data are in 
essence already grouped into discrete intervals. Grouped data can be analysed as 
sequential summarised information on whether an individual stays unemployed 
or exits to employment in every interval as a binary outcome. This dataset can 
be looked at as panel data where cross-section observations include a vector of 
binary outcomes on exiting and the explaining covariates. A model that is 
popular because of its flexibility and that is applied on grouped data and can 
incorporate time-varying covariates is a piecewise-constant proportional hazard 
model (Wooldridge (2002)): 
20) λ(ݐ; ݔ௠, ߩ) =  ݇(ݔ௠, ߚ)λ୫, 
ܽ௠ିଵ ≤ t <  ܽ௠, 
where m indicates interval (m = 1,...,M) as time has been split into intervals 
[0, ܽଵ), [ܽଵ, ܽଶ)… [ܽெିଵ, ܽெ), [ܽெ, ∞), where ܽ௠ are known constants and in 
the last interval all the observations are censored11 at ܽெ, with none of the 
durations longer than ܽெ. ߩ is a vector of unknown parameters in the hazard 
function. ݇(ݔ௠, ߚ) > 0 is usually again an exponential function. In the 
piecewise-constant proportional hazard model, the hazard rate for exiting 
unemployment can be different in each interval, but it is assumed to be constant 
during an interval. The time-varying covariates can also be different for each 
interval, but constant during an interval. The parameters to be estimated in this 
model are ߚ and ߣ௠ where vector ߣ௠ is the baseline hazard in intervals,  
m = 1,…, M. 
When covariates are not included in the piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard model then the maximum likelihood estimation of ߣ௠ leads to the 
Kaplan-Meier estimator12. The Kaplan-Meier method is a popular non-
parametric approach. If ݊௠ is a number of observations with duration of at least 
௠ܶ (a risk set), ℎ௠ is a number of observations with duration of exactly ௠ܶ and 
there are no censored observations before ݊௠, then the estimation of hazard rate 
is (Wooldridge (2002)): 
                                                 
11 In unemployment duration analysis, the data are usually subject to right censoring – it is 
known when an unemployment spell started, but it might still be continuing at the point of 
data collection. 
12 Developed by Kaplan and Meier (1958). 
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21) λ෠( ௠ܶ) =  
௛೘
௡೘
. 
One other method for estimating ߚ in the proportional hazard model is to use 
the Cox partial likelihood method (Cox 1972). The Cox model is a semi-
parametric method that estimates ߚ, but leaves the baseline hazard ߣ଴(ݐ) 
unspecified. Appealing points of the Cox method are that the parameters of 
covariates can be estimated very generally and that it is possible to include 
time-varying covariates in the model. This method can be applied above all on 
ungrouped flow data. 
In addition, there are models that can be elaborated for multiple-spell data 
(see for example van den Berg (2001)). In this case the data have to cover a 
longer period so that several unemployment spells per person occur. There are 
also models that can incorporate more than only one outcome, with exit to 
inactivity as well as exit to employment for example, so this model, called the 
competing risks model, allows exit from the initial state to several different 
alternative states (see for example Han and Hausman (1990)). 
With regards to duration analysis in this dissertation, the hazard rate for 
leaving unemployment into employment is looked at with both non-parametric 
and parametric methods. The Kaplan-Meier non-parametric method is used and 
piecewise-constant proportional hazard models are estimated. The piecewise-
constant proportional hazard model is chosen due to its flexibility and ability to 
take into account time-varying variables such as unemployment benefits and the 
labour market situation. For the same reasons, these models are also used for 
estimating post-unemployment employment duration, among other methods. 
A relevant issue in duration analysis is the possibility of unobserved 
heterogeneity or frailty occurring in the model. Introducing unobservable 
heterogeneity in the model helps a more general model to be obtained. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is introduced in the hazard function as an 
unobservable multiplicative effect. When unobserved heterogeneity is included, 
the piecewise-constant proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates 
(equation 20) becomes (Wooldridge (2002)): 
22)  λ(ݐ; ϑ, ݔ௠, ߩ) =  ϑ݇(ݔ௠, ߚ)λ୫, 
ܽ௠ିଵ ≤ t <  ܽ௠, 
where unobserved heterogeneity ߴ is a random positive quantity. For the 
purposes of model identifiability, ߴ is often assumed to have mean 1 and 
variance ߠ. When a chosen distribution function of unobservable heterogeneity 
corresponds to these assumptions, then the hazard function with unobservable 
heterogeneity reduces to a hazard function without unobservable heterogeneity 
when ߠ approaches 0 (Gutierrez (2002)). In this thesis individual specific 
unobservable heterogeneity is also added to estimate a more general model 
when piecewise-constant proportional hazard models are applied. 
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The method for measuring the unemployment spell has proven to be very 
important for the estimation of a spike at benefit exhaustion. There are three 
different methods for measuring the unemployment spell – period of unemploy-
ment benefit, period of registered unemployment and period of not being 
employed (Card et al. (2007)). If the data only concern the unemployment 
insurance benefit period, it is not possible to estimate the exit rate at the end of 
benefit period, because the exit rate is then 100% anyway. If the data concern 
the period of registered unemployment, they might not tell the whole truth 
either because people might de-register themselves when the benefit period is 
over, although nothing changes in their status as unemployed. If the unemploy-
ment benefit period and registered unemployment spell are used, there are 
usually precise administrative data available, but for the whole benefit period 
there are usually only survey data. Studies using survey data often find a spike 
at benefit exhaustion, while studies using administrative data do not (Card et al. 
(2007)). But even if survey data are used, the results may be affected by how 
the period of unemployment is defined – for example whether the ILO 
definition is followed13 or it is considered enough that individuals themselves 
consider that they are unemployed (Atkinson, Micklewright, (1991)). In the 
studies presented in this dissertation, the data used are better in this respect. 
Although they are administrative data, it is possible to detect the whole un-
employment spell from them (the issues of data in this dissertation are discussed 
more thoroughly in Section 2.3). 
The results are also different if the exit rate alone is studied or if a distinction 
is made between whether the exit is to employment or somewhere else such as 
to retirement or to studies. With the data used in the studies in this dissertation, 
it is clearly visible whether the exit is really to employment. What kind of 
employment the exit is into might be also important, whether it is temporary or 
not, full-time or part-time, self-employment or another form. Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1991) distinguish for example between “regular jobs” and 
“marginal jobs”. A “regular job” ought to be full-time, have the expectation of 
continued employment, be covered by statutory employment protection and be 
part of the legal economy. A “marginal job” fails to meet at least one of these 
criteria. The need to look separately at “regular jobs” and “marginal jobs” 
comes about because the labour market behaviour associated with these types of 
employment is likely be different later on. 
Portugal and Addison (2008) distinguish between as many as six different 
destinations of exit. In addition to inactivity they identify five different types of 
employment – open-ended employment, fixed-term contracts, part-time work, 
government-provided jobs and self-employment. Using Portuguese data they 
find that different groups behave differently when looking for a job. For 
                                                 
13 The most frequently used definition of unemployment in international statistics. A person 
is considered to be unemployed according to this methodology if the person is not employed, 
is actively seeking work and is ready to begin working. 
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example, the unemployed who leave to a part-time job exhibit a very high 
disincentive effect when compared to those who exit to public employment. 
Part-time employment is often used as a last resort. They argue that unemploy-
ment benefits do not provide support in finding stable employment. 
Differences in the results of studies of the impact of unemployment benefits 
can also stem from the fact that several analyses use data from a political reform 
that has changed the amount or potential duration of unemployment insurance 
benefit for certain groups of unemployed (for example van Ours and Vodo-
pivec, (2006) and (2008)). Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller (2006) argue that 
very often the results of studying a reform are not reliable because reforms tend 
to take place when a worsening of the labour market is expected and a political 
bias can change the results significantly. In the studies covered in this disser-
tation, there was no reform of the Estonian unemployment insurance benefit 
system during the period of the study and hence political bias cannot occur in 
the estimations. 
As employers in some countries tend to exploit the unemployment insurance 
system for temporary lay-offs, it might also be necessary to look separately at 
exits to the same employer. A person who is hoping to be re-employed by the 
same employer after a period may not be searching for a job very intensively 
and this would also be reflected in the results. Re-employment by the same 
employer has represented quite a large share of exits to employment in the USA 
(Katz (1986)) and Canada (Belzil (2001)), and also in some European countries 
like Austria (Card et al. (2007)), Sweden (Jansson, (2002)) and Denmark 
(Jensen and Nielsen, (2003)). It is not very likely that the unemployment in-
surance benefit system in Estonia is used for temporary lay-offs, at least not for 
seasonal lay-offs. In order to be entitled to unemployment insurance benefit, a 
person has to have been employed for at least 12 months during the previous 36 
months and when unemployment insurance benefit is once granted, the person 
has to start accumulating the necessary 12 contributions anew (a more thorough 
overview of the Estonian unemployment benefit system is presented in 
Subsection 2.1.3). This means that using the unemployment insurance benefit 
system for seasonal lay-offs requires careful planning by the employer over a 
period of two or three years and even then the employee might be left in some 
periods without any income.  
An important feature of Eastern European countries is a relatively larger 
share of the shadow economy (Schneider and Buehn (2009), Putninš and Sauka 
(2011)). People might start working without a formal contract during the benefit 
period and make their employment legal only when benefits lapse. In this case 
the data would show a spike at benefit exhaustion that is actually not there 
(Vodopivec, (1995)). Although the share of the shadow economy in Estonia is 
likely to be smaller than at the beginning of the transition period, it might still 
have an impact on the results. 
Another feature particularly common to Estonia is that many people work 
abroad in Finland while still remaining residents of Estonia. However, this is 
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not likely to cause a spike at the end of the benefit period. It is not very likely 
that large numbers of the unemployed accept a job offer abroad during the 
unemployment benefit period and at the end of benefit period quit this job and 
accept a job offer in Estonia, though this behaviour could indeed cause a spike 
in the exit rate out of unemployment in the end of the benefit period if Estonian 
tax data is used for the analysis. If an unemployed person accepts a job offer 
abroad and keeps it for some time, their exit to employment is simply not 
visible in the Estonian tax data regardless of whether they manage to remain 
registered as unemployed in Estonia. 
 
 
1.2.2. Micro-econometric methods of policy evaluation 
Besides the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, the 
effect of benefits on post-unemployment labour market outcomes is also 
analysed in this thesis. This effect can be studied using the tools designed for 
policy evaluation. Various empirical strategies can be used to evaluate a policy, 
such as passive or active labour market measures. Depending on the context and 
the available data, the literature offers a broad range of evaluation strategies. 
Useful overviews of different methods are provided by, for example, Blundell 
and Costa Dias (2009), Angrist and Pischke (2009), Imbens and Wooldridge 
(2008), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a, 2007b), Caliendo (2006), Smith (2004) 
and Angrist and Krueger (1999). This thesis analyses the effects of unemploy-
ment benefits and so this subsection focuses on those methods that can be 
applied particularly in the analysis of passive labour market policies. 
The focal issue of policy evaluation is whether the treatment of a policy 
affects a person in the outcome variable being studied. The outcome variables 
for labour market programmes usually concern employment and earnings after a 
treatment compared to how things would be if the treatment had not been 
received. As it is never possible in real life to see the outcome for the same 
individual following treatment and non-treatment, a fundamental evaluation 
problem arises (Caliendo (2006)). Different evaluation strategies try to find a 
plausible comparison group or control group in different ways in order to 
overcome this problem. 
Generally, the best strategy for dealing with the fundamental evaluation 
problem is to use experimental evaluation, also known as randomised controlled 
experiments or social experiments. The experimental approach is based on the 
random assignment of people into the treatment and control groups, meaning 
experimental evaluation can eliminate the selection bias14 from the mean-impact 
estimates and avoid the problems of identification of causal effects. However, 
there are still several problems associated with experimental evaluation like the 
                                                 
14 The problem of non-random selection into treatment, see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and 
Todd (1998). 
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problem of non-compliance or partial compliance15, the problem of dropouts16, 
substitution bias17, experimental effects or the Hawthorne effect18, randomi-
sation bias19, and others. The advantages and disadvantages of experimental 
evaluation are discussed by, among others, Heckman and Smith (1995), Berk 
(2005) and Stock and Watson (2006). So although a well-implemented ran-
domised controlled experiment is usually considered the gold standard for 
estimating policy effects, it is still far from being a perfect estimation. When 
labour market programmes in Europe are estimated, a problem with randomised 
experiments is that the data are usually not available as it is expensive to carry 
out randomised experiments and they raise ethical issues. 
As experimental data with which to evaluate labour market policies are quite 
rare, a suitable method using non-experimental data needs to be considered. In 
recent years it has been admitted that there is no single universal strategy for 
any non-experimental data. Depending on the data at hand, whether cross-
section or longitudinal, different methods can be proposed that invoke different 
identifying assumptions in handling selection bias. An estimator will produce 
consistent estimates only if the assumptions hold (Smith (2004)). 
There are two groups of estimators for handling selection bias (Caliendo 
(2006)): 1) estimators assuming that selection is based on observable charac-
teristics20; 2) estimators assuming that selection is based on both observable and 
unobservable characteristics. The more popular ones in the first group are 
matching and linear regression analysis, while the before-after estimator, the 
difference-in-differences estimator, the instrumental variable approach and the 
(Heckman) selection model21 belong to the second group. The assumption that 
selection is based on observables means that selection to treatment is assumed 
to be determined by observable characteristics, but the selection to treatment 
does not depend on outcomes in the absence of treatment. Selection based on 
unobservables means that unobservable characteristics are also used to 
determine selection to treatment (Smith 2004). 
With selection on observables it is sufficient for solving the selection bias 
problem to condition on the variables that determine selection to treatment. 
Though linear regression analysis is the most popular strategy when selection 
on observables is assumed, matching has several advantages over the linear 
regression approach. Above all, matching methods avoid any functional form 
restrictions, as the basic idea of matching is to find those persons among non-
                                                 
15 See Bijwaard and Ridder (2005). 
16 See Heckman, Smith and Taber (1998). 
17 See Heckman, Hohmann, Smith and Khoo (2000). 
18 See Parsons (1974). 
19 See Heckman and Smith (1995). 
20 Selection on observables is also sometimes referred to as unconfoundedness, conditional 
independence or ignorable treatment assignment assumption. 
21  A model closely related to instrumental variable strategy, see Heckman (1979) and 
Puhani (2000). 
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participants who are similar or identical to the participants in treatment in all 
relevant pre-treatment variables (Caliendo (2006)). In addition, in contrast to 
regression, matching methods focus on the support problem that arises when 
there are some treated observations in the data that do not have similar untreated 
observations (Smith (2004)). Matching should also be preferred over regression 
because regression analysis is not as well able to handle treatment effect 
heterogeneity (Caliendo (2006)). However, matching and regression do not 
necessarily have to be seen as competing strategies as they can also be com-
bined in evaluation (see Imbens and Wooldridge (2008)). In consequence, 
matching models have gained more popularity in recent years, especially for 
evaluating labour market policies. 
When selection is assumed to be determined by unobservables too, the 
simplest strategy is to use the before-after estimator. Though the before-after 
estimator is in essence very simple, comparing the outcomes for an individual 
before and after treatment, it does not take into account changes in the outcome 
because of other factors, such as the economic situation. For this reason, a more 
popular method is the difference-in-differences (DID) approach, which 
compares the before-after change of the treated with the before-after change of 
the non-treated, thus differencing out any common trends (Smith (2004)). 
However, the problem of the DID estimator is that it requires that without any 
treatment the average outcomes for the treatment and control group should 
follow parallel paths in time (Abadie (2005))22. Different ways of overcoming 
this problem have been proposed for the DID estimator, for example in Blundell 
and Costa Dias (2009), Athey and Imbens (2006), Abadie (2005) and Blundell 
et al. (2004). The DID estimator can be also combined with matching by calcu-
lating difference-in-differences for matched individuals. 
Another widespread strategy for selection on unobservables is the method of 
instrumental variables (IV). This method relies on finding a variable or 
instrument that determines the selection to treatment but does not affect the 
outcome. This variable is then excluded from the outcome equation but 
included in the assignment rule. In general, the IV estimator should identify the 
treatment effect without the bias incurred by non-randomised selection 
(Blundell and Costa Dias (2009)). The biggest concern with the IV method is to 
find a good instrument that is not correlated with the omitted variables and is 
not only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor(s) (see for example 
Angrist and Krueger (2001), Staiger and Stock (1997) and Bound, Jaeger and 
Baker (1995)). Another problem with IV arises in heterogeneous treatment 
effect models, where the impact parameter can be different across individuals in 
unobservable ways (see Blundell and Costa Dias (2009)). 
                                                 
22 With both the before-after estimator and the DID estimator there can be a problem called 
Ashenfelter’s dip (found by Ashenfelter (1978), see also Heckman and Smith (1999)). 
Ashenfelter’s dip means a situation where the treated individuals experienced a brief shock 
in their outcomes before participation. Unlike a permanent dip, a transitory dip can bias the 
estimates by overestimating the effect of treatment. 
 45 
The regression discontinuity design (RDD) is sometimes viewed as a 
specific case of IV strategy or matching, though in many ways it actually 
resembles a randomised experiment. It was first introduced by Thistlethwaite 
and Campbell (1960), but has been increasingly used in the policy evaluation 
literature during the last decade. Extensive appraisals of the RDD are given by 
Lee and Lemieux (2010), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Van der Klaauw (2008) 
and Hahn et al. (2001) among others. The RDD is a quasi-experimental design 
in which assignment to treatment is determined discontinuously on some 
observable covariates and the cut-off point is known. A sharp regression 
discontinuity and fuzzy regression discontinuity are distinguished according to 
whether the treatment status is deterministic or stochastic function at the cut-off 
point (see Hahn et al. (2001)). It is crucial for the RDD that individuals cannot 
precisely manipulate the assignment variable, so the variation in treatment near 
the cut-off point is randomised as in a randomised experiment and the RDD can 
be analysed and tested like randomised experiments23 (Lee and Lemieux 
(2010)). However, in contrast to data from randomised experiments, assignment 
in a RDD is not random and the treatment group differs systematically from the 
control group (van der Klaauw (2008)). The RDD has the advantage that, unlike 
the strategies of selection on observables or selection on unobservables, in the 
RDD the researcher does not have to take a strong standpoint on which 
variables to include in the analysis as the RDD predicts that the observable 
variables are irrelevant and unnecessary for identification, though they are 
useful for testing the underlying assumption as in Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
The choice between the different methods for non-experimental data should 
firstly depend on the nature of the institutions that determine selection into 
treatment, as this determines any selection bias and the plausibility of a specific 
strategy. Secondly, the researcher has to contemplate the available data as, for 
example, matching does not make sense without rich data, the IV method makes 
no sense without a valid instrument, and longitudinal methods cannot be applied 
on cross-section data. (Smith (2004)). 
In the current thesis a matching estimator is used to evaluate the impact of 
unemployment benefits on post-unemployment job quality (Chapter 4). As 
already noted in this subsection, matching has several advantages over 
regression and can be used when selection over observables is assumed and a 
rich dataset is available. In Section 4.1 the effect of unemployment benefits on 
the post-unemployment wage is estimated. In that section the matching esti-
mator is the main method used for the analysis. However, it is combined with a 
DID estimator so that the assumption of selection on observables would not 
have to hold so strictly. The analysis does not compare the difference in the 
post-unemployment wage between the treatment and the control groups, but 
rather the difference between the control and the treatment groups in the 
difference of the wage before and after the unemployment spell. 
                                                 
23 See validity tests for RDD such as Lee (2008) and McCrary (2008). 
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The matching estimator is also used in Section 4.2 as one of the methods for 
analysing post-unemployment employment duration. In addition, a method 
similar to RDD is used for analysing post-unemployment employment duration 
and also for analysing unemployment duration (in Section 3.2). In these 
sections, the behaviour of the unemployed is studied around the cut-off point of 
the eligibility criterion for the longer potential unemployment insurance benefit. 
However, the differences are studied in a non-parametric way. The advantage of 
this method is that it resembles a randomised experiment in several aspects and 
it does not require a strong standpoint as to whether the selection to treatment is 
on observables or unobservables. Additionally, post-unemployment job duration 
and unemployment duration are analysed in this thesis by the duration models 
that were discussed in the previous section (Subsection 1.2.1). 
From among the methods of policy evaluation discussed in this subsection, 
the matching estimator is the main method used in this study. Extensive 
overviews of the theory and implementation of matching methods are provided 
by Blundell and Costa Dias (2009), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), Caliendo 
(2006) and Imbens (2004) among others, and of bias correction in matching by 
Abadie and Imbens (2011). For matching on a higher number of observable 
characteristics, matching on some balancing scores for the functions of relevant 
observables tends to be more used than matching on covariates or cell matching. 
Especially popular in the literature on the estimation of labour market 
programmes is the use of the propensity score as a balancing score, or pro-
pensity score matching (see overviews specifically about the propensity score 
matching in, for example, Abadie and Imbens (2009), Bryson, Dorsett and 
Purdon (2002), Dehejia and Wahba (2002)). As a relatively high number of 
observables are used in the analyses in this thesis, it has been decided to apply 
propensity score matching here. 
The propensity score was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), who 
define it as the conditional probability of assignment to the treatment given a 
vector of observed pre-treatment variables. Propensity score matching (PSM) is 
then a semi-parametric two-step estimation, where in the first step the pro-
pensity scores are parametrically estimated and in the second step a non-para-
metric comparison of these propensity scores is conducted. In the usual binary 
treatment case of treatment versus non-treatment, the propensity scores are 
usually estimated by either probit or logit models. In the second step, for 
matching individuals with these scores, there are very many alternative algo-
rithms, such as nearest neighbour matching with single or multiple neighbours 
with or without replacement, caliper matching, radius matching, kernel 
matching, and local linear matching; see for example Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008). The choice between different algorithms is generally a trade-off 
between bias and variance, though asymptotically these strategies should pro-
duce the same estimation results. For empirical comparisons of the different 
algorithms and discussions on the performance of propensity score matching in 
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general see for example Smith and Todd (2005), Dehejia (2005), Frölich 
(2004), Smith and Todd (2001). 
In the policy evaluation literature, the two most commonly estimated 
parameters are the population average treatment effect (ATE) and the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). ATE is the average difference in expected 
outcome between treated and non-treated individuals. While ATE is relevant for 
random assignment to treatment, ATT is more relevant if a policy is targeted 
more specifically at some particular groups in society. Because of this, it can be 
argued that ATT is more relevant to policy makers as it excludes the effect on 
those individuals for whom the policy is not intended.24 If PSM is used, ATT is 
the mean difference in outcomes over the common support region25 and 
weighted by the propensity score, and can be formulated as follows (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig (2008)): 
23)  ܣܶ ௉ܶௌெ =  ܧ௉(௑)|ୈୀଵሼܧሾܻ(1)|D = 1, P(X)ሿ − ܧሾܻ(0)|D = 0, P(X)ሿሽ, 
  
Though PSM is widely used in the policy evaluation literature, there are some 
concerns that a researcher has to bear in mind. According to Blundell and Costa 
Dias (2009) the main weakness of PSM is connected to the data availability and 
the difficulties in choosing the right set of covariates for matching. Matching 
needs richer data than the “traditional” approaches and a failure to find the 
appropriate variables can end in biased results. Dehejia (2005) also stresses the 
importance of examining the sensitivity of the estimated effects to small 
changes in the specification of the propensity score26. As long as these concerns 
are kept in mind, PSM can be a powerful tool for evaluating a policy. 
In conclusion, though there is a wide range of possible policy evaluation 
methods available, there is no perfect estimation method, especially if there is 
                                                 
24  Other commonly used parameters are average treatment effect on non-treated, marginal 
average treatment effect and local average treatment effect. See Smith (2004) and Blundell 
and Costa Dias (2009) for a discussion of these parameters and Imbens (2004) for different 
versions of ATEs. 
25 With PSM, only those observations in the treatment and control groups that have an 
overlap in terms of pre-treatment variables are compared (see Dehejia and Wahba (1999)). 
The fact that only comparable observations are analysed in matching is also considered to be 
one of the reasons for preferring matching over regression analysis (as noted earlier in this 
subsection). 
26 There are also some more formal tests that have been developed for assessing whether 
the assumption of selection on observables holds, meaning sensitivity due to unobserved 
heterogeneity such as Rosenbaum Bounds, see DiPrete and Gangl (2004) and Becker and 
Caliendo (2007). 
where Y(1) – outcome in the situation of treatment 
 Y(0) – outcome in the situation of no treatment  
D – treatment assignment (equals 1 in case of treatment received and 0 
otherwise) 
 X – observed pre-treatment covariates  
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no way to conduct a random experiment. The main problem of policy 
evaluation methods is how to mitigate the possible selection problem, so the 
choice between the methods depends on the selection to treatment and also on 
the available data. 
 
 
1.3. Empirical evidence for benefit effects 
1.3.1. Previous research on the impact of unemployment 
benefits on unemployment duration  
This subsection aims to give an overview of the earlier empirical studies 
conducted into the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment 
duration. These are studies that test the predictions of search theory that un-
employment benefits above all increase unemployment duration through the 
disincentive effect, though there are also a few studies that explore the entitle-
ment effect and the effects of monitoring, sanctioning and activation on the 
disincentive effect. 
In empirical work, the entitlement effect is not so easy to define or estimate, 
and hence studies into this effect are quite rare. One of the very few works that 
tries to estimate this effect quantitatively is by Ortega and Rioux (2008). An 
increase in the inflow to unemployment due to unemployment benefits is also 
shown by Tuit and van Ours (2010), Winter-Ebmer (2003) and Andersen and 
Meyer (1997). 
In consequence, most of the empirical studies on the relationship between 
unemployment benefits and the level of unemployment focus on analysing the 
effects of unemployment benefits on the labour market behaviour of unemploy-
ment benefit recipients. The disincentive effect has been tested quite often and 
in most cases the results confirm the theory27, mostly using US and UK data; in 
Continental Europe the results vary rather more. A spike at benefit exhaustion is 
also often found, for example by Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990), 
though the results are less consistent than for the overall disincentive effect. 
A widely disseminated paper using US data is by Meyer (1990), where the 
emphasis is on the last weeks of a potential benefit period. Meyer finds a strong 
negative effect of unemployment insurance benefits on exiting unemployment, 
and also finds that the exit rate increases significantly just prior to benefit 
exhaustion. Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) use UK data and show that the 
disincentive effect decreases during the unemployment spell quite quickly and 
hence does not have any significant impact for long-term unemployment. 
Several studies have been conducted on Northern European unemployment 
insurance systems. Analysing Norwegian data, Røed and Zhang (2003) find that 
even the slightest rise in the size of the unemployment benefit decreases the exit 
                                                 
27  A very thorough review of earlier research on unemployment benefits is provided by 
Devine and Kiefer (1991). 
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rate from unemployment irrespective of the business cycle, and that the exit rate 
increases significantly during the last months prior to when benefits lapse. 
Bratberg and Vaage (2000) also look at Norwegian data and exploit a change in 
the unemployment insurance benefit system that extended the maximum benefit 
period. Though this reform had in total a negative impact on the exit rate into 
employment, neither before nor after the reform do they find any increase in the 
exit rate before benefit exhaustion. Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu (2001) use 
Swedish data and find that a decrease in the unemployment benefit replacement 
rate significantly increases the exit rate into employment. Røed, Jensen and 
Thoursie (2008) compare Swedish and Norwegian unemployment insurance 
systems and conclude that the shorter potential benefit period in Sweden causes 
a much higher exit rate into employment. Fredriksson and Söderström (2008) 
conclude similarly from Swedish data that unemployment benefit generosity 
does indeed contribute to higher regional unemployment. 
There are also many interesting works using Central and Southern European 
data. Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002) conclude from Spanish data that the 
disincentive effect is even greater than the impact of business cycle. Lalive, van 
Ours and Zweimüller (2006) use Austrian data to show that both an increase in 
the unemployment benefit replacement rate and in its maximum duration 
prolong unemployment duration. Card et al. (2007) discover from Austrian data 
that a spike at benefit exhaustion is much bigger for those leaving registered 
unemployment than for those exiting into employment. 
In recent years the research work on the disincentive effects of unemploy-
ment benefits has increased considerably. Partly this is because the crisis period 
has focused more attention on the problems of high unemployment, but at the 
same time some countries have extended their potential unemployment benefit 
during the crisis, enabling researchers to study differences in the effects of 
extended and non-extended unemployment benefits, for which US data have 
been used in notably more studies. Most of the recent studies find that more 
generous unemployment benefits do indeed increase unemployment (see Grubb 
(2011), Fujita (2011), Lalive et al. (2011)), but there are also exceptions. 
Howell and Azizoglu (2011) do not find disincentive effects in the US data and 
argue that the extensions of unemployment benefits might in fact increase long-
term unemployment by maintaining the level of labour market participation. 
Dahl (2011) finds from US data only a modest behavioural response to benefit 
extensions and argues that it is just as difficult for the long-term unemployed to 
enter employment and that for them unemployment benefits serve as an 
important source of income maintenance. 
There is also a recent meta-analysis of cross-country studies on the effect of 
unemployment benefits on the unemployment level by Kim (2011). The aim of 
the analysis is to find out why the results of different studies might be different, 
as there are some studies that indicate that more generous unemployment 
benefits increase unemployment, but there are also studies that do not find this 
effect or even show a negative relationship between unemployment benefit 
13
 50 
generosity and the level of unemployment. The results of the meta-analysis 
indicate that there is in fact a positive relationship between unemployment 
benefit generosity and the level of unemployment and that there might be some 
biasing factors that let some studies observe an insignificant relationship or a 
negative relationship. 
Only a few studies exploit data on Eastern European unemployment 
insurance systems and they tend to date back to the beginning of the transition 
period. One of the more recent studies is by van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) for 
Slovenian data. They find that a shortening of the potential benefit period 
increases the exit rate into employment, but also increases exits to active labour 
market programmes. They also show a sharp increase in the exit rate into 
employment during the last month of the benefit period. 
This all means that the disincentive effect is often empirically substantiated. 
However, it is more questionable whether the disincentive effect varies over 
business cycles as the research into this is quite limited. In search theory, 
unemployment benefits are rather expected to have a less distortionary effect on 
unemployment duration during a recession, though this ultimately remains an 
empirical question. Yet, as the empirical research into this is scarce and only a 
very few empirical studies have tried to take into account that the disincentive 
effect can vary over the business cycle. In most cases this variation is included 
in the model as an interaction term of the unemployment rate and the generosity 
of unemployment benefits. 
One of the earliest papers considering the varying disincentive effect is by 
Moffitt (1985), who finds from US data a significant positive coefficient for the 
interaction term of the unemployment rate and the potential unemployment 
benefit period, concluding that the disincentive effects of benefits are lower 
during times of high unemployment. Some later studies by Jurajda and Tannery 
(2003) using US data and Schmieder et al. (2010) using German data also find a 
decline in the disincentive effect during a recession, although a somewhat more 
modest one. Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011) find from US data that disincentive 
effects are less distortionary when local labour market conditions are poor. 
Bover et al. (2002) assess the impact of the business cycle and the effects of 
benefits on unemployment duration using Spanish data. Their results also 
indicate that the disincentive effects of benefits might be milder in a recession. 
So taken together the few existing empirical studies rather refer to lower 
disincentive effects during times of high unemployment. However, studies 
concerning the disincentive effects do not explore whether it still exists if there 
is extremely high unemployment in the economy. 
Another issue of the disincentive effect that has only gained more attention 
in recent years is whether monitoring and sanctions could lower the disincentive 
effect. The positive effects of monitoring and sanctions in the unemployment 
benefit system on people exiting unemployment to work are found for example 
by Abbring et al. (2005), Lalive et al. (2005), McVicar (2008), and Svarer 
(2011). Similar positive effects of monitoring and sanctions are also found on 
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welfare recipients by van den Berg et al. (2004), Boockmann et al. (2009) and 
van der Klaauw and van Ours (2010). Micklewright and Nagy (2005) and 
Gorter and Kalb (1996) find that monitoring of the job search only shortens the 
unemployment spell for some groups of the unemployed. Müller and Steiner 
(2008) find that sanctions are more effective the earlier on in the unemployment 
spell they are imposed. Boone, Sadrieh and van Ours (2009) show that un-
employment benefits cause both ex ante effects through the threat of sanctions 
and ex post effects when sanctions have already been imposed. In addition, ex 
ante effects prove to be even stronger than ex post effects. In conclusion, the 
literature on this matter tends to indicate that monitoring and sanctions could 
decrease the disincentive effect, that this effect is greater earlier in the 
unemployment spell and that the threat of sanctions could even have a bigger 
impact than the sanctions themselves. 
Some recent studies have shown that active labour market measures can 
incur similar ex ante effects to sanctions. Studies by, for example, Black et al. 
(2003), Geerdsen (2006), Geerdsen and Holm (2007) and Toomet (2008) prove 
that the threat of compulsory participation in an active measure might increase 
the exit from unemployment to employment prior to participation. Gaure et al. 
(2008) estimate using Norwegian data that the effect of active measures on 
offsetting the moral hazard problems in the unemployment benefit system is of 
even more importance than the effect of active measures that increase 
participants’ human capital. 
However, van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) do not find from Dutch 
data that counselling and monitoring could have an effect on the transition to 
employment as monitoring can instead cause a shift from informal job search to 
formal job search. Monitoring may be more effective for individuals with worse 
prospects of finding employment as they might have less scope for substitution. 
Furthermore, Manning (2009) analysed a reform in the UK that tightened the 
job search requirements for benefit recipients and found that the reform did not 
bring about higher job search efforts or transition to employment. Van den Berg 
and Vikström (2009) argue that the effect of monitoring can also vary 
depending on what is monitored and sanctioned. For example if monitoring 
focuses on job offer acceptance/rejection, people decrease their job search 
intensity in order not to receive a job offer that might be only partly suitable, so 
that they either have to reject it and get sanctioned or accept it even though it 
does not really match them. In this way, monitoring of job search effort may 
incur better results for increasing the exit rate to employment. 
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1.3.2. Previous research on the impact of unemployment 
benefits on post-unemployment job quality 
This subsection gives a brief discussion of the previous studies on the effects of 
unemployment benefits on post-unemployment job quality. There are few 
studies that look at job quality after the unemployment insurance benefit period 
and usually the post-unemployment wage or employment duration are 
considered. In addition, there are a few studies that analyse how monitoring and 
sanctioning affect the effect of unemployment benefits on post-unemployment 
job quality. 
The evidence for the effect on the post-unemployment wage is so far quite 
mixed. Gangl (2002) estimates the impact of unemployment benefits on un-
employment duration and post-unemployment wages simultaneously, using 
German and US data. He finds support for both effects in both countries and 
finds that the disincentive effect is slightly higher in the USA and the effect on 
job quality is more positive in Germany. He concludes that at the cost of a slight 
increase in unemployment duration, unemployment benefits contribute sub-
stantially to post-unemployment job quality.  
Another study by Gangl (2006) using US and European data shows that the 
scarring effects on post-unemployment earnings are mitigated by generous 
unemployment benefits. Addison and Blackburn (2000) also use US data to 
distinguish the effect on post-unemployment wages but they do not find any 
strong evidence as the positive effect is only revealed when the unemployed 
entitled to benefits are compared to the unemployed without benefits, and even 
then this effect is very small. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007) find from German 
data that unemployment benefits are of only little importance for the duration of 
search unemployment and for post-unemployment wages. No discernible effects 
of unemployment benefits on the post-unemployment wage are found from 
Austrian data by Lalive (2007). Gaure et al. (2008) argue using Norwegian data 
that the extension in the job search period due to unemployment benefits is not 
a waste of time as the benefits do indeed help the unemployed to find better 
paying jobs and also increase the probability that a job will be found after the 
unemployment spell. Centeno and Novo (2011) study Portuguese data and find 
that more generous unemployment benefits do not have a significant effect on 
re-employment wages. There is some evidence of higher unemployment 
benefits incurring higher post-unemployment wages, but longer unemployment 
spells have also been found in a less recent but relatively well-known study by 
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976). 
There have been relatively more studies about post-unemployment employ-
ment duration, or job duration, in the recent literature than about wages and the 
results are more unanimous. It is also sometimes argued that job duration could 
be a better proxy for job match quality. This argument stems from the models of 
job turnover that treat job match as an experience-good as opposed to a search-
good. Job match is treated as a pure experience-good by, for example, 
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Jovanovic (1979), who elaborates a model of job separations and argues that an 
employee’s productivity in a particular job is not known beforehand and will be 
revealed only during the employment period. He shows that employees stay in 
these jobs in which their productivity comes to be known to be relatively high 
and employees select themselves out of jobs in which their productivity is 
lower. The model also predicts that the probability of an employee leaving a job 
is a decreasing function of tenure, meaning that a mismatch between an 
employee and the job will probably be revealed earlier rather than later. 
Belzil (2001) finds from Canadian data that the exit rate increases signi-
ficantly during the last five weeks before benefit exhaustion, but the jobs 
accepted during these five weeks are of shorter duration. An increase in the 
potential benefit duration prolongs both unemployment and post-unemployment 
job duration, though the effect on unemployment duration is greater, meaning 
that the disincentive effect exceeds the effect on post-unemployment job 
quality. Tatsiramos (2009) finds from European data that besides the commonly 
found effect of benefits increasing unemployment spells, there is also an 
indirect effect of benefits increasing post-unemployment employment spells, 
which is more pronounced in countries that have more generous benefit 
systems. Caliendo, Tatsiramos and Uhlendorff (2009) find from German data 
evidence of a significant positive effect of longer potential unemployment 
benefit duration on unemployment and employment duration. 
Centeno (2004) shows with US data that more generous unemployment 
benefits incur longer job tenure and that this effect is even more amplified 
during economic busts. He argues that the job match quality is anyway quite 
good during better economic times as people are willing to change their jobs 
only if it increases their job quality. During a recession there are many un-
employed people and a low rate of job offers, so more bad matches are made28. 
It follows that unemployment benefits can relax this situation somewhat as 
people do not have to take the first job offer that comes along, so unemploy-
ment benefits are particularly important in times of crisis for improving job 
match quality and dampening the cyclicality in match quality. This is also one 
of the very few papers that actually studies post-unemployment job quality 
under different economic situations. 
Another paper that studies the impact of unemployment benefits on post-
unemployment job quality is by Schmieder et al. (2010) and they analyse 
several different aspects of job quality. However, from their German data they 
do not find strong effects of extended unemployment insurance benefit dura-
tions on any measures of post-unemployment job quality through wages, wage 
growth, longer-term employment outcomes or other indicators, and these results 
are similar in different economic situations. Another slightly later study by the 
same researchers using the same data (Schmieder et al. (2012)) even concludes 
                                                 
28 The higher level of mismatching during recessions is also showed by Bowlus (1995). 
This study indicates that the level of mismatching is primarily captured in starting wages. 
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that longer potential benefit durations incur a small but statistically significant 
negative effect on job quality through lower wages, less stable jobs, and higher 
probability of movement geographically or between occupations and industries. 
They argue that as unemployment benefits also incur longer unemployment 
spells, they also incur worse job outcomes through skill depreciation or stig-
matisation. 
There are some other studies that address the issues of post-unemployment 
wages and employment duration at the same time. Centeno and Novo (2006) 
show that unemployment benefits increase both the expected starting wage and 
job tenure. In addition, they find evidence that more generous benefits reduce 
the thickness of the lower tail of match quality through lower wages and shorter 
job tenure, and increase the matching quality available to all the unemployed. 
Gangl (2004a) shows from US and German data that though unemployment 
benefits prolong the job search period, they also improve the post-unemploy-
ment job quality and help people to avoid wage losses, occupational mobility 
and subsequent employment instability. 
Research on post-unemployment job quality using Eastern European data is 
even more scarce than research on unemployment benefit effects on unemploy-
ment. As already mentioned, van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) show a disincen-
tive effect and a spike at the end of the benefit period using Slovenian data. In 
their other study using the same data (van Ours and Vodopivec (2008)), they do 
not find positive effects from unemployment benefits on the post-unemploy-
ment wage or the quality of post-unemployment jobs in any other respect. 
It is often observed that monitoring and sanctions in the unemployment 
benefit system might increase the transition from unemployment to employment 
(see Subsection 1.3.1). However, benefit sanctions can also decrease post-
unemployment job quality. Arni, Lalive and van Ours (2009) also find that both 
warnings of and the imposition of sanctions increase the exit to employment, 
but also increase the exit out of the labour force. In addition, warnings might 
not have any effect on post-unemployment employment duration, but they do 
lower the post-unemployment wage. Real benefit sanctions lessen the post-
unemployment job quality both by lowering the post-unemployment wage and 
by decreasing the post-unemployment employment duration. A study by van 
den Berg and Vikström (2009) also finds not only that the imposition of 
punitive sanctions incurs lower ensuing job quality in terms of hourly wage and 
number of hours worked, but also that it makes the unemployed move more 
often to a lower occupational level. In this way sanctions can lower post-un-
employment job quality and lead to human capital losses.  
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2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ESTONIAN 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEM AND  
DATA USED IN THE ANALYSES 
2.1. Overview of the Estonian unemployment  
benefit system 
2.1.1. The development of the system  
of labour market policies in Estonia 
This section looks at the development of the provision of labour market 
measures in Estonia. It focuses particularly on passive measures in the form of 
unemployment benefits to sketch out the background for the following chapters 
where analyses of the effects of unemployment benefits on labour market 
outcomes are presented. 
In the beginning of the independence period following Soviet rule there was 
practically no unemployment in Estonia (see Figure 4). During the initial years 
of the transition period the economy went through extensive structural changes, 
so employment dropped and unemployment and inactivity rose gradually29. 
During these adjustments production became more efficient and capital-
intensive fields developed fast (Rõõm and Viilmann (2003)), while employment 
dropped a lot in agriculture and also in industry, and so although economic 
growth was restored, unemployment continued its gradual rise. 
During 1995–1997 the unemployment rate had stabilised at around 10% and 
a large part of the unemployment during these years was estimated to be 
structural caused by a mismatch of skills or regions. However, in 1998–1999 
Estonia was hit by the Russian crisis and went through yet another structural 
change. The unemployment rate rose to an even higher level and though 
economic growth was restored relatively quickly, it took years before the 
unemployment rate saw a more significant decline. The reason for this was that 
the economic growth was largely boosted by foreign direct investments, which 
again favoured higher labour productivity and growth in capital-intensive 
sectors. The more rapidly declining industries continued to be agriculture, 
forestry and fishing. 
 
  
                                                 
29 The developments in the labour market during the first decade of re-independence period 
are reviewed in, for example, Rõõm and Viilmann (2003), Eamets (2001) and Eamets 
(2000). 
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Figure 4. Developments in the economy after Estonia regained its independence and 
forecast for 2012–2015 
Sources: Statistics Estonia, United Nations Statistics Division, Economic forecast of the Ministry 
of Finance (2011) 
 
 
By 2005–2006, the real economic growth rate in Estonia had risen to around 
10% a year and the economy was showing signs of overheating. The unemploy-
ment rate continued to fall and labour shortages emerged in some fields of 
economic activity. A major role in the overheating was played by the bubble in 
the real estate market and the first signs of the bursting of the bubble appeared 
in 2007 when economic growth started to slow down and registered unemploy-
ment started to increase slowly, though overall unemployment calculated with 
the ILO methodology was still declining. The economy started to shrink in 2008 
and the problems in the Estonian economy were accelerated by the financial 
crisis in the global economy that emerged in the middle of 2008. The crisis 
turned out to be much deeper than the Russian crisis had been a decade earlier. 
The fall in GDP was much harsher and unemployment increased much faster. 
The Estonian economy suffered more during the crisis than most other 
economies in the European Union, and only the Latvian and Lithuanian eco-
nomies contracted more in 2009. The increase in unemployment was even 
sharper than in the other member states of the EU as Estonian unemployment 
started to increase from a relatively low level. The adjustments in the economy 
were not made only through employment and working hours, but unlike in 
many other countries also through the nominal wage30. 
                                                 
30 For a thorough analysis of the downward nominal wage rigidity in Estonia during the 
crisis see Dabušinskas and Rõõm (2011). 
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However, the recovery from this crisis was also relatively fast in Estonia. In 
2010–2011 there was positive economic growth and unemployment fell quite 
sharply. The economic forecasts for the next few years expect continuing 
recovery, though at a somewhat slower pace than in 2010–2011. During the 
crisis the fall in employment was biggest in the construction sector, and also in 
industry, such as metalworking and machinery. During the recovery, these 
sectors have also grown back the most, though they still employ fewer people 
than before the crisis. Overall the statistics do not provide much evidence that 
the economy has managed to restructure a lot following the recent crisis. 
As employment fell more in construction and to an extent also in industry 
during the most recent crisis, unemployment grew more among men and young 
people. As these sectors had recovered to some extent by the beginning of 2012, 
the shares of women and older people among the unemployed are growing. 
Non-Estonians also suffered more due to the crisis. The unemployment rate for 
non-Estonians has always been somewhat higher than the unemployment rate 
for Estonians due to the structural changes following the recovery of inde-
pendence when the unemployment rate grew more in those regions where there 
was a higher population of non-Estonians, but probably also because of their 
lack of Estonian language skills and low geographical mobility. Similarly, there 
is a wage gap between Estonians and non-Estonians. Toomet and Leping (2008) 
argue that the reasons for the wage gap also lie in different ethnicity-specific 
returns to education and establishment-level segregation, as the school system 
used to be segregated. Toomet (2011) also argues that non-Estonians experience 
lower income due to segregation and discrimination. He shows that the income 
premium for non-Estonians from English language skills is greater than that 
from knowledge of Estonian. 
Although there were basically no unemployed people in the period imme-
diately following the return to independence, unemployment and the need for 
social security for the unemployed emerged quickly within a few years. The 
first conditions for registering the unemployed and providing them with labour 
market measures were created as early as 1990, so even before the formal decla-
ration of the recovery of independence for Estonia. The first such laws regulated 
registered unemployment and set up the public employment service called the 
Estonian Labour Market Board, and the early system of unemployment benefits 
was created in 199131. The initial system of unemployment benefits consisted 
only of an unemployment allowance and was regulated by a Government decree 
until the end of 1994. The unemployment allowance was a fairly low flat rate 
benefit that depended on the current minimum wage and was financed through 
the state budget. To be eligible for the allowance a person had to have been in 
employment for at least 180 days during the previous 12 months and the 
maximum duration of payment was 180 days (Kuddo et al. (2002)). During this 
                                                 
31 An overview of the unemployment benefit system in Estonia for 1991-2002 is provided 
by Kuddo et al. (2002), and for 2003-2004 by Leetmaa et al. (2004). 
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period, the provision of active labour market policies was regulated by the same 
decree (Leetmaa and Võrk (2004)). 
The first time that labour market policies were regulated by an act was in 
1995 when the Social Protection of the Unemployed Act (Töötu sotsiaalse 
kaitse seadus, 1994) was passed. A major change introduced by this act was the 
option of extending the potential period of unemployment allowance by 90 days 
if a person had not found a job during the previous 180 days32. In addition, the 
act introduced a waiting period of 60 days for those unemployed whose 
working contract had been terminated at the initiative of the employee or 
because of the employee’s breach of contract, and also to those unemployed 
who had been in the education system before registering as unemployed33. What 
is more, this act laid down the possibility of sanctions being imposed on un-
employment allowance recipients if a suitable job offer or participation in an 
active measure was rejected. However, the choice of active labour market 
measures that this law implemented beyond information distribution and a job 
mediation service was very limited, offering only labour market training, a 
business start-up subsidy, a wage subsidy and public work. The unemployed 
had to apply for the measures themselves and were not pushed or forced to 
participate by the public employment service. In general, during this period the 
criteria for registering as unemployed were quite strict and the provision of 
active and passive labour market policies was rather limited. 
A major amendment in the legal framework took place in 2000 when the 
Social Protection of the Unemployed Act was amended (Töötu sotsiaalse kaitse 
seadus, 2000) and the Employment Service Act was passed (Tööturuteenuste 
seadus, 2000). The most important change in the laws was the redefinition of 
the registered unemployed so that the eligibility criteria for registering became 
milder. This meant, at least in theory, that more people were able to register 
themselves as unemployed and have access to active measures. The range of 
active measures was expanded by the introduction of career counselling. In 
addition, the monitoring of job search was relaxed somewhat as a person 
registered as unemployed was required to visit the public employment service at 
least once within thirty days instead of once every fifteen days or ten working 
days as was required previously. 
The reform in 2000 changed unemployment benefits by extending the poten-
tial period of unemployment benefit to 270 days while keeping the possible 
extensions of unemployment allowance in the system. In addition, the waiting 
period of 60 days was abolished for the unemployed whose employment 
contract was terminated at the initiative of the employee. This amendment was 
intended to protect those unemployed who in reality were forced to quit their 
job by the employer (Kuddo et al. (2002)). 
                                                 
32 Possible extensions of the unemployment allowance were also foreseen for people close 
to retirement age (up to 180 days), pregnant women (up to 70 days) and parents of at least 3 
children (up to 90 days). 
33 The potential period of unemployment allowance for those groups was only 120 days. 
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The next major change in the Estonian unemployment benefit system took 
place in 2001 when the bases for the system of unemployment insurance benefit 
were created. The Unemployment Insurance Act (Töötuskindlustuse seadus, 
2001) was passed at the end of 2001, the gathering of the funds for the insur-
ance system started in 2002 and the first unemployment insurance benefits were 
paid in 2003. Up to 2003, the unemployment benefit system in Estonia had 
consisted of only a relatively low means-tested unemployment allowance. 
Eamets (2001) argues that the very low level of unemployment benefits was one 
of the reasons why the unemployment rate was relatively low during the first 
decade after Estonia regained independence. Kuddo et al. (2002) state that 
during this period the system of unemployment allowance was a fairly 
insignificant labour market policy due to the low level of the allowance and also 
due to the lack of activating measures in the system. 
A new organisation, the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund, was 
established to administer the system of unemployment insurance. In addition to 
unemployment insurance benefit, the system also comprised benefits upon the 
collective termination of employment contracts and benefits upon the insol-
vency of the employer. The Estonian Labour Market Board continued to be 
responsible for registering the unemployed, implementing the active labour 
market policy and administering the unemployment allowance. The Labour 
Market Board was governed by the Ministry of Social Affairs, which is also 
responsible for labour market policy in Estonia. The Unemployment Insurance 
Fund was established as an independent public body with a tripartite manage-
ment with two members from the trade unions, two members from the 
employers and two members from the Government. 
While the expenditures of the Labour Market Board used to be covered by 
the state budget, a new tax was introduced to cover the responsibilities of the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund. The unemployment insurance benefits were 
covered by the unemployment insurance premium paid by the employees and 
the benefits for collective lay-offs and insolvency of the employer were covered 
by the insurance premium paid by the employers. During the initial years of the 
system the insurance premium for employees was set at 0.5% of their gross 
wage and that for employers at 1%. 
The unemployment insurance benefits were set to be dependent on the 
previous wage at 50% during the first 100 days and 40% later on, in general an 
amount several times higher than the unemployment allowance at the time. The 
potential duration of unemployment insurance benefits was set to be either 180 
days, 270 days or 360 days depending on whether the length of the previous 
record of unemployment insurance premium payments was less than five years, 
five to ten years or more than ten years. The unemployment insurance benefits 
were brought in to cover involuntary unemployment and also required a 
previous working record of 12 months during the previous 36 months. The un-
employment allowance system remained the secondary system of unemploy-
ment benefits to cover voluntary unemployment and the unemployed with 
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shorter employment records, and also provided an additional 90 days of un-
employment allowance to those unemployed who were eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance benefit for only 180 days. As the new unemployment insurance 
benefits were more generous than the unemployment allowances, the sanctions 
in the unemployment insurance system were stricter. The first failure to meet 
the eligibility criteria incurred immediate termination of the insurance benefit 
while the first failure under the unemployment allowance scheme incurred a 
suspension of payments and only the second failure incurred termination. 
After the introduction of unemployment insurance benefit, the next major 
change in the provision of labour market policies came in 2006 when the 
Labour Market Services and Benefits Act was passed (Tööturuteenuste ja –
toetuste seadus, 2005) to replace the Social Protection of the Unemployed Act 
and the Employment Service Act. The act was especially important for active 
labour market policies as it introduced several new measures: work practice, 
coaching for working life and four measures meant for the disabled unemployed 
covering the adaptation of premises and equipment, working with special aids 
and equipment, working with a support person and communication support in 
interviews. In addition, the concept of the individual action plan was introduced 
into the Estonian legal framework. This plan was supposed to help an un-
employed person to get back to employment by planning the necessary steps 
from the individual needs. The changes in the system of unemployment benefits 
were minor, so for example people previously in the education system were not 
eligible for 270-day unemployment allowance after a waiting period of 60 days, 
meaning the potential period was no longer cut by 60 days. In addition, the only 
possible extension of unemployment allowance remaining in the system was an 
extension up to the pension age as other previous extensions were abolished. 
In 2007, the major amendment in the legal system regarding the unemployed 
was that all people registered as unemployed were covered by health insurance, 
even those without unemployment benefits. This was a somewhat controversial 
change as on the one hand the public employment service was now able to 
reach out to those people who might have otherwise remained inactive on the 
labour market, but on the other hand, this change potentially increased the 
clients of the public employment service by adding those people who were not 
interested in employment and activation, but only in health insurance. 
The requirements for unemployment insurance benefit were also relaxed 
somewhat in 2007. When the system of unemployment insurance benefits was 
created, it was expected that the majority of the unemployed would be entitled 
to unemployment insurance benefit and the system of unemployment allowance 
would only have a supporting role for unemployment insurance. However, the 
share of the registered unemployed eligible for unemployment insurance benefit 
stayed relatively low over the years at around 20%, so in 2007 the requirement 
for previous insurance contributions was changed from 12 months during the 
previous 24 months to 12 months during the previous 36 months. This meant 
that a person who had previously been out of employment for up to two years 
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during the last three years might still be eligible for unemployment insurance 
benefit. However, even this change did not increase the share of unemployment 
insurance benefit recipients significantly. This was probably because most of 
the unemployed still had even shorter previous employment records or were 
those whose employment contract was terminated on a voluntary basis by 
mutual agreement or the employee’s initiative. 
The requirements for higher potential benefit duration were also changed in 
2007 to take into account that people might have breaks in their contribution 
payments even if they continue to be employed due to a long illness, vacations, 
an employer paying the salary for two months in one month, and similar issues. 
The requirement of contributions for 270-day benefit was changed from 5 years 
to 56 months and for 360-day benefit from 10 years to 111 months. In addition, 
the system of unemployment insurance benefits in Estonia was old enough by 
2007 that some people had started to become in fact eligible for the 270-day 
unemployment insurance benefit. 
As the rate of unemployment benefit even in the new system of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits was still relatively low compared to that in other 
countries in the European Union and basically at the minimum level allowed by 
the European Social Charter, more heated discussions about flexicurity issues in 
Estonia emerged in 2007 and 2008. The Ministry of Social Affairs revealed a 
draft for a new Employment Contracts Act in January 2008 that was supposed 
to lead to changes in the Unemployment Insurance Act as well. After long 
discussions between the social partners a tripartite agreement to change the 
system of labour market policies in Estonia was reached. The new law was 
supposed to make employment relations more flexible. This included a cut in 
severance payment of one month’s salary. In addition, the responsibility for 
paying the severance payment was supposed to be transferred largely to the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund for up to three months of salary and renamed as 
the insurance benefit upon lay-offs so that private sector employers would 
always pay a severance payment of one month’s salary following redundancy 
regardless of the tenure of the employee. 
Alongside the increase in flexibility, it was also planned to increase social 
security. The agreement included a rise in the replacement rate of the un-
employment insurance benefit to 70% during the first 100 days and 50% later 
on and an increase in the coverage of unemployment insurance benefit by 
extending it to those unemployed whose employment contract was terminated 
on a voluntary basis through mutual agreement or the employee’s initiative. 
However, to limit the possible moral hazard, the criteria for the voluntarily 
unemployed to be eligible for benefits were due to become stricter, demanding a 
longer employment record, and the replacement rate lower at 40% during the 
whole benefit period. It was also agreed that the unemployment allowance and 
the minimum level of unemployment insurance benefit should not be lower than 
half the minimum wage during the preceding year. To lessen the restrictive 
effects of severance pay on job search, it was agreed to enforce a waiting period 
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for unemployment insurance benefit for those people who were eligible for 
insurance benefit upon redundancy of 30 days for those who get one month’s 
salary, 60 days for two months of salary and 90 days for three months of salary. 
In addition, there were some further minor changes in the system34. Under this 
agreement the new Employment Contracts Act (Töölepingu seadus, 2008) and 
the necessary changes in the Unemployment Insurance Act were passed at the 
end of 2008 and were supposed to be implemented in the middle of 2009. 
As well as the agreed flexicurity package there was an agreement between 
the social partners that the responsibilities of the Labour Market Board should 
be taken over by the Unemployment Insurance Fund and that the Labour 
Market Board would be liquidated. The objective of this takeover was to merge 
the management of active and passive labour market policies to improve access 
to labour market measures and improve their quality and effectiveness. In 
addition, this reform was intended to involve the social partners in designing the 
labour market policy. The parties expected that the reform would help to focus 
the activities of the public employment service more on helping people back to 
work, increase the resources for labour market policies, help the resources be 
used more flexibly, and increase the administrative capacity and the analytical 
abilities for developing labour market policies. 
In May 2009, the Unemployment Insurance Fund indeed became responsible 
for implementing passive labour market policies as well as active ones35. 
However, the flexicurity package was only partly adopted. The agreements on 
increasing labour market flexibility were enforced fully, but some amendments 
on social security were abolished and some postponed only shortly before they 
were planned to come into force. The rise in the replacement of unemployment 
insurance benefits was abolished and the increase in the coverage of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits for the voluntarily unemployed and the rise in the 
unemployment allowance were postponed until 2013. At the beginning of 2012, 
the Government also proposed to abolish the extension of unemployment 
insurance for the voluntarily unemployed altogether. 
So the flexicurity package that was finally implemented in fact lowered the 
level of social security. Only the very minor amendments to increase the level 
of unemployment insurance benefits were implemented, giving a higher 
                                                 
34 For example, there was an amendment that people who had been on pregnancy leave, 
maternity leave, adoptive parents leave or parental leave during the previous 36 months 
could have their benefits period extended by the time spent on leave. This amendment was 
meant to increase social security for people who had been recently out of the labour force 
with small children. 
35 In May 2009 there was also a minor amendment in the law concerning those unemploy-
ment allowance recipients whose employment contract was terminated due to the 
employee’s breach of contract. Before, there was a waiting period for the unemployment 
allowance for them of 60 days and their potential benefit period was 210 days. In order not 
to punish them twice in the system, the waiting period was abolished, but the potential 
benefit period became even shorter than that for other unemployment allowance recipients 
(210 days). 
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minimum level of unemployment insurance benefits and more relaxed criteria 
for insurance contributions for those previously on pregnancy, maternity and 
parental leave. At the same time, the level of severance payment was cut, the 
notification period for redundancies was shortened and the waiting period for 
unemployment insurance benefits was brought in for those eligible for 
insurance benefit upon lay-offs from the Unemployment Insurance Fund36. 
The agreed flexicurity package was not fully implemented due to the very 
rapidly evolving economic crisis. The Government abolished the increase in the 
unemployment allowance because otherwise it would have increased even more 
the expenditures of the state budget, and due to the crisis there had been a 
significant increase in spending on the unemployment allowance already. The 
amendments that concerned unemployment insurance benefits were abolished 
because there was a threat that even the reserves of the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund would not be sufficient in times of crisis to increase spending to 
an even higher level and because of this, the unemployment insurance premium 
was also increased twice in 2009. A rise in the unemployment insurance 
premium had also been foreseen in the initial agreement between the social 
partners as it was forecast that the expenditures of the system would increase; 
however, the economic outlook during the time of agreement was not as bad as 
the reality turned out to be in 2009. 
When the unemployment insurance premium was increased in August 2009 
to 4.2% of the gross wage, with 2.8% for employees and 1.4% for employers, 
the revenues of the Unemployment Insurance Fund started again to exceed its 
expenditures. As the economy recovered remarkably between then and the 
beginning of 2012, the difference between the revenues and expenditures has 
also increased over time and the reserves of the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
have grown. However, the Government is not discussing at this point in time 
whether it is possible to return to the initial tripartite agreement and whether it 
could be possible to introduce the amendments that would increase social 
security. Instead, amendments are being discussed that would abolish those 
amendments that were initially postponed as well. In addition, there have been 
amendments and proposals for how to spend the accumulated reserves on 
targets other than unemployment insurance. This all gives some food for 
thought as to how big a role the economic crisis had in the decision not to 
implement the flexicurity package in full and how much the economic crisis 
provided the government an excuse not to implement those amendments that 
were demanded by the social partners rather than the government. 
                                                 
36 In addition, in the legal framework, the waiting period is not set to be dependent on the 
receipt of insurance benefit upon lay-off, but it is dependent on the tenure of previous 
employment and the reason for the termination of contract. So the waiting period is set for 
those whose employer should apply for the benefit upon lay-off. However, there have been 
cases when the employer has not applied for this benefit, but due to the regulation the 
waiting period for the unemployment insurance benefit has still been imposed. 
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One major change regarding the expenditures of the reserves of unemploy-
ment insurance is that as of 2012 these reserves are also used for active labour 
market policies. During the initial years of the system of labour market policies 
in Estonia, active labour market policies were financed through the state budget 
and to a smaller extent also through different projects of the European Union. 
Since 2008, the majority of active labour market policies started to be provided 
through a programme financed by the European Social Fund called Increasing 
the Supply of Qualified Labour 2007–2013. This kind of financing created the 
conditions for provision of a wider range of active measures beyond those 
stated in law and a widening of the groups of people eligible for active 
measures beyond the registered unemployed to include people such as those at 
risk of losing their job. In 2008 measures like psychological counselling and 
social rehabilitation started to be provided. Since May 2009 when the Un-
employment Insurance Fund took over the responsibility for providing active 
measures, the range of measures has widened even more and by the beginning 
of 2012 a very wide range of different measures besides those set out in the 
Labour Market Services and Benefits Act were part of the package, including 
job clubs, voluntary work, work trials, debt counselling, community work, 
individual job placement, care allowance, addiction counselling, individual 
solutions, mentoring for business start-up recipients, reaction to collective re-
dundancies, mobile counselling etc. In 2012 only a marginal amount of the 
active measures are financed through the European Social Fund and the 
majority of the measures are financed by the reserves of the unemployment 
insurance. In 2012, this wide range of measures is outlined in a decree by the 
government (Tööhõiveprogramm 2012–2013, 2011). Overall it is evident that 
the Labour Market Services and Benefits Act no longer satisfies the needs of the 
labour market and it should be thoroughly amended. 
Since May 2009 when the Unemployment Insurance Fund started to provide 
all the labour market policies, not only has the range of active measures been 
widened, but the design of the measures and the principles of provision have 
also been changed significantly. Most importantly, the provision of measures 
has been changed from being based on “wishes” to being based on “individual 
needs”. The crucial point in the system is that it should specify which services 
the individual unemployed person needs to get back to employment. The focus 
of the public employment service was turned towards helping people back to 
work and hence cooperation with employers was prioritised. Strong emphasis 
was put on activation, job search counselling and job mediation and an IT 
system was developed that was able to perform automatic matching of the 
unemployed and vacancies, pre-selection of candidates and other recruitment 
support. 
It can be concluded that the expectations from the social partners regarding 
the changeover were relatively quickly fulfilled despite the deep crisis in the 
labour market. During the changeover, Estonia suffered the sharpest increase in 
unemployment in the European Union, but since the beginning of 2010, the 
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Estonian labour market has recovered more quickly than the others (see also 
Figure 1 in the introductory part of the thesis). As the bigger changes in the 
principles of service provision were also implemented in the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund in the beginning of 2010, it can be argued that the reform in the 
labour market policy might indeed have had a significant positive impact on the 
Estonian labour market. 
 
 
2.1.2. The system of labour market policies  
in Estonia in international comparison 
The recent developments in labour market policies in Estonia are depicted in 
Figure 5. It shows that the expenditures on active labour market policies have 
indeed increased many times over since 2009. During the years of crisis both 
the number of people unemployed and the expenditures on active measures 
increased as there were more people who needed help from the public employ-
ment service. However, the figure also shows that the reform of the labour 
market institutions helped to bring more resources to active measures because 
while the number of unemployed fell sharply in 2011, the expenditures on 
active measures increased somewhat. A rise in the budget is foreseen for 2012 
too. In 2013 the budget ought to fall slightly, though spending per registered 
unemployed person is supposed to continue rising. It proves that the paradigm 
of labour market policy changed during the last reform and that active measures 
have gained much more importance. 
Appendix 1 provides a comparison of spending on active labour market 
measures with spending in the other countries in the EU. For years Estonia was 
the EU member that spends the least on active labour market policies as a share 
of GDP and 2009 was the first year when this was no longer the case. However, 
spending on active measures in Estonia still lags far behind the average in the 
EU. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Appendixes 2 and 3, which 
represent the average spending on active measures per person wanting to work 
and participants in active measures per 100 people wanting to work. Estonia 
also provided the lowest level of active labour market measures before 2009 for 
these indicators. Although, Estonia is no longer in last place since 2009, it still 
gives a low level of active measures in comparison to the EU average. 
Appendix 4 shows that on top of the increased spending on active labour 
market measures, the package of measures has changed a lot in other ways. For 
years, the provision of active labour market policies in Estonia consisted almost 
exclusively of career counselling and training. Since the reform, the package of 
active measures has been designed to meet better the needs of the unemployed. 
During the crisis, there were many unemployed with fresh working experience 
and a higher qualification, so the main concern was the lack of jobs rather than 
a lack of qualifications. For this reason, work with employers and services like 
job mediation, job search counselling, tailor-made training and wage subsidy 
17
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were prioritised. During the recovery in the labour market as the number of 
unemployed shrinks, the share of the long-term unemployed is increasing. 
These are people who might have individual and mixed obstacles to entry into 
employment. Different measures focused on these very individual needs are 
prioritised such as individual job placement, addiction counselling and debt 
counselling, together with work practice and work-related training. 
 
 
Figure 5. Spending on labour market policy by the public employment service in 
Estonia 2003–2013 
Note: 2012 and 2013 figures from budget and forecast, earlier years real expenditures. 
Categories for labour market policy interventions as in Eurostat (Labour market policy database. 
Methodology, 2006). LMP services cover all services and activities for jobseekers. LMP 
measures cover interventions that provide temporary support for groups that are disadvantaged in 
the labour market and which aim to activate the unemployed, helping people move from in-
voluntary inactivity into employment, or maintaining the jobs of people threatened by unemploy-
ment. LMP supports cover financial assistance that aims to compensate individuals for loss of 
wage or salary and support them during their job search or that facilitates early retirement. There 
are no passive measures in Estonia belonging to category 9 of LMP supports for early retirement 
intervention. 
Source: Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that spending on passive labour market policies has been higher 
than spending on active policies in most years. Spending on unemployment 
benefits sky-rocketed in 2009 as there was a vast inflow to unemployment 
because of the crisis. As they had only recently been in employment, most of 
the newly unemployed also qualified for unemployment benefits, and as the 
inflow has shrunk, the spending has also decreased. However, in 2013 the 
expenditures should increase somewhat due to the amendments in laws in-
creasing the level of the unemployment allowance and increasing the coverage 
of unemployment insurance, though it is likely that at least the latter amendment 
may be abolished before implementation. 
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The developments in the system of unemployment benefits with regards to 
the level of benefits is presented in Figure 6. When the system of unemploy-
ment benefits was introduced in Estonia, it consisted only of the unemployment 
allowance. As it was set at 80% of the minimum wage, it was not very much 
lower than the minimum wage or the average wage, but during the years since 
then both the average wage and the minimum wage have grown quite solidly 
while the level of the unemployment allowance has lagged far behind. In 2005 
and 2006 the level of the unemployment allowance reached only 15% of the 
minimum wage. During the last few years it has been around 23% of the 
minimum wage and only about 8% of the average wage. 
The average level of unemployment insurance benefit has been close to the 
minimum wage, even somewhat exceeding it during the first hundred days of 
unemployment. In consequence, the level of social security has proven to be 
significantly higher since unemployment insurance benefits were introduced 
than it was during the years before. The financial condition of the unemployed 
was worst during the few years before unemployment insurance was brought in, 
as then the difference between the wage and price level and potential unemploy-
ment benefits was the highest. 
As the average level of unemployment insurance benefits tends to be around 
the minimum wage, it can be argued that these benefits might incur some 
disincentive effects and prolong the unemployment duration but as the level of 
the unemployment allowance is extremely low, the disincentive effects of the 
unemployment allowance should be much milder. At the same time, it is also 
very likely that the level of unemployment allowance is too low to actually help 
the unemployed to look for work, so while it might not distort the labour market 
much, it might not fulfil its purpose either by not providing social security nor 
subsidising job search. 
Figure 6 also depicts the level of subsistence benefits. While subsistence 
benefit is not part of the system of unemployment benefits, it is the level of 
social security that some long-term unemployed may be eligible for. As it has 
always been at a very similar level to the unemployment allowance, the same 
conclusions apply. It probably provided social security and might have had 
some distortionary effects on the labour supply during the initial years after the 
return of independence. 
Some idea of the harshness of the eligibility criteria for unemployment bene-
fits in Estonia is provided in Figure 7. The figure shows that it has always been 
the case that around half of the registered unemployed do not have any un-
employment benefits. The coverage by unemployment benefits increases during 
recessions and spikes are visible in 1999 and 2009 as there are movements to 
unemployment from employment and the people with fresh employment experi-
ence tend to be eligible for unemployment benefits. As the inflow to unemploy-
ment slowly decreases, the share of benefit recipients declines. Those people 
who entered unemployment during the crisis and have not yet managed to find a 
new job as employment has not recovered to the pre-crisis level, have by then 
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exhausted their benefit period, meaning that during the recovery period in the 
economy the level of social security for the unemployed quickly declines. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The level of unemployment benefits in Estonia after the return of inde-
pendence  
Note: In some years the level of the minimum wage, unemployment allowance or subsistence 
benefit changed during the year. In these cases this rate is depicted that applied for most of the year. 
Source: Unemployment Insurance Fund, Statistics Estonia, Kuddo et al. (2002), Eamets (2001), 
Rõõm (2003a) 
 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of the registered unemployed receiving unemployment benefits in 
Estonia 1993–2011 
Source: Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
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The proportion of benefit recipients declined to its lowest level since the 
introduction of unemployment benefits in Estonia in 2011. The last crisis had a 
larger effect on the Estonian labour market than the crisis in the end of nineties 
as the decrease in employment was larger. Though the recovery in employment 
has also been quicker, the number of employed people in 2011 is still far behind 
the number in 2008. This means that many people have by then exhausted their 
benefit and might still not have found employment in a very short time after-
wards, for which reason the proportion of registered unemployed without any 
subsidy for job search increases. 
The decrease was especially deep in the share of unemployment insurance 
benefit recipients and their proportion still continues to decline at the beginning 
of 2012. The proportion of unemployment allowance recipients started to rise 
slowly in the second half of 2011. There is a rising share of unemployment 
insurance benefit applicants who are not eligible for unemployment insurance 
benefit because their previous employment was too short, but who are often still 
eligible for unemployment allowance. It shows that there are many people who 
have managed to exit unemployment into employment, but who have moved 
back to unemployment after a shorter period of within one year. This suggests 
the stricter criteria for eligibility for unemployment insurance benefit have also 
contributed to a decrease in the level of social security during the period of re-
covery. Because of the criteria regarding the previous record of unemployment 
insurance contributions, there are many people who have only recently been in 
employment and have become involuntarily unemployed, but receive only very 
low unemployment benefit that might not subsidise their job search. 
Figure 7 also depicts the changes in the system of unemployment benefits 
through the years described earlier in this section. The reform of 1995 that 
introduced the possibility of extending the unemployment allowance and also 
set a waiting period for some allowance recipients seems to have at least tempo-
rarily decreased the share of the registered unemployed eligible for unemploy-
ment allowance. The amendments in 2000 extended the potential benefit period, 
abolished the waiting period for the voluntarily unemployed, and relaxed the 
criteria for registering as unemployed. The impact of these changes seems to 
have occurred with a lag in 2001 as the economy was recovering by then and 
the number of unemployed was decreasing while the number of registered 
unemployed and unemployment allowance recipients increased. As the increase 
in the number of registered unemployed was bigger, the share of benefit 
recipients among the registered unemployed still decreased, so the amendments 
had a slightly greater impact on registered unemployment than on the number of 
unemployment benefit recipients. 
The introduction of unemployment insurance benefits in 2003 had the effect 
that some unemployed people became eligible for unemployment insurance 
benefit instead of the low unemployment allowance. Along with benefit level, 
the coverage of unemployment benefits also increased. During this time, 
employment increased and the number of unemployed and registered un-
18
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employed fell. However, the ratio of registered unemployed to unemployment 
benefits increased slightly. As unemployment insurance benefit and unemploy-
ment allowance have different criteria for eligibility, some people who are not 
eligible for unemployment allowance might be eligible for unemployment 
insurance benefit. 
The longer potential unemployment insurance benefit due to the maturity of 
the system in 2007 might have had some impact on the coverage rate in 2008 
rather than 2007. Similarly, the potential duration of unemployment insurance 
benefit for 360 days probably did not have a significant effect in 2011, but 
might influence the coverage rate in 2012. Firstly, on both of these occasions 
there were at first relatively few people who were eligible for the maximum 
potential period as they would have to have been in employment without any 
breaks since the beginning of 2002. Secondly, the new 270-day-benefit re-
cipients had to be in unemployment for over 180 days before their impact could 
have become visible in comparison to the 180-day-benefit recipients and to the 
360-day-benefit recipients after 270 days. 
Figures 8 and 9 give some idea about the generosity of the Estonian un-
employment benefit system compared to those of the other countries in the 
European Union37. Figure 8 pictures the coverage of unemployment benefits as 
a share of unemployment benefit recipients among all people wanting to work 
by countries. During the boom period, in 2006, only four countries had even 
lower unemployment benefit coverage than Estonia, and these were Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia38. In 2009 inflow both to unemployment and to 
unemployment benefits increased in most of the countries and hence the cove-
rage increased in most countries as well. As inflow to unemployment was 
higher in Estonia than in other countries, the coverage of unemployment bene-
fits became closer to the average coverage in the European Union. In 2006 the 
coverage of unemployment benefits in Estonia was only a third of the average 
coverage in the European Union, in 2009 it was almost two thirds. The increase 
in the coverage might also have been caused in some part by the emergence of 
270-day unemployment insurance benefits from 2007 and the marginal increase 
in the coverage rate that also came in 2007. In conclusion, the figure shows that 
the system of unemployment benefits in Estonia provides coverage far behind 
the EU average both in times of booms and in recessions. The coverage is 
especially low during better economic times. The situation is probably impro-
                                                 
37 Some comparisons of the unemployment benefit system in Estonia with other countries 
before or during the initial years of implementation of unemployment insurance benefits are 
provided by Behar (2009), Trumm (2006), Leetmaa et al. (2004), Eamets and Masso (2004), 
Paas et al. (2004), Vodopivec et al. (2003), Rõõm (2003a), Paas et al. (2003), Eamets (2001) 
and others. A somewhat more recent international comparison is presented by Võrk et al. (2010). 
A very recent and thorough comparison about the strictness of eligibility criteria for unemploy-
ment benefits in OECD and EU countries (including Estonia) is provided by Venn (2012). 
38 If all passive labour market policies are considered, including category 9: early retire-
ment schemes, then only Bulgaria had lower coverage in 2006. 
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ving somewhat as the system matures, as since March 2011 360-day unemploy-
ment insurance benefits have also been granted. 
Figure 8. Number of unemployment benefit recipients per 100 persons wanting to work 
2006 and 2009 
Note: category 8 from the classification of labour market policies considered. The data for Greece 
in 2006 are not available. Persons wanting to work include the unemployed according to the ILO 
definition and the labour reserve of inactive persons wanting to work or the discouraged 
unemployed. 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Figure 9 presents the average spending on unemployment benefits per person 
wanting to work and combines information about the coverage of benefits with 
information about the level of benefits. In 2006, only Bulgaria spent less per 
person wanting to work than Estonia. By 2009, Estonia’s spending had grown 
significantly and had increased closer to the average expenditure in the 
European Union. In 2006, Estonia’s average expenditure was about 6% of the 
average in the EU. By 2009, the expenditure had grown to 47% of the EU 
average. Though some part of the increase is probably due to the introduction of 
270-day unemployment insurance benefits, a bigger role was played by the 
more severe labour market conditions in Estonia. The overall level of social 
security provided by the system of unemployment benefits is still far behind the 
EU average and this difference is more marked during better economic times. 
The introduction of 360-day unemployment insurance benefits, the rise in the 
level of unemployment allowance and the possible coverage of the voluntarily 
unemployed with unemployment insurance benefits will probably bring Estonia 
closer to the average level of unemployment benefit generosity in the European 
Union. 
The level of the coverage rate and expenditure on unemployment benefits 
are on the one hand dependent on the generosity of the level and duration of 
benefits. The generosity of benefits can be compared between countries by the 
net replacement rate of benefits during the initial phase of unemployment and 
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for the long-term unemployed. These data are provided in the OECD database 
for benefits and wages for 2001–2009. Estonia is by these indicators among the 
countries with the least generous unemployment benefit systems in the OECD 
and the EU. 
 
 
Figure 9. Spending on unemployment benefits in PPP units per person wanting to work 
2006 and 2009 
Note: category 8 from the classification of labour market policies considered. Persons wanting to 
work include the unemployed according to the ILO definition and the labour reserve of inactive 
persons wanting to work i.e. the discouraged unemployed. 
Source: Eurostat  
 
On the other hand, the coverage and expenditures also depend on the strictness 
of the eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits. Eligibility criteria include 
the criteria for benefit granting such as previous employment and the criteria for 
the continuing receipt of benefit such as proven job search or compulsory 
participation in active labour market policies. A thorough analysis of these 
criteria in 36 OECD and EU countries in 2011 is provided by Venn (2012), who 
constructs an indicator out of four different sub-indicators39 using the legislation 
and regulations in each country to compare the eligibility criteria between the 
countries. Estonia turns out to be one of the countries with stricter entitlement 
and job-search monitoring conditions. Job search and availability requirements 
in Estonia are around the average level. However, the overall weighted indicator 
of eligibility criteria puts Estonia among the countries with strict regulations, so 
the eligibility criteria in Estonia are also a reason why the coverage of and 
                                                 
39 1) entitlement conditions: minimum employment/contribution record and sanctions for 
voluntary unemployment; 2) job-search and availability requirements: availability during 
ALMP participation, demands on occupational mobility, demands on geographical mobility 
and other valid reasons for refusing job offers; 3) monitoring: proof of job search; 
4) sanctions: sanctions for refusing job offers or ALMP participation and sanctions for 
repeated refusal of job offers or ALMP participation. 
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spending on unemployment benefits have been rather low. However, this 
indicator takes into account formal regulations and not how these regulations 
are implemented, so for example, Estonia’s sanctions for a person refusing a 
suitable job offer are in the regulations rather strict, but in practice these 
sanctions are very rarely imposed, according to the statistics of the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund.  
This section has shown that during the period after independence was 
regained, there has been a huge development in Estonia with regards to the 
provision of labour market measures. Important steps have been taken in only a 
few recent years when the provision of active and passive policies were put 
under the administration of one single organisation, which has let the provision 
of active labour market policies develop especially. The major step with regards 
to passive labour market policies was the introduction of unemployment 
insurance benefit. The generosity of the system of unemployment benefits 
continues to increase with the maturity of the system and will do so again if the 
amendments due to be implemented in 2013 are applied in reality. However, 
while the provision of labour market measures has increased in Estonia, the 
other countries in the European Union, especially the older member states, are 
instead cutting their spending on labour market policies, particularly on passive 
labour market policies, but also in recent years on labour market services. 
Regardless of these movements in the opposite direction to other countries, the 
difference in the level of labour market policy provision between Estonia and 
the EU average has not changed much. Estonia is still among the countries that 
spend the least on both active and passive labour market policies. 
Nevertheless, the level of spending cannot be a goal in itself. High expendi-
tures do not always incur low unemployment and high employment, as seen in 
Spain, nor do low expenditures always incur low employment and high 
unemployment, as shown by the United Kingdom. So it also matters a lot what 
the design of the measures is, how they are implemented, and what the other 
labour market institutions like are. This means that the effects of labour market 
policies on labour market outcomes can be different in different countries even 
if the level of provision is similar. 
 
 
2.1.3. The Estonian unemployment benefit system during  
the period under study 
While Subsection 2.1.1 discussed the changes in the provision of labour market 
measures over the past twenty years, this subsection focuses on the regulation of 
unemployment benefits during the time period that is used for the analyses of 
the effects of unemployment benefits on labour market outcomes presented in 
the following chapters. These analyses study unemployment benefits granted 
from the earliest in 2007 to the latest in March 2009. During this period the 
regulation of unemployment benefits was essentially the same in terms of 
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entitlement rules, potential periods, replacement rates, administrative organi-
sations and so forth. The sample from the crisis period, meaning benefits 
granted from July 2008 until March 2009, saw some change in institutions 
during the unemployment period as the unemployment spells are studied up to 
the first quarter of 2010, but in May 2009 the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
took over the responsibilities of the Labour Market Board and in July 2009 the 
new Employment Contracts Act came into force. However, these changes did 
not much change the regulation of unemployment benefits for those un-
employed who had already started to receive benefits earlier40. 
There were somewhat larger changes in the provision of active measures, 
though in 2009 the only change was a rise in the funding allocated for active 
measures, as unemployment was rising rapidly. During 2009, the design of 
active measures was also thoroughly analysed, but the new and redesigned 
measures and the principles for active measures were only implemented in 
2010. An increase in job-search monitoring and activation also started to 
happen after the period under study. 
However, as there were more funds allocated to active measures, there were 
also more participants in active measures in the sample from the period of 
crisis, so the periods before, during and after the participation are also included 
in the duration models for studying the effect of unemployment benefits on 
unemployment duration. In the study of the effect of unemployment benefits on 
post-unemployment job quality, those people receiving active measures are 
excluded from the study so that only the pure effect stemming from unemploy-
ment benefits is studied41. 
During the period studied, and still today, there are two main acts in the 
Estonian legal system setting the grounds for unemployment benefits. The Un-
employment Insurance Act (Töötuskindlustuse seadus, 2001) lays down the 
rules for unemployment insurance benefits. The unemployment allowance and 
matters related to registered unemployment and active labour market measures 
are laid out in the Labour Market Services and Benefits Act (Tööturuteenuste ja 
-toetuste seadus, 2005). 
Unemployment allowance (UA) is a flat, and quite low, rate benefit financed 
from the state budget. In order to be entitled to receive UA, a person has to have 
been in employment or engaged in certain other activities for at least 180 days 
during the previous 12 months. The activities that are considered equal to work 
and that give eligibility for UA are study in an educational institution, compul-
sory national conscript service, and time during which the spousal allowance is 
paid to the non-working spouse accompanying an official working in a foreign 
mission of the Republic of Estonia. Eligibility for UA is also granted to the 
                                                 
40 The only change in the regulation concerning this sample was that the minimum level of 
unemployment insurance benefit was increased and this increase is also taken into account in 
the study. 
41 In this respect the interaction effects of passive and active measures are not studied in the 
thesis. However, this could be a topic for future research. 
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unemployed who were raising a disabled child of up to 18 years of age or a 
child under 8 years of age, the unemployed who were receiving in-patient treat-
ment, those who were caring for a sick, disabled or elderly person, the 
permanently incapacitated for work and the unemployed who had been in prison 
or a house of detention. In addition, other incomes are taken into account in the 
eligibility criteria for UA, although some types of benefits are excluded42. UA is 
granted if other types of income are lower than the level of UA. 
A person who fulfils the job search criteria can usually get this allowance for 
up to 270 days. Extensions to the allowance apply when a person has less than 
180 days to go until reaching retirement age. The usual waiting period for UA is 
seven days, but if the person was engaged in full-time studies before applying 
for benefits or their employment contract was ended following a breach of 
contract, a waiting period of 60 days applied during the period under study. 
Following an employees’ breach of contract the maximum UA period was 210 
days. 
Unemployment insurance benefits (UIB) are financed from statutory un-
employment insurance contributions. In order to be entitled to receive this 
benefit, a person has to have made contributions for at least 12 months during 
the previous 36 months. In addition, differently from UA, only involuntary un-
employment is covered, meaning that the employer initiated the termination of 
the working contract. If a person has made contributions for 12 months, the 
potential UIB period is 180 days. In order to be entitled to receive UIB for 270 
days, a person has to have made contributions for 56 months, but due to the 
youth of the Estonian UIB system, this has only been possible since 2007. 
Benefit for 360 days has been available only since March 2011, as this requires 
111 months of contributions and so this potential benefit period is not studied in 
the thesis. The waiting period for UIB was always seven days during the studied 
period. 
A person who was granted UIB for 180 days and is still registered as un-
employed after this period can still apply for UA for the remaining 90 days and 
can get an extension until retirement for 180 days on the same grounds as all 
other benefit recipients. UA is not granted automatically after the UIB period 
and a person must apply for this. The eligibility for UA is then checked and as 
the rules for eligibility are different for UA and UIB, a 180-day-UIB recipient is 
generally eligible for 90-day-UA, but not always.  
Every time a person is granted a benefit, they have to start from zero to 
accumulate the insurance contributions, or the necessary employment record for 
UA, for the next unemployment period. However, if an unemployment benefit 
recipient accepts a job offer but becomes unemployed again within a year of 
being granted the benefit, they can continue receiving the benefit for the 
                                                 
42 Grants and transport and accommodation benefits during the participation in active 
measures, remuneration for public work, subsistence benefits, family benefits, social benefits 
for disabled persons, maintenance allowance, and benefits received from the voluntary un-
employment fund. 
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remaining days of the potential benefit period. This applies to both types of 
benefit and should encourage the unemployed to accept job offers even if there 
is a risk that the employment might turn out to be short-lived, perhaps because 
of difficult economic circumstances. UA recipients could even start receiving 
UIB if they accumulate the necessary unemployment insurance record through 
short-term working and then become unemployed involuntarily. 
During the benefit period both UIB and UA recipients have to fulfil the 
activity criteria, and during the period under study this meant above all 
regularly meeting consultants at the Labour Market Board, or at the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Fund from May 2009. Failing to meet the activity criteria could 
lead to sanctions. The activity criteria are stricter for UIB recipients than for UA 
recipients and a failure to meet the activity criteria for the first time means 
termination of UIB payments for UIB recipients, but suspension of UA 
payments for UA recipients. If a UA recipient refuses a suitable job or an 
activity in the individual action plan, the suspension is for 10 days. After the 
first no-show, the suspension is imposed from the last meeting with the consul-
tant until the next show-up. UA is terminated after a second failure to meet the 
activity criteria. The third failure to meet the activity criteria incurs de-regist-
ration as unemployed, although during the period under study, a person was 
allowed to register again the next day. 
An overview of the different sanctions imposed on unemployment benefit 
recipients in the years 2006–2011 is given in Table 1. The data show that a vast 
majority of sanctions applied for failure to meet the consultant at the public 
employment service. A refusal to follow the individual action plan, including 
refusal to participate in an active measure, is of much smaller importance and 
only became a somewhat higher proportion of sanctions in 2011 when the Un-
employment Insurance Fund became responsible for activating the registered 
unemployed. However, 2011 is already entirely out of the observable time 
period for this thesis. During the years of crisis there were practically no sanc-
tions for refusing a suitable job offer, and so it appears that in the Estonian 
system the use of sanctions is quite low and sanctions are mostly imposed only 
for no-shows. The level of sanctions was particularly low during the time period 
studied in this thesis. 
From January 2007 until June 2009, the minimum UIB equalled the UA flat 
rate. Since July 2009 the minimum rate of UIB has been half the minimum 
wage during the preceding year, so in practice about twice the UA43. However, 
UIB is usually 4–5 times higher than UA as it is 50% of the previous average 
wage during the first 100 days and 40% thereafter. Earnings in the previous 12 
employed months are taken into account as an average of the nine employed 
months preceding the last three employed months. When a person’s average 
wage is calculated for UIB, the maximum limit is three times the national 
                                                 
43 The same amendment was supposed to be implemented for UA, but it was postponed 
until 2013. 
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average wage. This means that in general the replacement rate is 50% and later 
on 40%, but a small percentage of people have a higher replacement rate 
because of their low previous wage and about the same number of people have 
a lower replacement rate because of their very high previous earnings. Personal 
income tax applies generally on UIB, but not on UA, as UA is lower than the 
minimum taxable amount. 
 
Table 1. Number of sanctions imposed on unemployment benefit recipients 2006–2011 
Sanction  
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Unemployment insurance benefit – premature termination of payments 
No-show for the first time 250 137 153 1080 1527 846 
Refusal of an activity in the individual 
action plan or a job offer for the first time 6 2 1 0 0 0 
Refusal of an active labour market measure 
for the first time 2 8 6 24 28 66 
Total 258 147 160 1104 1555 912 
Share of UIB recipients sanctioned 2.9% 1.8% 1.0% 1.9% 2.5% 2.8% 
Unemployment allowance – suspension of payments  
No-show for the first time 461 271 208 402 429 461 
Refusal of a job offer for the first time 27 23 1 1 18 2 
Refusal of an activity in the individual 
action plan for the first time 146 195 77 76 138 411 
Total 760 565 348 638 1709 1556 
Share of UA recipients sanctioned 3.8% 3.2% 1.5% 1.4% 3.8% 5.1% 
Unemployment allowance – premature termination of payments  
No-show for the second time 97 0 29 54 19 16 
Refusal of a job offer for the second time 6 7 0 0 0 0 
Refusal of an activity in the individual 
action plan for the second time 13 12 4 5 2 20 
Total 116 19 33 59 21 36 
Share of UA recipients sanctioned 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
The classification of benefit recipients in the information system of the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund for sanctions is somewhat different for UIB and UA recipients. For UIB it is possible to 
distinguish whether a person refused to participate in an active labour market measure but for UA 
this sanction belongs to the group “Refusing an activity in the individual action plan”. For UA it 
is possible to distinguish whether a person turned down a job offer. 
Source: Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund, author’s calculations 
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When the UIB and UA periods are exhausted, a person is not eligible for any 
unemployment benefits. They can however apply for subsistence benefit from 
the local government. Subsistence benefits are low and means-tested benefits 
that depend on the income of all the members of a household44. There are no 
time limits for subsistence benefit, though it has to be applied for every month 
anew. 
In conclusion, almost all benefit recipients are covered by unemployment 
benefits for at least 270 days, but the coverage is higher for 270-day-UIB 
recipients, and nowadays for 360-day-UIB recipients. For 180-day-UIB re-
cipients the coverage drops significantly after 180 days. For UA recipients the 
coverage with monetary benefits is very low throughout the benefit period. 
 
 
2.2. Previous studies concerning passive labour 
market policies in Estonia 
There are a few studies that examine the Estonian labour market during the last 
global economic downturn, but the system of unemployment benefits is dealt 
with only very briefly in these studies. There are some less recent studies that 
also try to estimate the effects of unemployment and other benefits on labour 
supply, but these studies tend to use data from the period when the system of 
unemployment benefits differed a lot from the current system in Estonia before 
the introduction of unemployment insurance benefits. Furthermore, there are no 
studies available in Estonia dealing with the effects of unemployment benefits 
on post-unemployment job quality. 
There are a few recent studies that, like this thesis, use the Estonian data to 
explore the labour market in extremely bad circumstances. A study by Meriküll 
(2011) investigates mobility in the Estonian labour market throughout the 
previous boom-bust cycle by analysing worker flows, unemployment duration, 
employment and job-to-job spells. The estimation results indicate that during 
the crisis labour market mobility was high due to high levels of movement from 
employment to unemployment and higher geographical mobility. However, 
there was less mobility during the crisis with regards to job-to-job movement, or 
movements between industries and occupations. She finds very strong support 
for the argument that hiring rates in Estonia are pro-cyclical and separation rates 
counter-cyclical. The probability of exiting unemployment for employment 
declined more and the probability of exiting employment for unemployment 
increased more for people with low education and for non-Estonians. Un-
employment duration analysis has not been able to estimate the unemployment 
benefit effects in this study due to data limitations. However, the patterns of 
                                                 
44 During the period under study, the maximum possible subsistence benefit for a single-
member household was close to the level of UA. Households with more members had lower 
maximum rates. 
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unemployment duration at the beginning of the last decade and during the end 
years of it turn out to be quite different and she argues that the implementation 
of the system of unemployment insurance benefits could indeed have changed 
the labour market behaviour of the unemployed as unemployment benefits 
might have increased unemployment duration. Meriküll does not find any 
statistically significant evidence that the new Employment Contract Act that 
came into force in July 2009 had an impact on unemployment or employment 
duration. 
Another recent study on the impacts of the global economic crisis on the 
Estonian labour market and also on the Latvian and Lithuanian labour markets 
is by Masso and Krillo (2011). They study the adjustments in the labour market 
in response to the crisis and the impact of the crisis on different labour market 
segments. They also note that the reduction in employment took place above all 
because of high flows from employment to unemployment and only marginally 
due to lower hiring rates. In addition to the adjustment in employment, wage 
adjustments, principally cuts, also occurred and more flexible work arrange-
ments emerged. They observe that labour market conditions worsened more for 
males, young people and non-natives, similarly to Meirküll (2011). However, 
they do not assess the role of unemployment benefits on the labour market 
adjustments. 
More recent papers on the system of social security in Estonia, including 
unemployment benefits, assess for example the efficiency of the organisation of 
the system of social security in Estonia (Veldre et al. (2011)) and the possibili-
ties for sustainable financing of the Estonian social security system (Aaviksoo 
et al. (2011)). Studies on the effects of unemployment benefits on labour market 
outcomes tend to be somewhat less recent. There are a few papers that analyse 
the effects of benefits on labour supply and unemployment duration, but there 
appear to be no studies so far on Estonian data analysing the effects of 
unemployment benefits on post-unemployment job quality. 
There are several analyses that study the potential effects of different bene-
fits by calculating such indicators as marginal effective tax rates, unemployment 
traps and low-wage traps for different types of household (Võrk et al (2010), 
Võrk and Paulus (2006), Kallaste et al. (2005), Kuddo et al. (2002)). All these 
studies indicate that even though there are relatively low unemployment 
benefits available during the period, labour supply might still be somewhat 
restricted among people whose potential wage is not much above the minimum 
wage. 
A research report by Võrk et al (2010) studies the role of the flexicurity 
concept in the system of social security in Estonia. For this they also analyse the 
potential effects of the benefit system, including unemployment insurance 
benefits, on the incentives to work for different types of household in Estonia 
during 2000–2009. They conclude that the system of social security restricts the 
labour supply relatively less than in many other countries in the European 
Union as the level of benefits is low. However, the system supports the tran-
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sition to full-time jobs and not to part-time jobs as the payment of unemploy-
ment benefits and subsistence benefits is fully terminated even if only a part-
time job is accepted. They also propose that the unemployment trap increased 
significantly in 2003 when the system of unemployment insurance was imple-
mented45. 
A study by Võrk and Paulus (2006) analyses the effects of the system of 
taxes and social benefits on the incentives for labour supply in Estonia using 
data from the Household Budget Survey for 2000–2004. With regards to social 
benefits they analyse the effects of subsistence benefits, unemployment bene-
fits, parental benefits and pensions. They note that during those years the 
distortionary effect of unemployment benefits on the labour supply was low in 
international comparison due to the relatively low level of benefits. Potential 
periods of unemployment benefits were kept short to cover the risk of un-
employment only temporarily and were not designed to secure income for the 
long-term unemployed. This suggests that unemployment benefits might have 
had more of an effect on the short-term labour supply. As the potential periods 
of unemployment benefits increased in 2007 and 2011 due to the maturity of the 
unemployment insurance system, the effect of unemployment benefits might 
currently be somewhat greater. However, more detailed simulations on different 
policies are only conducted in this study on subsistence benefits, but not on 
unemployment benefits. Subsistence benefits might rather hinder labour supply 
for the long-term unemployed. 
One slightly earlier study on the impact of different benefits on labour 
supply in Estonia is by Kuddo et al. (2002). They analyse the potential effect of 
unemployment allowances, unemployment insurance benefits, severance 
payments, subsistence benefits and parental benefits on different types of 
household using data from the Household Budget Survey for 2000. They conc-
lude for unemployment benefits that the labour supply might be restricted for 
people whose potential wage is close to the minimum wage. They also conduct 
an econometric analysis to study the effects of parental benefits and subsistence 
benefits on the labour supply. They argue that the effect of unemployment 
allowances on the behaviour of people is similar to the effect of subsistence 
benefits, though only temporary, and thus they do not include unemployment 
allowance in their model. However, the results show that subsistence benefits 
do not have any significant impact on the labour supply for women nor men, 
suggesting that potentially unemployment allowances do not have any impact 
either. Parental benefits restrict the labour supply for women but not for men. 
Nevertheless, they propose that a statistically significant effect of subsistence 
benefits, and of unemployment allowances, could be exposed if it were only the 
wage of potential low wage earners that was studied. 
                                                 
45 Similar conclusions can be drawn from the research report by Kallaste et al. (2005) who 
study the potential effects of different benefits separately for 2002 and 2003 using a similar 
methodology, also taking unemployment insurance benefits into account in 2003. 
 81 
There are only a few studies that try to analyse the job search behaviour of 
the unemployed. Rõõm (2004) studies differences in job search behaviour bet-
ween men and women and whether differences in job search behaviour explain 
the large gender wage gap in Estonia. She finds that unemployed men do indeed 
search for employment more actively than women and this difference reduces 
the residual gender wage gap significantly. No variable for unemployment 
benefits is included in the estimated models for search activity, but as the period 
studied is 1998–2000, there was anyway only a low means-tested unemploy-
ment allowance available and no unemployment insurance benefits yet. In 
addition, it is most likely that the majority of the unemployed studied were not 
eligible even for unemployment allowance any longer as the average unemploy-
ment duration for the unemployed in the sample was 3.45 years. Nevertheless, 
she includes a variable that indicates per capita labour income earned by other 
family members and an interaction term of this variable with a female dummy. 
The income per family member during unemployment should have a negative 
impact on job search intensity similar to that of unemployment benefits. The 
coefficient for the interaction term of income and female dummy should also be 
negative if unemployment income has a systematically greater impact on search 
activity for women. However, the impact of income turns out to be significant 
in only one model out of four and has a positive sign. The interaction term does 
not turn out to be significant in any of the models, so the estimation results 
indicate that income per family member during the unemployment period does 
not have much impact on job search activity. However, it can be argued that 
unemployment benefits and the income of other household members in the 
family can have a different impact on search behaviour as unemployment bene-
fits are terminated upon entry into employment while the income of other 
family members might not be. 
Hinnosaar (2003) studies a similar period (1997–2000) to Rõõm (2004) and 
also finds that women search for employment less actively than men and that 
income by other household members might not influence search intensity as the 
estimated coefficient has a positive sign, but turns out not to be significant. In 
addition, women have a lower reservation wage than men, which could also 
contribute to the persistence of the gender wage gap. Hinnosaar (2003) focuses 
on estimating the impact of unemployment benefits on the reservation wage and 
search intensity and uses the predicted values of reservation wages and search 
intensity to see if they have an impact on unemployment duration. As the data 
are from 1997–2000, there are no unemployment insurance benefits yet, but 
only the low means-tested unemployment allowances and subsistence benefits 
in the data. Her estimation results show that even very low benefits during the 
unemployment period decrease search intensity and through that prolong un-
employment duration. However, the estimation results show that eligibility for 
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unemployment benefits does not influence the reservation wage46 even though 
search theory predicts that unemployment benefits should increase the reser-
vation wage, which in turn restricts the hazard of leaving unemployment. She 
does show that the income of the other household members increases the 
reservation wage and that a higher reservation wage does indeed increase un-
employment duration. She argues that the result of unemployment benefits not 
influencing the reservation wage in contradiction to the predictions of search 
theory might be caused by the data used, which cover only the fact of eligibility 
for benefits available and not the exact level, or that some unobservable factors 
may have played a role47. 
Another study by Hinnosaar (2004) studies the impacts of different possible 
labour market policy reforms using a computable general equilibrium model. 
Data from 2001, before the unemployment insurance system was introduced, 
are used for the simulations. In addition, different elasticities are taken from 
previous studies that used data from countries other than Estonia. The replace-
ment rate of benefits in the model is 32% for low-skilled workers and 23% for 
skilled workers. 
One simulation regarding benefits by Hinnosaar (2004) considers the case 
where the replacement rate of benefits increases for both skilled and low-skilled 
workers. The simulation shows that this reform would increase wages for both 
groups of workers, while production and employment would decrease and 
unemployment would increase. The second simulation regarding benefits is an 
increase in the replacement rate only for high-skilled workers, who otherwise 
have a lower replacement rate. She argues that this simulation resembles the 
reform of introducing unemployment insurance benefits in Estonia. In this 
simulation the wage increase is much smaller, unemployment increases less and 
the decrease in production and labour demand is lower. 
Research reports by Võrk and Leetmaa (2007) and Võrk, Leppik and Leet-
maa (2005) also shed some light on the effects of benefits on unemployment 
duration. Both of these studies analyse collective redundancies in Estonia. The 
first of them uses data from 2005–2007 and uses propensity score matching to 
show that higher severance payments prolong the period of unemployment 
insurance benefit. The study from 2005 uses data from 2003–2004 and shows 
                                                 
46 The estimated coefficient for unemployment benefits in the model for the reservation 
wage turns out in fact to be negative, indicating that unemployment benefits might even 
lower the reservation wage. However, this result does not turn out to be statistically signi-
ficant. 
47 The analysis of this study regarding the impact of benefits on the reservation wage is pre-
sented in more detail in Rõõm (2003b). As the estimated models are very similar, the results 
are also very similar, though one major difference is that the eligibility for benefits is inclu-
ded in the model of the reservation wage. In this paper it is argued that unemployment 
benefits might not only influence job search intensity, but also the job offer arrival rate and 
through this also extend unemployment duration. An earlier paper on labour market flows by 
Rõõm (2002) also estimates a model for unemployment duration. However, this model does 
not incorporate any variable for unemployment benefits. 
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that on average people who are made redundant collectively experience shorter 
spells of unemployment insurance benefits. However, this conclusion ignores 
the fact that other unemployment insurance benefit recipients might also have 
received some severance payments. They also argue that people who were made 
redundant collectively might have had a better qualification level than other 
unemployed people. 
In conclusion, there are only a few studies that use Estonian data to analyse 
the potential effects of unemployment benefits on labour market outcomes. 
Even though most of them use data from the period before unemployment 
insurance benefits had been implemented, they still tend to suggest that even 
very low benefits might have some impact on unemployment duration. Un-
fortunately, there are no studies on Estonian data analysing the effects of 
unemployment benefits on post-unemployment job quality. 
 
 
2.3. Data used in the study 
This thesis focuses on Estonian data on unemployment benefit recipients from 
the last global financial crisis. During this last economic downturn Estonia 
witnessed the highest rise in unemployment in the whole of the European 
Union. Although the Estonian economy had already started to shrink by the 
beginning of the crisis, the unemployment rate was still low (see Figure 10). In 
the second quarter of 2008, the unemployment rate in Estonia was 4%, one of 
the lowest in the European Union. During the crisis, Estonia witnessed rapid 
growth in the unemployment rate and by the first quarter of 2010 it had reached 
20%, one of the highest in the European Union. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Number of unemployed in Estonia 2005–2010 and the scope of the study 
UB – unemployment benefits (unemployment insurance benefit and unemployment allowance) 
Sources: Statistics Estonia, Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
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In this dissertation, the unemployment duration is first studied during the pre-
crisis period to shed some light on whether the effects of benefits differ during 
the pre-crisis and crisis periods. To achieve this, the data for UIB recipients to 
whom UIB was granted during 2007 are analysed. The year 2007 was the first 
year when it became possible to grant UIB for 270 days and not only for 180 
days, which had not been possible in earlier years because of the youth of the 
UIB system. During 2007, economic growth was slowing down, but the 
Estonian economy was not yet in crisis as the GDP growth rate was 7.5% in 
2007. 
The main focus in this dissertation is on the behaviour of unemployment 
benefit recipients during the crisis period. To analyse the crisis period, it looks 
at unemployment benefits granted during the first three quarters that saw the 
sharp increase in unemployment rate, from July 2008 until March 2009. 
The thesis focuses on studying the labour market behaviour of unemploy-
ment insurance benefit recipients. Unemployment insurance benefit is paid 
upon involuntary unemployment; its size depends on the previous wage and its 
potential length depends on the previous record of insurance contributions. In 
some parts of the analysis of the disincentive effects during the crisis (Sub-
section 3.2), unemployment allowance recipients are also studied. Unemploy-
ment allowance is a low flat rate benefit for those unemployed who are 
unemployed voluntarily, meaning at least where formally the employer did not 
initiate the termination of the working contract, or whose previous employment 
record is relatively short. Unemployment allowance recipients are somewhat 
different from unemployment insurance benefit recipients in observable 
variables, but are also likely to be different in unobservable variables, so it is 
arguable whether unemployment allowance recipients can be used as a 
comparison group for unemployment insurance benefit recipients. 
In addition, there might be an inflow to registered unemployment of people 
who do not qualify for either of the unemployment benefits. These are people 
who have previously had only a very short employment period of less than half 
a year during the previous year or who have not been in employment over a 
longer period at all and have previously been in inactivity or in unregistered 
unemployment. As these people are likely to be significantly different from 
benefit recipients, these observations cannot be included as a control group in a 
study estimating benefit effects. In addition, the unemployed who are not regis-
tered and for that reason do not receive any unemployment benefits are also 
likely to behave differently regardless of the benefit receipt and could not be 
used as a comparison group even were there data available about them for the 
study. 
For these reasons the thesis concentrates on studying the differences in the 
behaviour of unemployment insurance benefit recipients with different potential 
benefit periods of 180 days and 270 days. The problem of unobservable variab-
les in comparison of these groups is likely to be much smaller than it is in com-
parison of unemployment insurance benefit recipients with any of the other 
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groups of the unemployed. The unemployed with different potential benefit 
duration are all unemployed involuntarily and they have some relevant previous 
employment record. However, the length of the previous employment record 
can differ significantly as the requirement of longer previous insurance contri-
butions for a longer benefit period tends to be in correlation with tenure in the 
previous job. To guard against the potential problem of unobservable variables 
caused by different previous tenure, estimations are also presented for observa-
tions near the cut-off point of eligibility for the longer potential period. This 
method resembles the RDD methodology and is applied to the crisis data 
(Subsections 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2). As there are too few observations during the pre-
crisis period, it is not applicable to the pre-crisis data. 
In addition, unemployment insurance benefit recipients who are continuing 
the benefit period from the last unemployment period are included in some parts 
of the analysis of the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment 
duration. The potential unemployment insurance benefit period for them is 
different from 180/270 days and so the inclusion of those observations allows 
the effect of benefit receipt on the hazard of leaving unemployment over the 
unemployment period to be estimated. However, the inclusion of those obser-
vations does impose the limitation that such people might behave differently 
from the other unemployed as they have been in unemployment for a short 
period during the preceding year. On the other hand there are also recent 
unemployment spells in some of the observations of people with the maximum 
benefit period who were not eligible for or did not apply for unemployment 
benefits during their last unemployment period. 
In consequence the thesis uses only data about unemployment benefit re-
cipients. The focus is on comparing the behaviour of unemployment insurance 
benefit recipients with the potential benefit periods of 180 and 270 days, though 
in some parts of the analysis the unemployed with a different potential benefit 
period and unemployment allowance recipients are also considered. This means 
that the conclusions from the analyses can be drawn above all about the effects 
of the generosity of unemployment benefits as benefits with different generosity 
levels are compared and less about the total effects of the unemployment benefit 
system. This applies particularly in Chapter 4, where only 180-day-UIB and 
270-day-UIB recipients are compared and so the differences in the behaviour of 
the unemployed arising specifically from the 90 days of difference in benefit 
generosity can be studied. 
As already mentioned, the Estonian unemployment benefit system consists 
of unemployment insurance benefit and unemployment allowance. Until May 
2009, registered unemployment and the unemployment allowance were ad-
ministered by the Estonian Labour Market Board and unemployment insurance 
benefit was administered by the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund. In 
May 2009, the responsibilities of the Labour Market Board were taken over by 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund and so it became possible to merge the 
databases of registered unemployed and unemployment insurance benefit 
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recipients. There is a record for every benefit recipient in the registered un-
employment database, because a person has to register as unemployed before 
applying for benefit. 
The data on the characteristics of unemployment benefit recipients and the 
data about the passive and active measures they received are taken from the 
databases of the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund, including the data-
base of the former Labour Market Board. More specifically, the following data 
from these databases are used: date of application for benefit, date of granting 
of benefit, potential end of benefit period, actual end of benefit period, reason 
for termination of benefit, rate of benefit granted, average previous wage, 
reason for termination of employment contract, gender, date of birth, education, 
citizenship, main language, county, residence in the countryside or in a town, 
duration of last employment, previous occupation, disability, lack of Estonian 
proficiency, knowledge of English, and potential and real beginning and ending 
dates of participation in different active measures. In the sample for the pre-
crisis period there are a total of 6097 observations. The summary statistics for 
this group is provided in Section 3.1. The sample for the crisis period consists 
of 41,044 observations and the summary statistics for specific sub-groups under 
study are provided in Sections 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2. 
The uniqueness of the research in this dissertation is that although it uses 
administrative data about registered unemployment, there is relatively good 
definition of whether and when exit to employment really occurs, because data 
about registered unemployment are in turn combined with wage data from the 
Estonian Tax and Customs Board48. Wage data for the observations from the 
pre-crisis period are observed for 2007–200849, so unemployment duration is 
studied during a slight economic slowdown but before the crisis in the Estonian 
labour market (see Figure 10). For the crisis period, the wage data for exploring 
benefit effects on unemployment duration are matched for the observations 
from July 2008 to March 201050 when unemployment peaked. For studying the 
effects on post-unemployment wages, the wage data until September 2010 are 
considered and the post-unemployment job duration is studied from the wage 
data up to April 2011. However, exits to employment during the crisis period 
are also studied in the analysis of post-unemployment wage and job duration, 
                                                 
48 Employment in the formal sector is covered exceptionally well but it is not possible to 
take into account employment in the informal sector. 
49 In the sample all registered unemployment spells start between 01.01.2007 and 
31.12.2007. Exit to employment can be in December 2008 at the latest, otherwise the spells 
are censored as of December 2008. In this way, the minimum length of a spell can be one 
day and the maximum two years. Censoring can occur between one and two years after the 
start of a spell. 
50 Registered unemployment spells start between 01.07.2008 and 31.03.2009. Exit to 
employment can be in March 2010 at the latest, otherwise the spells are censored as of 
March 2010. This means the minimum length of an unemployment spell is one day and the 
maximum seven quarters. Censoring can occur between one year and seven quarters after the 
beginning of an unemployment spell. 
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and only the observations where exit to employment took place by the first 
quarter of 2010 at the latest are included. The administrative data about taxes 
allow joblessness and employment periods to be determined very precisely 
beyond the benefit and registered unemployment periods. It is possible to 
determine unemployment spells up to the point when a person actually gets a 
job and starts earning a wage. 
An exit into employment is considered to occur when the first wage obser-
vation appears in the data. Wage data are monthly and indicate the month when 
a person received a wage. In general, wages are paid either at the end of the 
month for the current month or at the beginning of the month for the previous 
month, so the first wage observation means that a person started a job either 
during the month in which the wage observation appears or during the previous 
month. For this reason all entries to employment are taken as occurring on the 
first day of the month in which the wage observation appears as an average of 
the start of a job up to 30 days earlier or up to 30 days later51. The first wage 
observation is limited to being later than the beginning of the benefit period as 
this is considered the start of the spell.  
The entry to employment for an unemployed person is considered to have 
happened when any amount of wage is declared by an employer in the data and 
this determines the length of the unemployment period for unemployment 
duration analysis. For study of the post-unemployment wage, information about 
the size of the wage is also used. The wage declared in the second month of 
employment is considered to be the starting wage as the wage in the first month 
might very often not be for a full month. The post-unemployment average wage 
is calculated for people who received a wage for at least seven months over a 
period of nine months to allow for breaks in the wage because of illnesses and 
vacations where the wage might not be declared for every consecutive month. 
In addition, information about the employer is used for studying post-
unemployment job duration as a proxy for post-unemployment job quality. Only 
the wage declared by the employer who declared a wage in the first month of 
entry to employment is taken into account in the following months. The 
employment relationship is considered to be continuing if the same employer 
continues to be the one declaring the highest wage, meaning temporary or part-
time jobs on the side are not taken into account. As with the study of the wage, 
breaks in the employment data are allowed and the employment relationship is 
deemed to continue if the same employer does not declare a wage for one 
month, but does declare it a month later. 
Unfortunately, the data available for post-unemployment employment are 
limited to monthly data for the wage level and the registration number of the 
employer, so it is not possible to study any aspects of post-unemployment job 
quality other than wage and employment duration. However, post-unemploy-
                                                 
51 No statistics are available as to whether it is more common to receive a wage in the same 
month or in the following month. 
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ment wage and job duration are considered to be relatively adequate proxies for 
post-unemployment job quality in the empirical literature on unemployment 
benefit effects. 
Subsection 2.1.3 established that sanctions are seldom imposed in Estonia 
and mostly for no-shows at the public employment service. There is no 
variation at all in sanctions for UIB recipients, where only termination is 
possible, and only limited variation for UA recipients, where termination and 
suspension are possible. If a benefit is terminated due to a no-show, the 
dominant sanction in the data, it is not possible to see from the available data 
whether a person did not show up because they had already entered employ-
ment or whether the sanction had the impact of making that person exit 
unemployment, because the wage data are only monthly and so they are not 
precise enough. Furthermore, there are no data available for the period under 
study on monitoring of the job search activity or threats of sanctions. This 
means it is not possible to estimate from the Estonian data whether monitoring 
and sanctions on benefit recipients could affect the disincentive effect or post-
unemployment job quality. 
All in all, the data used in the thesis can still be considered as exceptionally 
good for studying the effects of unemployment benefits compared to those used 
in many other studies on the topic. The use of administrative data allows the 
unemployment and employment periods and the wage level to be defined very 
precisely. In addition, the data cover the receipt of unemployment benefits and 
participation in active measures in detail as well as a broad range of the 
personal characteristics of the people registered as unemployed. 
 
 
2.4. Hypotheses of the study 
Drawing on the theoretical and empirical search theory literature discussed in 
the first chapter and the Estonian unemployment benefit system outlined in this 
chapter, three hypotheses are postulated in the thesis. Two of them concern the 
effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration and one of them 
the effects on post-unemployment job quality. 
The first hypothesis of the thesis is that the unemployment benefit system in 
Estonia does incur longer unemployment spells, meaning unemployment bene-
fits have disincentive effects and more generous benefits have higher disincen-
tive effects. The existence of these effects stems straightforwardly from the 
search model. It can be shown that more generous benefits with higher levels or 
longer potential duration increase the reservation wage and decrease job search 
activity. This means there is a lower probability of a job offer being received 
and a lower probability of a job offer being accepted. This in turn leads to 
longer unemployment spells. 
The positive relationship between unemployment benefits and unemploy-
ment duration is also substantiated in many previous studies for example Røed 
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and Zhang (2003), van Ours and Vodopivec (2006), Lalive et al. (2011)). 
Furthermore, the few previous studies conducted on Estonian data a decade ago 
have also identified possible negative effects from subsistence benefits and 
unemployment allowance on labour supply (Hinnosaar (2003), or slightly less 
confirming results by Kuddo et al. (2002)). The system of unemployment bene-
fits in Estonia has become far more generous than it was in that time period, so 
the disincentive effects of the system of unemployment benefits should now be 
even more evident. 
While most studies concerning the relationship between the generosity of 
unemployment benefits and unemployment duration do confirm the existence of 
the disincentive effect of benefits, there are also some studies that do not find it. 
These may be cases where systems of unemployment benefits with stricter 
monitoring, sanctioning and activation are studied. There are several studies 
showing that the application of stricter monitoring, activation and sanctions 
decreases the disincentive effect significantly (for example Abbring et al. 
(2005), Boone et al. (2009), Svarer (2011)). This means the disincentive effect 
of benefits cannot emerge as easily in systems that apply stricter eligibility 
criteria for benefits. However, the level of monitoring and sanctioning during 
the period studied has been quite modest, and so it can be expected that signi-
ficant disincentive effects of unemployment benefits will indeed occur. 
The second hypothesis postulated in the thesis is that the effect of unemploy-
ment benefits on unemployment duration is smaller during a period of crisis 
than during better economic times. In the framework of search theory, the 
magnitude of the disincentive effect through business cycles is ambiguous as it 
can be shown that there might be both effects that make it lower and effects that 
make it higher. Although it is rather more expected that the disincentive effect 
might be milder in worse economic circumstances, it is ultimately unproven 
empirically.  
There are only a few empirical studies investigating the magnitude of the 
disincentive effect in different economic situations. These studies mainly 
suggest that there are lower disincentive effects in worse economic circum-
stances (for example Schmieder et al. (2010), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011)). 
This thesis studies the disincentive effect of unemployment benefits during an 
extremely deep recession and compares the results with the pre-crisis period 
when the economic situation was better. It follows that if the disincentive effect 
is indeed smaller in a worse economic situation, this should be visible in the 
data used in this study. 
The third hypothesis posed in the thesis is that more generous unemploy-
ment benefits incur higher post-unemployment job quality. It is argued in the 
search literature that unemployment benefits decrease the opportunity cost of 
job search and hence relax the restrictions on searching. In this way more 
generous benefits could lead to better match quality between workers and jobs 
and improve post-unemployment job quality. 
23
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There are several empirical studies that show the positive relationship 
between the generosity of unemployment benefits and post-unemployment job 
quality (for example Gangl (2004a), Centeno and Novo (2006), Tatsiramos 
(2009)), but also some that do not find strong support for it (for example 
Addison and Blackburn (2000), Lalive (2007), (Schmieder et al. (2012)). The 
positive effect of unemployment benefits tends to be found more often on 
subsequent job duration rather than on the post-unemployment wage. The posi-
tive effect of unemployment benefits on the post-unemployment wage might be 
milder because unemployment benefits are at the same time still expected to 
increase unemployment duration. However, the offer wage distribution might 
deteriorate when the unemployment spell lengthens and so it is more likely that 
the Estonian data might also show the effect of the generosity of unemployment 
benefits to be stronger on job duration than on wages. 
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3. THE IMPACT OF THE GENEROSITY  
OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ON 
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION IN ESTONIA 
3.1. Disincentive effects of unemployment  
insurance benefits: the pre-crisis period52 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The search model predicts a disincentive effect of unemployment benefits on 
the exit from unemployment into employment as more generous unemployment 
benefits increase unemployment duration. This effect is often substantiated in 
empirical studies such as Røed and Zhang (2003), Lalive et al. (2006), though 
research on Eastern European data is very scarce (van Ours and Vodopivec 
(2006)). 
This section uses a dataset about unemployment insurance benefit recipients 
and their exits to employment in Estonia before the global economic crisis to 
investigate the effects of benefits on unemployment duration. The number of 
registered unemployed and the number of new UIB recipients both fell to their 
lowest level by the end of 2006, a year with very high economic growth of 10%. 
In 2007, growth started to slow down and unemployment started to grow until 
in 2009 it had surpassed even the level of the previous crisis at the beginning of 
the decade. This study looks at those UIB recipients to whom UIB was granted 
during 2007. Firstly, this is because it is then possible to distinguish between 
recipients to whom the benefit was granted for 180 days and those who received 
it for 270 days. Secondly, economic growth was slowing down in 2007 but the 
economy was not yet in deep crisis. 
First, the duration of unemployment is analysed using non-parametric 
methods. After that, a piecewise-constant proportional hazard model is applied 
to estimate the impact of unemployment benefits and of other covariates. Both 
methods reveal strong disincentive effects and a spike at benefit exhaustion. 
In addition, the study presented in this section covers participation in active 
measures during the unemployment spell. Recent literature suggests that active 
labour market programmes might work better as a stick rather than as a carrot 
(see for example Black et al. (2003), Geerdsen (2006), Geerdsen and Holm 
(2007)). The threat of being required to participate in an active measure might 
have an ex ante effect and make people leave unemployment for employment. 
For that reason, when estimating the piecewise-constant proportional hazard 
model, covariates before, during and after active measures are also included in 
the model. As the active measures in Estonia are applied more to people who 
themselves want to participate rather than forcing the unemployed to parti-
cipate, the results show that the unemployed tend to wait for the measures and 
                                                 
52 Some parts of this section are published in Lauringson (2011). 
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the probability of leaving unemployment into employment is lower just before 
the start of these measures. 
 
 
3.1.2. Non-parametric analysis 
In the study presented in this section, the labour market behaviour of two 
groups of UIB recipients is studied: the unemployed with a potential UIB period 
of 180 days and the unemployed with a potential UIB period of 270 days. The 
semi-parametric analysis also covers those UIB recipients who continue their 
UIB period for the remaining days from a previous benefit period because they 
were initially granted UIB for 180 or 270 days, but were briefly in employment 
and during the unemployment spell under study were consequently granted a 
shorter UIB period. Inclusion of those benefit recipients allows the effects of 
unemployment benefits to be estimated parametrically53. In the non-parametric 
analysis these benefit recipients are not included to reveal better the different 
behaviour of benefit recipients due to the different potential benefit period. 
The groups of people to whom UIB is granted for 180 days and for 270 days 
are different in several ways (see Table 2). Recipients for 270 days are on 
average slightly older and better educated and have previously worked in 
higher-ranking occupations. Their tenure in their last job was on average longer, 
which is in some part also the reason why they are eligible for the longer 
unemployment insurance benefit. 
To study the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration 
during the pre-crisis period, data about unemployment insurance payments and 
the characteristics of recipients are combined with wage data from the Estonian 
Tax and Customs Board up to December 2008. This means it is possible to 
determine unemployment spells up to the point when a person actually gets a 
job and starts earning a wage. 
An exit from unemployment into employment is considered to have occurred 
when the first wage observation appears in the monthly tax data. The first wage 
observation is taken into account if it is later than the beginning of the un-
employment spell and the unemployment benefit spell. When this method is 
applied, 75.5% of spells end in employment with 76.1% of 180-day-UIB 
recipients and 74.9% of 270-day-UIB recipients exiting to employment. 
 
                                                 
53  The inclusion of these benefit recipients is crucial for the estimation of the effects of 
benefits on unemployment duration. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these recipients has a 
limitation that they might exhibit a slightly different disincentive effect of unemployment 
benefits as they have already once accepted a job during the benefit period. However, there 
are observations with very different previous benefit periods, including observations where 
the unemployed have accepted a job offer at the very end of their benefit period. 
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Table 2. Description of UIB recipients in 2007 
  Days granted: 
 180 270 
Number of observations 3 029 3 304 
Average UIB daily rate for 1–100 days, EEK54 120.7 145.2 
Average UIB daily rate for 101+ days, EEK 96.5 116.2 
Average UIB replacement rate for 1–100 days 49.8% 49.7% 
Share of people who received UA after UIB 28.9% 0.2% 
Continuing benefit for the remaining days from a previous benefit period 7.2% 2.3% 
Average previous daily wage, EEK 245.9 298.1 
Previous UIB contributions, in months 31.3 63.7 
Average tenure in previous job, years 1.9 8.4 
Males 36.7% 37.6% 
Age at the beginning of UIB period 40.7 46.7 
Estonian citizens55 72.6% 73.9% 
Main language Estonian 51.1% 53.3% 
Basic education or less 14.8% 11.8% 
Higher education 15.8% 19.8% 
Living in a town 70.9% 73.0% 
Disabled 14.4% 15.6% 
Exposed to training 16.8% 22.4% 
Exposed to any active measure 34.6% 41.9% 
Previous occupation     
Managers 5.8% 10.7% 
Professionals 6.1% 7.4% 
Technicians and associated professionals 10.6% 15.0% 
Clerical support workers 7.4% 8.5% 
Service and sales workers 17.4% 11.7% 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 2.0% 1.0% 
Craft and related trades workers 17.4% 14.7% 
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 10.4% 14.6% 
Elementary occupations 22.9% 16.3% 
Note: days granted as the initial grant of UIB (unemployed continuing their 180-day-UIB are 
under 180-day-UIB recipients and unemployed continuing their 270-day-UIB are under 270-day-
UIB recipients).  
Only those observations are excluded where the retirement age began during the period of un- 
employment insurance benefit or when some variables used in the analyses were missing in the data. 
The average replacement rate does not equal 50% during the first 100 days of benefit receipt, 
because the minimum and maximum levels of UIB apply. In 2007, the minimum level of UIB 
was 32.9 EEK and the maximum level 383.36 EEK. The average replacement rate being under 
50% indicates that the maximum level affects it more than the minimum level. 
                                                 
54 1 EUR = 15.6466 EEK 
55 As a Soviet legacy, Estonia has a large minority of Russians living in Estonia. At the 
beginning of 2007 there were 69% Estonians and 26% Russians among the Estonian popu-
lation according to Statistics Estonia. However, people of Russian nationality do not always 
have Estonian or Russian citizenship and at the beginning of 2007 there were more than 
120 000 people i.e. 9.4% of Estonian population, with undetermined citizenship according to 
the Estonian Ministry of the Interior. 
24
 94 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates that consider the exit to employment as 
described in subsection 1.2.1 (equation 21) are presented in Figure 11. In 
addition, adjusted survival functions are calculated so that when an exit to 
employment from wage data is earlier than the actual end of the benefit, the 
actual end of the benefit is considered as the exit to employment. Exits to 
employment are more precisely detected during the benefit period, as exits to 
employment should not be earlier than the end of the benefit. In reality, this 
might not always be the case because in 2007 benefit was terminated due to 
employment only when the person told the Labour Market Board they had got a 
job. Benefit was also terminated when a person did not fulfil any of the activity 
criteria, which in almost all of the existing cases meant that the person failed to 
come to a prescribed appointment (see Subsection 2.1.3). However, whether the 
person received a wage was not confirmed, for example by the Tax and 
Customs Board database, as this has only happened since 201056. 
 
 
Figure 11. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, non-adjusted and adjusted using the end of 
the benefit period 
Note: Benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of benefit from a previous benefit 
period are excluded to show more explicitly the impact of the potential benefit period. 
                                                 
56  However, it is not possible to estimate how many of the unemployed started to receive a 
wage before the end of UIB payments, thus abusing the system, from the data used. The tax 
data were checked for wage payments since 2010 and also for earlier unemployment records, 
particularly when an unemployed person was still registered or had re-registered since 2010. 
In these cases the unemployed had to pay back the excess payments and these amounts are 
not included in the data. 
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The two graphs look quite similar. The 270-day-benefit recipients exit 
unemployment more slowly until somewhat more than 270 days, after which 
the two survival functions approach each other again. When exit to employment 
is adjusted using the actual end of the benefit period, a small drop is visible at 
day 180 for 180-day-benefit recipients and at day 270 for 270-day-benefit 
recipients. This means that the method described earlier might overestimate the 
exit rate, though only slightly. 
The smoothed hazard rates for the non-adjusted and adjusted data also look 
almost identical (see Figure 12). For 180-day benefits the hazard rate is at its 
maximum at around 180 and for 270-day benefits the peak comes slightly after 
270 days. When the hazard rates are smoothed less (see Appendix 5), then the 
rightward shift of the spike for 270-day-benefit recipients is much smaller. The 
rightward shift in the smoothed hazard estimates appears because the rise in the 
hazard rate for entering employment in the end of benefit period is sharper than 
the decline in the hazard rate afterwards. In addition, some delay in entering 
employment might appear in the data if it is more common for the employers to 
pay the wage in the following month and less common for it to be paid in the 
same month, although if the employment spells were considered to start one 
month earlier, it would underestimate the length of the unemployment spells. It 
is also clear that adjusting the data with the actual ends of benefit periods might 
overestimate the spike at benefit exhaustion. 
Appendix 5 presents hazard functions for groups with different characte-
ristics. These show that males exit later and people with higher education exit 
earlier when benefits are granted for longer periods, while younger people exit 
earlier and older people much later, disabled people exit much later, and people 
who speak Estonian as their main language might exit earlier. Hazard functions 
grouped by previous occupation differ more when benefits are granted for 
longer periods, meaning that it probably matters how long the tenure of the 
occupation has been. Plant and machine operators and service and sales workers 
might exit earlier than others. Crafts and related trades workers tend to exit 
later57. 
There are 15 counties in Estonia, but generally regional differences are not 
very large. Nevertheless, unemployment has always been much higher in Ida-
Viru county in north-eastern Estonia. Large industries that employed many 
people during the Soviet period have to a large extent been closed down but 
labour in the region is not mobile enough to move to other regions. In the 
southern Estonian Valga and Võru counties, unemployment is also relatively 
higher. In Harju county, where the capital city is located and many businesses 
operate, the situation is much better. The hazard functions for these counties 
show that people in Ida-Viru, Valga and Võru counties do indeed exit later into 
                                                 
57 For this time period there are no data available in the database for the occupation studied 
or the economic activity of the last employer. However, these variables are very likely to be 
in very high correlation with previous occupation and the estimation results would be similar. 
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employment. However, Harju county does not seem to differ very much from 
the others. 
 
 
Figure 12. Smoothed hazard rates for exiting into employment with 95% confidence 
intervals, non-adjusted and adjusted using the end of the benefit period. 
Note: Benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of benefit from a previous benefit 
period are excluded to show more explicitly the impact of the potential benefit period. 
 
 
An important factor determining unemployment duration might also be seve-
rance payment. During the period studied, this was paid as a lump sum on the 
last day of employment and depended on tenure and the exact reason for the 
termination of employment. In addition, severance payments were higher in the 
public sector (at up to 12 months of salary) than in the private sector (at up to 4 
months of salary)58. Hazard functions grouped according to severance payment 
level differ more for 270-day-benefit recipients, probably because it is not very 
usual for a 180-day-benefit recipient to have a higher severance payment 
because tenure was shorter. In general, a higher severance payment seems to 
mean a lower exit rate. An exception to this is when the severance payment is 
                                                 
58 In the current paper the level of severance payment is calculated from the reason for 
employment termination and tenure. In reality, the severance payment may differ if an 
employer does not follow the law and refuses to pay the severance payment. In addition, if 
the employer goes bankrupt, workers might not get their severance payment at the beginning 
of their unemployment spell. 
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equal to one month’s wage, which has lower hazard rates than any other level. It 
is very likely that here the reason for employment termination matters more 
than the amount of severance payment as this level of severance payment means 
basically that the employment was terminated because an employee was 
unsuitable for the job or the work to be done due to a lack of professional skills 
or for reasons of health. 
 
 
3.1.3. Results of the piecewise-constant  
proportional hazard model 
To estimate the effects of UIB on unemployment duration, a piecewise-constant 
proportional hazard model is used as presented in subsection 1.2.1 (equation 
22). This is a popular model because of its flexibility and with this model it is 
possible to incorporate the time-varying covariates that are necessary for 
estimating the impact of unemployment benefits: 
24) λ(ݐ; ϑ, ݔ௠, ߩ) =  ϑ exp(ݔ௠, ߚ) λ୫, 
ܽ௠ିଵ ≤ t <  ܽ௠, 
where ߣ(∙) is the hazard function, t is the duration of unemployment, ߴ is 
unobserved heterogeneity, x is the vector of covariates, ߩ is a vector of 
unknown parameters in the hazard function, vector ߣ௠ is the baseline hazard to 
be estimated and ߚ is a vector of the parameters to be estimated.  
m denotes interval (m = 1,...,M) as time has been divided into intervals 
[0, ܽଵ), [ܽଵ, ܽଶ)… [ܽெିଵ, ܽெ), [ܽெ, ∞), where ܽ௠ are known constants. In the 
last interval all the observations are censored59 at ܽெ. In this study, the intervals 
are set as 10-day periods up to 500 days, and after that as 30-day periods as 
there are then relatively few observations and exit rates then seem to change 
very little. 
Unobservable heterogeneity or frailty is introduced in the model as an 
unobservable multiplicative effect to obtain a more general model. In the 
current study, individual specific unobserved heterogeneity is added to the 
model following a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance ߠ). The hazard 
function with unobservable heterogeneity is a more general model as it reduces 
to a hazard function without unobservable heterogeneity when ߠ approaches 0. 
Vector x is included in the model to incorporate covariates that can affect 
unemployment duration, including variables for unemployment benefits. In this 
study, benefit effects are estimated in two different versions as time-varying 
covariates: 1) any amount of unemployment benefits (referred to in the 
following tables as model type I); 2) as a grouped amount of benefits (referred 
                                                 
59 As usual in unemployment duration analysis, the data are subject to right censoring – it is 
known when an unemployment spell started, but it might still be continuing at the point of 
data collection. 
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to in the tables as model type II). If a person started to receive UA after the UIB 
period, this is also taken into account. All the observations are used in these 
models, including those benefit recipients who were granted a UIB period 
shorter than 180 or 270 days as they had received some period of UIB within 
the year before the benefit application. This ensures that there are observations 
with and without unemployment benefits during the first 180 days of 
unemployment spell, as otherwise there would only be observations with 
unemployment benefits during that period. 
Unemployment benefits are included in the models in two different ways, as 
any amount of benefits and as different benefit levels. Adding different levels 
for benefits in the model sheds some light on whether the disincentive effect 
varies with the size of the benefit. However, as unemployment insurance 
benefits depend on the previous wage, the disincentive effect might be affected 
by some characteristics of the unemployed person and not only by the benefit 
level. This influence is lessened somewhat by the addition to the models of 
unemployment allowance, which is not affected by the previous wage. 
Nevertheless, the receipt of benefits is also modelled basically as a dummy 
variable showing whether a person received any benefits during the interval or 
not. In this way the estimations of benefit effects are not affected by the 
previous wage level. 
Another set of time-varying covariates describes the labour market situation. 
To do this, variables for the monthly regional registered unemployment rate, 
monthly change in the registered unemployment rate and monthly inflow of 
registered vacancies are included in the models. 
In addition, time-varying covariates for participation in active labour market 
measures are added. On the one hand, exit to employment might be higher after 
participation in active measures if the measures make the unemployed person 
more attractive to the potential employers or if the measures teach the 
unemployed how to search a job for example. On the other hand, locking-in 
effects might occur during the participation as the unemployed might have less 
time or motivation to look for a job while in an active measure. Additionally, 
recent literature suggests that active labour market programmes as activation 
methods for benefit recipients might work better as a stick than a as carrot, as an 
ex ante threat effect of active measures might occur and the hazard of leaving 
unemployment rises before active measures. In this study, time-varying 
covariates are added for the waiting periods for active measures60, periods while 
participating in active measures and periods after participation in active 
measures. 
The other covariates are included in the estimations as at the beginning of 
the unemployment spell: gender, age, education, main spoken language as Esto-
                                                 
60  Anticipation periods are also included in the estimations for those people who eventually 
did not participate in active measures, for example if they entered employment before the 
active measure started. Anticipation periods of 30 days are used in the estimations. 
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nian, previous occupation, residence in a town or the countryside, disability, 
previous employment in the public sector, previous employment abroad, reason 
for employment termination and tenure of last job. Severance payment is not 
included as tenure and reason for employment termination also define the level 
of severance payment. 
The estimated hazard ratios61 for benefit effects are presented in Table 3. 
There is unobservable heterogeneity present in most of the models, meaning 
that the hazard ratios presented in the table hold at ݐ଴, which is the beginning of 
the benefit period. As unobservable heterogeneity is modelled as a gamma 
distribution, the hazard ratios will tend towards one as t moves to infinity, so the 
effect of the covariates vanishes with time (Gutierrez (2002). 
The first block of models in Table 3 includes all the available observations 
from the time period studied. The estimations show that the unemployed re-
ceiving unemployment benefits have a hazard of leaving unemployment for 
employment that is less than half that of the unemployed currently not on 
benefits. The estimations taking into account the level of benefits suggest that a 
higher level of benefits might cause stronger disincentive effects than lower 
levels of benefit, though as higher levels of benefits mean a higher previous 
wage, it can be argued alternatively that the estimations show that people with a 
higher previous wage exhibit stronger disincentive effects from unemployment 
benefits. 
In addition, Table 3 presents estimation results separately for the un-
employed with initial UIB periods of 180 days and 270 days. As Table 2 
showed that these two groups are different in several respects, it could be 
argued that their labour market behaviour could also be different. The 
estimations indicate that the behaviour of 270-day-UIB recipients tends to be on 
average somewhat less distorted by the receipt of benefits, though as their 
benefit period tends to be longer, the benefit effect emerges for a longer time 
period and distorts the behaviour more than comparison of these estimations 
shows. The effect of unemployment benefits on the hazard of leaving un-
employment also appears to be more homogeneous across different benefit 
levels in the group of 270-day-UIB recipients, while 180-day-UIB recipients 
exhibit much larger differences in the disincentive effect across benefit levels or 
across previous wage levels. 
 
                                                 
61 The hazard ratio for dummy variables shows the hazard rate of the group under study 
divided by the hazard rate of the reference group. A hazard ratio smaller than 1 shows that 
the group under study has a lower hazard rate than the reference group. 
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Table 3. Estimation results for benefit covariates in piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard models 
Obser- 
vations 
included 
Model 
type Covariate 
Compared 
to 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
All UIB 
recipients 
I Any amount of benefit No benefit 0.477 0.000 
II 
0 EEK < UIB daily rate <100 EEK 
No benefit 
0.482 0.000 
100 EEK ≤ UIB daily rate <200 EEK 0.487 0.000 
200 EEK ≤ UIB daily rate <300 EEK 0.401 0.000 
300 EEK ≤ UB rate <400 EEK 0.323 0.000 
UIB 180 
I Any amount of benefit No benefit 0.431 0.000 
II 
0 EEK < UIB daily rate <100 EEK 
No benefit 
0.433 0.000 
100 EEK ≤ UIB daily rate <200 EEK 0.461 0.000 
200 EEK ≤ UIB daily rate <300 EEK 0.335 0.000 
300 EEK ≤ UB rate <400 EEK 0.234 0.000 
UIB 270 
I Any amount of benefit No benefit 0.519 0.014 
II 
0 EEK < UIB daily rate <100 EEK 
No benefit 
0.527 0.017 
100 EEK ≤ UIB daily rate <200 EEK 0.526 0.017 
200 EEK ≤ UIB daily rate <300 EEK 0.465 0.006 
300 EEK ≤ UB rate <400 EEK 0.408 0.002 
I – a dummy variable for benefit receipt during an interval, II – different benefit levels compared 
during an interval. 
 
 
The estimations results in Table 3 present the average effects of unemployment 
benefits during the unemployment benefit period. However, Figure 12 indicates 
that the effect of benefits might vary during the benefit period as there is a spike 
in the hazard of leaving unemployment for employment at the end of benefit 
period. In consequence the hazard of leaving unemployment is modelled next so 
that the spikes in the hazard rate are also taken into account. As the non-
parametric methods indicate that the hazard rate starts increasing before the 
exhaustion of benefits and stays higher for a short while after the exhaustion 
date, there are dummy variables for higher hazard rate included both before and 
after the end of the benefit period. The diagnostics of the models suggest 
models where dummy variables are included to show the periods of 60 days 
before UIB and UA exhaustion and 60 days after UIB and UA exhaustion. The 
estimation results for these models are presented in Table 4. This table provides 
estimations where spikes are modelled separately for UIB and UA periods and 
separately for initial 180-day-UIB and initial 270-day-UIB and the following 
UA periods, and both of these models are run in two different ways to include 
benefit receipt giving a total of four different estimation results. 
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Table 4. Estimation results for benefit covariates and spikes in the hazard rate due to 
benefits in piecewise-constant proportional hazard models 
Model 
type Covariate 
Com-
pared 
to 
Different 
spike for UIB 
and UA 
Different spike 
for UIB-180, 
UIB-270 and 
UA 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
I 
Any amount of benefit No benefit 0.401 0.000 0.374 0.000 
60 days before UIB-180 
exhaustion 
All 
other 
periods
1.304 0.000
1.219 0.005 
60 days before UIB-270 
exhaustion 1.422 0.003 
60 days before UA exhaustion 1.740 0.000 2.045 0.000 
60 days after UIB-180 exhaustion 1.083 0.278 0.856 0.094 60 days after UIB-270 exhaustion 1.580 0.000 
60 days after UA exhaustion 0.705 0.003 0.872 0.287 
II 
0 EEK < UIB daily rate  
<100 EEK 
No 
benefit
0.401 0.000 0.374 0.000 
100 EEK ≤ UIB daily rate  
<200 EEK 0.423 0.000 0.395 0.000 
200 EEK ≤ UIB daily rate  
<300 EEK 0.352 0.000 0.330 0.000 
300 EEK ≤ UB rate  
<400 EEK 0.282 0.000 0.266 0.000 
60 days before UIB-180 
exhaustion 
All 
other 
periods
1.303 0.000
1.219 0.005 
60 days before UIB-270 
exhaustion 1.417 0.003 
60 days before UA exhaustion 1.745 0.000 2.045 0.000 
60 days after UIB-180 exhaustion 1.081 0.294 0.856 0.095 60 days after UIB-270 exhaustion 1.572 0.000 
60 days after UA exhaustion 0.707 0.004 0.872 0.290 
I – a dummy variable for benefit receipt during an interval, II – different benefit levels during an 
interval compared. 
 
 
The estimations where a common spike is assumed for any UIB period indicate 
that there is a statistically significant rise in the hazard rate prior to the 
exhaustion date, but the spike is not significant after that date. The estimation 
results that distinguish between the initial potential benefit period suggest that 
the hazard rates are also significantly different after the potential UIB period but 
might not be after the UA period. When interpreting the results in the table, it is 
important to consider that before the benefit exhaustion date the variables for 
benefit receipt matter as well, as the hazard ratios multiply, while after the 
26
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benefit exhaustion they do not matter. The total effects caused by unemploy-
ment benefits as estimated by the model containing dummy variables for any 
benefit receipt and spikes before and after UIB-180, UIB-270 and UA are 
presented in Figure 13 (the model presented on the right in the upper part of 
Table 4). The figure depicts benefit effects for the three most common groups 
among UIB recipients: 1) unemployed with UIB period of 270 days; 2) un-
employed with UIB of 180 days; 3) unemployed with UIB of 180 days followed 
by UA for 90 days. 
 
 
Figure 13. Estimation results for benefit effects in piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard models where spikes in the hazard due to unemployment benefits are taken into 
account 
 
 
Figure 13 essentially depicts the hazard ratios for benefit recipients compared to 
the unemployed without benefits, so without any benefits the hazard ratio would 
be equal to one through the unemployment period. The figure demonstrates that 
the spike around the end date of benefit exhaustion is higher for 270-day-UIB 
recipients, as was also suggested by the less smooth hazard rates for leaving 
unemployment shown in Appendix 5. Furthermore, the figure proves that 
unemployment benefits do prolong unemployment duration. For 180-day-UIB 
recipients the hazard of leaving unemployment is lower throughout the benefit 
period and beyond it than it would be if they did not receive unemployment 
benefits. For a while after the benefit period, 270-day-UIB recipients have an 
even higher hazard of leaving unemployment than without any benefit receipts, 
but it still does not compensate for the lower hazard rate earlier during the 
benefit period. 
The shape of the hazard function depicted in Figure 12 and Appendix 5 is 
affected not only by the benefit effects but also by the baseline hazard function, 
and it can also be affected somewhat by participation in active measures and 
changes in the economic situation during the unemployment spell; the level of 
the hazard function depends on the different characteristics of the unemployed. 
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The baseline hazard estimated with the model including variables for benefit 
receipt and spikes is presented in Figure 14. The figure shows that the baseline 
hazard of leaving unemployment for employment increases during the first few 
months of unemployment and afterwards declines gradually. This suggests that 
in the very beginning of the unemployment period, the unemployed do not start 
searching for a job very actively or that they are very selective about job offers. 
The gradual decline in the baseline hazard later on might be caused by the 
deteriorating job offer distribution as the long-term unemployed might not be as 
attractive to the potential employers while their human capital might depreciate. 
The search activity might also fall for this reason as the marginal returns of 
search are lower. 
 
 
Figure 14. Estimation results for covariates of time intervals in piecewise-constant 
proportional hazard models where spikes in the hazard due to unemployment benefits 
are taken into account62 
 
 
In conclusion, the estimation results show that the labour market behaviour of 
the unemployed is influenced by the receipt of unemployment benefits. The 
hazard of leaving unemployment for the unemployed receiving unemployment 
benefits tends to be on average less than half that of the unemployed currently 
not on benefits. Furthermore, people receiving a higher level of unemployment 
benefits, basically the unemployed with a higher previous wage, exit unemploy-
ment at an even slower pace. In addition, the hazard of leaving unemployment 
rises prior to the benefit exhaustion date and continues to be higher for some 
period afterwards. However, the rise in the hazard rate may be somewhat 
delayed in the data compared to the reality if it is more common for the 
employers to pay the wage during the next month rather than during the current 
month of employment. 
The results for the other covariates in the models where separate spikes for 
UIB and UA and the receipt of benefits are included as dummy variables are 
                                                 
62 Note that intervals are longer after 500 days. 
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presented in Appendix 6. The results are presented by benefit types for only one 
version of the models as the hazard ratios for the other covariates are very 
similar in all the models. In all the models men have significantly lower hazard 
rates at around 17% while young people might exit earlier and older people exit 
significantly later. The unemployed who mainly speak Estonian have hazard 
rates for exiting into employment that are 1.2–1.4 times higher. The disabled 
unemployed experience much lower hazard rates. 
The estimation results that men and non-Estonians have a lower hazard of 
leaving unemployment for employment is similar to the results of Masso and 
Krillo (2011). Among other estimations, they estimate the flows from un-
employment to employment in 2008, a time period that overlaps with the time 
period in this study. They use the data from the Labour Force Survey and also 
show that men exhibit a lower flow from unemployment to employment than 
women and non-Estonians have a lower flow from unemployment to employ-
ment than Estonians. 
When it comes to previous occupations, plant and machine operators and 
assemblers have a significantly higher hazard of entering employment. This 
group of occupations includes jobs such as car drivers, taxi drivers, bus drivers, 
sewing machine operators, and food machine operators. For former service and 
sales workers hazard rates are also relatively high, though significant only in the 
270-day-UIB model. 
Tenure covariates show that longer tenure in general means a lower hazard 
rate for exiting into employment. An interesting result is that people whose last 
employment was somewhere abroad experience much lower hazard rates. One 
reason for this is probably that people who have worked abroad would also try 
to find a job abroad again, but if they do succeed in finding a job abroad, this is 
mostly not visible in the data as only Estonian tax data are used to detect 
employment. 
People who have been dismissed because they are unsuitable for the job or 
because of long-term incapacity for work find it harder to find a new job than 
people who become unemployed for other reasons. People who are unemployed 
due to the bankruptcy or liquidation of a firm have significantly higher hazard 
ratios in the 270-day-UIB model. It is likely that people already know about the 
probability of liquidation or bankruptcy quite some time in advance and might 
have started looking for a new job before the unemployment spell. 
Interesting results from the study concern time-varying covariates for parti-
cipation in active labour market measures. Recent literature suggests that active 
labour market programmes might work better as a stick than as a carrot, as an ex 
ante threat effect might emerge and make people leave unemployment. Here, 
time-varying covariates are added for the waiting periods for active measures63, 
                                                 
63 Anticipation periods are also included for those people who eventually did not get active 
measures, perhaps because they entered employment before the active measure started. 
Anticipation periods of 30 days are used in the calculations. 
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periods while receiving active measures and periods after receiving active 
measures. It turns out that people who are directed towards different training 
courses, work practice or counselling have much lower exit rates before the start 
of the measure. Exit rates are also lower during the period they are receiving the 
various active measures. 
Hazard rates tend to be significantly higher after the receipt of work practice 
and occupational training. However, the positive effects of Estonian courses, 
counselling and job search training turn out to be more questionable. 
The result that people eligible for active measures tend to wait for the 
measure rather than increase their job search intensity is in accordance with 
reality in Estonia. Unlike in several other countries, the unemployed in Estonia 
are not forced to participate in active measures in order to continue drawing un-
employment benefits. However, the results indicate negative anticipation effects 
and locking-in effects while the hazard rates are not significantly higher after 
every active measure. In this sense the results suggest that some of the measures 
provided might not benefit a higher employment rate, though more thorough 
evaluation of those measures is needed. 
 
 
3.1.4. Conclusion 
Search theory predicts that an increase in the amount or maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits reduces the probability of an unemployed person 
exiting unemployment. In the current study conducted on Estonian data from 
the pre-crisis period as presented in this section, both non-parametric and para-
metric estimations of the hazard of leaving unemployment to employment show 
that unemployment benefits do indeed have a strong and significant disincentive 
effect on the hazard rates. Benefit effects prove to be even stronger than most of 
the other covariates. 
The estimation results indicate that the receipt of benefits more than halves 
the hazard of leaving unemployment for employment. The hazard of leaving 
unemployment for the unemployed who receive higher benefits and have also 
had a previously higher wage is even more influenced by the receipt of benefits. 
The analysis also demonstrates that the hazard of leaving unemployment is 
significantly higher just prior to the end of the benefit period, implying that the 
disincentive effect decreases during the benefit period. 
The study shows that the baseline hazard of leaving unemployment for 
employment decreases gradually during the unemployment period. However, 
during the very beginning of the unemployment period there is a rise in the 
baseline hazard. These results suggest that the unemployed might not start 
looking for a job in the very beginning of the unemployment period and that 
they increase their search activity over the first few months irrespective of 
benefit receipt. The gradual decline in the hazard rate afterwards is most 
probably caused by the deterioration in job offers. 
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The study presented in this section shows the strong disincentive effects of 
unemployment benefits during the pre-crisis period as most of the period under 
study was a period of relatively high GDP growth. However, the question 
remains whether this effect also occurs during a period of deep crisis. Another 
question is whether unemployment benefits also support job search; in other 
words, whether people get better jobs because they can prolong their job search. 
These issues are dealt with in the next sections. 
 
 
3.2. Disincentive effects of unemployment  
insurance benefits: the crisis period 
3.2.1. Introduction 
The search model predicts a strong disincentive effect of unemployment bene-
fits on exiting unemployment into employment and this effect is also often 
substantiated in empirical studies. However, it is questionable whether the 
disincentive effect still remains in a period of economic recession when the job 
arrival rate decreases. The conclusions drawn from search theory are ambiguous 
in terms of the impact of the business cycle both on unemployment duration and 
on the disincentive effect. The search model predicts that on the one hand, the 
reservation wage declines and the unemployed become less selective during an 
economic downturn, but on the other hand, the unemployed might decrease 
their job search intensity as the marginal benefit of the search effort might fall 
as the probability of entering employment conditional on the current job search 
intensity and the expected present value of income from a job might both 
decrease. The disincentive effects of unemployment benefits are expected to be 
rather milder during an economic downturn, though it eventually remains an 
empirical question. Yet, also the empirical research on the cyclicality of dis-
incentive effects is very scarce (for example Schmieder et al. (2010) and Kroft 
and Notowidigdo (2011); a more thorough overview of this matter is provided 
in Subsections 1.1.3 and 1.3.1). 
The study presented in the previous section (Section 3.1) showed that the 
disincentive effect occurred in Estonia during the period before the global eco-
nomic crisis. The study presented in the current section explores the dis-
incentive effect in times of rocketing unemployment using Estonian data as the 
rise in unemployment there during the last crisis was the highest in the whole 
European Union. In Estonia, the number of unemployed people grew more than 
fivefold in less than two years while the number unemployed less than doubled 
in most countries of the European Union. It is shown that the receipt of 
unemployment benefits has a significant effect on labour market behaviour even 
when unemployment is extremely high. The results are compared with a study 
conducted on Estonian data before the crisis (covered in Section 3.1) to draw 
conclusions about the size of the disincentive effect in different economic 
situations. 
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3.2.2. Data 
The study looks at unemployment benefits granted in Estonia from July 2008 
until March 2009, meaning the beginning of the study period is when un-
employment started to rise sharply. The data for unemployment benefits and the 
characteristics of recipients from the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
are combined with wage data from the Estonian Tax and Customs Board up to 
March 2010, which is when unemployment reached its peak. As in Section 3.1, 
those unemployed who were continuing their benefit period for the remaining 
days of a previous benefit period are included in the semi-parametric estimation 
models but not in the non-parametric analysis. 
The study looks at both forms of unemployment benefits available in 
Estonia, unemployment insurance benefit and unemployment allowance. UIB is 
generally much higher than the flat rate UA, but has more stringent criteria for 
eligibility, covering only involuntary unemployment and setting stricter criteria 
about previous employment (see Subsection 2.1.3.). In order to make UIB and 
UA recipients more comparable, only those UA recipients are considered who 
were entitled to UA because of previous working record and not because of 
alternative activities such as studying or childcare. The characteristics of the 
benefit recipients under study are presented in Table 5. In addition to the three 
main groups of benefit recipients (UIB for 180 days, UIB for 270 days and 
UA), characteristics for the main subgroup of UA recipients are also provided. 
These are UA recipients who are eligible for UA for 270 days after a waiting 
period of 7 days meaning the unemployed who were previously engaged in full-
time studies are excluded and the unemployed whose employment contract was 
ended following the employee’s breach of contract are excluded. 
The major difference between 180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients lies 
in the average previous tenure, as this is highly correlated with the insurance 
contributions that determine the length of UIB. In addition, 270-day-UIB 
recipients previously earned a higher wage, are more educated, are older, have 
worked in slightly higher-ranking jobs and receive higher benefits. UA 
recipients on average have less education than 180-day-UIB recipients and have 
worked in even lower ranking jobs. Compared to the pre-crisis characteristics of 
UIB recipients (Section 3.1, Table 2), the overall picture is similar, though the 
characteristics reflect the fact that the crisis hit the real estate and construction 
market more, with slightly more unemployed during the crisis who used to be 
craft and related trades workers and fewer who were employed as professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals; the share of unemployed men is also 
higher during the crisis period. 
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Table 5. Description of unemployment benefit recipients by type of benefit 
  
UIB 
180 
UIB 
270 
UA 
(all) 
UA 
270 
Number of observations 10148 13232 17645 15925 
UB daily rate for 1–100 days, EEK 163.1 197.6 32.9 32.9 
UB daily rate for 101–180 days, EEK 130.5 158.1 32.9 32.9 
UB daily rate for 180+ days, EEK 32.9 158.1 32.9 32.9 
UA after UIB 54.3% 0.3% x x 
Continuing benefit for the remaining days from a 
previous benefit period 2.8% 3.1% 3.1% 3.4% 
Average previous daily wage, EEK 331.2 411.6 x x 
Average tenure of the previous job, years 1.5 6.1 2.2 2.2 
Males 55% 56% 50% 48% 
Age at the beginning of UB period 36.7 44.8 35.5 36.3 
Main language Estonian 54% 58% 51% 50% 
Basic education or less 21% 13% 25% 25% 
Higher education 13% 17% 9% 9% 
Living in a town 69% 68% 69% 69% 
Disabled 8% 9% 2% 2% 
Exposed to training 15% 20% 15% 15% 
Exposed to any active measure 31% 35% 38% 37% 
Previous occupation     
Managers 6% 9% 3% 3% 
Professionals 5% 6% 4% 4% 
Technicians and associate professionals 8% 11% 6% 6% 
Clerical support workers 6% 6% 5% 5% 
Service and sales workers 14% 10% 21% 22% 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Craft and related trades workers 31% 27% 26% 26% 
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 10% 14% 10% 10% 
Elementary occupations 19% 16% 23% 23% 
 
 
3.2.3. The crisis period versus the pre-crisis period 
The crisis and pre-crisis periods are compared using data on UIB recipients. 
First, the duration of unemployment is analysed using non-parametric methods. 
Figure 15 presents Kaplan-Meier survival estimates. Before the crisis the 
survival function of 270-day-UIB recipients was constantly higher than that of 
180-day-UIB recipients. As the distance between the survival functions was at 
its highest at around the 270th day of the unemployment spell, it was evident 
that the length of the UIB affected the labour market behaviour. During the 
crisis, the survival functions are more similar and the survival function of 270-
day-UIB recipients is mostly lower than the survival function of 180-day-UIB 
recipients. However, the only period when the survival function of 270-day-
UIB recipients is higher than that of 180-day-UIB recipients is around the 270th 
day. This suggests that the disincentive effect is still there during the crisis. 
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Figure 15. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, the pre-crisis and the crisis period 
Note: Benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of benefit from a previous benefit 
period are excluded to show more explicitly the impact of the potential benefit period. 
 
 
The estimation of hazard rates during the crisis period (see Figure 16) reveals 
that the unemployed eligible for 270-day-UIB experience a very sharp rise in 
the hazard rate for leaving unemployment for employment around the end of the 
benefit period, and a fall in the hazard rate afterwards. The 180-day-UIB 
recipients also experience a spike around the exhaustion of the unemployment 
insurance benefit, though the spike is smaller. A smaller spike for 180-day-UIB 
recipients is also visible around the 270th day, when their UA also ceases. 
Compared to the hazard functions during the pre-crisis period, the shape of the 
smoothed hazard functions remains similar, but at a much lower level. While 
the hump around the end of the benefit has remained clearly evident during the 
crisis for 270-day-UIB recipients, the hazard function for 180-day-UIB 
recipients has flattened somewhat 64. 
                                                 
64 The survival and smoothed hazard estimates for 270-day-UA recipients are presented in 
Appendix 7. It is visible that this group also exhibits a small spike in the hazard rate at the 
end of benefit period, that is, around the 270th day of the unemployment spell. 
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Figure 16. Smoothed hazard rates for exiting into employment with 95% confidence 
intervals, the pre-crisis and the crisis period 
Note: Benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of their benefit from a previous 
benefit period are excluded to show the impact of the potential benefit period more explicitly. 
 
 
Less smooth hazard functions show that the rise at the end of benefit period is 
even sharper and coincides more with the end of the maximum benefit period 
(Figure 17). The figure of less smooth hazard rates also shows that the spike at 
the end of benefit period is higher for 270-day-UIB recipients both during the 
pre-crisis and the crisis periods. However, as the spike is narrower for 270-day-
UIB recipients than for 180-day-UIB recipients during the pre-crisis period, the 
spike for them appears lower when smoothed more. The opposite applies for the 
crisis data, when the spike for 180-day-UIB recipients is much narrower. The 
figure also shows that the hazard of leaving unemployment for employment 
during the first year of unemployment is much higher during the pre-crisis 
period than during the crisis period. After the benefit periods, the hazard rates 
turn out to be more similar in level. On the one hand, it could be argued that this 
phenomenon could be caused by higher disincentive effects during the pre-crisis 
period, but on the other hand, the longer unemployment spells in the pre-crisis 
data might already be affected somewhat by the crisis and the longer 
unemployment spells of the crisis period might already be affected by the 
recovery. 
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Figure 17. Smoothed hazard rates for exiting into employment, pre-crisis and crisis 
period 
Note: Benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of their benefit from a previous 
benefit period are excluded to show the impact of the potential benefit period more explicitly. 
 
 
Alongside the non-parametric method, a piecewise-constant proportional hazard 
model is applied to estimate the impact of unemployment benefits and other 
covariates (see subsection 1.2.1, equation 22): 
25) λ(ݐ; ϑ, ݔ௠, ߩ) =  ϑ exp(ݔ௠, ߚ) λ୫, 
ܽ௠ିଵ ≤ t <  ܽ௠, 
where ߣ(∙) is the hazard function, t is the duration of unemployment, ߴ is 
unobserved heterogeneity, x is the vector of covariates, ߩ is a vector of 
unknown parameters in the hazard function, vector ߣ௠ is the baseline hazard to 
be estimated and ߚ is a vector of the parameters to be estimated. m signifies the 
interval (m = 1,...,M) as time has been divided into smaller periods [0, ܽଵ), 
[ܽଵ, ܽଶ)… [ܽெିଵ, ܽெ), [ܽெ, ∞). In the last interval all the observations are 
censored65 at ܽெ. 
Vector x includes covariates for unemployment benefit, generally the size of 
the benefit as a time-varying covariate or a dummy for any unemployment 
benefit receipt; the UIB recipient characteristics at the beginning of the 
unemployment spell of gender, age, education, tenure at last job, being a native 
speaker of Estonian, being disabled, living in a town or the countryside, 
previous profession, previous job in Estonian public sector/ Estonian private 
                                                 
65 As usual in unemployment duration analysis, the data are subject to right censoring – it is 
known when an unemployment spell started, but it might still be continuing at the point of 
data collection. As the wage data used in this study are until March 2010, all the spells are 
censored as of the beginning of March 2010. 
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sector/ abroad, and reason for termination of employment contract; exposure to 
active measures as time-varying covariates before, during and after; and time-
varying covariates for the labour market situation of monthly regional registered 
unemployment rate, monthly change in registered unemployment rate and 
monthly inflow of registered vacancies. The variables and models are defined as 
similarly as possible to the variables and models in Section 3.1 to make the 
estimation results of the crisis and pre-crisis period comparable. 
First, variables for benefit receipt are included in the model, not taking into 
account the spikes in the hazard rate. The parameter estimates for the covariates 
of unemployment benefits are presented in Table 6. Compared to the pre-crisis 
period, the benefit disincentive effects appear to be in general slightly smaller 
and more homogeneous for both benefit levels and for the different potential 
benefit periods66. However, the differences between the estimation results for 
crisis and pre-crisis data are quite small even though the recession was 
extremely deep. In general, the unemployed receiving unemployment benefits 
exit unemployment into employment about half as fast as the unemployed 
currently not on benefits in both the crisis and the pre-crisis periods. 
Nevertheless, during the crisis the disincentive effects appear to be more similar 
across benefit levels. During the pre-crisis period, the labour market behaviour 
of people with very high unemployment benefits (because of a higher previous 
wage) was more affected by unemployment benefits than was the behaviour of 
other groups. During the crisis period, the benefit effects on this group are not 
much different from those on the other groups. Indeed the disincentive effects 
of lower benefits, UIB for previous low wage earners and UA, might even have 
increased slightly during the crisis. 
In addition to the estimation results for UIB recipients, estimations for UA 
recipients are also shown in Table 6. UA recipients exhibit smaller disincentive 
effects, but their benefit level is also lower as it is fixed at 32.9 EEK per day, 
which is the lower bound of the benefit interval in the model. The estimation 
results of this model for the crisis period indicate that very low benefit rates 
might incur lower disincentive effects, but the differences in disincentive effects 
might be smaller at higher benefit levels. 
The estimation results incorporating spikes in the hazard rate in the models 
are presented in Table 7 and the full estimation results are given in Appendix 8. 
Like the estimations for the pre-crisis period presented in Subsection 3.1.3, the 
models for the crisis data favour models with dummy variables of 60 days prior 
to benefit exhaustion date and 60 days after benefit exhaustion data. Table 7 
shows estimations where spikes are modelled separately for UIB and UA 
periods and separately for initial 180-day-UIB, initial 270-day-UIB and the 
following UA periods. 
                                                 
66 Some differences in the estimates can also be caused by the differences in the pool of 
benefit recipients as the crisis hit more some sectors than others. In addition, the pool of 
benefit recipients in the pre-crisis period is very small. 
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When variables for spikes are included in the models, the estimation results for 
the variables for benefit receipt continue to indicate slightly lower disincentive 
effects, particularly when different benefit levels are added to the models. The 
estimated parameters for benefit receipt turn out to be more homogeneous for 
the crisis period like they did in the models that did not include dummies for 
spikes. On top of this, the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits for UA 
recipients also prove to be very similar to the effects for UIB recipients when 
the spikes in the hazard rate are taken into account. 
The variables for the spikes also tend to identify slightly lower distortionary 
effects from benefits during the crisis, though the differences between the crisis 
and the pre-crisis data are again fairly marginal. When interpreting the results of 
benefit effects in total, it is necessary to remember that before the benefit 
exhaustion date the hazard ratios for benefit receipt and the spike multiply, 
while after benefit exhaustion only the spike matters. The total effects of 
unemployment benefits estimated by a model including dummy variables for 
any benefit receipt and spikes before and after UIB-180, UIB-270 and UA are 
presented in Figure 18. In the model presented in this figure the spikes before 
and after are modelled in even more detail at one and two months before the 
exhaustion and one and two months after the exhaustion of a benefit. The figure 
illustrates benefit effects during and before the crisis for the three most common 
groups among UIB recipients: 1) the unemployed with UIB for 270 days; 2) the 
unemployed with UIB for 180 days; 3) the unemployed with UIB for 180 days 
followed by UA for 90 days. 
Figure 18 demonstrates that the effect of unemployment benefits on the 
hazard of leaving unemployment for employment is very similar during both the 
crisis and the pre-crisis periods. The disincentive effect of benefits might be 
only marginally lower during the crisis as the hazard ratio compared to no 
unemployment benefits is only marginally higher. In general, unemployment 
benefits prolong unemployment duration significantly during both the crisis and 
the pre-crisis periods as the hazard ratio for leaving unemployment tends to be 
lower than 1 compared to no benefit receipts (only 270-day-UIB recipients have 
a higher hazard rate than other unemployed without benefits during for a while 
after benefit receipt). 
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Figure 18. Estimation results for benefit effects in piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard models where spikes in the hazard due to unemployment benefits are taken into 
account 
 
 
Table 8 reports the information presented in Figure 18 as average hazard ratios 
over different periods. If only benefit periods are compared, which are the first 
180 days for 180-day-UIB recipients and 270 days for the other groups, then the 
average hazard ratio compared to no benefit receipts tends to be around 0.4, and 
benefits hinder the transition to employment by a factor of more than two. 
However, as the benefit effects also appear after the benefit period and tend to 
be smaller then, or in the case of 270-day-UIB recipients even display the 
opposite effect, the average hazard ratio over the whole period of distortionary 
effects shows in total a smaller disincentive effect from benefits. With the first 
330 days of unemployment, which represents the point when the benefit effects 
vanish from the data for all these three types of benefit, the average hazard ratio 
is around 0.6. Over this period, the unemployed with the least generous 
benefits, who are the 180-day-UIB recipients, exhibit the smallest disincentive 
effect. The disincentive effect for 270-day-UIB recipients is somewhat bigger 
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and those unemployed receiving 180-day-UIB and afterwards 90-day-UA seem 
to exhibit even greater disincentive effects. In addition, over this period of 
unemployment the distortionary effects of unemployment benefits are smaller 
for the crisis period, though the difference is rather small. In any case, when the 
unemployment duration approaches infinity, the hazard ratio approaches one, 
meaning the effect of benefits approaches zero.  
 
Table 8. Hazard ratios of benefit recipients compared to no benefit receipts in 
piecewise-constant proportional hazard models where spikes in the hazard due to 
unemployment benefits are taken into account 
 
The effect of 
unemployment 
benefits during 
benefit period 
The effect of 
unemployment 
benefits during the 
period of benefit 
effects appearing 
The effect of 
unemployment 
benefits during the 
first 330 days of 
unemployment 
Benefit type Pre-crisis period 
Crisis 
period 
Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
UIB-270 0.402 0.427 0.618 0.634 0.618 0.634 
UIB-180 0.392 0.350 0.493 0.496 0.631 0.633 
UIB-180 + UA-90 0.454 0.436 0.529 0.546 0.529 0.546 
 
 
Search theory predicts that the hazard of leaving unemployment rises during the 
benefit period ceteris paribus. It is usually assumed that income and leisure are 
complements and that hence the hazard rate should shift up after the benefit 
period and stabilise at that level. In general the graphs presented in Figure 18 
coincide with search theory. The hazard of leaving unemployment does indeed 
rise in the benefit period and stabilises later at a higher level ceteris paribus. 
However, there is still an increase in the hazard rate for some time after the end 
of benefit period, especially for 270-day-UIB recipients. It is likely, that some 
part of the spike during the benefit period is somewhat delayed in the data as it 
might be more common for employers to pay the wage in the following month 
than in the current month of employment. 
In addition, there is a decline in the hazard rate before the stabilisation in 
both the crisis and the pre-crisis data, particularly for 270-day-UIB recipients. 
On the one hand, this could be caused by the shadow economy. Some of the 
unemployed might have already started working informally during the benefit 
period and have formalised their contracts only after benefit exhaustion. This 
would mean that the hazard ratio pictured in Figure 18 would be at a higher 
level during the benefit period if the informal sector were taken into account as 
well. The spike in the end of benefit period, particularly after the benefit period, 
would however be smaller. So including the informal sector in the analysis 
30
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might reveal slightly milder distortionary effects from unemployment benefits67. 
Nevertheless, there are no data available in this study for analysing the informal 
sector. 
Alternatively, the spike in the hazard rate at the end of benefit period and the 
later decline could be explained by optimised timing of job starting dates as 
suggested by a model by Boone and van Ours (2009). This proposes that the 
unemployed might negotiate with their prospective employers to start the job 
only after the end of the benefit period and that this would cause the accumu-
lation of entrances to employment after the benefit exhaustion date. It is likely 
that 270-day-UIB recipients can negotiate with the employers more successfully 
as they tend to work in higher ranking jobs, have more experience and have a 
higher education level, so employers might be more willing to wait for this kind 
of labour and that would cause a more pronounced spike at the end of the 
benefit period for 270-day-UIB recipients. 
Besides the benefit effects depicted in Figure 18, the other major component 
shaping the overall hazard function visible in Figure 17 is the baseline hazard 
function. The baseline hazard functions for UIB and UA recipients estimated on 
the crisis data are reported in Figure 19. The baseline hazard for UIB recipients 
shows a steady decline throughout the unemployment period, indicating the 
deterioration in job offers. For UIB recipients there is a rise in the baseline 
hazard rate for about 1.5 months, after which their baseline hazard for leaving 
unemployment for employment declines very similarly to that of the UIB 
recipients. 
 
Figure 19. Estimation results for covariates of time intervals in piecewise-constant 
proportional hazard models where spikes in the hazard due to unemployment benefits 
are taken into account, the crisis period68 
                                                 
67 In addition, it can be argued that the exits to the informal sector could affect the shape of 
the hazard function if it were assumed that the unemployed prefer to take up a job in the 
formal sector rather than the informal sector, for example because social security is provided 
in the formal sector.  
68  Note that intervals are longer after 500 days. 
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Figure 20 compares the baseline hazard for UIB recipients during the crisis and 
pre-crisis periods. In general, the hazard of leaving unemployment for employ-
ment declines during the unemployment period in both cases. However, the 
baseline hazard is at a much lower level during the crisis period as there are 
fewer chances of exiting unemployment, but search activity might also be lower 
as the marginal return of job search might be lower. In addition, during the pre-
crisis period the baseline hazard increases somewhat before the decline while 
the baseline hazard during the crisis period starts declining quite early in the 
unemployment period. This suggests that when the economic situation is better, 
the unemployed might not start looking for a job very actively at the very 
beginning of the unemployment period as they might use the beginning of the 
unemployment period rather more as a vacation before the next job. During the 
crisis period, the unemployed seem to start looking for a job straight away at the 
beginning of the unemployment period. 
The finding that the baseline hazard declines during the unemployment spell 
is quite predictable due to the likely deterioration in job offers when the 
unemployment spell lengthens. In addition, the decline in the hazard rate is also 
shown for those unemployment benefit systems where unemployment benefits 
are basically infinite and therefore no spikes occur (see for example Cockx and 
Dejemeppe (2002), Degraeve (2012)) and for those unemployment systems 
where activation is at a very high level that also minimises benefit effects and 
spikes in the hazard rate (see for example Koskela and Uusitalo (2004)). 
 
 
Figure 20. Estimation results for covariates of time intervals in piecewise-constant 
proportional hazard models where spikes in the hazard due to unemployment benefits 
are taken into account, for UIB recipients during the crisis and the pre-crisis periods 
 
 
3.2.4. The impact of the benefit period 
Since the number of unemployment benefit recipients grew sharply because of 
the crisis, the sample for the crisis period is also quite large and this makes it 
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and 270-day-UIB recipients are studied in depth69. The main difference between 
180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients lies in their previous employment 
tenure, as this is also why they receive unemployment insurance benefit for 
different maximum periods. In order to model these two groups in the same 
model to reveal differences in the effect of the maximum benefit duration, only 
people with a record of unemployment insurance contributions of 54–58 months 
are considered. As 56 months of unemployment insurance contributions is when 
people start to be eligible for the longer benefit, there could be a risk that some 
people are able to convince their employer to extend the employment contract 
so they qualify for the longer benefit. Figure 21 shows that the number of UIB 
recipients with an insurance record of 56 months is not higher than the number 
of people with an unemployment insurance record of a few months less (the full 
figure is presented in Appendix 9). It can be concluded that it is not likely that 
people can manipulate their unemployment insurance record in Estonia. 
 
Figure 21. Number of UIB recipients on the basis of previous unemployment insurance 
contributions 
 
 
The descriptive statistics for UIB recipients with unemployment insurance 
records from 54 to 58 months are presented in Table 9. The table shows that 
after the unemployment insurance record is constrained, the two groups under 
study are now more similar not only on the basis of previous average tenure, but 
also in other characteristics. The greatest difference between these two groups is 
now that the 270-day-UIB recipients continue to receive relatively high UIB 
during the period 181–270 days of the unemployment spell, while the 180-day-
UIB recipients are only eligible for the very low UA, or not even that. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 In this subsection, benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of their 
benefit for from a previous benefit period are excluded to show more explicitly the impact of 
the potential benefit period. 
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Table 9. Description of UIB recipients with unemployment insurance records 54–58 
months 
  
UIB 180 
(insurance 
record 54–
55 months)
UIB 270 
(insurance 
record 56–
58 months)
Probability  
H0: difference = 0  
H1: difference <> 0 
Number of observations 452 541  
UB daily rate for 1–100 days, EEK 175.6 185.5 0.127 
UB daily rate for 101–180 days, EEK 140.5 148.4 0.128 
UB daily rate for 180+ days, EEK 32.9 148.4 0.000 
UA after UIB 53% 0% 0.000 
Average previous daily wage, EEK 360.5 377.7 0.250 
Average tenure of the previous job, 
years 2.3 2.4 0.580 
Males 58% 57% 0.657 
Age in the beginning of UB period 39 39 0.994 
Main language Estonian 56% 60% 0.232 
Knowledge of English 21% 21% 0.995 
Basic education or less 17% 15% 0.470 
Higher education 16% 14% 0.275 
Living in a town 68% 68% 0.963 
Disabled 9% 9% 0.753 
Previous occupation    
Managers 6% 7% 0.437 
Professionals 5% 5% 0.618 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 10% 11% 0.547 
Clerical support workers 5% 5% 0.972 
Service and sales workers 12% 10% 0.273 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and 
fishery workers 1% 0% 0.236 
Craft and related trades workers 31% 31% 0.929 
Plant and machine operators, and 
assemblers 11% 11% 0.707 
Elementary occupations 19% 20% 0.584 
 
 
The survival and hazard estimates for the constrained sample are illustrated in 
Figure 22. Even though the characteristics of the two groups are relatively 
similar, the labour market behaviour is quite different. The survival function for 
the 270-day-UIB recipients is continuously higher than the survival function for 
the 180-day-UIB recipients. The hazard functions pictured here again show a 
spike at benefit exhaustion and a drop after the benefit period. Compared to the 
hazard function for the whole group of 180-day-UIB recipients (Figure 16), the 
hazard for the unemployed with an insurance record of 54–55 months, the maxi-
mum for this group, exhibit a higher hazard function, meaning the probability of 
leaving unemployment into employment is higher. 
31
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Figure 22. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and smoothed hazard estimates of UIB 
recipients with unemployment insurance records of 54–58 months 
Note: in general, 180-day-UIB recipients are eligible for 90-day-UA, which is even more likely 
following longer previous employment as presented on this figure. This might be the reason why 
both 270-day-UIB and 180-day-UIB recipients have the highest hazard rate for leaving un-
employment about the same time. 
In addition to the effects of unemployment benefits, the figures might be influenced by the fact 
that in some time intervals there are relatively few observations available. 
 
 
Next, the hazard function of these two groups is estimated in a joint model 
using a piecewise-constant proportional hazard model framework. At first, the 
model includes a covariate for any amount of UB and a covariate showing that 
the UIB period is 270 days, and the rest of the covariates that are not related to 
benefits. The hazard ratio estimate for UB turns out to be 0.534 and highly 
significant, meaning that on average it is about half as likely for people to leave 
unemployment for employment when they get any amount of unemployment 
benefit. The hazard ratio estimate for the covariate showing a longer UIB period 
turns out to be 0.830, which is significant at 0.05 level. This estimation reveals 
that in this group, people with longer unemployment insurance benefit do 
indeed experience a lower hazard of exiting unemployment into employment 
than people eligible for the shorter benefit. Similar results are also produced by 
a model where the benefit level is included in more detail (see Table 10). Here, 
the hazard ratio estimation for 270-day-UIB recipients is 0.811 and even 
slightly more significant. 
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Table 10. Estimation results for benefit covariates in a piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard model of UIB recipients with unemployment insurance records of 54–58 months 
Covariate Compared to Hazard ratio P>z 
0 EEK < UB rate <100 EEK 
UB = 0 EEK 
0.507 0.003 
100 EEK ≤ UB rate <200 EEK 0.599 0.033 
200 EEK ≤ UB rate <300 EEK 0.612 0.065 
300 EEK ≤ UB rate <400 EEK 0.659 0.188 
400 EEK ≤ UB rate 0.396 0.028 
UIB 270 UIB 180 0.811 0.027 
 
 
Next, the estimations are carried out specifically for the time interval 181 to 270 
days of the unemployment spell, as this is the period when the benefit level is 
most different between the two groups under study (Table 11). The estimations 
show similar results for the period 181–270 days when only the unemployed 
with an insurance record of 54–58 months are considered, as the 270-day-UIB 
recipients are less likely to exit unemployment. The less constrained the sample, 
the lower the probability that the 270-day-UIB recipients will be hampered from 
leaving unemployment by unemployment benefits. In the wider sample the 
disincentive effect for 180-day-UIB recipients is greater than that for 270-day-
UIB recipients. 
 
Table 11. Estimation results for benefit covariates in a piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard model of UIB recipients during 181 to 270 days of the unemployment spell 
180 < t ≤ 270 (insurance record 54–58 months) 
Covariate Compared to Hazard ratio P>z 
UIB 180 = 32.9 UB = 0 EEK 
(UIB 180) 
0.164 0.011 
UIB 270 > 0 0.130 0.002 
180 < t ≤ 270 (insurance record 50–62 months) 
Covariate Compared to Hazard ratio P>z 
UIB 180 = 32.9 UB = 0 EEK 
(UIB 180) 
0.200 0.000 
UIB 270 > 0 0.229 0.000 
180 < t ≤ 270 (insurance record 32–79 months) 
Covariate Compared to Hazard ratio P>z 
UIB 180 = 32.9 UB = 0 EEK 
(UIB 180) 
0.322 0.000 
UIB 270 > 0 0.370 0.000 
180 < t ≤ 270 (insurance record 12+ months) 
Covariate Compared to Hazard ratio P>z 
UIB 180 = 32.9 UB = 0 EEK 
(UIB 180) 
0.293 0.000 
UIB 270 > 0 0.419 0.000 
Note: the estimation results indicate quite big disincentive effects from unemployment benefits in 
this time period. It is possible that some 180-day-UIB recipients do not apply for 90-day-UA  
because they already have a job waiting. In that case the models might overestimate the benefit 
effects. 
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The behaviour of benefit recipients with different lengths of previous un-
employment insurance contributions is depicted in Figure 23. These figures 
show that there is a drop in the share of people in employment in the cut-off 
point 180 days, 270 days and 360 days after the beginning of the unemployment 
spell. The first graph describes the situation where 180-day-UIB recipients are  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Share of UIB recipients in employment after 180, 270 and 360 days after the 
beginning of the benefit period, by previous unemployment insurance record in months. 
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just finishing their unemployment insurance benefit period and 270-day-UIB 
recipients can still continue receiving the benefit. The drop on the cut-off point 
is visible in this graph, but is much smaller than on the second graph where 
180-day-UIB recipients have had to be without UIB for three months and  
270-day-UIB recipients are only finishing their benefit. On the third graph it is 
shown that after both groups have exhausted their benefits, the drop on the cut-
off point diminishes again. These graphs suggest again that the job search and 
acceptance behaviour change on the cut-off point of 56 months of previous 
unemployment insurance contributions, meaning the behaviour changes along 
with the length of the benefit. Figure 23 also shows that the share of the 
unemployed who have entered employment rises with the length of previous 
unemployment insurance record at all three points in time studied. This explains 
the results found in Table 11, where with a very small bandwidth of previous 
contributions the results indicate that 270-day-UIB recipients are less likely to 
exit unemployment, but the results change with larger bandwidths. 
 
 
3.2.5. The benefit size 
In order to shed some more light on the effect of the size of the benefit,  
270-day-UIB and 270-day-UA recipients are compared70. In order to make the 
groups comparable, only those UA recipients are considered whose last activity 
was employment, not any other similar activity granting eligibility under the 
law, and who left employment formally because of a mutual agreement or at the 
initiative of the employee. In both groups, only those people are considered 
whose tenure in their last job was four to six years. These constraints should 
assure that the only major difference between these groups lies in the formal 
reason for termination of the employment contract, whether unemployment was 
involuntary or voluntary71, and this is also the reason why some people are 
eligible for unemployment insurance benefit and others only for unemployment 
allowance. The descriptive statistics for these two groups are presented in Table 
12. The differences between UA and UIB recipients in the constrained sample 
are smaller than those in the unconstrained sample (Table 5) but remain to some 
extent. 
 
                                                 
70 In this subsection, benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of their 
benefit from a previous benefit period are excluded. 
71 There is reason to believe that at least some part of voluntary unemployment is only for-
mally voluntary. During the period under study, employers in Estonia had to pay a relatively 
high severance payment upon termination of an employment contract at the initiative of the 
employer. 
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Table 12. Description of unemployment benefit recipients with tenure in the previous 
job of 4 to 6 years 
  
UIB 270 
(tenure 
4–6 years)
UA 270 (tenure 
4–6 years, 
voluntary 
unempl.) 
Probability 
H0: difference = 0 
H1: difference <> 0 
Number of observations 1353 598  
UB daily rate for 1–100 days, EEK 192.7 32.9 0.000 
UB daily rate for 100+ days, EEK 154.1 32.9 0.000 
Average tenure of the previous job, 
years 5.0 4.9 0.002 
Males 55% 43% 0.000 
Age in the beginning of UB period 44.5 40.6 0.000 
Main language Estonian 61% 53% 0.001 
Knowledge of English 19% 17% 0.256 
Basic education or less 13% 17% 0.015 
Higher education 16% 11% 0.005 
Living in a town 65% 70% 0.050 
Disabled 8% 2% 0.000 
Previous occupation    
Managers 10% 5% 0.000 
Professionals 7% 5% 0.104 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 10% 7% 0.007 
Clerical support workers 6% 4% 0.075 
Service and sales workers 10% 23% 0.000 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and 
fishery workers 1% 1% 0.224 
Craft and related trades workers 28% 24% 0.077 
Plant and machine operators, and 
assemblers 14% 13% 0.373 
Elementary occupations 15% 20% 0.022 
 
 
The survival and hazard estimates for the constrained sample are illustrated in 
Figure 24. The survival estimates are similar up to 270 days, which is the end of 
the benefit period, and move apart after that point. During the benefit period, 
UIB recipients tend to have similar survival estimates, but after the benefit 
period they are much lower. The results suggest that the receipt of UIB lifts the 
survival estimates more than UA receipt does and that is why the two groups 
appear to behave similarly. Later on, after benefit exhaustion, the differences 
between the two groups indicated by Table 12 become more evident and make 
the two groups behave differently. Overall this supports the assumption that 
higher benefits hamper exits from unemployment more than lower benefits do. 
The picture of smoothed hazard functions shows that both groups are affected 
by the entitlement to benefit, as both groups have spikes in the hazard functions 
at the end of the potential benefit period, but the spike is much higher for UIB 
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recipients, suggesting that this group is affected more by the benefit dis-
incentive effect. 
 
 
Figure 24. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and smoothed hazard estimates for un-
employment benefit recipients with tenure in their previous job of 4 to 6 years 
 
 
Subsequently, the hazard function of these two groups is estimated in a joint 
model using a piecewise-constant proportional hazard model framework72. The 
model includes a covariate for UIB recipients, with UA recipients remaining as 
the control group, and the rest of the covariates that are not related to benefits 
(see Table 13). The model is estimated separately for the whole period, for the 
benefit period and for the period after benefit receipt. The estimations show that 
the exit rate from unemployment to employment is in general higher for UIB 
recipients. The difference in the hazard rates is not significant during the benefit 
period, but significant and greater thereafter. After the benefit period, UIB 
recipients are 1.4 times more likely to leave unemployment than UA recipients 
are. This result gives reason to believe that the two groups remain somewhat 
different regardless of the trimming of the previous employment period and that 
during the benefit period, the exit rate to employment for UIB recipients is more 
hindered because of their higher unemployment benefit. 
 
                                                 
72  Though there is a limitation that the two groups might be somewhat different regardless 
of the similar previous employment record. 
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Table 13. Estimation results for benefit covariates in a piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard model for benefit recipients with a tenure in their previous job of 4 to 6 years 
Criteria in model Covariate Compared to Hazard ratio P>z 
1 ≤ t; tenure 4–6 years UIB 270 UA 270 1.167** 0.037 
1 ≤ t ≤ 270; tenure 4–6 years UIB 270 UA 270 1.08700 0.354 
270 < t; tenure 4–6 years UIB 270 UA 270 1.384** 0.013 
 
 
3.2.6. Other factors of unemployment duration 
All the estimated piecewise-constant proportional hazard models described in 
the previous subsections of this section include other covariates besides 
covariates for unemployment benefit receipt. The coefficients for the other 
variables in the different models turn out to be similar and these results are also 
quite similar to those of the study conducted on the pre-crisis data (described in 
Section 3.1). The estimations for hazard ratios are presented in detail in 
Appendix 8 for models which contain a dummy variable for benefit receipt and 
dummy variables for spikes in the hazard rate 60 days before and after the 
benefit exhaustion. 
The hazard rate for men for exiting unemployment into employment turns 
out to be lower than that for women. Young people exit unemployment earlier 
and older people later. Estonian native speakers exit unemployment earlier, 
disabled people exit it later, and people living in towns rather than the country-
side exit earlier. Looking at previous occupation, it is seen that professionals 
and service and sales workers might exit earlier, but the exit rate is much lower 
for craft and related trades workers, which includes construction workers. As 
the crisis was especially deep in the construction and real estate markets, the 
results turn out to be as predicted. In addition, the exit rate also tends to be 
lower for people previously engaged in elementary occupations, meaning 
people who are likely to have lower skill levels. 
These results resemble the results for flows between employment and un-
employment calculated from the data of the Labour Force Survey for the crisis 
period in Estonia by Meriküll (2011) and Masso and Krillo (2011). Meriküll 
(2011) shows that during the crisis, it was harder for people with low Estonian 
language skills and people with a low level of education to exit unemployment, 
but it was easier for women. The estimation results of Masso and Krillo (2011) 
indicate that the flow from unemployment to employment during the crisis was 
lower for men than it was for women and it was also lower for non-Estonians 
than for Estonians. While the level of flows from unemployment to employment 
declined for all groups during the crisis, the decline was particularly steep for 
men. 
The estimation results in this thesis also indicate that it was relatively 
slightly more difficult for men to exit unemployment for employment during the 
crisis (estimation results in Appendix 8 compared to estimation results for the 
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pre-crisis period in Appendix 6). The estimation results also show that during 
the crisis the hazard of leaving unemployment for employment fell more for 
non-Estonian speakers, but less for people with higher education. These results 
of this thesis and those of Meriküll (2011) and Masso and Krillo (2011) reflect 
the structural changes that took place in the economy. The sectors that suffered 
more from the crisis were construction, real estate, and to an extent industry, 
particularly metalworking and machinery, meaning that the sectors that shrank 
during the crisis were those that employ more men, and also more non-Esto-
nians and fewer people with higher education. 
People with longer tenure in their previous job might exit unemployment 
later. This means that severance payments might also have a hampering effect 
on the exit from unemployment into employment. With those whose employ-
ment contract was terminated, people who were unsuitable for their job and 
people who were incapable of their work in the long-term exited unemployment 
significantly later than the other unemployed. 
To describe the economic situation, three different time-varying covariates 
are included in the models: monthly regional registered unemployment rate, 
monthly change in registered unemployment rate and monthly inflow of vacan-
cies mediated by the Unemployment Insurance Fund. Although the number 
registered as unemployed rose throughout the period under study, the inflow of 
vacancies declined until November 2009 and increased sharply thereafter (see 
Figure 25). This means that in the first quarter of 2010, it might have been 
easier to find a job than in the fourth quarter of 2009, even though the 
unemployment rate was higher. Estimations show that both the level of and 
increase in the registered unemployment rate lower hazard rates significantly. 
The inflow of vacancies increases the hazard of leaving unemployment. 
 
 
Figure 25. Number of vacancies mediated by the Estonian Unemployment Insurance 
Fund 2004–2010 
Sources: Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
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Like the study conducted on the pre-crisis data presented in Section 3.1, the 
analysis on the crisis data shows that the hazard of leaving unemployment prior 
to and during participation in active measures decreases73. The hazard rate is 
lower before and during the participation in various training and counselling 
measures. As participation in the active measures is voluntary rather than 
compulsory, it does not tend to cause threat effects that would make people 
leave unemployment before the beginning of a measure. 
Hazard rates are significantly higher after work practice or occupational 
training have been completed. Post-effects for Estonian language courses turn 
out to be significant for UA recipients only74. There are fewer Estonian speakers 
among UA recipients (see Table 5), so this group might benefit more from 
Estonian lessons. Counselling has a small positive effect for 270-day-UIB 
recipients, who are people who have generally worked a longer period for the 
same employer and have not had to look for a job for a longer period. 
In conclusion, the results for active measures in the system of unemployment 
benefits indicate that anticipation effects and locking-in effects exist that lower 
the hazard of leaving unemployment. The hazard rate is higher after some active 
measures, but not after all of them. Further analysis is needed to evaluate 
whether all of those measures incur positive labour market outcomes for the 
participants after all. 
 
 
3.2.7. Conclusion 
Search theory predicts a disincentive effects for unemployment benefits, 
meaning that a higher benefit or longer period of benefit hinders unemployed 
people from leaving unemployment into employment. However, the question 
arises whether the disincentive effect still exists when the economy is in 
recession and the unemployment rate is extremely high. The study presented in 
this section uses data on Estonian unemployment benefit recipients to answer 
this question. During the recent global financial crisis the number of 
unemployed people rose in Estonia more than fivefold in less than two years. 
It is shown in this section that the disincentive effects of unemployment 
benefits exist even during a period of deep recession, though the size of the 
                                                 
73 Anticipation periods are also included for these people who eventually did not get active 
measures, for example because they entered employment before the active measure started). 
Anticipation periods of 30 days are used in the calculations. 
74 A recent study by Lauringson et al. (2011) shows that the occupational labour market 
training provided by the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund did indeed have positive 
effects on the labour market outcomes of the participants in both 2009 and 2010. The esti-
mated average treatment effects on the treated for Estonian courses, however, turned out to 
be significant and positive in 2010 but not in 2009, and 2009 is also the time period studied 
in this thesis. As Estonian courses in 2009 were not yet focused on occupational Estonian as 
they were during later years, these courses did not help the participants return more quickly 
back to employment. 
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effect might be slightly smaller than it is when the economic situation is better. 
However, regardless of the extremely difficult economic situation, the fall in the 
disincentive effect appears to be very marginal. The study also looks in more 
detail at the effect of the length and the effect of the size of the benefit on the 
hazard of leaving unemployment into employment. It is shown that both a 
higher benefit level and a longer potential benefit period cause a disincentive 
effect during a period of sharply rising unemployment. 
The results indicate slightly milder disincentive effects from unemployment 
benefits during a recession, like the few existing studies on the cyclicality of 
disincentive effects (see for example Schmieder et al (2010) and Bover et al 
(2002)). In consequence, it can be argued that it might be reasonable to increase 
the generosity of unemployment benefits during times of higher unemployment 
as the welfare effects of more generous benefits are likely to be positive. 
In addition, the models for estimating benefit disincentive effects include 
covariates for active measures alongside personal characteristics and covariates 
for the economic environment. Participation in active measures is modelled 
using time-varying covariates showing the period before the measures, during 
the measures and after the measures. The study shows that people directed to 
active measures tend to have lower hazards of leaving unemployment just 
before the period of an active measure and during the period they are receiving 
an active measure. This is also in accordance with the system of active 
measures in Estonia where people are not forced to participate, but are in fact 
willing to do so. While the study shows negative anticipation effects and 
locking-in effects, post effects are not positive for all measures. A more in-
depth analysis of those measures is required for conclusions to be drawn on 
their impact on employment. 
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4. THE IMPACT OF THE GENEROSITY  
OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ON POST-
UNEMPLOYMENT JOB QUALITY IN ESTONIA 
4.1. Unemployment insurance generosity in a period 
of crisis: the effect on post-unemployment wages 
4.1.1. Introduction 
In general, the conclusions drawn from search theory concerning unemploy-
ment benefits are quite negative as benefits are assumed to increase unemploy-
ment duration. However, a positive impact can be found on post-unemployment 
job quality, and the relationship between the generosity of unemployment bene-
fits and post-unemployment job quality is shown in this section using the data 
from the recent crisis period. 
The previous chapter (Chapter 3) reveals from Estonian data that unemploy-
ment benefits increase unemployment duration significantly both in good 
economic conditions and in a severe recession. The study presented in this sec-
tion uses the same Estonian data from the recession period as Section 3.2 did to 
explore whether more generous benefits increase not only unemployment dura-
tion but also post-unemployment job quality. The study shows that a longer 
potential benefit period allows people to search for longer and accept relatively 
higher wages during the benefit period with a smaller drop from their previous 
wage than would have been possible if they had been entitled to a shorter 
benefit. The effect is found during the period when the matched control group 
of people on the shorter benefit has exhausted their benefit, but the treatment 
group of people on the longer benefit can still continue to receive their benefit. 
This implies that the spike at the end of the benefit period happens at least to 
some extent because people become less selective towards the end of their 
benefit period and not only because of their greater search intensity. 
 
 
4.1.2. Data and methodology 
The study presented in this section, like that in Section 3.2, looks at unemploy-
ment insurance benefits granted during the first three quarters of the sharp 
increase in the unemployment rate, from July 2008 until March 2009 (see 
Figure 26). The data for unemployment benefit recipients from the Estonian 
Unemployment Insurance Fund are combined with wage data from the Estonian 
Tax and Customs Board up to September 201075. The entry to employment is 
                                                 
75 The use of tax data allows the time a job is accepted and the accepted wage level to be 
defined exceptionally well, though only in the formal sector. However, according to a busi-
ness survey by Putninš and Sauka (2011), there might be a significant share of employers in 
Estonia who under-report their number of employees and employers who under-report 
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dealt with like in Section 3.2, running until the spring of 2010, which saw the 
peak in unemployment rate. The wage data, however, are combined for a longer 
time span up to September 2010 to allow the wage effects after entry into 
employment to be studied. 
 
 
Figure 26. Number of unemployed in Estonia for 2005–2010 and the scope of the study 
Source: Statistics Estonia 
 
 
This section focuses on UIB recipients only76, comparing labour market out-
comes for people with different potential benefit periods. During the period 
under study it was possible to be eligible for either 180-day-UIB or 270-day-
UIB. To be entitled to the longer benefit of 270 days, there is an additional 
criterion that a person has to have made contributions for at least 56 months77. 
The characteristics of the benefit recipients analysed in this study are 
presented in Table 14. Unlike Section 3.2 this study does not include the un-
employed who received active measures during their registered unemployment 
                                                                                                                       
wages. If accepting part of the wage in the informal sector after the unemployment spell is 
more common than working partly informally before the unemployment spell, then the esti-
mations that only consider the informal sector would overestimate the accepted wage drop. 
However, the share of the shadow economy tends to be higher in some certain sectors, such 
as construction, and lower in others. At the same time, the unemployed tend to look for a job 
in the same sectors where they worked previously, so it is likely that those who accept a 
partly informal wage might also have earned partly informal wage previously. In that case, 
the exclusion of informal sector might not cause big differences in the estimations. 
76  In this chapter, benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of their benefit 
from a previous benefit period are excluded to show more explicitly the impact of the 
potential benefit period. 
77 A more thorough overview of the Estonian unemployment benefit system is provided in 
Subsection 2.1.3. 
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spell. Those observations are excluded to restrict the study to only the pure 
effect of unemployment benefits on job quality. 
 
Table 14. Description of UIB recipients by type of benefit and exit to employment 
Variable 
All Enter employment*
Enter empl. 
for ≥2 
months* 
Enter empl. 
for ≥7 
months* 
UIB 
180 
UIB 
270 
UIB 
180 
UIB 
270 
UIB 
180 
UIB 
270 
UIB 
180 
UIB 
270 
Number of observations 7780 9327 4157 5366 3796 5038 1886 2875 
Average previous monthly 
wage, EEK 9832 12590 10585 13589 10592 13698 10670 13994 
Average tenure of the previous 
job, years 1.5 5.9 1.5 5.0 1.5 5.0 1.6 5.3 
Males 57% 59% 53% 56% 52% 56% 45% 50% 
Age at the beginning of UIB 
period 36 45 35 43 35 43 34 42 
Main language Estonian 52% 57% 58% 62% 59% 63% 63% 67% 
Knowledge of English 28% 19% 34% 23% 34% 24% 39% 28% 
Basic education or less 21% 14% 20% 13% 19% 13% 17% 11% 
Higher education 12% 16% 14% 18% 14% 18% 19% 21% 
Living in a town 71% 69% 70% 67% 70% 67% 70% 66% 
Disabled 7% 8% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 
Previous occupation         
Managers 6% 10% 7% 12% 7% 12% 10% 14% 
Professionals 4% 6% 5% 6% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 8% 10% 9% 10% 9% 10% 11% 11% 
Clerical support workers 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 8% 7% 
Service and sales workers 14% 9% 16% 10% 16% 10% 17% 11% 
Skilled agricultural, forestry 
and fishery workers 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Craft and related trades 
workers 32% 29% 28% 26% 28% 26% 22% 22% 
Plant and machine operators, 
and assemblers 10% 14% 10% 13% 10% 14% 9% 14% 
Elementary occupations 19% 16% 17% 15% 17% 15% 15% 13% 
* Unemployed who entered employment by April 2010 at the latest. 
Note: People who received active measures are not considered in the table as they are not used in 
this study. In addition, benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of benefit from a 
previous benefit period are excluded. 
EEK – the currency used in Estonia until 31.12.2010 (1 EUR = 15.6466 EEK). 
 
 
Even these smaller samples show similar differences between 180-day-UIB and 
270-day-UIB recipients to those shown in the whole samples dealt with in 
Section 3.2. The biggest difference between 180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB 
recipients lies in the average previous tenure, as this is highly correlated with 
the period of unemployment insurance contributions that determine the length 
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of UIB. Furthermore, 270-day-UIB recipients have previously earned a higher 
wage, are more educated, are older, and held a previous job with a slightly 
higher ranking. In addition to this, Table 14 presents the mean values of 
variables for those UIB recipients who exited unemployment by April 2010 at 
the latest. The means of characteristics are provided for all exits to employment, 
for those people whose exit to employment lasted at least two months and for 
those whose exit to employment lasted at least seven months, meaning they re-
ceived a wage in at least seven months during a nine-month period after 
entering employment. The UIB recipients who enter employment have pre-
viously earned a higher wage, are more educated, are younger, and have worked 
previously in jobs with higher rankings, and there is a higher share of women, 
native speakers of Estonian and people with a knowledge of English among 
them. The same differences are even larger when people who enter employment 
for a longer term are compared with the whole sample. 
The estimation of hazard rates by type of UIB recipient is presented in 
Figure 27; for a shorter time span the smoothed hazard rates are presented in 
Figure 16 and 17 in Section 3.2. The figure reveals clear spikes in the hazard 
rates at the ends of UIB periods. The study presented in the previous chapter 
(Section 3.2) used the same data and showed that the disincentive effects remain 
even during a period of crisis and that both higher benefit level and maximum 
duration of benefit decrease significantly the hazard of leaving unemployment 
to employment.  
 
 
Figure 27. Smoothed hazard rates for exiting into employment 
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the job match quality as it allows a person to look for a job longer with lower 
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and in the average wage compared to the previous wage are looked at. In 
addition to the overall difference between shorter and longer term UIB re-
cipients, differences in different periods of the unemployment spell when exit 
occurs are also investigated. The difference in post-unemployment job quality 
should occur particularly when 180-day-UIB recipients are about to exhaust 
their benefit, and when their benefit is exhausted but 270-day-UIB recipients 
are still receiving their benefit. In Figure 27 it can be seen that the hazard of 
leaving unemployment for 180-day-UIB recipients is higher around 150–240 
days in the unemployment spell, so this is also the period the study focuses on. 
In addition, it is examined whether there is a post-unemployment job quality 
difference for people who accept job offers around 270–360 days of the 
unemployment spell, as 270-day-UIB recipients exhibit a lot higher hazard rate 
then as their benefit has just lapsed. The beginning of the unemployment spell 
at 1–150 days is also studied, where hazard rates are more similar but 270-day-
UIB recipients demonstrate a slightly higher hazard of leaving unemployment. 
To make different groups of UIB recipients more comparable, the method of 
propensity score matching is applied as presented in Subsection 1.2.2 (see 
thorough overview in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), Caliendo (2006) and 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2009)). Stata modules by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) 
and Gangl (2004b) are used for conducting estimations. Samples are matched 
using nearest neighbour matching with a probit model, using one nearest 
neighbour with replacement. Average treatment effects on the treated are 
estimated over the common support area. People who received active measures, 
mainly training, are not used in the estimations as participation in active 
measures could affect the treatment effects, though most benefit recipients did 
not receive active measures during the period under study. 
 
 
4.1.3. Estimation results: starting wage 
For differences in job match quality between people entitled to 180 and 270 
days of benefit to be studied, the differences in the starting wage are first 
estimated. The starting wage is defined as the wage in the second month, 
because the wage in the very first month might not be for a full month. The 
starting wage is compared to the person’s previous wage, which is defined as 
the average wage which was used as the basis for granting the benefit, typically 
the nine employed months preceding the last three employed months78. 
                                                 
78 In the calculations of wage change, the rise is truncated at 100%, so the wage change can 
be between –100% and 100%. The wages for calculating the change are in nominal terms, 
meaning the wage changes on the market in time are not considered. The time period under 
study is quite short and the wage level was quite stable during the crisis. The national 
average wage decreased by 5% during 2009 and increased by 1% in 2010; the average wage 
increases varied more by economic sector, but no information about the previous or future 
sectors of the unemployed was available. 
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The drop in the starting wage for 180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients 
is illustrated in Figure 28 (upper panel). The figure shows that the accepted 
wage declines during the unemployment spell, meaning the scar effects are 
bigger the longer a person is unemployed. People who exit unemployment 
straight away during the first three months of unemployment might not 
necessarily lose in their wage, but people who have already been unemployed 
for more than a year might have to settle for only two thirds of their previous 
wage. 
The accepted wage declines particularly quickly during the benefit period as 
also predicted by search theory. In general, the wage drop compared to the 
previous wage is larger for 270-day-UIB recipients, but the wage drop is larger 
for 180-day-UIB recipients around the period when their benefit lapses but 270-
day-UIB recipients can continue to receive their benefit. Similarly, the drop in 
wage is especially large for 270-day-UIB recipients when their benefit lapses. 
In this, even unmatched data identify that the accepted wage is affected by the 
potential period of benefits, and at the end of the benefit period the hazard of 
exiting unemployment rises because the acceptable drop in wage is larger and 
not only because job search intensity is higher. 
In addition, it can be seen in Figure 28 (lower panel) that shifting the graph 
for 180-day-UIB recipients down by 8% would result in very similar accepted 
wage drops to those of 270-day-UIB recipients during the beginning of the 
unemployment period. When benefits expire for 180-day-UIB recipients, their 
accepted wage drop quickly accelerates, and 270-day-UIB recipients suffer 
larger losses when their benefits expire, after which the wage drops are again 
similar. This would suggest that the behaviour of both types of benefit recipient 
are highly influenced by the benefit receipt. 
Recipients of 180-day-UIB have previously had a lower wage probably 
above all because of their shorter tenure (see Table 14), but the offer wage 
distribution for them might not be lower to the same degree. On the one hand, 
180-day-UIB recipients have already accumulated some tenure and skills, 
raising the wage distribution for them on their next job, while on the other hand, 
270-day-UIB recipients have had to have a break in their long tenure, which 
was mainly for one single employer, and so it is more likely that they have had 
to accept a larger wage drop than 180-day-UIB recipients; the differences 
between the two groups are smaller for the future employer than they were for 
the previous employer. That is why the graph of accepted wage drops for  
180-day-UIB recipients is at a somewhat higher level than for 270-day-UIB 
recipients. This suggestion is also supported by the figure of accepted wage 
drops by UIB recipients whose previous record of unemployment insurance 
contributions is between 32–79 months (see Appendix 10). Limiting the period 
of insurance contributions, which determines the benefit length and is closely 
related to tenure, makes the two groups of benefit recipients more similar (see 
Appendix 11). The figure confirms similarities in wage drops in the beginning 
35
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and later on during the benefit period and differences around the benefit 
exhaustion dates. 
 
 
Figure 28. The change in the starting wage compared to the previous wage for 180-day-
UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients 
Note: Average change over intervals of 30 days up to 360 days; the last interval is 360–480 days 
as there are fewer observations. Only those unemployed are considered who entered employment 
by the beginning of April 2010 at the latest. 
 
 
The next part of this section examines the accepted wage drops for the two 
groups of benefit recipients matched by propensity score matching. Table 15 
presents the estimation results for the differences in unmatched samples and 
matched samples (the probit models for matching 180-day-UIB and 270-day-
UIB recipients are presented in Appendix 12; the mean values of the most 
relevant variables for the unmatched and matched samples are presented in 
Appendix 13; propensity score distributions are graphed in Appendix 14). The 
estimations are given for people who had found a job by the beginning of April 
2010 at the latest, or during the period when unemployment was still rising. 
Both groups of benefit recipients start earning a lower wage than their wage 
before unemployment. When wage differences between shorter and longer term 
benefit recipients are estimated for the overall period (model 1), the unmatched 
differences show that the wage declines significantly more, in fact almost 8% 
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more, for 270-day-UIB recipients. The matched samples produce results that 
indicate no significant differences in the drop in the post-unemployment starting 
wage. 
The estimation results show much greater differences for the period of 151–
240 days of the unemployment spell, which is the period when the benefit 
lapses for 180-day-UIB recipients but still continues for 270-day-UIB recipients 
(model 3). The estimation results for matched samples show that 270-day-UIB 
recipients exhibit an 8.4% smaller drop in the starting wage than they would 
have seen if they had been entitled to benefits only for 180 days (significant at 
the 0.05 level). 
 
Table 15. Estimation results for the differences in the change in the starting wage 
  
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
Diffe-
rence T-stat p-value 
Latest entry to employment in April 2010 (model no. 1) 
Unmatched: 2nd month wage rise 
from previous wage –20.5% –12.8% –7.7% –7.78 0.000 
ATT: 2nd month wage rise from 
previous wage –20.5% –20.5% 0.1% 0.03 0.976 
Entry to employment at 1–150 days from the beginning of benefit period (model 
no. 2) 
Unmatched: 2nd month wage rise 
from previous wage –11.1% –2.1% –9.0% –6.00 0.000 
ATT: 2nd month wage rise from 
previous wage –10.8% –7.1% –3.7% –1.46 0.144 
Entry to employment at 151–240 days from the beginning of benefit period 
(model no. 3) 
Unmatched: 2nd month wage rise 
from previous wage –19.2% –17.4% –1.8% –0.92 0.358 
ATT: 2nd month wage rise from 
previous wage –19.0% –27.5% 8.4% 2.53 0.011 
Entry to employment at 271–360 days from the beginning of benefit period, latest 
in April 2010 (model no. 4) 
Unmatched: 2nd month wage rise 
from previous wage –34.0% –22.3% –11.7% –5.00 0.000 
ATT: 2nd month wage rise from 
previous wage –33.3% –34.8% 1.5% 0.35 0.726 
 
 
The estimation results for the people who leave unemployment relatively 
quickly during 1–150 days of the unemployment spell (model 2) and who leave 
relatively slowly during 271–360 days of the unemployment spell (model 4) 
show that 270-day-UIB recipients accept wage drops that are about 10% larger 
for unmatched samples. Matched samples show no significant differences in 
wage declines.  
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Wage changes in the starting wage using matched samples are presented in 
Figure 29. For matching, models 2, 3 and 4 are used, and similar models for the 
periods of 241–270 days and 361–480 days are estimated in addition. Wage 
changes are calculated as averages over 30-day-periods of exits from unemploy-
ment to employment and only the last interval is longer at 361–480 days. The 
figure shows that for the first 150 days of unemployment the accepted wage 
drop increases slightly for both 270-day-UIB recipients and the control group 
and the wage drop is smaller for the control group. After that, the accepted 
wage drop plummets for the control group as their benefit lapses, and 
afterwards their accepted wage drop deepens only to some extent. The change 
in the starting wage for 270-day-UIB recipients falls at a slower pace through-
out their benefit period, and this drop is smaller during the period when 
matched 180-day-UIB recipients have exhausted their benefit period but 270-
day-UIB recipients still have not. Afterwards, the wage drops of the two groups 
are quite similar. 
 
 
Figure 29. The change in the starting wage compared to the previous wage for 270-day-
UIB recipients and for the matched control group of 180-day-UIB recipients 
Note: Average change over intervals of 30 days up to 360 days; the last interval is 360–480 days 
as there are fewer observations. Only those unemployed are considered who entered employment 
by the beginning of April 2010 at the latest. 
 
 
Figure 29 shows that the drop in the accepted starting wage compared to the 
previous wage is particularly steep around the point when benefits lapse for 
both 180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients. After the fall, the wage change 
rises somewhat in both cases before gradually falling again. When the graphs of 
hazard rates and wage changes are compared (Figure 27 and 29 combined in 
Figure 30), it can be seen that the peaks in the hazard rate coincide more or less 
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with the larger drops in the accepted wage. The graphs also depict clearly the 
inverse relationship between the hazard rates and wage changes. At the 
beginning of the unemployment spell 270-day-UIB recipients have a higher 
hazard of leaving unemployment at the expense of larger drops in the accepted 
wage. When the end of the benefit period approaches for 180-day-UIB 
recipients, their hazard rate rises and the drop in the accepted wage quickly 
plummets. The approaching end of benefit for 270-day-UIB recipients causes a 
rising hazard rate and larger wage drops for that group as well. It can be 
concluded that the higher hazard of exiting unemployment into employment 
means larger drops in the starting wage are accepted and not just that search 
intensity is higher; the data in use do not indicate whether the job search 
intensity also changes along with the reservation wage. 
 
Figure 30. Hazard rates for exiting unemployment into employment and the change in 
the starting wage compared to the previous wage 
Note: For changes in the wage, average change over intervals of 30 days up to 360 days; the last 
interval is 360–480 days as there are fewer observations. Only those unemployed are considered 
who entered employment by the beginning of April 2010 at the latest. Hazard rates are calculated 
for the same time intervals as wage change. 
 
 
Figures 28–30 depicted average changes in the accepted wage. The change in 
the reservation wage should be reflected more by the accepted wage changes in 
the lower percentiles. Figure 31 illustrates the accepted wage changes in the 
fifth percentile and in the first quartile. The figure shows even more clearly the 
relationship between the end of the benefit period and the accepted wage 
change. Both groups of benefit recipients exhibit larger drops in the accepted 
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wage at the end of the benefit periods. There is basically no difference in the 
wage drop when both groups receive benefits or when neither group receives 
benefit. The difference in wage drops occurs when only one of the groups 
receives benefit.  
 
 
Figure 31. The change in the starting wage compared to the previous wage, the fifth 
percentile and the first quartile for 270-day-UIB recipients and for the matched control 
group of 180-day-UIB recipients 
 
 
Figure 31 also shows that after the end of benefit, 5% of the unemployed who 
enter employment settle for a wage that is at least 90% lower than their previous 
wage. A quarter of the unemployed who enter employment after the end of 
benefit accept a wage drop of at least 60%. 
Figure 32 presents the distribution of the change in the starting wage 
compared to the previous wage. Firstly, 270-day-UIB recipients are matched 
with 180-day-UIB recipients irrespective of when they leave unemployment 
(model no. 1). In this case it can be seen that the matched 180-day-UIB 
recipients suffer more from more severe wage drops. However, there are also 
relatively more who start earning a very much higher wage than previously. 
Recipients of 270-day-UIB show more density around smaller wage losses and 
gains and hence in total the average treatment effect on treated does not turn out 
to be significant as the average wage losses are similar. 
Secondly, Figure 32 depicts in more detail the results of the model when 
only those UIB recipients who leave unemployment at 151–240 days of their 
unemployment period are studied (model no. 3). In this case there is in fact a 
relatively larger share of matched 180-day-UIB recipients who suffer large 
losses in wages and relatively more 270-day-UIB recipients who experience 
minor drops or minor rises in their starting wage. While 22% of 270-day-UIB 
recipients during that period accept wage drops of more than 50%, this share is 
34% among 180-day-UIB recipients. In addition, 24% of 270-day-UIB 
recipients accept a higher wage than their previous wage and 26% accept a 
-100%
-90%
-80%
-70%
-60%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
1-
30
31
-6
0
61
-9
0
91
-1
20
12
1-
15
0
15
1-
18
0
18
1-
21
0
21
1-
24
0
24
1-
27
0
27
1-
30
0
30
1-
33
0
33
1-
36
0
36
1-
39
0
39
1-
42
0
42
1-
45
0
45
1-
48
0
W
ag
e 
ch
an
ge
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 w
ag
e
Unemployment duration in days
UIB 270 - 5% UIB 270 - 25% UIB 180 - 5% UIB 180 - 25%
 143 
wage drop of up to a quarter. Among 180-day-UIB recipients these shares are 
22% and 15% respectively. 
 
 
Figure 32. The distribution of the change in the starting wage compared to the previous 
wage (models no. 1 and 3) 
 
 
Similar conclusions can be drawn on the percentiles of the change in the starting 
wage graphed in Appendix 15. The lower percentiles of 270-day-UIB recipients 
accept smaller wage drops than 180-day-UIB recipients. This effect is stressed 
during the entry into employment at around 151–240 days of the unemployment 
spell. 
 
 
4.1.4. Estimation results: average wage 
As well as the starting wage, the average wage over a longer period is studied. 
As the previous wage used in the study, which serves as the basis for benefits, is 
calculated over a period of nine months, the post-unemployment average wage 
is calculated over a period of the same length. The wage from the second until 
the tenth month is taken, as the wage in the very first month might not be for a 
full month. Only those people who received a wage for at least seven months 
during those nine months are considered. This makes it possible to include in 
the study people who are off from the work for a short while due to vacations or 
sickness. 
As with the starting wage, the average wage is compared to the previous 
wage in a similar manner, through a relative wage change. The estimations are 
calculated for people who exited unemployment into employment by December 
2009 at the latest as the tax data are available only until September 2010. The 
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differences in the starting wage are calculated for the same group as well, with 
the differences from the previous subsection being that the exit to employment 
had to be by December 2009 at the latest and that the criterion of at least seven 
months of wages during the first nine months still had to hold, so that very 
temporary employment is not considered. 
Figure 33 presents the change in the starting wage and in the average wage 
compared to the previous wage for people who received a wage for at least 
seven months during the first nine months of the employment spell. The picture 
is similar to Figure 28 as in general 180-day-UIB recipients experience smaller 
drops in their wage than 270-day-UIB recipients do, with the exception of the 
period when 180-day-UIB recipients run out of benefit. The figure also shows 
that the wage increases over time for both groups and the average wage over a 
longer period is higher than the starting wage. 
 
 
Figure 33. The change in the average wage and in the starting wage compared to the 
previous wage for 180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients (excluding short 
employment spells) 
Note: Average change over intervals of 30 days up to 360 days; the last interval is 360–480 days 
as there are fewer observations. Only those unemployed are considered who entered employment 
by the beginning of December 2009 at the latest. 
 
 
Table 16 presents the estimation results for the differences in the average wage 
in the unmatched samples and matched samples (the probit models for matching 
180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients are presented in Appendix 16; the 
mean values of the most relevant variables for the unmatched and matched 
samples are presented in Appendix 17; propensity score distributions are 
graphed in Appendix 18). For every group studied, the estimations for the 
differences in the starting wage are also provided. 
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The estimation results for the differences in the average wage are similar to the 
estimated differences in the starting wage. The differences in the wage change 
for the whole group under study do not turn out to be significant (model 5). 
However, large differences occur for people who exit unemployment at 151–
240 days of their unemployment spell (model 7). Recipients of 270-day-UIB 
exhibit a 9.9% smaller wage drop in their average wage and an 11.8% smaller 
drop in the starting wage than the matched control group (both significant at the 
0.01 level). 
During the beginning of the unemployment spell, the control group entitled 
to 180-day-UIB typically accept jobs where they earn quite similar wages to 
those of their previous job; for unmatched data the increase in the average wage 
is 5.8%, and for matched data it is 0.2% (model 6). Recipients of 270-day-UIB 
accept offers that involve a wage drop of about 7%, which might be the reason 
why they exhibit higher exit rates from unemployment during that period. For 
people exiting unemployment during the period when both types of benefit 
recipient have exhausted their benefits, there are no statistically significant 
differences in the wage drops (model 8). 
This means that during the beginning of the unemployment spell, 270-day-
UIB recipients accept jobs with a relatively lower wage. When 180-day-UIB 
recipients’ benefits lapse, then 180-day-UIB recipients have larger drops in 
wages. Afterwards there are no significant differences, so the estimation results 
show no significant wage differentials for the whole period. However, the 
relative wage changes accepted by different UIB recipients are different during 
different periods. 
The wage change in the starting and average wages for longer employment 
spells using matched samples is presented in Figure 34. Models 6, 7 and 8 are 
used for matching and in addition, similar models are estimated for the periods 
of 241–270 days and 361–480 days. Wage changes are calculated in the same 
way as in the previous subsection with averages over 30-day-periods of exits 
from unemployment to employment, while the last interval is longer. The figure 
shows increasing wage drops over benefit periods and more stable wage drops 
after benefit periods. The sharpest drop in wage for the control group is at 151–
180 days of the unemployment spell, which is just when their benefit expires. 
Recipients of 270-day-UIB experience a slighter decline in wages during the 
benefit period, so the decline in the average wage for the jobs accepted at 151–
270 days of unemployment spell is smaller for 270-day-UIB recipients than it is 
for 180-day-UIB recipients. However, 270-day-UIB recipients exhibit a larger 
drop in the accepted wage at around 300 days of the unemployment spell as 
their benefit period ends then. 
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Figure 34. The change in the average wage compared to the previous wage for longer 
employment spells for 270-day-UIB recipients and for the matched control group of 
180-day-UIB recipients 
Note: Average change over intervals of 30 days up to 360 days; the last interval is 360–480 days 
as there are fewer observations. Only those unemployed are considered who entered employment 
by the beginning of December 2009 at the latest. 
 
 
Figure 34 depicting the drop in the average wage shows a slightly more blurred 
picture than Figure 29 or Figures 30 and 31 depicting the drop in the starting 
wage. There are bigger differences between the two groups of benefit recipients 
at the beginning of the unemployment period and also later on. This shows that 
the starting wage might be a better proxy for the job quality of the accepted job 
than the average wage as the average wage may be affected more by events that 
happen later on during the employment period, including a change of job. In 
addition, the starting wage can be assumed to show the movements in the 
reservation wage better. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from Figure 35, which illustrates the 
distribution of the change in the average wage, to those drawn from Figure 32, 
which depicts the distribution of changes in the starting wage. When UIB 
recipients who exit unemployment in the period of 151–240 days of unemploy-
ment are matched, the estimations show that there is a relatively larger share of 
270-day-UIB recipients who experience a minor drop in their average wage 
compared to their previous wage and a relatively larger share of matched 180-
day-UIB recipients who suffer large drops in the average wage. Of the 180-day-
UIB recipients who have exited unemployment during 151–240 days of the 
unemployment spell, 25% experience wage drops of more than 50% compared 
to their previous wage. The share of these severe wage drops among 270-day-
-40%
-35%
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
1-
30
31
-6
0
61
-9
0
91
-1
20
12
1-
15
0
15
1-
18
0
18
1-
21
0
21
1-
24
0
24
1-
27
0
27
1-
30
0
30
1-
33
0
33
1-
36
0
36
1-
39
0
39
1-
42
0
42
1-
45
0
45
1-
48
0
W
ag
e 
dr
op
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 p
re
vi
ou
s w
ag
e
Unemployment duration in days
UIB 270 average wage (matched)
Matched control group average wage
UIB 270 average wage (unmatched)
 148 
UIB recipients is only 13%. Of the 180-day-UIB recipients, 22% have a higher 
post-unemployment average wage than their previous wage, while the share 
among 270-day-UIB recipients is 24%. The percentiles of the change in the 
average wage graphed in Appendix 19 confirm that the lower percentiles of 
270-day-UIB recipients accept smaller wage drops than 180-day-UIB recipients 
do, especially during the entry to employment at 151–240 days of the 
unemployment spell. 
 
 
Figure 35. The distribution of the change in the average wage compared to the previous 
wage (models no. 5 and 7) 
 
 
4.1.5. Addressing the problem of adverse selection 
The previous subsections showed that in general the drop in the accepted wage 
becomes larger as the unemployment spell lengthens. In addition, the drop in 
the accepted wage tends to be sharper around the end of the benefit period. This 
raises the question of whether the movements in the changes of the accepted 
wage are caused by individual characteristics. Appendix 20 presents some indi-
vidual characteristics – education, occupations, language, age and previous 
tenure – of the unemployed exiting into employment during different un-
employment spells. It can be seen that the pool of the unemployed leaving un-
employment in different time periods does indeed change over time as indi-
vidual characteristics tend to deteriorate gradually. Basically this shows the 
same effects as the different covariates estimated with hazard models in Section 
3.2 (Appendix 8), but the changes in these characteristics are not as severe 
around the end of benefit period as the relative changes in accepted wage. 
Another indicator that should reflect the value of human capital and that also 
directly affects the calculation of change in the accepted wage compared to the 
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previous wage is the previous wage itself. The graphs in Appendix 21 depict the 
starting wage and the previous wage in absolute terms for both 180-day-UIB 
and 270-day-UIB recipients. Both matched and unmatched data for the previous 
wage reveal that there is actually no deterioration from the previous wage along 
the unemployment spell. However, the unmatched data shows that people who 
exit at around the end of the benefit period have previously had a higher wage. 
In the matched data these jumps are much smaller. 
The level of unemployment benefits is based on the previous average wage, 
meaning the reasons behind the changes in the previous average wage during 
the unemployment spell reflect the level of unemployment benefits. From this it 
appears that those who leave unemployment for employment straight after the 
unemployment benefit period tend to be those who get higher unemployment 
benefits (see Figure 36 and Appendix 22). In this point, this paper confirms 
again that people with higher unemployment benefits are less eager to exit 
unemployment during the unemployment benefit spell, but the hazard of 
entering employment for them rises at the end of the benefit period. However, 
these effects are almost absent in the matched data and do not cause the effects 
in the post-unemployment wage studied in the previous subsections, or if so, 
then only for 270-day-UIB recipients at the end of their benefit. 
It can be concluded from these graphs that the severe drop in the accepted 
wage at the end of the benefit period for 180-day-UIB recipients is indeed there 
because they accept a much lower wage when their benefit period lapses. The 
bigger drop in the accepted wage for 270-day-UIB recipients at the end of their 
benefit period is caused partly because of their willingness to accept a lower 
wage as well, though it might also be partly caused by the fact that at the end of 
the benefit period there are relatively more exits to employment by people with 
higher unemployment benefit and a higher previous wage. 
In addition, it could be argued that the differences in the behaviour of 
different groups of benefit recipients could be caused by unobservable 
characteristics, as propensity score matching assumes selection to treatment on 
observables only. However, as the study shows differences in labour market 
behaviour specifically during the period when benefits differ (see for example 
Figure 30), it is highly unlikely that any variable other than the generosity of 
benefits could cause such differences.  
 
38
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Figure 36. Daily unemployment benefit rate during the first 100 days for 270-day-UIB 
recipients and for 180-day-UIB recipients 
 
 
4.1.6. Conclusion 
The current section uses Estonian data from the period of the last global 
economic downturn when unemployment in Estonia grew more than in any 
other EU country. A previous study using that data described in Section 3.2 has 
shown that the behaviour of unemployed people is seriously affected by the 
receipt of benefits even during a period of crisis. Higher or longer benefits incur 
lower hazards of leaving unemployment and the hazard rate reaches its highest 
level at the end of the benefit period, after which it drops significantly. The 
current study presented in this section shows that at least some part of that rise 
in the hazard rate occurs because people become less selective and are forced to 
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accept jobs with lower quality, meaning a lower wage, and the rise is not only 
caused by increased job search intensity79. 
In this study two groups of unemployment benefit recipients are examined – 
the unemployed receiving unemployment insurance benefit for 270 days and the 
unemployed receiving the benefit for 180 days. The estimations are provided 
for the average treatment effects on the treated, where people eligible for the 
longer benefit are considered as treated. A significant difference occurs during 
the period when the 180-day-UIB recipients are exhausting their benefit and 
have a rise in the hazard rate for leaving unemployment, but the 270-day-UIB 
recipients can still continue with their benefit. During that period the average 
drop in both the accepted starting wage and the accepted average wage 
compared to their previous wage is almost 10% smaller for 270-day-UIB 
recipients, and is statistically significant. This result resembles somewhat the 
results by Gaure et al. (2008) who estimate from Norwegian data that just prior 
to benefit exhaustion there is a drop of 10% in accepted earnings. 
The wage decline for 270-day-UIB recipients is smaller on average during 
the period when the difference occurs, because there is a smaller share of people 
who accept a very large wage decline compared to the group of shorter-term 
benefit recipients. Among the shorter-term benefit recipients, 34% accept a 
wage drop of at least 50% during that period, but only 22% of longer-term 
benefit recipients do likewise. However, the overall difference in the drop of the 
accepted wage for all possible unemployment spells does not turn out to be 
significant, because the control group of 180-day-UIB recipients with a shorter 
unemployment spell accepts relatively smaller wage drops and after longer 
unemployment spells both groups accept similar wage drops. 
The estimations over the matched samples show that people eligible for a 
longer benefit period experience a gradual wage decline over their benefit 
period and afterwards their accepted wage stabilises at a lower level. The 
control group of shorter unemployment insurance benefit recipients accepts 
wage offers during their benefit period that incur relatively lower wage drops 
compared to their previous wage. At the end of their benefit period they exhibit 
a serious drop in the accepted wage and a spike in the hazard rate for exiting 
unemployment to employment. Afterwards, the drop in the accepted wage 
slowly expands and stabilises at a similar level to that of longer benefit 
recipients. In total, recipients of shorter benefit accept relatively smaller wage 
drops during their benefit period, but a lot larger after their benefit is exhausted 
than do the longer-term benefit recipients, who can still continue receiving their 
benefit. After both groups have exhausted their benefits, the relative wage drops 
are alike. 
The study shows that the hazard of leaving unemployment and the accepted 
wage are very tightly connected. A higher hazard rate for leaving unemployment 
                                                 
79 Unfortunately it is not possible to draw conclusions using this data as to whether the job 
search intensity also changes. 
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into employment always occurs in the data at the cost of accepting larger drops 
in the wage. The results of this paper can be interpreted as proof of un-
employment benefits increasing the reservation wage as proposed by search 
theory. At the same time unemployment benefit works as a job search subsidy 
by letting the unemployed prolong their job search so they can find a job of 
higher quality. 
 
 
4.2. Unemployment insurance generosity  
in a period of crisis: the effect on  
post-unemployment employment duration 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 confirmed the main conclusion of search theory that more generous 
unemployment benefits increase unemployment duration and that this effect 
occurs even in a period of a deep recession. However, it was shown in Section 
4.1 that more generous benefits with longer potential duration might also 
support the job search and that the unemployed can accept a higher wage while 
on benefit receipt. In the current section it is established that more generous 
unemployment benefits also increase post-unemployment job quality in terms of 
longer job duration. It might be argued that job duration could be an even better 
proxy for job match quality than wage, stemming from the models of job 
turnover that treat job match as an experience good (for example Jovanovic 
(1979)).  
The study shows that people who receive unemployment benefits with 
longer potential duration and exit to employment stay with the same employer 
for a longer period. The difference in job duration tends largely to be revealed 
straight away in the earlier stage of employment, implying that there are fewer 
bad matches between workers and jobs when benefits are more generous. This 
suggests that more generous benefits might relax the job search constraints so 
that people can accept jobs that suit them better. 
 
 
4.2.2. Data and methodology 
This section looks at the unemployment insurance benefits granted during the 
first three quarters of the sharp increase in the unemployment rate during the 
most recent crisis, from July 2008 until March 2009, similarly to Sections 3.2 
and 4.1 (see Figure 37). The data on unemployment benefit recipients are 
combined with wage data up to April 2011. The entry into employment is 
considered until the spring of 2010 like in Sections 3.2 and 4.1, as this is when 
the unemployment rate peaked. The employment data are combined for a longer 
time period than in those sections, running up to April 2011, to allow the 
employment duration after the unemployment period to be studied. 
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Figure 37. Number of unemployed in Estonia for 2006–2011 and the scope of the study 
Source: Statistics Estonia 
 
 
Section 4.1 focused on 180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients to see the 
differences in the accepted wage between these two groups. The current section 
studies the same two groups to explore whether differences also exist in the 
duration of the accepted job. If unemployment benefits support the job search, 
the match quality between the job and the worker should be improved and 
people should stay longer in the accepted job. As with the accepted wage, the 
differences in job duration should occur above all among the jobs accepted at 
150–240 days of the unemployment period. This is the period when 180-day-
UIB recipients are exhausting their benefit but 270-day-UIB recipients are still 
receiving the benefit. 
In this study, data are available for received wage and employer, but not for 
employment starting and ending dates, so employment duration is defined as the 
period when a person receives a wage from the same employer. As there may be 
no wage paid in some months because of vacation or sickness, breaks in the 
wage data are allowed so that if for one month the wage is not declared, but the 
next month it is, the job duration is considered to continue. For each observation 
only the primary employer is considered, which is defined as the one who 
declares the highest wage for a month, meaning that smaller jobs on the side are 
not considered. The employment duration is observable for every observation 
up to at least 13 months as the employment spell of those who entered 
employment in August 2008 is censored at 33 months and for those who only 
entered employment in April 2011, the censoring takes place at 13 months. 
The characteristics of the UIB recipients who had entered employment by 
April 2010 are presented in Table 17; the first column of characteristics in the 
table is basically the same as the second column in Table 14 in Section 4.1. In 
addition, the characteristics are shown for those people who continued  
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Table 17. Description of UIB recipients who entered employment 
Variable 
Enter 
employment 
Exit job after 
≤ 4 months 
Stay on the 
job ≥ 13 
months 
UIB 
180 
UIB 
270 
UIB 
180 
UIB 
270 
UIB 
180 
UIB 
270 
Number of observations 4157 5366 1553 1616 1588 2606 
Average previous monthly wage, EEK 10585 13589 10600 13155 10555 13717 
Average tenure of the previous job, 
years 1.5 5.0 1.5 4.5 1.6 5.3 
Males 53% 56% 58% 57% 50% 55% 
Age in the beginning of employment 
period 35 43 35 43 36 43 
Main language Estonian 58% 62% 58% 63% 58% 62% 
Knowledge of English 34% 23% 35% 23% 33% 23% 
Basic education or less 20% 13% 21% 14% 18% 12% 
Higher education 14% 18% 12% 16% 15% 19% 
Living in a town 70% 67% 72% 70% 69% 66% 
Disabled 6% 5% 7% 7% 5% 5% 
Previous occupation       
Managers 7% 12% 6% 11% 8% 12% 
Professionals 5% 6% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 9% 10% 9% 10% 9% 11% 
Clerical support workers 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 
Service and sales workers 16% 10% 17% 11% 14% 10% 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and 
fishery workers 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Craft and related trades workers 28% 26% 29% 27% 26% 24% 
Plant and machine operators, and 
assemblers 10% 13% 9% 13% 11% 14% 
Elementary occupations 17% 15% 18% 18% 18% 15% 
Note: People who received active measures are not considered in the table as they are not used in 
this study. In addition, benefit recipients who are continuing the remaining days of benefit from a 
previous benefit period are excluded. Only those people are considered who entered employment 
by April 2010 at the latest. 
EEK – the currency used in Estonia until 31.12.2010 (1 EUR = 15.6466 EEK). 
 
 
to receive a wage from the same employer for up to four months, which is the 
maximum duration of the probationary period in Estonia, and for those who 
received a wage for 13 months (more than one year). Recipients of 270-day-
UIB tend to have had longer previous tenure, a higher previous wage, higher 
education, higher age and so forth, and these differences remain for people with 
only short post-unemployment job duration or with longer post-unemployment 
job duration. Generally, people who exit the new job relatively quickly are 
slightly less educated and have worked in lower ranking jobs than the average 
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person who entered employment. The opposite is true for people who stay in 
their new job longer, but the differences in mean characteristics for post-
unemployment job duration are generally quite small. However, while 37% of 
180-day-UIB recipients keep the new job for up to four months and 38% 
continue in the same job for at least 13 months, the share of 270-day-UIB 
recipients in the first group is lower and the share of them in the second group is 
higher, as 30% stay in the job for up to four months and 49% for at least 13 
months. So on average 270-day-UIB recipients accept jobs where they continue 
working for a longer period of time than do 180-day-UIB recipients. 
In order to investigate the differences in post-unemployment job duration 
between 180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients, several different methods 
are used in this study. First, the duration analysis methods of non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier estimator and semi-parametric piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard rate model described in subsection 1.2.1 are applied. After that, the 
propensity score matching described in subsection 1.2.2 is used like in Section 
4.2 where differences in post-unemployment wage were studied. 
 
 
4.2.3. Non-parametric estimation results 
Non-parametric estimations of survival rates and hazard rates for exiting a job 
(when the employer stops declaring a paid wage) for 180-day-UIB and 270-day-
UIB recipients are depicted in Figure 3880. The figure shows that the 
employment survival rates are continuously higher for 270-day-UIB recipients. 
Hazard rate estimates reveal that the hazard of leaving a job is higher for 180-
day-UIB recipients at any duration of employment. The difference in hazard 
rates is particularly high at the beginning of the employment spell, meaning 
there is a relatively higher share of workers among 180-day-UIB recipients who 
exit a job after a shorter time. 
The estimates presented in Figure 38 might be affected by the selection to 
the benefit type. The unemployed with a longer previous employment record 
tend to be eligible for a longer UIB period, but they might also be more likely to 
keep their next job for longer, so there might be a correlation between the 
previous job duration and the accepted job duration regardless of the unemploy-
ment benefits. To overcome the problem of selection, the survival estimates are 
also studied for people with more similar previous employment records, who 
are the unemployed near the cut-off point of eligibility for the longer potential 
benefit period.  
 
                                                 
80  Less smooth hazard rate estimations are shown in Appendix 23. 
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Figure 38. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and smoothed hazard estimates of post-
unemployment employment81.  
 
 
 
The result that 270-day-UIB recipients experience a higher rate for keeping a 
job still holds for the smaller sample near the cut-off point of benefit 
entitlement. Figure 39 presents survival estimates for benefit recipients who had 
previously paid 32–79 months of unemployment insurance contributions, and 
for benefit recipients who had paid 54–58 months of insurance contributions as 
56 months is the limit when the unemployed are eligible for the 270-day benefit 
instead of the 180-day benefit. For smaller samples the differences in obser-
vable characteristics are also much smaller and are closer to random selection as 
people cannot manipulate by themselves the eligibility for longer term benefit 
around the cut-off point. For both the more constrained samples the 270-day-
UIB recipients have a continuously higher job survival rate.  
 
                                                 
81 A limitation of applying the Kaplan-Meier estimator is that it assumes that the censoring 
value and the duration are independent. If the successive duration variables of unemploy-
ment duration and employment duration are assumed to be correlated variables because 
unemployment duration has an influence on the potential censoring value of employment du-
ration, a non-parametric estimation method suggested by Visser (1996) could be imagined. 
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Figure 39. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and smoothed hazard estimates of post-
unemployment employment 
 
 
Like with the accepted wage studied in Section 4.1, the greatest difference in 
post-unemployment job duration can be expected among those unemployed 
who accept a job at around 151–240 days of the unemployment spell when one 
group is finishing its benefit and the other group can still continue to receive 
UIB. During the beginning of the unemployment benefit period the two groups 
of benefit recipients can behave more similarly and so there should not be such 
big differences in the accepted jobs. The differences can also be smaller later in 
the unemployment period when both groups have exhausted their benefit. 
Figure 40 presents the estimated survival rates and hazard rates for three 
different periods of accepting a job: 1) 1–150 days of the unemployment period, 
2) 151–240 days of the unemployment period, 3) 271–360 days of the un-
employment period. The figure reveals that in all of these three periods for 
accepting a job, 270-day-UIB recipients always have a higher job survival rate 
and a lower hazard of leaving the job. However, the behaviour of 180-day-UIB 
recipients and 270-day-UIB recipients is indeed more similar in the group of 
people who accepted a job during the first 150 days of their benefit period. The 
hazard rate for the 270-day-UIB recipients who accepted a job at 151–240 days 
of benefit period is very similar to that for the 270-day-UIB recipients who 
accepted a job at the beginning of benefit period. At the same time, 180-day-
UIB recipients experience a significant rise in the hazard rate for exiting a job in 
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
0 10 20 30 40
Employment duration (months)
UIB 180 UIB 270
UI contributions 32-79 months
Su
rv
iv
al
 ra
te
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
0 10 20 30 40
Employment duration (months)
UIB 180 UIB 270
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
UI contributions 54-58 months
Su
rv
iv
al
 ra
te
40
 158 
the group who accepted the job at 151–240 days of unemployment, which is the 
end of the benefit period. The hazard rate is particularly high at the beginning of 
the employment period, which indicates bad matches between workers and jobs 
(a high share of jobs that are quit or where the employee is forced to quit 
relatively quickly). People who accept a job at 271–360 days of the unemploy-
ment period experience a rather higher hazard of exiting a job in both groups of 
benefit recipients (the higher hazard is again revealed particularly in the 
beginning of the employment spell)82. 
 
 
Figure 40. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and smoothed hazard estimates of post-
unemployment employment by time of accepting a job 
 
 
Figure 41 combines the dimensions of the previous unemployment insurance 
record (to overcome the problem of selection) and the time period of acceptance 
of the job. The graphs on the left side depict the people who left the job during 
the first four months, which is the usual probationary period in Estonia, as a 
share of all the people who entered employment. The graphs on the right side 
show the share of people who stayed in the accepted job for at least more than 
one year (13 months). Following Jovanovic (1979), a mismatch between a 
worker and a job should be detected quite early during the employment spell, so 
                                                 
82 However, it could be argued that the results might be affected somewhat by the selection 
to the type of benefit due to different previous employment record. 
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that a worker’s job separation probability is a decreasing function of job tenure. 
This means that most of the mismatch should already have been revealed during 
the 13 months studied in this thesis. 
The figure shows that 270-day-UIB recipients tend to have a lower share of 
people who leave the job relatively quickly and a higher share who keep the job 
longer. Clearer changes in these shares around the cut-off point for benefit 
eligibility are visible for those people who accepted a job at 151–240 days of 
unemployment when 180-day-UIB recipients were about to exhaust their 
benefit. 
 
 
Figure 41. Share of accepted jobs lasting up to 4 months and jobs lasting at least 13 
months 
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4.2.4. Estimation results of propensity score matching 
In the current section propensity score matching is used to compare 270-day-
UIB recipients with those 180-day-UIB recipients who are more comparable in 
terms of all relevant observable characteristics (see subsection 1.2.2 for 
overview of the method). Stata modules created by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) 
and Gangl (2004b) are used to run the estimations. A probit model is applied for 
calculating the propensity scores where 270-day-UIB recipients are matched 
with 180-day-UIB recipients using nearest neighbour matching of one nearest 
neighbour with replacement over the common support area to calculate the 
average treatment effect on the treated. Like in Section 4.1, the unemployed 
who received active measures are not used in the estimations as participation in 
active measures could affect the treatment effects, though only a very small 
share of the unemployed received active measures during the period under 
study. The samples are somewhat larger than in Section 4.1 as people who 
entered employment for only one month are also included. In Section 4.1 only 
the wage in the second month was looked at to study the full month wage, 
which in turn excluded people who received a wage for only one month. 
Table 18 displays the estimation results for the differences in the share of 
people with employment duration of up to four months and in the share of 
people with employment duration of at least 13 months (the probit models for 
matching 180-day-UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients are presented in Appendix 
24; the mean values of the most relevant variables for the unmatched and 
matched samples are presented in Appendix 25). The first block of the table 
reports the estimations that do not consider the differences concerning when 
exactly during the unemployment period people accepted the job. The results 
show that there are 6.3% fewer people among 270-day-UIB recipients who 
already leave the job during the probationary period and 7.2% more who keep 
the job for more than one year. This means that the difference in employment 
duration already emerges in the very beginning of the employment spell as bad 
matches between jobs and workers are ended during the first few months. 
In addition, Table 18 presents estimation results for employment duration 
separately by time of entering employment, basically meaning that there is strict 
matching of job acceptance in terms of unemployment period. The estimations 
for those people who already accept a job during the first 150 days of un-
employment show similar results to those of estimations over the whole sample. 
The estimations show that the differences between the two types of benefit 
recipients in fact expand somewhat in the groups that enter employment later. 
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To increase the comparability of the two groups of benefit recipients even 
further, the next set studied are only those benefit recipients who had accumu-
lated 32–79 months of unemployment insurance contributions before their 
unemployment period, giving a smaller bandwidth of benefit recipients around 
the cut-off point of 270-day-benefit eligibility. The estimation results for this 
smaller sample are shown in Table 19 (the probit models for matching 180-day-
UIB and 270-day-UIB recipients are presented in Appendix 26; the mean values 
of the relevant variables for the unmatched and matched samples are presented 
in Appendix 27). 
The first block of Table 19 displays the results for all people who entered 
employment before April 2010 and shows that there are on average 4% fewer 
people among 270-day-UIB recipients who leave work during the probationary 
period than among the otherwise similar 180-day-UIB recipients. The share of 
people keeping their job for more than a year is 6.1% higher among 270-day-
UIB recipients. The estimated differences for people who accepted a job during 
the first 150 days of unemployment are lower and not significant at the 0.1 
level. The estimated differences are greater for the period when one group of 
benefit recipients exhausts its benefit and the other one continues to receive its 
benefit, as there are 10.6% fewer people with a short employment period and 
10.4% more people with an employment period of more than a year. The 
estimated differences for people who accepted a job after 270 days of the 
unemployment period are only slightly smaller. 
In several estimations over different groups the differences in the share of 
short employment spells are similar to the differences in the share of long 
employment spells. This implies that a large part of the differences in 
employment duration might already emerge at the beginning of the employment 
period. In consequence, 180-day-UIB recipients might end up more often in 
temporary jobs or in worse matching jobs that are already terminated during the 
probationary period. The difference in job match quality might not be very big 
for those people who accept a job relatively early in their unemployment period, 
but there may be about 10% more bad matches among 180-day-UIB recipients 
who accept a job at the end of their benefit. This means there is also a 
statistically significant difference of more than 6% in badly matching jobs for 
the whole sample irrespective of the job acceptance period. In general, the 
estimation results for unmatched and matched samples turn out to be similar. 
 
 163 
Ta
bl
e 
19
. E
st
im
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
 f
or
 t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 t
he
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
du
ra
tio
n 
fo
r 
pe
op
le
 w
ith
 3
2–
79
 m
on
th
s 
of
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 
  
T
re
at
ed
 (2
70
)
C
on
tr
ol
s (
18
0)
D
iff
e-
re
nc
e
T
-s
ta
t 
p-
va
lu
e 
La
te
st
 e
nt
ry
 to
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t i
n 
A
pr
il 
20
10
 (m
od
el
 n
o.
 1
) 
U
nm
at
ch
ed
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 u
p 
to
 4
 m
on
th
s 
32
.7
%
 
37
.2
%
 
–4
.5
%
 
–3
.4
9 
0.
00
0 
A
TT
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 u
p 
to
 4
 m
on
th
s 
32
.6
%
 
36
.7
%
 
–4
.0
%
 
–1
.9
3 
0.
05
4 
U
nm
at
ch
ed
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
m
on
th
s 
47
.0
%
 
38
.8
%
 
8.
2%
 
6.
05
 
0.
00
0 
A
TT
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
m
on
th
s 
47
.0
%
 
40
.8
%
 
6.
1%
 
2.
86
 
0.
00
4 
En
tr
y 
to
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t 1
–1
50
 d
ay
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 b
en
ef
it 
pe
ri
od
 (m
od
el
 n
o.
 2
) 
U
nm
at
ch
ed
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 u
p 
to
 4
 m
on
th
s 
33
.1
%
 
35
.3
%
 
–2
.2
%
 
–1
.1
5 
0.
25
0 
A
TT
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 u
p 
to
 4
 m
on
th
s 
33
.2
%
 
34
.9
%
 
–1
.7
%
 
–0
.5
4 
0.
58
9 
U
nm
at
ch
ed
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
m
on
th
s 
49
.1
%
 
40
.9
%
 
8.
2%
 
4.
02
 
0.
00
0 
A
TT
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
m
on
th
s 
48
.9
%
 
44
.5
%
 
4.
4%
 
1.
40
 
0.
16
2 
En
tr
y 
to
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t 1
51
–2
40
 d
ay
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 b
en
ef
it 
pe
ri
od
 (m
od
el
 n
o.
 3
) 
U
nm
at
ch
ed
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 u
p 
to
 4
 m
on
th
s 
29
.8
%
 
37
.4
%
 
–7
.6
%
 
–2
.7
2 
0.
00
7 
A
TT
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 u
p 
to
 4
 m
on
th
s 
29
.8
%
 
40
.4
%
 
–1
0.
6%
 
–2
.3
7 
0.
01
8 
U
nm
at
ch
ed
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
m
on
th
s 
47
.2
%
 
35
.9
%
 
11
.3
%
 
3.
88
 
0.
00
0 
A
TT
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
m
on
th
s 
47
.1
%
 
36
.7
%
 
10
.4
%
 
2.
27
 
0.
02
3 
En
tr
y 
to
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t 2
71
–3
60
 d
ay
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 b
en
ef
it 
pe
ri
od
, l
at
es
t i
n 
A
pr
il 
20
10
 (m
od
el
 n
o.
 4
) 
U
nm
at
ch
ed
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 u
p 
to
 4
 m
on
th
s 
33
.0
%
 
42
.0
%
 
–9
.0
%
 
–2
.7
6 
0.
00
6 
A
TT
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 u
p 
to
 4
 m
on
th
s 
33
.2
%
 
43
.1
%
 
–9
.9
%
 
–1
.9
3 
0.
05
4 
U
nm
at
ch
ed
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
m
on
th
s 
45
.3
%
 
36
.4
%
 
8.
9%
 
2.
65
 
0.
00
8 
A
TT
: s
ha
re
 o
f j
ob
 d
ur
at
io
ns
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
3 
m
on
th
s 
45
.2
%
 
35
.5
%
 
9.
7%
 
1.
92
 
0.
05
5 
 
 164 
4.2.5. Estimation results of piecewise-constant  
proportional hazard model 
Alongside the Kaplan-Meier estimates and propensity score matching, a 
piecewise-constant proportional hazard model is applied to estimate the impact 
of benefit generosity on post-unemployment job duration (see Subsection 1.2.1 
for a description of the method). A more general model is used in that 
individual specific unobserved heterogeneity is introduced following a gamma 
distribution with mean 1 and variance ߠ. However, unobserved heterogeneity 
does not turn out to be significant at the 0.1 level in any of the estimated models 
as ߠ approaches 0, so the estimated hazard functions reduce to hazard functions 
without unobservable heterogeneity. 
Besides the variables for benefit type, the estimated models also include 
variables for the personal characteristics of gender, age, being a native speaker 
of Estonian, being disabled, living in a town or countryside and education; the 
previous occupation characteristics of previous profession and tenure on the last 
job; the labour market situation of monthly regional registered unemployment 
rate, monthly change in registered unemployment rate and monthly inflow of 
registered vacancies; and duration of unemployment before acceptance of a job. 
The estimated hazard ratios83 for benefit effects on post-unemployment job 
duration are presented in Table 20 (full results by unemployment duration are 
reported in Appendix 28 and by unemployment insurance record in Appendix 
2984). Results are reported for the whole sample in the last column, and for 
samples that are constrained by previous record of unemployment insurance 
contributions. For all these four samples by insurance record there are esti-
mation results provided by unemployment period before job acceptance and also 
results from samples that are not constrained by unemployment period, presented 
in the first row of the results. In this way every reported hazard ratio in the table is 
estimated by a different model that uses a differently constrained sample.
                                                 
83 The hazard ratio for dummy variables shows the hazard rate of the group under study 
divided by the hazard rate of the comparison group. A hazard ratio smaller than 1 shows that 
the group under study has a lower hazard rate than the comparison group. 
84 The models for which estimations are presented in this thesis include a control variable 
for previous tenure as dummies with previous tenure of less than 1 year, 1 to 5 years, 5 to 10 
years, or more than 10 years. The inclusion of previous tenure in this way also controls for 
income during the unemployment period as the severance payments depend on the previous 
tenure discontinuously. However, to diminish the possible problem of correlation between 
the duration of previous job duration and post-unemployment job duration, the regressions 
were additionally estimated with the inclusion of a continuous variable for tenure. The 
results turned out to be very similar to the results with dummy variables for tenure. These 
alternative estimations even show a slightly greater effect of benefit generosity on post-un-
employment job duration. The hazard ratio for 270-day-UIB recipients compared to 180-
day-UIB recipients including all observations turned out to be 0.822 instead of 0.831; at  
1–150 days it was 0.870 instead of 0.878; at 151–240 days it was 0.801 instead of 0.805; at 
271-360 days it was 0.726 instead of 0.737, and so forth. 
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The estimations on the whole sample that is not constrained by insurance record 
and job acceptance period show that 270-day-UIB recipients exit the accepted 
job at a significantly slower pace than 180-day-UIB recipients, with a hazard 
ratio of 0.831. The sample that is constrained to only people with 32–79 months 
of unemployment insurance contributions shows a similar result with a hazard 
ratio of 0.900. The even more constrained samples produce similar hazard 
ratios, but these are not significant at the 0.1 level. 
The sample that is not constrained by previous insurance contributions 
reports that the hazard ratio decreases slowly with the time period of job 
acceptance, as the difference in hazard rates between 270-day-UIB and 180-
day-UIB recipients is the greatest among those who were unemployed for 
longer before job acceptance. Similar estimations using the sample of people 
with 32–79 months of insurance record suggest that there might not even be a 
significant difference in the hazard rates among people with a short unemploy-
ment period, as the hazard ratio is 0.929 and not significant at the 0.1 level. 
During the period when 180-day-UIB recipients are finishing their benefit, a 
significant difference in hazard rates also appears, with a hazard ratio of 0.858 
for people with 151–240 days of unemployment period that remains at a similar 
level later on. The more constrained sample with an insurance record of 50–62 
months suggests similarly that there is no significant difference among those 
who leave unemployment early, but the difference quickly appears when 180-
day-UIB recipients are finishing their benefit period. The most constrained 
sample of 54–58 months of insurance record does not reveal significant 
differences among benefit recipients, though the samples here are also very 
small. 
In addition, the estimations are conducted separately for the first four months 
of employment, which is the usual probationary period, and for the later stage of 
employment duration (see Table 21). The estimations on the whole sample do 
not show much difference in hazard ratios between the beginning and the later 
part of the employment period, with a hazard ratio of 0.845 during the first four 
months and 0.823 later on. In general, the same conclusion also applies to 
estimation results gained from samples constrained by unemployment duration 
and unemployment insurance period as the hazard ratio is similar over the 
employment period. The only exceptions are the results from the sample most 
constrained by insurance contributions at 54–58 months. These results indicate 
that there is a large difference in the hazard rates during the first four months 
with a hazard ratio of 0.630 significant at the 0.05 level, and that there might 
not be any difference in hazard rates later on as the hazard ratio is 0.908 and not 
significant at the 0.1 level. The differences in different employment periods 
might be also reasons why the results for this group in Table 20 are not 
statistically significant. 
In conclusion, estimations using piecewise-constant proportional hazard 
models indicate that 270-day-UIB recipients are about 15% less likely to exit 
the accepted job than 180-day-UIB recipients. The estimations do not provide 
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strong evidence that the difference in the hazard rates of these two groups of 
benefit recipients changes much during the employment period. However, the 
results indicate that the hazard rates might not be different for the people who 
accepted the job early in the unemployment period. The difference emerges 
with those jobs that were accepted during the period when 180-day-UIB re-
cipients were exhausting their benefit.  
In all the estimated models, other covariates besides eligibility for 270-day-
UIB are also included (see also Appendixes 28 and 29). The estimations for 
duration of unemployment show that jobs that are accepted very early during 
the unemployment period might not last as long as jobs that are searched for 
over some time. The estimation results also show that men tend to quit the 
accepted job sooner than women. Very young people and older people leave the 
accepted job quicker than people in the middle age group (aged 25–54). People 
who speak the national language, the disabled and people living in towns rather 
than the countryside also tend to leave the job sooner. 
In general, a longer tenure in the previous job also incurs a longer duration in 
the accepted job. However, the results for the previous occupation are not too 
clear-cut and often not significant at the 0.1 level. The estimations for level of 
education show that people with very low and people with relatively high levels 
of education tend to leave the accepted job sooner than other groups. 
The covariates for labour market situation show that both a higher un-
employment rate and a higher number of vacancies tend to increase the hazard 
of leaving a job. The results for the labour market situation and for socio-
economic variables reflect the fact that employment termination can be initiated 
from both sides, by employers and employees. A higher hazard of terminating 
an employment relationship can be caused by a worse economic situation in 
which the employer initiates the termination, or equally by an improved 
economic situation in which the employee initiates the termination as there is a 
larger choice of jobs available on the labour market. For similar reasons, the 
hazard of leaving a job can be higher for people in a weaker position on the 
labour market such as disabled people or people with a very low level of 
education, and also for people in a relatively strong position on the labour 
market such as the highly educated and native speakers of the national 
language. 
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4.2.6. Conclusion 
The current section studies post-unemployment job duration using Estonian data 
from the period of the last global economic crisis. Previous studies using the 
same data (Sections 3.2 and 4.1) have shown that even during a serious eco-
nomic crisis the behaviour of the unemployed is significantly affected by the 
receipt of unemployment benefits. On the one hand, more generous benefits 
incur disincentive effects and prolong the unemployment duration, but on the 
other hand, people can search for longer for a better matching job and might 
start earning a higher post-unemployment wage. The study presented in this 
section shows that people who receive more generous benefits in the form of 
benefits with a longer potential duration also stay longer in the accepted job. 
In the current study, the labour market behaviour of two groups of un-
employment benefit recipients is compared – the unemployed entitled to 180-
day unemployment insurance benefit and the unemployed entitled to 270-day 
unemployment insurance benefit. Non-parametric estimations show that  
270-day-UIB recipients always have a higher job survival rate and lower hazard 
of leaving the job than 180-day-UIB recipients. This applies even when very 
small samples around the cut-off point of 270-day-UIB eligibility are compared. 
The non-parametric estimations establish that the difference between the hazard 
rates is largest in the earlier period of employment, meaning there are relatively 
more employees among former 180-day-UIB recipients who leave their new job 
relatively quickly. The difference in the hazard rates in the earlier stage of 
employment is especially pronounced among people who accepted the job at 
151–240 days of their unemployment spell, but also stays relatively high among 
people who exit unemployment even later. 
Non-parametric methods suggest that the difference in job duration emerges 
among those jobs that are accepted when 180-day-UIB recipients are finishing 
their benefit period and are experiencing a higher hazard of leaving unemploy-
ment. A similar finding that jobs accepted very quickly within five weeks of the 
benefit exhaustion date tend to have a higher dissolution rate is also reached by, 
for example, Belzil (2001). 
The estimation results gained by propensity score matching are largely 
similar to the non-parametric results. These estimations confirm that the diffe-
rence in post-unemployment job quality might not be very big for those people 
who accepted the job early in their unemployment period. Recipients of 180-
day-UIB who accept a job only when their benefit is finishing experience 10% 
more bad matches and very short employment periods than do 270-day-UIB 
recipients. The difference between the two groups of benefit recipients also 
remains similar among those who accepted a job after both groups had exhaus-
ted the benefit, so on average, if the job acceptance time is ignored, 270-day-
UIB recipients have more than 6% fewer badly matching jobs in terms of 
people who leave the job during the first four months or the usual probationary 
period. The differences between the two groups of benefit recipients also turn 
out to be similar with regards to people who keep their job for more than one 
43
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year. These results suggest that a large part of the difference in employment 
duration already emerges earlier in the employment period. 
The estimation results from piecewise-constant proportional hazard models 
indicate that 270-day-UIB recipients are about 15% less likely to leave the 
accepted job than 180-day-UIB recipients. In contrast to the non-parametric and 
matching methods however, the estimations from duration models do not 
provide strong evidence that the difference in the hazard rates for benefit 
recipients changes a lot during the employment period. However, the results do 
confirm that there might not be a difference in job match quality for those who 
accept the job earlier in their unemployment period and that the significant 
difference develops for those jobs that are accepted when 180-day-UIB 
recipients are running out of benefits. 
The results of the study indicate that at the end of the benefit period people 
become less selective when accepting a job. On the one hand, the hazard rate for 
leaving unemployment for employment rises and more of the unemployed are 
accepting a job. On the other hand, the accepted job is of lower quality for them 
and matches them worse than would have been the case had the benefit receipt 
continued giving them more time to look for a better job. In consequence, the 
unemployed with a longer potential benefit period have longer post-unemploy-
ment job duration. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The most recent global economic downturn raised the level of unemployment in 
all the countries of the European Union, and also elsewhere. This in turn led to 
discussions about the effects of active and passive labour market policies on the 
level of unemployment and the economic situation in general. For example, one 
of the more debated issues has been the effect of unemployment benefits on the 
behaviour of the unemployed – the extent to which these benefits hinder their 
return to employment, the extent to which they assist the job search, and 
whether these benefits could be more generous in times of crisis. This thesis 
studies the effects of the generosity of unemployment benefits on labour market 
outcomes using data about unemployment benefit recipients in Estonia. The 
Estonian labour market was affected by the global economic crisis more than 
that of any other country in the European Union, so Estonian data allow the 
benefit effects to be explored in an extreme recession. 
The main theory used to describe the effects of unemployment benefits on 
labour market outcomes is search theory. The most straightforward conclusion 
about unemployment benefits from search theory is that more generous benefits 
with either longer potential duration or a higher level hinder the exit from 
unemployment to employment and hence increase unemployment duration 
through the so-called disincentive effect. In addition, if the potential period of 
unemployment benefits is limited, there should be a spike in the hazard rate for 
leaving unemployment prior to the exhaustion date of benefits. As the 
exhaustion date approaches it becomes more and more likely that a job will not 
be found during the benefit period, so the unemployed increase their job search 
intensity and decrease their reservation wage and in that way the hazard rate for 
exiting unemployment increases. 
An economic slowdown in the search model has slightly ambiguous total 
effects on the labour market outcomes. On the one hand, the number of job 
offers decreases and there is a lower chance of exiting unemployment, and thus 
the unemployment duration increases. On the other hand, people become less 
selective when there are fewer job offers and that increases the hazard rate and 
decreases unemployment duration. There is very little theoretical literature 
about whether the disincentive effect could also be different during the business 
cycle. The few existing studies argue that the disincentive effect could be rather 
smaller in economic difficulties, but it still remains an empirical issue. 
While the basic search model predicts that unemployment benefits motivate 
people to stay in unemployment, some extensions of the theory argue that 
benefits can also support job search. Unemployment benefits relax the restric-
tions on job search, as for example longer benefit allows more time for looking 
for a job, so more generous benefits allow the unemployed to find a job that 
suits them better with a higher wage, longer potential employment duration, 
better skills and knowledge match and so forth. Thus more generous unemploy-
ment benefits could increase the post-unemployment job quality. 
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It is empirically substantiated that the disincentive effect of unemployment 
benefits does exist. In addition, it is often found that the hazard of leaving 
unemployment increases during the benefit period and that there is a spike in 
the hazard rate at the end of benefit period. However, empirical literature on 
whether the disincentive effect is different in different economic situations is 
scarce. The few existing studies suggest that the disincentive effect might be 
rather slightly smaller in a worse economic situation. However, no empirical 
studies have been conducted for an extremely bad economic situation, and 
hence this thesis investigates whether the disincentive effect still occurs during 
a very deep crisis, using the Estonian data from the latest global economic crisis 
period. In addition, the results for the crisis period are compared with the results 
for the Estonian pre-crisis period. 
Another issue the thesis deals with is the post-unemployment job quality. 
Some empirical studies have been conducted on this matter only in recent years, 
but the results are rather mixed and only some of the studies find a positive 
effect from unemployment benefits on post-unemployment job quality. This 
dissertation investigates the effect of the generosity of unemployment benefits 
on post-unemployment job quality during a crisis period using Estonian data. 
The effect on the post-unemployment wage and post-unemployment job 
duration is studied as these are the usual proxies for post-unemployment job 
quality. 
The aim of this thesis is to study the effects of the generosity of unemploy-
ment benefits on labour market outcomes during a period of deep recession in 
Estonia. So the aim is to study whether unemployment benefits have negative 
effects on labour market outcomes in a crisis through longer unemployment 
duration and whether unemployment benefits have positive effects on labour 
market outcomes through higher post-unemployment job quality. Two main 
sources are used for the data. The data about unemployment benefits and perso-
nal characteristics of the unemployed come from the database of the Estonian 
Unemployment Insurance Fund. The data about post-unemployment employ-
ment come from the database of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The 
spells of registered unemployment are combined with the spells of employment. 
Although the analysis uses only administrative data, the total spells of un-
employment and employment are exceptionally precisely determined, and there 
is also very accurate data about wage levels. 
The system of unemployment benefits in Estonia consists of unemployment 
insurance benefit that depends on the previous wage and of unemployment 
allowance that is a low means-tested benefit. The thesis focuses above all on 
studying the unemployment insurance benefit recipients. The main tools for the 
analysis of unemployment and employment duration in this thesis are Kaplan-
Meier survival estimates and the piecewise-constant proportional hazard model. 
While Kaplan-Meier estimates describe well the behaviour of the unemployed, 
the piecewise-constant proportional hazard model enables the researcher to 
quantify the effects of unemployment benefits on their behaviour. Additionally, 
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the post-unemployment employment duration is analysed using propensity 
score matching. The same method is also used for the post-unemployment 
wage. In both cases people with longer potential unemployment insurance bene-
fit are matched with people on shorter benefit to analyse the difference in post-
unemployment job quality stemming from benefit generosity. Furthermore, 
these three methods are combined using a method similar to RDD, so the 
benefit effects are studied in more detail around the cut-off point of the 
eligibility criterion for benefits of a different level of generosity. 
The effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration is analysed 
using data from both the crisis and the pre-crisis periods. For the pre-crisis 
period, unemployment insurance benefit recipients are studied whose un-
employment insurance benefit period started in 2007. Data about their exit to 
employment are studied until the end of 2008. For the crisis period, those 
unemployment benefit recipients are studied who started their benefit period 
from the third quarter of 2008 up to the first quarter of 2009. Their exit to 
employment is analysed up to the first quarter of 2010 when unemployment 
reached its peak in Estonia; the period of crisis is defined in this thesis as the 
period of a sharp continuous rise in the unemployment rate in Estonia from the 
third quarter of 2008 up to the first quarter of 2010. 
The pre-crisis data show that unemployment insurance benefits have a strong 
significant effect on unemployment duration. It is shown that people receiving 
unemployment benefits leave unemployment on average at less than half the 
rate of people currently not on benefits. The hazard rate for leaving unemploy-
ment is hindered even more for the unemployed receiving a higher level of 
benefits, though this effect might be affected by the fact that these people also 
earned a higher wage previously. So the difference in their labour market 
behaviour could be affected also by some other factors than unemployment 
benefits. In addition, the study reveals that there are significant spikes in the 
hazard of leaving unemployment for employment around the benefit exhaustion 
date. A significant disincentive effect of unemployment benefits and/or spike in 
the end of benefit period is found also in several other studies (for example by 
van Ours and Vodopivec (2006), Fujita (2011), Lalive et al. (2011)). 
The study of the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment 
duration using the crisis data reveals that the disincentive effect of benefits even 
occurs during an extremely severe recession. However, the size of the effect 
might be slightly smaller than during the pre-crisis period (similar result as for 
example by Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011), Schmieder et al. (2010)). The 
receipt of unemployment benefits hinders the exit to employment by on average 
about halving it, though the hazard rate is more hindered at the beginning of the 
benefit period and less later on. During the crisis period the disincentive effect 
is also more homogeneous among the different levels and potential lengths of 
benefits and the hazard of leaving unemployment is about halved during the 
benefit period irrespective of the benefit size. In addition, when both the benefit 
receipt and the spikes in the hazard rate are taken into account in the estimation 
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models, it is shown that the disincentive effect caused by UA is rather similar to 
that of UIB despite its very low level. 
As there are many more observations to use from the crisis period than from 
the pre-crisis period, the crisis data enable the researcher to explore the 
disincentive effect stemming from the length and the size of the unemployment 
benefits in more detail. The analysis reveals that both higher benefit amounts 
and longer potential benefit durations increase unemployment duration during 
the crisis period. 
In this way the crisis data indicate that significant disincentive effects occur 
in a quickly deteriorating labour market, though the disincentive effect might be 
slightly lower during a crisis than when the economic situation is better. 
However, comparing different economic situations is somewhat complicated as 
the unemployed can be different in different economic situations (incurring 
different behaviour) and accompanying active labour market policies might also 
be different in different economic situations, which might also have an effect on 
the labour market behaviour of the unemployed. 
The effect of the generosity of unemployment benefits on post-unemploy-
ment job quality is studied in this thesis using the same observations from the 
crisis period as in the analysis of the unemployment benefit effects on 
unemployment duration. The data about post-unemployment wages are studied 
for these observations over a longer period to analyse two proxies for post-
unemployment job quality – wage level and job duration. Analyses on both 
wage and job duration show that the spike in the hazard rate for entering 
employment at the end of the benefit period occurs at least partly because the 
unemployed become less selective at the end of the benefit period and are 
forced to accept jobs with lower quality. This means that less generous benefits 
at least in terms of the potential duration might incur lower post-unemployment 
job quality. Unfortunately it is not possible to estimate from the available data 
whether the intensity of the job search also changes during the unemployment 
period. In addition, the analyses show positive effects occurring from a longer 
potential benefit period. The question of whether a higher benefit level might 
also lead to similar effects needs further analysis. 
In order to analyse the effect of unemployment benefits on the post-un-
employment wage, 270-day-UIB recipients are matched with statistically 
similar 180-day-UIB recipients to estimate the average treatment effects on the 
treated. The estimations show that a significant difference in the accepted wage 
is found when those unemployed who accept a job at 151–240 days of their 
unemployment spell are compared. During this period, 180-day-UIB recipients 
are exhausting their benefit period and their hazard rate for exiting unemploy-
ment rises sharply but the accepted wage declines sharply. Recipients of 270-
day-UIB can still continue their benefit receipt and their hazard rate does not 
rise, but the accepted wage also declines only slightly. This means that during 
this period, 270-day-UIB recipients accept a wage drop compared to their 
previous wage that is about 10% smaller than the drop accepted by the matched 
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180-day-UIB recipients, and this applies both to the starting wage and to the 
average wage over the first nine months of employment. These estimation 
results are similar to those of Gaure et al. (2008) who show that the accepted 
earnings decline by about 10% just prior to benefit exhaustion. The results also 
resemble those of Centeno and Novo (2011) who do not find an overall 
significant effect from unemployment benefits on re-employment wages, but 
the effect is somewhat exposed when matches formed around the potential 
benefit exhaustion dates are studied (benefit exhaustion dates before benefit 
extensions). 
The estimations of accepted wage drops over the matched samples indicate 
that the accepted wage declines compared to the previous wage the longer a 
person is unemployed. However, there is a much sharper drop in the accepted 
wage when the benefit period lapses and the hazard of leaving unemployment 
spikes, so it is evident from the analysis that the hazard of leaving unemploy-
ment and the accepted wage are very tightly connected. The estimation results 
confirm that the reservation wage is higher during the benefit period, as pro-
posed by search theory. At the end of the benefit period the reservation wage 
drops and the hazard of leaving unemployment rises. With a longer potential 
unemployment benefit period the job search can be prolonged to find a better 
matching job as unemployment benefit would continue to subsidise the job 
search. 
The estimation results of this analysis are also in line with the studies that do 
not find support for the positive relationship between the potential benefit 
period and post-unemployment wage as they do not control for the time of job 
acceptance (for example van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) and Schmieder et al. 
(2012)). Also in this thesis the positive relationship appears only when studying 
the period when one group of the unemployed people is still eligible for UIB 
and the other one not. The effect of unemployment benefits working as a search 
subsidy might not appear as strongly over the overall period, because it is likely 
that the accepted wage is affected by the deterioration in the offer wage distri-
bution as the unemployment spell lengthens. 
The study on post-unemployment employment duration shows that longer 
potential unemployment benefit duration might also increase post-unemploy-
ment job duration. Jobs accepted by 270-day-UIB recipients tend to last longer 
than jobs accepted by 180-day-UIB recipients, even if otherwise statistically 
very similar people are compared. 
Kaplan-Meier estimates show that 270-day-UIB recipients have a higher job 
survival rate and lower hazard rate for leaving a job than 180-day-UIB re-
cipients even if only observations near the cut-off point of 270-day-UIB 
eligibility are considered. Like the analysis of the post-unemployment wage, the 
analysis of job duration suggests that the difference develops above all among 
jobs accepted at 151–240 days of unemployment, which is the period when 180-
day-UIB recipients are exhausting their benefit, but 270-day-UIB recipients can 
still continue their benefit. However, the estimations on job duration indicate 
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that the difference between the two groups remains quite high even when both 
groups have exhausted their benefit. 
The estimations of job duration using propensity score matching confirm the 
results of non-parametric methods. A major difference in job duration occurs 
among jobs accepted at 151–240 days of unemployment. From among these 
jobs, 180-day-UIB recipients accept about 10% more badly matching jobs with 
very short employment periods than do 270-day-UIB recipients. As the 
difference is also quite high for people accepting a job later in their unemploy-
ment period, 270-day-UIB recipients accept on average 6% fewer bad matches 
(jobs lasting up to four months, which is the maximum limit of the usual 
probationary period) than do 180-day-UIB recipients. 
Results from both non-parametric methods and propensity score matching 
suggest that the difference in job duration to a large extent already develops in 
the very beginning of the employment spell, so bad matches between workers 
and jobs are often terminated straight away in the early stage of employment. 
The estimation results gained by piecewise-constant proportional hazard 
models suggest that 270-day-UIB recipients are about 15% less likely to leave 
the accepted job than 180-day-UIB recipients. In addition, the results from these 
models also indicate that the significant difference in job duration develops for 
jobs accepted at 151–240 days of unemployment when 180-day-UIB recipients 
are finishing their benefit and 270-day-UIB recipients are not yet. This result is 
also similar to that of the estimations by Belzil (2001) who shows that jobs 
accepted within five weeks of benefit termination tend to have a higher 
dissolution rate. So again, the rise in the hazard rate for leaving unemployment 
is accompanied by a decline in post-unemployment job quality. 
In conclusion, the analyses show that the hypotheses proposed in the thesis 
hold in large part. The estimations demonstrate that unemployment benefits do 
increase unemployment duration significantly as was posed by the first hypo-
thesis. The second hypothesis suggested that this effect should be significantly 
milder during a crisis. While the disincentive effect appears to be milder during 
the crisis, the difference is bigger for some groups and much slighter for the 
others. This was the most unexpected result of the study, the discovery that the 
difference in the disincentive effect over the business cycle might be quite 
minor. 
The third hypothesis proposed that more generous unemployment benefits 
incur higher post-unemployment job quality in Estonia and expected this effect 
to appear stronger on post-unemployment job duration than on wage. The thesis 
confirms that positive effects from more generous unemployment benefits do 
indeed occur on wage as well as on post-unemployment job duration while the 
latter effect appears to be somewhat stronger as the effect on wage occurs only 
during the period when one group of the unemployed has finished the benefit 
and the other group is continuing its benefit receipt. 
In general, the results of this thesis are similar to the few existing studies on 
these issues. The scarce empirical literature on the effects of unemployment 
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benefits on unemployment duration over business cycles also suggests that the 
disincentive effects might be slightly milder in worse economic conditions (for 
example Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011), Schmieder et al. (2010), Jurajda and 
Tannery (2003)). In relation to post-unemployment job quality, the positive 
effect of unemployment benefits on post-unemployment employment duration 
is found more often than the positive effect on post-unemployment wage 
(studies finding only minor effects on wage are for example Lalive (2007) and 
Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007); stronger effects on employment for example 
Tatsiramos 2009 and Caliendo et al. (2009)). In this thesis the positive effect on 
job duration also proves to be very significant and strong. The positive effect on 
post-unemployment wages appears only when the job acceptance period is 
considered in more detail. 
The result that the positive effects of unemployment benefits on post-un-
employment job duration usually appear to be stronger than on wages might be 
caused by the deteriorating wage offer distribution over the unemployment 
spell. The accepted wage declines quickly as the unemployment spell lengthens 
because the reservation wage declines, but might also decline somewhat be-
cause of a decline in the offered wage. In post-unemployment job duration, no 
such rapid decline is visible, meaning people might still find a suitable job after 
a longer unemployment spell, but they will at least start the job earning a lower 
wage. Job duration is sometimes argued to be a better proxy for job quality than 
wage (see for example Centeno 2004). 
The analysis of the effects of unemployment benefits on labour market 
outcomes during a period of crisis indicates that it might be reasonable to 
introduce more generous benefits during an economic recession. The analyses 
of unemployment duration show that unemployment benefits increase un-
employment duration even during a very severe economic slowdown. However, 
this effect is slightly milder than in somewhat better economic circumstances. 
In addition, studies of post-unemployment job quality confirm that this longer 
unemployment and job search duration might also incur higher post-un-
employment job quality. This suggests that more generous benefits prolong the 
job search period and unemployment spell, but the accepted jobs will match the 
workers’ skills and needs better, which is shown above all by job duration as a 
proxy for match quality. 
The need for a longer potential unemployment benefit duration during the 
crisis is also seen when looking at the ratio of unemployment benefit recipients 
among the registered unemployed. During the period of recovery from the 
recent crisis, there was a larger share of registered unemployed without any 
unemployment benefits than ever before. These people probably lacked the 
means to look for employment and they were probably not covered by any 
adequate level of social security. Longer potential periods of unemployment 
benefits would prevent there being such a large share of the unemployed 
without benefits to some extent; two thirds of the registered unemployed were 
without any unemployment benefits in 2011. 
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However, Estonia is among the countries with relatively low expenditures on 
unemployment benefits per unemployed person compared to the other EU 
countries even when the economy is doing well. So it follows that the post-
unemployment job quality and hence better matching between jobs and workers 
in the labour market might be hindered more in Estonia by its unemployment 
benefit system than is the case in the other EU countries. The current thesis 
showed more explicitly the positive dependence of post-unemployment job 
quality on the potential duration of unemployment benefits, and it can be argued 
that the potential unemployment benefit duration could also be longer in 
favourable economic conditions to decrease the scarring effects of unemploy-
ment. Nevertheless, if only the potential duration is increased and nothing else 
in the system changes, such as the introduction of monitoring and sanctions, it 
would also increase the average unemployment spell and increase the un-
employment rate in the economy. 
As the unemployment benefit system matures in Estonia, the share of the 
unemployed with longer potential unemployment insurance benefit increases 
and the system should resemble more those in the other EU countries even 
without any changes in the system. Since 2007 there has basically been a 
growing trend of registered unemployed who qualify for 270-day unemploy-
ment insurance benefit. As the necessary prior insurance contributions of 56 
months are not limited to a certain number of years, but are always counted 
from the beginning of the system in 2002, the number of people who accumu-
late the necessary amount of contributions over a longer time is still growing 
slowly. In addition, since March 2011 there are more and more people who 
have already gathered 111 months of contributions and become eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefit for 360 days. So due to the maturity of the 
system, the average potential unemployment benefit duration is gradually 
increasing, which ceteris paribus could also lead to longer unemployment spells 
and a higher unemployment rate, but also to better matches in the labour 
market. However, as the Estonian economy is recovering from the crisis at the 
same time, these changes will probably not be visible in the macro level indi-
cators as the unemployment rate will still continue to decrease. 
In addition, the level of social security provided by unemployment benefits 
in Estonia would be increased and become slightly closer to the EU average if 
the amendments to the system come into force in 2013. One of the amendments 
is supposed to more than double the level of unemployment allowance from the 
current level so that basically it would provide the same level of benefits to 
those unemployed who are eligible for UA (but not for UIB) as is provided by 
the minimum amount of UIB. People who receive the minimum amount of UIB 
have had a longer previous working record and left their job on the employer’s 
initiative, but their previous wage was very low (lower than the minimum 
wage). UA recipients could have previously earned an even higher wage, but 
their employment record was too short or they had to quit their job voluntarily. 
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Additionally, the second amendment in the system foresees that basically 
those UA recipients who quit their job voluntarily but have a long previous 
employment record will be eligible for unemployment insurance benefit from 
201385. To avoid the consequences of possible moral hazard, the criterion regar-
ding the record of unemployment insurance contributions is much stricter for 
them than it is for those UIB recipients whose employment contract was 
terminated at the initiative of the employer. Currently the criterion is at least 12 
months of contributions during the previous 36 months, but the voluntarily 
unemployed will have to have at least 48 months of contributions during the last 
60 months. In addition, the replacement rate of unemployment insurance benefit 
for the voluntarily unemployed will be slightly lower at 40% throughout the 
benefit period. 
So if these amendments come into force, only the unemployed with a shorter 
previous employment record will receive unemployment allowance, though at a 
higher rate than currently, and all other previously employed unemployed will 
qualify for unemployment insurance benefit. However, in reality the criterion 
for previous employment for the voluntarily unemployed is rather harsh and 
many unemployed will still have to survive on unemployment allowance. What 
is more, in the countries of the EU and the OECD, it is much more common for 
the risk of moral hazard to be tempered by a waiting period for unemployment 
benefits for the voluntarily unemployed rather than by a lowering of the level of 
benefit or imposition of tougher criteria for eligibility in other aspects (see Venn 
(2012)). It is believed that a waiting period prevents people giving up working 
too easily as they would have to manage without income for some time. In 
Estonia, this risk is dealt with instead through lower benefits in the form of low 
unemployment allowance or in the future a slightly lower unemployment 
insurance benefit. Although, given that the coverage of the voluntarily un-
employed with unemployment insurance is justified above all because some of 
these unemployed were in reality forced to quit their job because the employer 
forced them to quit, their family moved, they had health problems or bad 
working conditions or a similar reason, it cannot be very well argued why these 
people should have a lower replacement rate or stricter criteria for eligibility. So 
a system of unemployment benefits that imposed a higher replacement rate for 
the voluntarily unemployed and also a waiting period could lower the risk of 
people using the system for a vacation from working life and might be better at 
ensuring adequate post-unemployment job quality. 
The problem of moral hazard for benefit recipients in Estonia might also be 
to some degree smaller than the data indicate. Some part of the disincentive 
effect of unemployment benefits in the estimation results might be caused by 
the shadow economy, as the thesis uses only administrative data and officially 
declared wages. Some people might start working without a formal contract 
                                                 
85  However, during the time of writing this thesis it is discussed in the parliament whether 
to abolish this amendment. 
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during the benefit period so that they can continue collecting benefits and 
formalise the contract only when the benefit period is exhausted. This would 
explain why the spike in the hazard rate for leaving unemployment at the end of 
the benefit period is so high and why is there a sharp drop in the hazard rate 
afterwards. If this is the case, then the effect of unemployment benefits on 
prolonging the unemployment period is milder than the formal data reveal. 
The increase in the share of the shadow economy during the crisis is also 
suggested by the difference in the data for employment between the data of the 
Estonian Tax and Customs Board and the data gathered in the Labour Force 
Survey by Statistics Estonia. During the period of recovery the statistics for 
employed people show the increase in employment is higher than the increase 
in the administrative data for declared wages. According to the Labour Force 
Survey, the number of employed people in Estonia increased by 34,000 between 
2009 and 2011, while the number of people for whom a wage was declared 
increased by 15,000 when only Estonian residents in LFS data are considered, 
and an even bigger difference otherwise86. Though there are also some other 
methodological differences between these data, a major part of this is probably 
caused by the shadow economy, so this might indeed be reflected as a 
disincentive effect in the data for unemployment benefits. This shows it is 
necessary for the country to combat the shadow economy to save costs on 
unemployment benefits and increase its tax revenues. While it is mostly the job 
of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board, a role could also be found for the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund. For example stricter monitoring of job search 
and increased activation could lessen the risk of the system being exploited by 
workers in the shadow economy, specifically people who receive unemploy-
ment benefits while working in the shadow economy. 
Nevertheless, a rather significant spike in the hazard rate in the end of 
benefit period is also found in many other studies from several other countries 
(for example Meyer (1990), Cockx and Ries (2004), Røed and Zhang (2005), 
and others). Grubb (2011) argues that the spike is only not evident in excep-
tional countries like Austria, Finland and Sweden where there is very extensive 
management of unemployment spells by the public employment service. These 
organisations of the public employment service tend to follow the principle that 
job vacancies have to be filled by the best candidate available regardless of their 
benefit duration and that the unemployed approaching benefit exhaustion should 
be placed in an active labour market programme. 
Indeed, some previous research has shown that the disincentive effect of 
unemployment benefits might be milder if there were more monitoring of the 
job search by the public employment service and if sanctions were imposed for 
a lack of effort in job search (for example Boone et al (2009), Svarer (2011)). 
During the period under study in this thesis the monitoring of job search activity 
was not very thorough in Estonia. However, there are no data available on the 
                                                 
86 This difference in the data is discussed also for example by Viilmann and Soosaar (2012). 
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monitoring and it is not possible to estimate the effect of monitoring on 
unemployment duration. In addition, sanctions are also not used very often, 
being imposed mostly only for no-shows, and the range of sanctions is very 
limited. For unemployment insurance benefit, the only applicable sanction is the 
termination of benefit. However, if a benefit is terminated due to a no-show, it 
is not possible to see in the data whether a person did not come to the public 
employment service because they had already entered employment or whether it 
was really the sanction that gave the person the push to accept the job. This 
means it is not possible to use the Estonian data to estimate the effects of 
monitoring and sanctions in the unemployment benefit system on unemploy-
ment duration. However, the experience of other countries shows that it is likely 
that more effective monitoring and sanctioning in the unemployment benefit 
system would shorten the unemployment duration in Estonia too. Nevertheless, 
as some studies have also shown, more sanctioning could also incur a decline in 
post-unemployment job quality (for example Arni et al. (2009), van den Berg 
and Vikström (2009)). On the other hand, shortening the length of unemploy-
ment by imposing monitoring and sanctions might help to increase post-
unemployment quality with respect to post-unemployment wage as the distri-
bution of offer wage might deteriorate when unemployment spell lengthens.  
The effects of monitoring and sanctions on labour market outcomes also 
depend on how they are regulated and imposed. Van den Berg and Vikström 
(2009) argue that monitoring should focus on job search effort, not on job offer 
rejection/acceptance. This might indeed encourage people to increase their job 
search activity. If only rejections are punished, the unemployed might decrease 
their job search activity in order not to receive those job offers that do not suit 
them. In the Estonian unemployment benefit system, there are sanctions for 
rejecting a suitable job offer. A suitable job offer is defined in terms of distance, 
education, occupation, work experience and wage. The criteria for a suitable job 
are wider after 20 weeks so that jobs that match worse and might incur lower 
post-unemployment job quality should also be accepted. However, this sanction 
is almost never imposed in Estonia and the impact of this sanction on job search 
activity and post-unemployment job quality is probably more or less non-
existent. Following van den Berg and Vikström (2009) it might also not be 
sensible to impose this sanction much more often. 
The criteria for job search effort and sanctions for lack of effort are fairly 
unregulated in Estonia. The activity criteria and sanctions mostly concern 
meetings with a job search counsellor or case manager and these regulations do 
not say much about the quantity or quality of job search. In this respect Estonia 
could indeed set further regulations for job search effort and monitor it much 
more strictly in order to decrease the disincentive effects of unemployment 
benefits.  
One more point identified by van den Berg and Vikström (2009) with 
regards to monitoring and sanctioning is that monitoring could be carried out by 
a different person in the public employment service than the job mediation 
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consultant of the unemployed person. The job mediation consultant might feel 
uncomfortable imposing punishments on their clients as they have a personal 
relationship with them to a certain degree as they meet them regularly. This 
might be the reason why the level of sanctions is at quite a low level in many 
countries (see for example Gray (2003)) besides Estonia. However, this pro-
position might be hard to implement in Estonia, where many employees in the 
public employment service in smaller local offices have some level of personal 
contacts with many of their clients for reasons from outside the work of public 
employment service. On the one hand, the employees of the public employment 
service tend to have more information about the real search activity of their 
clients and about whether any of them has picked up a job in the shadow 
economy, but on the other hand, they might indeed feel too intimidated to 
impose real sanctions on them. 
Another observation made in previous empirical studies is that active labour 
market policies might work better as a stick rather than a carrot, as an ex ante 
threat effect might occur and make people leave unemployment when they learn 
that they will have to participate in an active measure. However, this effect 
seems to apply only when participation in an active measure is compulsory. In 
Estonia, where the unemployed are encouraged to participate in active measures 
rather than forced with the threat of sanction of their benefit, active measures 
still tend to work as a carrot and the opposite effect applies. The unemployment 
duration analysis conducted on the crisis data indicates that the hazard of 
leaving unemployment tends to decrease just before and during the participation 
in active measures, meaning a locking-in effect also occurs. Thus, it still 
remains a question as to whether active labour market policies could also work 
as a stick in Estonia if more widely used and in a more compulsory manner. 
Most probably, compulsory participation in active measures would decrease 
registered unemployment spells and the spike at the end of benefit period would 
appear smaller. However, as with the effects of sanctions, some people might 
accept jobs with lower post-unemployment job quality when threatened with 
compulsory active measures or could indeed exit registered unemployment into 
inactivity. 
A more reasonable approach to active measures and imposing sanctions for 
non-participation seems to be the principle that has been more and more 
straightforwardly implemented in the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
since 2010, after the period studied in the current thesis. Since 2010, active 
measures are provided on the basis of individual needs, not the wishes of the 
unemployed or the length of the unemployment and benefit period. This 
principle of service provision has already provided positive results (see 
Lauringson et al. (2011)). In addition, there is the principle that if a need for an 
active measure for an unemployed person is detected, the participation in this 
measure for this unemployed person is indeed compulsory. This means that if 
an unemployed person does not participate in a measure that they need, a 
sanction on their unemployment benefit will follow. As a result, the 
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unemployed are not made to participate after a certain period of unemployment 
regardless of whether they actually need an active measure to exit to 
employment or not. In this system there should be fewer people than in the 
system of compulsory measures for all unemployed who then de-register just 
because they are forced to participate in measures that might not incur higher 
post-unemployment job quality for them, and it should increase the post-
unemployment job quality for the participants and ensure that the people who 
need measures really do participate in them. 
However, these regulations of service provision and sanctions are not 
explicit in the legal system and most of the package of active labour market 
policies delivered is not regulated by law. This means it might be necessary to 
make quite big changes in the Labour Market Services and Benefits Act so that 
it would support better the system of unemployment benefits; on top of the 
provision of active measures, questions of monitoring and sanctions should also 
be dealt with. 
In addition to a seemingly quite high spike at the end of the benefit period 
compared to the other countries, it is also quite unusual that the hazard of 
leaving unemployment for employment drops very fast after the spike. Search 
theory would rather expect that the hazard rate should stabilise at a higher level 
as the search intensity and the job search environment stay the same, so search 
theory would assume that income and leisure are complements (Meyer (1990)). 
However, the Estonian data suggest that income and leisure are substitutes, and 
hence after the period of unemployment benefits people are not driven towards 
a new income, but increasingly devote their time to leisure. However, a more 
likely explanation for this phenomenon is to be found in the model proposed by 
Boone and van Ours (2009). They argue that the spike at the end of benefit 
period could at least partly be explained by optimised timing of job starting 
dates. If this is the case, it is expected that there should be a fall in the hazard 
rate for leaving unemployment for employment after the benefit period, as a 
large share of exits to employment have been accumulated in one period. As the 
Estonian labour market is quite small and it is often hard for employers to find 
employees whose skills match the job well, it is likely that employers are indeed 
willing to wait for the employee and basically agree beforehand that the 
employee will start the job in one or two months. This is especially likely with 
more highly qualified specialists. 
If it is the case that the unemployed negotiate with the employer to postpone 
their employment period in order to first exhaust their benefit, it is still to be 
considered as a disincentive effect of unemployment benefits. It still means that 
people do not have an incentive to take up a job before the end of the benefit 
period. However, it is probably not too easy to change this behaviour by 
regulation of the unemployment benefit system. It might be lessened to some 
extent by better monitoring of job search and sanctioning, because if it is harder 
to prove their eligibility for benefits, a person could decide to start working 
sooner. Another concern is the attitude of people that they are willing to live on 
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benefits even though a job is waiting. This however, cannot be changed by the 
system. 
In conclusion, the results of this thesis indicate that on the one hand, it might 
be quite difficult to become eligible for unemployment benefits particularly for 
the unemployment insurance benefit that has a higher level. This is reflected in 
the data for spending on unemployment benefits per unemployed person when 
Estonia is compared with other EU countries. On the other hand, once a person 
becomes eligible for unemployment benefits, it seems quite easy to stay on the 
benefit. This is reflected in the estimation results for the disincentive effects as 
well as in the relatively high spikes in the hazard rates for leaving unemploy-
ment for employment at the end of the benefit period. 
It can be argued that this kind of system might not incur very good results in 
labour market outcomes. On the one hand there is a large proportion of the 
unemployed who do not have income or have a very low income during their 
unemployment period and so lack any subsidy for job search and might lose in 
their post-unemployment job quality. On the other hand there are some 
unemployed who have a higher level of income and can prolong their job 
search. It is shown in this thesis that at least some part of this prolonging takes 
place because people wait for a more suitable job offer during their benefit 
period and thus are more selective about the job offers received. However, there 
might still be a lower job search intensity during the unemployment benefit 
period due to the disincentive effect as the monitoring of job search is at rather a 
low level. 
This all suggests that the level of post-unemployment job quality and the 
level of job search intensity in the Estonian unemployment benefit system could 
be increased. This could be achieved by covering more unemployed with 
unemployment insurance benefits while increasing the job search monitoring 
and job search activation during the benefit period. In this way more people 
would have access to a job search subsidy, but in order to keep the subsidy, they 
have to make more effort to look for a new job. 
The increase in the coverage rate of the unemployed with unemployment 
benefits is especially important in times of crisis as there tends to be an increase 
in the share of the unemployed without benefits that emerges during a crisis and 
the match quality between jobs and workers tends to be worse during economic 
difficulties. This means that unemployed people without a job search subsidy 
are willing to take any of the few job offers available regardless of whether it 
matches their skills. This is reflected in the estimation results of this thesis that 
unemployment benefits have less impact on unemployment duration during a 
crisis period. In addition, it is reflected in the results that the job match quality 
(post-unemployment job quality) drops significantly just at the end of benefit 
period. When there are no or very low unemployment benefits the match quality 
of jobs and workers in the economy can suffer and incur a welfare loss. The 
current system can be improved in this respect by extending the potential 
unemployment benefit period when economic conditions are worse, although in 
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order to limit a fall in job search activity due to longer unemployment benefit 
periods, proper monitoring and activation should accompany the benefit 
extensions. 
In short, the analyses presented in the thesis suggest that there might be 
welfare effects if the system of unemployment benefits in Estonia were made 
more generous, particularly in terms of the potential benefit period, which was 
analysed more thoroughly. However, from previous studies conducted in other 
countries, it can be concluded that it might be reasonable to increase monitoring 
and sanctioning in the Estonian unemployment benefit system too, so that 
instead of the current situation where it is hard to start receiving benefits and 
easy to stay on benefits, the system should be changed so that it would be easier 
to start receiving benefits, but harder to stay on benefits.  
This thesis studies the effects of unemployment benefits on labour market 
outcomes. However, when assessing the overall effects of unemployment 
benefit systems on the economy, several other important aspects have to be 
considered. The most important aspect of unemployment benefits is the reason 
why unemployment benefit systems are created in the first place – to provide 
some level of social security during periods of unemployment. This implies that 
unemployment benefits are intended to smooth out somewhat the fluctuations in 
income and hence also the fluctuations in internal demand, and thus unemploy-
ment benefits are particularly important in times of crisis to maintain the level 
of consumption and internal demand, to prevent a rise in poverty, to restrict a 
rise in inequality in the society, to preserve social cohesion, to avoid social 
exclusion, and for much more. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Spending on active labour market measures in the EU in 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat, Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
Note: categories 2–7 from the classification of labour market policies considered. 
 
 
Appendix 2. Spending on ALMP in PPP units per person wanting to work in 
the EU in 2006 and 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: categories 2–7 from the classification of labour market policies considered. Persons 
wanting to work include unemployed (according to the ILO definition) and the labour reserve 
(inactive persons wanting to work i.e. discouraged unemployed). 
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Appendix 3. Participants in ALMP per 100 persons wanting to work in the 
EU in 2006 and 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: categories 2–7 from the classification of labour market policies considered. Persons 
wanting to work include unemployed (according to the ILO definition) and the labour reserve 
(inactive persons wanting to work i.e. discouraged unemployed). 
 
 
Appendix 4. Inflow to active labour market measures in Estonia 2003–2013 
 
Source: Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
Note: inflow depicts different entries to measures, not different people (one person can receive 
several measures). 
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Appendix 5. Smoothed hazard rates for exiting into employment (pre-crisis 
period) 
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Appendix 5 (continued) 
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Appendix 5 (continued) 
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Appendix 5 (continued) 
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Appendix 5 (continued) 
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Appendix 5 (continued) 
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Appendix 6. Estimation results of piecewise-constant proportional hazard 
models (pre-crisis period) 
Covariate Compared to 
UIB 180 UIB 270 All UIB 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Any amount of benefit No benefit 0.260 0.000 0.665 0.280 0.401 0.000 
60 days before UIB exhaustion 
All other 
periods 
1.672 0.000 0.877 0.674 1.304 0.000 
60 days before UA exhaustion 2.623 0.000 2.351 0.262 1.740 0.000 
60 days after UIB exhaustion 0.995 0.975 1.340 0.389 1.083 0.278 
60 days after UA exhaustion 0.957 0.760 0.000 1.000 0.705 0.003 
Male Female 0.830 0.006 0.823 0.000 0.838 0.000 
Age 16–24 Age 25–54 1.172 0.126 1.038 0.908 1.031 0.736 Age 55+ 0.741 0.002 0.538 0.000 0.598 0.000 
Main language Estonian Other language 1.158 0.038 1.350 0.000 1.284 0.000 
Disabled Not disabled 0.410 0.000 0.504 0.000 0.445 0.000 
Living in a town Countryside 1.006 0.935 1.093 0.129 1.049 0.319 
Previous occupation: 
Technicians 
      
Managers 0.933 0.657 0.955 0.637 0.952 0.572 
Professionals 0.968 0.838 1.053 0.639 1.005 0.960 
Clerks 0.764 0.065 0.971 0.769 0.882 0.146 
Service and sales workers 0.983 0.886 1.177 0.080 1.060 0.434 
Agriculturists 0.887 0.606 1.136 0.610 1.020 0.904 
Craft and related trades workers 0.856 0.210 1.042 0.660 0.961 0.601 
Plant and machine operators 1.252 0.094 1.179 0.074 1.210 0.015 
Elementary occupations 0.885 0.298 1.104 0.263 0.996 0.954 
Education: 
General 
secondary 
education 
      
Elementary or less 0.787 0.474 1.771 0.055 1.174 0.483 
Basic 0.857 0.127 1.064 0.493 0.934 0.321 
Vocational secondary 1.058 0.478 1.188 0.007 1.125 0.020 
Professional secondary 1.023 0.834 1.145 0.108 1.089 0.213 
Vocational higher 1.329 0.088 1.277 0.062 1.325 0.008 
Bachelor’s studies 1.116 0.376 1.096 0.307 1.101 0.200 
Master’s or doctoral studies 1.374 0.116 1.249 0.098 1.239 0.067 
Tenure 1–5 years 
Tenure <1 
year 
0.737 0.000 0.993 0.934 0.809 0.000 
Tenure 5–10 years 0.550 0.002 0.840 0.056 0.828 0.012 
Tenure 10+ years 0.473 0.000 0.657 0.000 0.618 0.000 
Prev. job in Estonian public 
sector Estonian private sector
0.697 0.122 1.268 0.042 1.109 0.344 
Prev. job abroad 0.217 0.000 0.383 0.011 0.254 0.000 
Reason for unemployment: 
End of fixed-
term contract
      
Unsuitability for the job 0.727 0.031 0.771 0.050 0.721 0.001 
Long-term incapacity for work 0.522 0.015 0.731 0.291 0.557 0.003 
Unsatisfactory results of a 
probationary period 1.143 0.327 1.212 0.182 1.158 0.136 
Violation by employer 0.946 0.699 1.100 0.452 1.031 0.749 
Bankruptcy 1.206 0.331 1.350 0.060 1.209 0.126 
Liquidation of the organisation 0.848 0.326 1.486 0.002 1.166 0.136 
Lay-off 1.009 0.919 1.146 0.123 1.071 0.259 
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Appendix 6 (continued) 
Covariate 
UIB 180 UIB 270 All UIB 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Anticipation period of training 0.086 0.001 0.089 0.000 0.089 0.000 
Anticipation period of job search training 0.000 0.999 0.166 0.073 0.098 0.020 
Anticipation period of Estonian course 0.352 0.145 0.000 1.000 0.158 0.009 
Anticipation period of counselling 0.168 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.189 0.000 
Training period 0.117 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.106 0.000 
Job search training period 0.158 0.068 0.225 0.010 0.199 0.001 
Estonian course period 0.037 0.001 0.195 0.000 0.131 0.000 
Work practice period 0.242 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.221 0.000 
Post-training 1.153 0.159 1.257 0.001 1.244 0.000 
After job search training 0.854 0.472 1.182 0.175 1.071 0.542 
After Estonian course 1.092 0.727 0.924 0.668 0.993 0.962 
After work practice 1.883 0.007 1.574 0.020 1.643 0.001 
Post-counselling 0.845 0.022 0.968 0.562 0.911 0.040 
Monthly regional registered unemployment 
rate (in percentage points) 0.958 0.061 0.889 0.000 0.913 0.000 
Monthly change in registered unemployment 
rate (in percentage points) 0.403 0.000 0.790 0.220 0.602 0.000 
Monthly inflow of registered vacancies (in 
hundreds) 0.988 0.022 0.978 0.000 0.982 0.000 
day 1–10 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.000 
day 11–20 0.016 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.010 0.000 
day 21–30 0.015 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.011 0.000 
day 31–40 0.024 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.000 
day 41–50 0.036 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.022 0.000 
day 51–60 0.029 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.020 0.000 
day 61–70 0.029 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.017 0.000 
day 71–80 0.044 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.024 0.000 
day 81–90 0.053 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.026 0.000 
day 91–100 0.031 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.016 0.000 
day 101–110 0.056 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.025 0.000 
day 111–120 0.045 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.028 0.000 
day 121–130 0.026 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.020 0.000 
day 131–140 0.028 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.021 0.000 
day 141–150 0.038 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.025 0.000 
day 151–160 0.030 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.023 0.000 
day 161–170 0.031 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.020 0.000 
day 171–180 0.038 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.024 0.000 
day 181–190 0.023 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.020 0.000 
day 191–200 0.038 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.025 0.000 
day 201–210 0.035 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.022 0.000 
day 211–220 0.026 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.017 0.000 
day 221–230 0.037 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.024 0.000 
day 231–240 0.025 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.019 0.000 
day 241–250 0.018 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.015 0.000 
day 251–260 0.026 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.019 0.000 
day 261–270 0.026 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.020 0.000 
day 271–280 0.025 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.014 0.000 
day 281–290 0.018 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.018 0.000 
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Appendix 6 (continued) 
Covariate 
UIB 180 UIB 270 All UIB 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
day 291–300 0.015 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.021 0.000 
day 301–310 0.014 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.015 0.000 
day 311–320 0.017 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.018 0.000 
day 321–330 0.020 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.019 0.000 
day 331–340 0.012 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.012 0.000 
day 341–350 0.013 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.009 0.000 
day 351–360 0.013 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.017 0.000 
day 361–370 0.016 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.012 0.000 
day 371–380 0.016 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.011 0.000 
day 381–390 0.018 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.016 0.000 
day 391–400 0.013 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.008 0.000 
day 401–410 0.014 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.012 0.000 
day 411–420 0.019 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.017 0.000 
day 421–430 0.012 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.011 0.000 
day 431–440 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.000 
day 441–450 0.023 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.015 0.000 
day 451–460 0.024 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.012 0.000 
day 461–470 0.008 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.000 
day 471–480 0.028 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.000 
day 481–490 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.000 
day 491–500 0.013 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.012 0.000 
day 501–530 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 531–560 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.000 
day 561–590 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000 
day 591–620 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.000 
day 621–692 0.013 0.000 0.004 1.000 0.007 0.000 
θ (variance of gamma shared frailty; 
Likelihood-ratio test of θ =0) 0.796 0.260 0.294 0.001 0.570 0.001 
Wald test 21830.76 0.000 33025.96 0.000 52224.41 0.000 
No. of observations 73299  83969  157268  
No. of subjects  2942  3304  6172  
No. of failures 2306  2477  4783  
Note: The results for 270-day-UIB recipients might be influenced by the fact that there are very 
few observations with UA after UIB. 
There is no anticipation period for work practice included in the model due to too few 
observations.
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Appendix 7. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and smoothed hazard rates for 
exiting into employment (crisis period) 
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Appendix 8. Estimation results from piecewise-constant proportional hazard 
models (crisis period)  
Covariate Com-pared to 
UIB 180 UIB 270 All UIB UA 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Any amount of 
benefit No benefit 0.268 0.000 0.507 0.000 0.437 0.000 0.421 0.000 
60 days before UIB 
exhaustion 
All other 
periods 
1.022 0.891 1.520 0.004 1.225 0.000 x x 
60 days before UA 
exhaustion 2.953 0.000 0.796 0.652 1.413 0.000 1.496 0.000 
60 days after UIB 
exhaustion 0.835 0.206 1.221 0.207 1.122 0.007 x x 
60 days after UA 
exhaustion 1.194 0.023 0.985 0.967 0.840 0.004 0.693 0.002 
Male Female 0.825 0.000 0.819 0.000 0.831 0.000 0.984 0.571 
Age 16–24 Age  
25–54 
1.190 0.000 1.192 0.283 1.002 0.958 1.142 0.000 
Age 55+ 0.638 0.000 0.572 0.000 0.587 0.000 0.643 0.000 
Main language 
Estonian 
Other 
language 1.520 0.000 1.414 0.000 1.504 0.000 1.444 0.000 
Disabled Not disabled 0.744 0.000 0.688 0.000 0.689 0.000 0.407 0.000 
Living in a town Country-side 1.080 0.045 0.992 0.778 1.036 0.142 1.080 0.007 
Previous job: 
Technician 
        
Manager 1.042 0.623 1.027 0.640 1.037 0.459 1.102 0.187 
Professional 0.980 0.824 1.054 0.408 1.035 0.520 1.141 0.063 
Clerk 0.975 0.765 1.009 0.891 1.000 0.993 0.997 0.960 
Service and sales 
worker 1.003 0.962 1.193 0.002 1.099 0.037 1.051 0.344 
Agriculturist 1.304 0.093 0.940 0.632 1.057 0.588 1.066 0.588 
Craft and related 
trades worker 0.802 0.001 0.964 0.464 0.892 0.005 0.855 0.004 
Plant and machine 
operator 0.884 0.110 1.037 0.497 0.988 0.786 1.049 0.427 
Elementary 
occupation 0.852 0.020 1.068 0.210 0.971 0.499 0.901 0.051 
Education: 
General 
secondary 
education 
        
Elementary or less 0.873 0.297 0.833 0.258 0.808 0.037 0.629 0.000 
Basic 0.921 0.105 0.916 0.058 0.889 0.001 0.809 0.000 
Vocational 
secondary 1.076 0.085 1.049 0.140 1.066 0.016 1.022 0.477 
Professional 
secondary 1.153 0.037 1.076 0.143 1.102 0.020 1.016 0.763 
Vocational higher 1.260 0.019 1.264 0.002 1.267 0.000 1.254 0.002 
Bachelor 1.189 0.010 1.168 0.002 1.173 0.000 1.231 0.000 
Master or doctor 1.560 0.000 1.207 0.004 1.312 0.000 1.222 0.029 
Tenure 1–5 years Tenure <1 
year 
0.827 0.000 0.901 0.010 0.850 0.000 0.802 0.000 
Tenure 5–10 years 0.867 0.458 0.773 0.000 0.836 0.000 0.748 0.000 
Tenure 10+ years 0.891 0.589 0.646 0.000 0.680 0.000 0.805 0.003 
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Appendix 8 (continued) 
Covariate Com-pared to 
UIB 180 UIB 270 All UIB UA 
Hazard 
ratio P>z
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Prev. job in Estonian 
public sector 
Estonian 
private 
sector 
1.535 0.007 1.163 0.070 1.228 0.007 x x 
Prev. job abroad 0.452 0.000 0.526 0.000 0.467 0.000 x x 
Reason for unempl.:  
End of 
fixed- 
term 
contract 
        
Unsuitability 0.747 0.004 0.725 0.000 0.728 0.000 x x 
Long-term incapacity 0.675 0.062 0.511 0.001 0.578 0.000 x x 
Unsatisfactory results 
of a probationary 
period 
0.854 0.010 1.070 0.258 0.951 0.254 x x 
Violation by employer 0.988 0.848 1.132 0.022 1.092 0.035 x x 
Bankruptcy 0.871 0.195 1.083 0.293 1.018 0.773 x x 
Liquidation 0.753 0.071 1.004 0.968 0.921 0.348 x x 
Lay-off 0.975 0.565 1.012 0.778 1.009 0.769 x x 
Reason for unempl.:          
Mutual agreement All other 
reasons 
(involunt. 
unempl.) 
x x x x x x 1.506 0.000 
Initiative of employee x x x x x x 1.468 0.000 
Employee's breach of 
duties x x x x x x 1.018 0.816 
Anticipation of training 0.199 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.155 0.000 
Anticipation of job search 
training 0.108 0.026 0.198 0.001 0.172 0.000 0.166 0.002 
Anticipation of Estonian course 0.145 0.054 0.082 0.012 0.105 0.001 0.224 0.010 
Anticipation of work practice 0.104 0.024 0.115 0.002 0.110 0.000 0.418 0.021 
Anticipation of counselling 0.279 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.276 0.000 0.304 0.000 
Training period 0.210 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.211 0.000 
Job search training period 0.286 0.078 0.307 0.009 0.306 0.002 0.144 0.006 
Estonian course period 0.086 0.001 0.117 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.311 0.000 
Work practice period 0.243 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.364 0.000 0.427 0.000 
Post-training 1.201 0.001 1.244 0.000 1.243 0.000 1.368 0.000 
After job search training 0.924 0.560 0.919 0.310 0.939 0.386 0.874 0.158 
After Estonian course 1.329 0.118 1.028 0.839 1.096 0.407 1.495 0.001 
After work practice 2.010 0.000 3.003 0.000 2.700 0.000 2.844 0.000 
Post-counselling 0.991 0.842 1.137 0.000 1.070 0.022 0.993 0.828 
Monthly regional registered 
unemployment rate (in 
percentage points) 
0.988 0.060 0.975 0.000 0.979 0.000 0.962 0.000 
Monthly change in registered 
unemployment rate (in 
percentage points) 
0.445 0.000 0.534 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.492 0.000 
Monthly inflow of registered 
vacancies (in hundreds) 1.027 0.000 1.045 0.000 1.039 0.000 1.024 0.000 
day 1–10 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.000 
day 11–20 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 21–30 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 
day 31–40 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 
day 41–50 0.013 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.008 0.000 
day 51–60 0.010 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 
day 61–70 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 
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Appendix 8 (continued) 
Covariate 
UIB 180 UIB 270 All UIB UA 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
day 71–80 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 
day 81–90 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.000 
day 91–100 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 101–110 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 
day 111–120 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 121–130 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 131–140 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 
day 141–150 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 151–160 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 161–170 0.012 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 171–180 0.012 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 
day 181–190 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 
day 191–200 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 
day 201–210 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.000 
day 211–220 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 
day 221–230 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 
day 231–240 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 241–250 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 251–260 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 
day 261–270 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 271–280 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 281–290 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 291–300 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 301–310 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 311–320 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 321–330 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 331–340 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 341–350 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 351–360 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 361–370 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 371–380 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 
day 381–390 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 391–400 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 401–430 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 431–460 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 461–490 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 491–520 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 521–550 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
day 551–602 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
θ (variance of gamma 
shared frailty; Likeli-
hood-ratio test of θ =0) 
0.466 0.006 0.193 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.053 0.085 
Wald test 75508.1 0.000 118508.72 0.000 184010.14 0.000 141012.17 0.000 
No. of observations 300890 393615 694505 542067 
No. of subjects  10148 13232 23380 17645 
No. of failures 5076 7107 12183 7594 
Note: The results for 270-day-UIB recipients might be influenced by the fact that there are very 
few observations with UA after UIB. 
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Appendix 9. Number of UIB recipients on the basis of their previous UI 
contributions (crisis period) 
 
Note: There are more people with longer records of unemployment insurance contributions, 
because the distribution of insurance records is truncated from the right side as the unemployment 
insurance system was only created in Estonia in 2002. If the system was older, the insurance 
records would be more evenly distributed. 
 
 
Appendix 10. The change in the starting wage compared to the previous 
wage for UIB recipients with previous record of UI contributions of 32–79 
months 
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Appendix 11. Description of UIB recipients with previous record of UI 
contributions of 32–79 months who entered employment  
Variable  
UIB 270, 
contributions of 
56–79 months 
UIB 180, 
contributions of 
32–55 months 
% bias p>|t| 
Beginning of benefit:      
IV Q 2008 0.236 0.246 –2.1 0.455 
III Q 2008 0.275 0.124 38.5 0.000 
I Q 2009 0.462 0.587 –25.2 0.000 
Male 0.548 0.527 4.1 0.148 
Age 41.4 35.3 57.1 0.000 
Previous wage (EEK) 12571 11423 15.1 0.000 
Education:      
General secondary 0.299 0.303 –0.8 0.770 
Elementary or less 0.005 0.014 –8.6 0.002 
Basic 0.130 0.155 –6.9 0.015 
Vocational secondary 0.314 0.301 2.8 0.328 
Professional secondary 0.083 0.069 5.3 0.066 
Vocational higher 0.031 0.040 –4.8 0.088 
Bachelor 0.098 0.092 2 0.477 
Master or doctor 0.039 0.026 7 0.014 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.093 0.099 –2.2 0.435 
Manager 0.109 0.089 6.9 0.016 
Professional 0.064 0.057 3.1 0.271 
Clerk 0.052 0.063 –4.5 0.113 
Service and sales worker 0.113 0.137 –7.3 0.010 
Agriculturist 0.012 0.010 2.4 0.404 
Craft and related trades worker 0.268 0.289 –4.7 0.096 
Plant and machine operator 0.134 0.098 11.2 0.000 
Elementary occupation 0.156 0.160 –1.1 0.693 
Main language Estonian 0.610 0.575 7.2 0.011 
Living in a town 0.686 0.719 –7.2 0.012 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.311 0.388 –16.2 0.000 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.3 5.9 –24.5 0.000 
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Appendix 12. Probit model for matching (starting wage) 
Variable 
Model no. 1 Model no. 2 Model no. 3 Model no. 4 
(all) (exit 1–150) (exit 151–240) (exit 271–360) 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Beginning of benefit period: IV Q 2008 
III Q 2008 0.135 0.010 0.138 0.046 0.206 0.107 0.045 0.735 
I Q 2009 0.096 0.030 0.000 0.998 0.042 0.642 0.163 0.050 
Male 0.163 0.000 0.182 0.001 0.135 0.079 0.040 0.649 
Age 0.269 0.000 0.291 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.167 0.000 
Age square –0.003 0.000 –0.003 0.000 –0.003 0.000 –0.001 0.000 
Previous wage (EEK) / 1000 0.033 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.050 0.000 
Education: general secondary 
Elementary or less –0.143 0.351 –0.063 0.780 –0.592 0.080 0.206 0.597 
Basic 0.022 0.649 –0.015 0.850 0.011 0.919 0.065 0.592 
Vocational secondary 0.045 0.236 0.105 0.076 –0.004 0.957 0.077 0.423 
Professional secondary –0.141 0.019 –0.083 0.361 0.070 0.601 –0.446 0.003 
Vocational higher –0.108 0.210 –0.108 0.370 –0.290 0.184 –0.146 0.517 
Bachelor –0.115 0.060 –0.049 0.589 –0.174 0.193 –0.421 0.010 
Master or doctor –0.092 0.307 –0.155 0.228 –0.046 0.832 –0.122 0.635 
Previous occupation: technician 
Manager 0.089 0.199 0.120 0.256 –0.037 0.800 0.156 0.396 
Professional 0.173 0.032 0.178 0.126 0.129 0.502 0.120 0.580 
Clerk 0.134 0.083 0.237 0.038 0.117 0.507 –0.020 0.921 
Service and sales worker –0.098 0.130 –0.040 0.682 –0.053 0.711 –0.372 0.027 
Agriculturist –0.312 0.039 –0.507 0.019 –0.188 0.565 –0.694 0.064 
Craft worker –0.030 0.615 0.018 0.850 0.016 0.901 –0.358 0.016 
Plant and machine operator 0.129 0.054 0.229 0.034 0.204 0.140 –0.291 0.090 
Elementary occupation –0.010 0.872 0.043 0.665 0.025 0.851 –0.277 0.082 
Main language Estonian 0.172 0.000 0.183 0.003 0.240 0.006 0.055 0.563 
Reason for unemployment: end of fixed-term contract 
Unsuitability for the job 0.187 0.074 0.265 0.094 –0.244 0.385 0.103 0.655 
Unsatisfactory results of a 
probationary period 0.231 0.000 0.143 0.113 0.398 0.010 0.120 0.479 
Bankruptcy 0.520 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.173 0.337 0.603 0.002 
Liquidation 0.549 0.000 0.652 0.000 0.498 0.141 0.349 0.241 
Lay-off 0.461 0.000 0.480 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.517 0.000 
Long-term incapacity  0.001 0.998 0.685 0.079 –0.160 0.767 –1.133 0.037 
Violation by employer 0.474 0.000 0.648 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.567 0.000 
Living in a town 0.064 0.071 –0.003 0.955 0.156 0.038 0.007 0.937 
Region: Central and Western 
Northern –0.026 0.491 0.010 0.869 –0.044 0.598 –0.099 0.283 
Southern –0.015 0.847 0.039 0.704 –0.263 0.128 –0.025 0.907 
North-Eastern 0.123 0.097 0.130 0.138 –0.101 0.522 0.222 0.132 
Disabled –0.150 0.026 –0.204 0.056 –0.186 0.198 –0.044 0.785 
Tenure on prev. job < 1 year –0.133 0.001 –0.154 0.081
Regional registered 
unemployment rate –0.011 0.337 0.003 0.892   
Knowledge of English –0.143 0.144
Constant –6.663 0.000 –7.176 0.000 –7.552 0.000 –4.630 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.199 0.208 0.207 0.225 
LR chi2 2404.9 0.000 1091.5 0.000 548.5 0.000 444.0 0.000 
Number of observations 8834 3851 1913 1526 
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Appendix 13. Unmatched and matched variables (starting wage) 
  Model no. 1 (all) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.239 0.264 –5.9 0.239 0.245 –1.3 
III Q 2008 0.170 0.125 12.7 0.170 0.170 0.0 
I Q 2009 0.555 0.568 –2.7 0.555 0.551 0.7 
Male 0.559 0.524 7.1 0.559 0.554 1.1 
Age 42.5 34.5 74.5 42.5 42.5 0.0 
Previous wage (EEK) 13698 10592 38.6 13651 13852 –2.5 
Education:      
General secondary 0.298 0.302 –0.9 0.299 0.297 0.3 
Elementary or less 0.006 0.016 –9.5 0.006 0.009 –2.5 
Basic 0.120 0.177 –16.1 0.120 0.124 –1.2 
Vocational secondary 0.320 0.294 5.5 0.320 0.336 –3.5 
Professional secondary 0.078 0.067 4.3 0.078 0.083 –2.0 
Vocational higher 0.035 0.034 0.4 0.035 0.027 4.5 
Bachelor 0.093 0.087 2.2 0.093 0.088 1.5 
Master or doctor 0.050 0.023 14.7 0.050 0.036 7.8 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.102 0.094 2.8 0.102 0.101 0.4 
Manager 0.122 0.074 16.2 0.122 0.108 4.8 
Professional 0.064 0.050 6.1 0.064 0.052 4.8 
Clerk 0.061 0.065 –1.8 0.061 0.062 –0.7 
Service and sales worker 0.101 0.157 –16.7 0.101 0.096 1.5 
Agriculturist 0.010 0.013 –3.2 0.010 0.009 0.8 
Craft and related trades worker 0.255 0.278 –5.2 0.255 0.303 –10.8 
Plant and machine operator 0.136 0.097 12.2 0.136 0.115 6.6 
Elementary occupation 0.148 0.172 –6.4 0.148 0.152 –1.1 
Main language Estonian 0.626 0.588 7.7 0.625 0.599 5.5 
Living in a town 0.674 0.698 –5.1 0.674 0.687 –3.0 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.262 0.444 –38.8 0.262 0.293 –6.6 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.7 5.9 –7.0 5.7 5.8 –2.7 
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Appendix 13 (continued) 
  Model no. 2 (exit 1–150) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.230 0.229 0.3 0.230 0.228 0.5 
III Q 2008 0.213 0.159 14.0 0.214 0.223 –2.5 
I Q 2009 0.525 0.571 –9.4 0.524 0.520 0.9 
Male 0.511 0.472 7.7 0.510 0.515 –1.0 
Age 41.9 34.1 73.7 41.9 42.2 –3.1 
Previous wage (EEK) 13655 10362 39.4 13035 13184 –1.8 
Education:      
General secondary 0.286 0.294 –1.6 0.288 0.301 –2.7 
Elementary or less 0.006 0.018 –10.9 0.006 0.005 1.2 
Basic 0.106 0.170 –18.4 0.107 0.111 –0.9 
Vocational secondary 0.318 0.283 7.7 0.321 0.299 4.9 
Professional secondary 0.082 0.069 4.7 0.081 0.103 –8.6 
Vocational higher 0.046 0.044 0.7 0.045 0.036 4.0 
Bachelor 0.101 0.094 2.2 0.099 0.092 2.1 
Master or doctor 0.055 0.028 13.8 0.053 0.053 0.0 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.099 0.091 2.9 0.098 0.097 0.6 
Manager 0.125 0.078 15.6 0.120 0.106 4.8 
Professional 0.076 0.060 6.4 0.074 0.073 0.5 
Clerk 0.069 0.075 –2.4 0.069 0.045 9.5 
Service and sales worker 0.123 0.186 –17.5 0.124 0.122 0.5 
Agriculturist 0.009 0.016 –6.7 0.009 0.007 1.2 
Craft and related trades worker 0.232 0.246 –3.3 0.234 0.256 –5.2 
Plant and machine operator 0.123 0.079 14.6 0.124 0.128 –1.4 
Elementary occupation 0.146 0.170 –6.8 0.147 0.166 –5.2 
Main language Estonian 0.660 0.621 8.1 0.657 0.589 14.1 
Living in a town 0.657 0.703 –9.9 0.656 0.685 –6.3 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.295 0.473 –37.2 0.297 0.317 –4.2 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.6 5.9 –10.6 5.6 5.6 1.3 
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Appendix 13 (continued) 
  Model no. 3 (exit 151–240) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.237 0.285 –10.9 0.236 0.235 0.2 
III Q 2008 0.122 0.073 16.4 0.123 0.120 1.1 
I Q 2009 0.598 0.588 2.1 0.598 0.599 –0.2 
Male 0.602 0.566 7.3 0.600 0.588 2.4 
Age 41.8 34.3 70.2 41.8 42.2 –2.9 
Previous wage (EEK) 13684 11173 33.6 13447 13447 0.0 
Education:      
General secondary 0.301 0.299 0.5 0.301 0.331 –6.6 
Elementary or less 0.005 0.017 –11.3 0.005 0.009 –3.1 
Basic 0.129 0.184 –15.2 0.129 0.126 0.9 
Vocational secondary 0.340 0.312 5.9 0.341 0.329 2.5 
Professional secondary 0.081 0.052 11.8 0.082 0.075 2.6 
Vocational higher 0.019 0.028 –5.5 0.019 0.015 2.8 
Bachelor 0.085 0.089 –1.5 0.084 0.087 –1.1 
Master or doctor 0.040 0.019 12.0 0.039 0.028 6.4 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.100 0.104 –1.5 0.100 0.124 –7.8 
Manager 0.117 0.088 9.6 0.115 0.110 1.8 
Professional 0.047 0.042 2.6 0.046 0.034 5.7 
Clerk 0.047 0.053 –2.7 0.047 0.031 7.4 
Service and sales worker 0.094 0.129 –10.9 0.095 0.075 6.2 
Agriculturist 0.011 0.014 –3.2 0.011 0.002 7.8 
Craft and related trades worker 0.260 0.277 –3.6 0.260 0.300 –9.0 
Plant and machine operator 0.170 0.114 16.1 0.171 0.179 –2.2 
Elementary occupation 0.153 0.180 –7.1 0.154 0.144 2.6 
Main language Estonian 0.640 0.608 6.5 0.638 0.584 11.1 
Living in a town 0.674 0.661 2.7 0.673 0.704 –6.4 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.255 0.436 –38.7 0.255 0.305 –10.6 
Regional registered unemployment rate 6.0 6.2 –7.5 6.0 6.1 –2.4 
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Appendix 13 (continued) 
  Model no. 4 (exit 271–360) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.246 0.308 –13.8 0.248 0.263 –3.5 
III Q 2008 0.117 0.109 2.5 0.119 0.148 –9.1 
I Q 2009 0.584 0.532 10.5 0.581 0.575 1.2 
Male 0.586 0.558 5.6 0.578 0.580 –0.4 
Age 43.6 35.0 81.3 43.5 43.2 3.1 
Previous wage (EEK) 14082 10153 50.7 13190 13013 2.3 
Education:      
General secondary 0.294 0.323 –6.2 0.296 0.256 8.7 
Elementary or less 0.007 0.011 –4.5 0.007 0.003 4.3 
Basic 0.127 0.170 –12.2 0.130 0.102 7.9 
Vocational secondary 0.328 0.294 7.3 0.336 0.400 –13.8 
Professional secondary 0.074 0.083 –3.2 0.076 0.088 –4.2 
Vocational higher 0.037 0.028 5.0 0.036 0.029 4.1 
Bachelor 0.082 0.075 2.5 0.077 0.092 –5.4 
Master or doctor 0.050 0.015 19.8 0.040 0.030 5.8 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.118 0.079 13.2 0.119 0.136 –5.9 
Manager 0.136 0.055 27.8 0.118 0.111 2.1 
Professional 0.057 0.042 7.3 0.056 0.052 1.9 
Clerk 0.063 0.049 6.2 0.065 0.057 3.6 
Service and sales worker 0.078 0.162 –26 0.081 0.068 3.8 
Agriculturist 0.011 0.011 –0.3 0.011 0.007 3.9 
Craft and related trades worker 0.273 0.323 –10.8 0.281 0.294 –2.9 
Plant and machine operator 0.110 0.108 0.9 0.114 0.112 0.3 
Elementary occupation 0.153 0.172 –5.2 0.157 0.162 –1.4 
Main language Estonian 0.593 0.545 9.7 0.584 0.580 0.8 
Living in a town 0.672 0.728 –12.4 0.672 0.671 0.2 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.216 0.411 –43.1 0.217 0.244 –5.9 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.9 6.0 9.5 5.9 5.8 6.6 
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Appendix 16. Probit model for matching (average wage) 
Variable 
Model no. 5 Model no. 6 Model no. 7 Model no. 8 
(all) (exit 1–150) (exit 151–240) (exit 271–360) 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Beginning of benefit period: IV Q 2008 
III Q 2008 0.172 0.012 0.033 0.732 0.332 0.026 0.234 0.183 
I Q 2009 0.133 0.030 0.072 0.415 0.046 0.624 0.327 0.013 
Male 0.140 0.004 0.146 0.039 0.094 0.332 0.063 0.656 
Age 0.291 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.202 0.000 
Age square –0.003 0.000 –0.003 0.000 –0.003 0.000 –0.002 0.001 
Previous wage (EEK) / 1000 0.043 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.056 0.000 
Education: general secondary 
Elementary or less –0.045 0.840 –0.121 0.690 –0.430 0.423 0.430 0.443 
Basic –0.043 0.556 –0.078 0.450 0.046 0.755 –0.002 0.991 
Vocational secondary 0.036 0.503 0.107 0.159 0.047 0.655 –0.010 0.946 
Professional secondary –0.150 0.072 –0.135 0.245 0.017 0.919 –0.579 0.018 
Vocational higher –0.039 0.721 –0.037 0.801 –0.399 0.123 –0.103 0.755 
Bachelor –0.233 0.003 –0.183 0.093 –0.269 0.089 –0.564 0.024 
Master or doctor –0.190 0.104 –0.238 0.122 –0.122 0.636 –0.172 0.672 
Previous occupation: technician 
Manager 0.030 0.732 0.039 0.758 –0.064 0.715 –0.006 0.984 
Professional 0.146 0.149 0.116 0.400 0.098 0.661 0.073 0.820 
Clerk 0.188 0.062 0.191 0.167 0.153 0.479 0.108 0.732 
Service and sales worker –0.076 0.372 –0.100 0.401 –0.109 0.531 –0.417 0.109 
Agriculturist –0.269 0.198 –0.479 0.084 0.002 0.996 –0.614 0.277 
Craft worker 0.075 0.362 0.029 0.809 0.228 0.145 –0.348 0.133 
Plant and machine operator 0.191 0.037 0.312 0.022 0.212 0.224 –0.453 0.079 
Elementary occupation 0.025 0.773 0.005 0.968 0.076 0.657 –0.382 0.117 
Main language Estonian 0.180 0.001 0.108 0.169 0.299 0.006 –0.018 0.907 
Reason for unemployment: end of fixed-term contract 
Unsuitability for the job 0.246 0.093 0.289 0.178 0.084 0.795 0.257 0.555 
Unsatisfactory results of a 
probationary period 0.197 0.031 0.074 0.538 0.439 0.028 0.320 0.231 
Bankruptcy 0.588 0.000 0.625 0.001 0.399 0.083 0.644 0.056 
Liquidation 0.296 0.062 0.285 0.181 0.361 0.476 0.378 0.300 
Lay-off 0.439 0.000 0.371 0.000 0.505 0.000 0.669 0.000 
Long-term incapacity  0.420 0.284 1.493 0.032
Violation by employer 0.468 0.000 0.584 0.000 0.435 0.003 0.612 0.008 
Living in a town 0.007 0.878 –0.058 0.395 0.087 0.363 0.121 0.393 
Region: Central and Western 
Northern –0.056 0.286 0.007 0.928 –0.083 0.420 –0.224 0.126 
Southern –0.012 0.914 0.078 0.588 –0.469 0.033 0.546 0.277 
North-Eastern 0.221 0.036 0.222 0.130 –0.084 0.601 0.290 0.230 
Disabled –0.191 0.055 –0.107 0.473 –0.236 0.267 –0.298 0.226 
Tenure on prev. job < 1 year –0.050 0.371 –0.049 0.524
Regional registered 
unemployment rate –0.023 0.146 –0.021 0.348   
Knowledge of English –0.021 0.724
Constant –7.064 0.000 –7.158 0.000 –8.108 0.000 –5.362 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.210 0.217 0.219 0.245 
LR chi2 1341.0 0.000 709.2 0.000 352.9 0.000 197.7 0.000 
Number of observations 4761 2468 1168 638 
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Appendix 17. Unmatched and matched variables (average wage) 
  Model no. 5 (all) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.254 0.276 –5.1 0.254 0.270 –3.5 
III Q 2008 0.207 0.152 14.5 0.207 0.197 2.6 
I Q 2009 0.510 0.528 –3.7 0.509 0.500 1.7 
Male 0.502 0.451 10.1 0.495 0.500 –0.9 
Age 42.2 34.3 75.3 42.2 42.2 0.0 
Previous wage (EEK) 13994 10670 40.0 13064 13074 –0.1 
Education:      
General secondary 0.297 0.305 –1.6 0.301 0.290 2.2 
Elementary or less 0.006 0.014 –8.8 0.006 0.003 2.5 
Basic 0.101 0.151 –15.3 0.103 0.121 –5.6 
Vocational secondary 0.313 0.277 7.9 0.318 0.286 7.0 
Professional secondary 0.076 0.067 3.6 0.077 0.083 –2.5 
Vocational higher 0.045 0.040 2.4 0.043 0.045 –1.1 
Bachelor 0.105 0.119 –4.4 0.101 0.115 –4.7 
Master or doctor 0.058 0.028 15.1 0.053 0.056 –1.4 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.111 0.110 0.2 0.110 0.112 –0.7 
Manager 0.137 0.097 12.5 0.126 0.120 1.8 
Professional 0.079 0.067 4.5 0.076 0.075 0.5 
Clerk 0.067 0.075 –3.3 0.068 0.052 6.4 
Service and sales worker 0.113 0.172 –16.8 0.116 0.110 1.5 
Agriculturist 0.010 0.012 –1.5 0.010 0.012 –1.4 
Craft and related trades worker 0.216 0.222 –1.5 0.221 0.247 –6.3 
Plant and machine operator 0.136 0.091 14.4 0.139 0.138 0.4 
Elementary occupation 0.131 0.155 –6.8 0.134 0.135 –0.2 
Main language Estonian 0.668 0.627 8.6 0.661 0.647 3.1 
Living in a town 0.658 0.702 –9.4 0.658 0.662 –0.8 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.249 0.406 –33.9 0.252 0.259 –1.5 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.4 5.6 –7.7 5.4 5.4 0.2 
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Appendix 17 (continued) 
  Model no. 6 (exit 1–150) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.242 0.238 0.8 0.242 0.259 –4.2 
III Q 2008 0.223 0.194 7.1 0.224 0.228 –0.8 
I Q 2009 0.504 0.522 –3.7 0.503 0.484 3.9 
Male 0.467 0.417 10.2 0.460 0.456 0.9 
Age 41.7 33.9 75.0 41.7 41.9 –2.4 
Previous wage (EEK) 13952 10447 40.0 12899 12872 0.3 
Education:      
General secondary 0.287 0.295 –1.9 0.289 0.295 –1.3 
Elementary or less 0.005 0.018 –12.1 0.005 0.011 –5.6 
Basic 0.096 0.150 –16.7 0.098 0.092 1.6 
Vocational secondary 0.309 0.262 10.4 0.315 0.293 4.7 
Professional secondary 0.077 0.070 2.7 0.077 0.093 –6.4 
Vocational higher 0.054 0.045 4.1 0.053 0.047 2.5 
Bachelor 0.111 0.125 –4.1 0.107 0.106 0.2 
Master or doctor 0.061 0.034 12.6 0.057 0.061 –1.9 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.108 0.101 2.3 0.106 0.128 –7.4 
Manager 0.137 0.100 11.4 0.128 0.133 –1.7 
Professional 0.090 0.078 4.3 0.086 0.086 0.2 
Clerk 0.074 0.086 –4.6 0.075 0.049 9.8 
Service and sales worker 0.128 0.193 –18.0 0.130 0.122 2.2 
Agriculturist 0.008 0.015 –6.1 0.009 0.013 –4.3 
Craft and related trades worker 0.198 0.202 –0.9 0.203 0.206 –0.7 
Plant and machine operator 0.131 0.072 19.8 0.134 0.134 0.2 
Elementary occupation 0.126 0.153 –7.8 0.128 0.129 –0.2 
Main language Estonian 0.695 0.665 6.4 0.689 0.645 9.4 
Living in a town 0.640 0.696 –11.9 0.641 0.647 –1.3 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.277 0.435 –33.6 0.281 0.282 –0.3 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.5 5.6 –5.2 5.5 5.4 3.0 
 
  
57
 226 
Appendix 17 (continued) 
  Model no. 7 (exit 151–240) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.211 0.249 –9.1 0.209 0.221 –2.8 
III Q 2008 0.143 0.075 21.9 0.140 0.143 –1.1 
I Q 2009 0.593 0.615 –4.5 0.595 0.568 5.5 
Male 0.561 0.524 7.5 0.546 0.543 0.7 
Age 42.0 33.9 76.8 41.9 42.0 –0.3 
Previous wage (EEK) 14021 11481 33.7 12906 12839 0.9 
Education:      
General secondary 0.305 0.321 –3.2 0.312 0.309 0.7 
Elementary or less 0.003 0.011 –9.3 0.003 0.008 –6.0 
Basic 0.101 0.139 –11.7 0.106 0.113 –2.1 
Vocational secondary 0.341 0.295 9.9 0.344 0.320 5.1 
Professional secondary 0.084 0.059 9.7 0.084 0.086 –0.7 
Vocational higher 0.023 0.035 –7.4 0.022 0.027 –3.0 
Bachelor 0.095 0.121 –8.4 0.094 0.089 1.6 
Master or doctor 0.048 0.020 15.5 0.034 0.047 –7.4 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.108 0.125 –5.2 0.110 0.096 4.2 
Manager 0.138 0.110 8.6 0.120 0.118 0.5 
Professional 0.055 0.055 –0.1 0.047 0.030 7.4 
Clerk 0.050 0.060 –4.6 0.051 0.078 –11.8 
Service and sales worker 0.103 0.150 –14.2 0.108 0.140 –9.7 
Agriculturist 0.011 0.007 4.1 0.012 0.002 10.5 
Craft and related trades worker 0.252 0.253 –0.1 0.261 0.243 4.3 
Plant and machine operator 0.154 0.099 16.7 0.159 0.152 2.0 
Elementary occupation 0.129 0.141 –3.6 0.133 0.142 –2.5 
Main language Estonian 0.672 0.626 9.6 0.659 0.641 3.9 
Living in a town 0.664 0.685 –4.5 0.663 0.710 –10.1 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.240 0.366 –27.8 0.241 0.246 –1.1 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.9 6.2 –9.6 6.0 5.8 6.1 
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Appendix 17 (continued) 
  Model no. 8 (exit 271–360) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.383 0.510 –25.6 0.388 0.400 –2.5 
III Q 2008 0.187 0.157 7.9 0.188 0.193 –1.3 
I Q 2009 0.430 0.333 19.9 0.424 0.407 3.5 
Male 0.521 0.467 10.9 0.507 0.644 –27.3 
Age 43.6 35.4 75.2 43.6 42.6 8.7 
Previous wage (EEK) 14401 9986 53.1 13076 13040 0.4 
Education:      
General secondary 0.301 0.319 –3.8 0.307 0.344 –7.9 
Elementary or less 0.009 0.014 –4.6 0.010 0.002 6.8 
Basic 0.110 0.167 –16.5 0.115 0.137 –6.4 
Vocational secondary 0.318 0.281 8.0 0.327 0.339 –2.7 
Professional secondary 0.068 0.076 –3.3 0.071 0.085 –5.7 
Vocational higher 0.049 0.038 5.4 0.046 0.037 4.8 
Bachelor 0.089 0.090 –0.6 0.085 0.044 14.5 
Master or doctor 0.056 0.014 22.8 0.039 0.012 14.6 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.138 0.086 16.6 0.139 0.112 8.5 
Manager 0.145 0.062 27.5 0.120 0.117 0.8 
Professional 0.065 0.048 7.7 0.063 0.122 –25.3 
Clerk 0.075 0.052 9.2 0.076 0.037 16.0 
Service and sales worker 0.086 0.157 –21.7 0.090 0.054 11.2 
Agriculturist 0.014 0.014 –0.2 0.015 0.005 8.2 
Craft and related trades worker 0.224 0.252 –6.6 0.234 0.305 –16.6 
Plant and machine operator 0.105 0.138 –10.1 0.110 0.098 3.7 
Elementary occupation 0.147 0.190 –11.6 0.154 0.151 0.7 
Main language Estonian 0.610 0.567 8.8 0.595 0.680 –17.3 
Living in a town 0.678 0.710 –6.9 0.673 0.615 12.7 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.199 0.414 –48.0 0.200 0.244 –9.8 
Regional registered unemployment rate 4.8 4.4 16.6 4.8 5.0 –14.3 
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Appendix 20. Individual characteristics of unemployed exiting into 
employment during different unemployment spells 
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Appendix 20. Individual characteristics of unemployed exiting into employment 
during different unemployment spells (continuous) 
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Appendix 21. The starting wage and the previous wage for 270-day-UIB 
recipients and for 180-day-UIB recipients 
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Appendix 22. Unemployed receiving UIB on the level of the upper quartile 
and exiting unemployment as a share of all UIB recipients exiting 
unemployment into employment during the interval (unmatched data) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 23. Smoothed hazard rates for exiting post-unemployment job 
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Appendix 24. Probit model for matching (job duration) 
Variable 
Model no. 1 Model no. 2 Model no. 3 Model no. 4 
(all) (exit 1–150) (exit 151–240) (exit 271–360) 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Beginning of benefit period: IV Q 2008 
III Q 2008 0.130 0.010 0.117 0.077 0.206 0.075 0.082 0.545 
I Q 2009 0.106 0.012 0.022 0.668 0.077 0.269 0.141 0.150 
Male 0.147 0.000 0.140 0.008 0.171 0.022 0.036 0.670 
Age 0.267 0.000 0.277 0.000 0.323 0.000 0.174 0.000 
Age square –0.003 0.000 –0.003 0.000 –0.003 0.000 –0.002 0.000 
Previous wage (EEK) / 1000 0.032 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.048 0.000 
Education: general secondary 
Elementary or less –0.160 0.273 –0.116 0.596 –0.535 0.109 0.256 0.460 
Basic 0.005 0.921 –0.039 0.600 0.031 0.757 –0.025 0.829 
Vocational secondary 0.048 0.189 0.114 0.044 0.012 0.884 0.032 0.731 
Professional secondary –0.112 0.053 –0.061 0.487 0.153 0.241 –0.444 0.002 
Vocational higher –0.088 0.294 –0.076 0.515 –0.289 0.169 –0.127 0.554 
Bachelor –0.094 0.106 –0.018 0.835 –0.195 0.130 –0.296 0.059 
Master or doctor –0.021 0.810 –0.072 0.562 –0.049 0.819 0.042 0.867 
Previous occupation: technician 
Manager 0.040 0.550 0.061 0.546 –0.057 0.696 0.134 0.450 
Professional 0.117 0.129 0.124 0.262 0.125 0.497 –0.072 0.721 
Clerk 0.097 0.193 0.191 0.084 0.147 0.391 –0.140 0.471 
Service and sales worker –0.115 0.064 –0.083 0.373 –0.037 0.788 –0.316 0.049 
Agriculturist –0.305 0.035 –0.496 0.019 –0.168 0.601 –0.667 0.056 
Craft worker –0.062 0.270 –0.012 0.891 0.019 0.874 –0.370 0.009 
Plant and machine operator 0.110 0.090 0.189 0.066 0.203 0.129 –0.293 0.078 
Elementary occupation –0.025 0.683 0.026 0.783 0.011 0.929 –0.268 0.078 
Main language Estonian 0.177 0.000 0.197 0.001 0.206 0.012 0.089 0.333 
Reason for unemployment: end of fixed-term contract 
Unsuitability for the job 0.192 0.053 0.296 0.047 –0.110 0.673 –0.038 0.860 
Unsatisfactory results of a 
probationary period 0.202 0.001 0.117 0.175 0.341 0.019 0.140 0.387 
Bankruptcy 0.484 0.000 0.701 0.000 0.203 0.222 0.431 0.022 
Liquidation 0.566 0.000 0.635 0.000 0.633 0.054 0.386 0.177 
Lay-off 0.458 0.000 0.453 0.000 0.538 0.000 0.447 0.000 
Long-term incapacity  0.121 0.538 0.598 0.085 0.231 0.629 –0.935 0.046 
Violation by employer 0.477 0.000 0.590 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.559 0.000 
Living in a town 0.059 0.086 0.019 0.712 0.135 0.065 0.004 0.967 
Region: Central and Western 
Northern –0.022 0.544 0.001 0.986 –0.035 0.661 –0.075 0.395 
Southern –0.019 0.806 0.055 0.579 –0.266 0.079 –0.065 0.756 
North-Eastern 0.099 0.164 0.110 0.185 –0.084 0.477 0.197 0.259 
Disabled –0.158 0.011 –0.194 0.047 –0.204 0.141 –0.049 0.736 
Tenure on prev. job < 1 year –0.111 0.003 –0.144 0.132 
Regional registered 
unemployment rate –0.008 0.437 0.008 0.751 
Knowledge of English –0.125 0.243 
Constant –6.595 0.000 –6.878 0.000 –7.966 0.000 –4.578 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.194 0.199 0.204 0.220 
LR chi2 2531.6 0.000 1126.6 0.000 567.4 0.000 480.0 0.000 
Number of observations 9523 4150 2013 1673 
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Appendix 25. Unmatched and matched variables (job duration) 
  Model no. 1 (all) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.239 0.268 –6.6 0.240 0.249 –2.2 
III Q 2008 0.167 0.126 11.8 0.167 0.171 –1.2 
I Q 2009 0.556 0.564 –1.6 0.556 0.552 0.9 
Male 0.562 0.534 5.7 0.562 0.572 –1.9 
Age 42.7 34.7 73.7 42.7 42.7 –0.1 
Previous wage (EEK) 13589 10585 37.4 13545 13702 –2.0 
Education:      
General secondary 0.299 0.302 –0.7 0.299 0.295 1.0 
Elementary or less 0.006 0.017 –10.4 0.006 0.006 0.3 
Basic 0.121 0.181 –16.9 0.121 0.130 –2.5 
Vocational secondary 0.318 0.293 5.3 0.318 0.332 –3.1 
Professional secondary 0.078 0.065 5.3 0.078 0.078 0.1 
Vocational higher 0.034 0.033 0.6 0.034 0.029 3.1 
Bachelor 0.094 0.087 2.5 0.094 0.089 1.8 
Master or doctor 0.050 0.021 15.3 0.050 0.042 4.0 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.103 0.092 3.8 0.103 0.090 4.4 
Manager 0.119 0.073 15.6 0.119 0.108 3.7 
Professional 0.064 0.052 5.5 0.064 0.061 1.3 
Clerk 0.059 0.063 –1.8 0.059 0.044 6.2 
Service and sales worker 0.102 0.155 –16.1 0.102 0.107 –1.6 
Agriculturist 0.010 0.013 –2.5 0.010 0.010 0.0 
Craft and related trades worker 0.257 0.283 –5.9 0.257 0.279 –5.0 
Plant and machine operator 0.134 0.095 12.2 0.134 0.136 –0.6 
Elementary occupation 0.152 0.174 –5.9 0.153 0.165 –3.4 
Main language Estonian 0.625 0.584 8.3 0.625 0.601 4.9 
Living in a town 0.674 0.699 –5.4 0.674 0.665 2.0 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.267 0.444 –37.8 0.267 0.289 –4.6 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.8 5.9 –6.5 5.8 5.8 –2.0 
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Appendix 25 (continued) 
  Model no. 2 (exit 1–150) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.231 0.232 –0.2 0.231 0.217 3.3 
III Q 2008 0.210 0.161 12.5 0.210 0.185 6.4 
I Q 2009 0.528 0.566 –7.8 0.527 0.569 –8.5 
Male 0.514 0.487 5.4 0.513 0.541 –5.5 
Age 42.2 34.4 72.8 42.1 42.1 0.1 
Previous wage (EEK) 13551 10372 38.3 12993 12985 0.1 
Education:      
General secondary 0.287 0.294 –1.6 0.289 0.284 1.0 
Elementary or less 0.006 0.019 –11.5 0.006 0.008 –1.9 
Basic 0.107 0.174 –19.2 0.108 0.115 –1.8 
Vocational secondary 0.317 0.282 7.6 0.319 0.340 –4.6 
Professional secondary 0.081 0.067 5.3 0.080 0.090 –3.9 
Vocational higher 0.045 0.043 0.8 0.044 0.041 1.5 
Bachelor 0.103 0.095 2.6 0.101 0.078 7.7 
Master or doctor 0.055 0.026 14.3 0.052 0.044 4.6 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.102 0.090 4.2 0.101 0.099 0.7 
Manager 0.122 0.077 15.0 0.118 0.105 4.1 
Professional 0.077 0.062 6.0 0.075 0.070 2.2 
Clerk 0.065 0.071 –2.3 0.066 0.046 7.9 
Service and sales worker 0.120 0.183 –17.5 0.122 0.120 0.5 
Agriculturist 0.008 0.015 –6.2 0.009 0.011 –2.0 
Craft and related trades worker 0.234 0.250 –3.6 0.236 0.279 –10.1 
Plant and machine operator 0.121 0.081 13.5 0.122 0.114 2.7 
Elementary occupation 0.150 0.172 –6.2 0.151 0.156 –1.3 
Main language Estonian 0.655 0.615 8.3 0.652 0.623 6.2 
Living in a town 0.661 0.699 –8.2 0.661 0.680 –4.1 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.299 0.471 –35.9 0.300 0.314 –2.9 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.7 5.9 –9.7 5.7 5.9 –8.7 
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Appendix 25 (continued) 
  Model no. 3 (exit 151–240) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.235 0.288 –12.0 0.234 0.232 0.5 
III Q 2008 0.119 0.073 15.6 0.118 0.104 4.9 
I Q 2009 0.598 0.586 2.5 0.599 0.631 –6.5 
Male 0.606 0.563 8.8 0.605 0.571 6.9 
Age 41.9 34.4 69.2 41.9 41.4 4.2 
Previous wage (EEK) 13621 11115 33.7 13350 12865 6.5 
Education:      
General secondary 0.300 0.297 0.6 0.300 0.325 –5.4 
Elementary or less 0.005 0.018 –12.2 0.005 0.003 1.9 
Basic 0.129 0.190 –16.7 0.130 0.122 2.0 
Vocational secondary 0.335 0.310 5.4 0.336 0.328 1.8 
Professional secondary 0.088 0.050 15.0 0.088 0.103 –5.8 
Vocational higher 0.020 0.028 –5.4 0.020 0.020 0.0 
Bachelor 0.086 0.089 –1.3 0.086 0.077 3.3 
Master or doctor 0.038 0.018 12.1 0.035 0.023 7.5 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.099 0.102 –0.9 0.100 0.081 6.2 
Manager 0.114 0.083 10.4 0.113 0.130 –5.6 
Professional 0.049 0.042 3.5 0.048 0.036 5.5 
Clerk 0.048 0.054 –2.4 0.049 0.054 –2.4 
Service and sales worker 0.095 0.129 –11.0 0.095 0.099 –1.0 
Agriculturist 0.010 0.013 –2.9 0.010 0.006 3.8 
Craft and related trades worker 0.265 0.283 –4.0 0.265 0.286 –4.9 
Plant and machine operator 0.166 0.112 15.6 0.167 0.145 6.3 
Elementary occupation 0.153 0.181 –7.7 0.154 0.163 –2.5 
Main language Estonian 0.645 0.609 7.6 0.643 0.633 2.1 
Living in a town 0.674 0.663 2.3 0.674 0.704 –6.4 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.262 0.436 –37.2 0.261 0.290 –6.2 
Regional registered unemployment rate 6.0 6.2 –6.4 6.0 6.1 –1.8 
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Appendix 25 (continued) 
  Model no. 4 (exit 271–360) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.245 0.313 –15.1 0.247 0.251 –1.1 
III Q 2008 0.117 0.104 4.0 0.118 0.128 –3.0 
I Q 2009 0.585 0.534 10.3 0.582 0.586 –0.8 
Male 0.588 0.571 3.4 0.580 0.600 –4.0 
Age 43.6 35.0 80.0 43.5 43.8 –2.2 
Previous wage (EEK) 13990 10188 48.5 13073 13137 –0.8 
Education:      
General secondary 0.298 0.321 –5.0 0.299 0.266 7.2 
Elementary or less 0.008 0.015 –6.3 0.009 0.013 –4.4 
Basic 0.124 0.173 –13.7 0.128 0.127 0.3 
Vocational secondary 0.327 0.297 6.5 0.336 0.358 –4.7 
Professional secondary 0.071 0.079 –2.9 0.073 0.063 4.0 
Vocational higher 0.036 0.027 5.3 0.035 0.038 –1.6 
Bachelor 0.084 0.074 3.9 0.079 0.093 –5.3 
Master or doctor 0.050 0.013 21.0 0.041 0.042 –0.5 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.116 0.079 12.5 0.117 0.101 5.5 
Manager 0.131 0.052 27.5 0.113 0.103 3.7 
Professional 0.057 0.049 3.5 0.056 0.055 0.4 
Clerk 0.060 0.050 4.3 0.060 0.077 –7.5 
Service and sales worker 0.083 0.158 –23.0 0.086 0.074 3.5 
Agriculturist 0.012 0.012 0.3 0.012 0.009 3.5 
Craft and related trades worker 0.272 0.321 –10.8 0.279 0.323 –9.6 
Plant and machine operator 0.107 0.101 1.9 0.110 0.095 4.7 
Elementary occupation 0.162 0.178 –4.2 0.167 0.163 1.0 
Main language Estonian 0.593 0.548 9.1 0.584 0.550 6.9 
Living in a town 0.675 0.733 –12.6 0.675 0.704 –6.3 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.224 0.420 –42.8 0.228 0.215 2.7 
Regional registered unemployment rate 6.0 5.7 9.2 6.0 6.0 –2.0 
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Appendix 26. Probit model for matching of UIB recipients with previous 
record of UI contributions of 32–79 months (job duration) 
Variable 
Model no. 1 Model no. 2 Model no. 3 Model no. 4 
(all) (exit 1–150) (exit 151–240) (exit 271–360) 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Beginning of benefit period: IV Q 2008 
III Q 2008 0.354 0.000 0.469 0.000 0.364 0.018 0.336 0.042 
I Q 2009 0.104 0.055 –0.058 0.390 0.026 0.821 0.106 0.404 
Male 0.154 0.000 0.173 0.011 0.050 0.615 –0.022 0.838 
Age 0.199 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.117 0.001 
Age square –0.002 0.000 –0.002 0.000 –0.003 0.000 –0.001 0.017 
Previous wage (EEK) / 1000 0.018 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.034 0.000 
Education: general secondary 
Elementary or less –0.408 0.032 –0.146 0.584 –0.667 0.113 –0.285 0.567 
Basic –0.002 0.977 –0.046 0.623 0.006 0.962 0.042 0.781 
Vocational secondary 0.014 0.766 0.084 0.243 –0.082 0.419 0.128 0.277 
Professional secondary –0.046 0.535 0.012 0.915 0.157 0.365 –0.348 0.056 
Vocational higher –0.177 0.096 –0.198 0.171 –0.370 0.179 0.087 0.761 
Bachelor 0.009 0.904 0.089 0.403 –0.123 0.459 –0.325 0.099 
Master or doctor –0.076 0.503 –0.157 0.331 –0.081 0.772 0.092 0.775 
Previous occupation: technician 
Manager 0.034 0.688 –0.001 0.993 –0.106 0.577 0.239 0.269 
Professional 0.072 0.454 0.025 0.854 0.072 0.761 –0.008 0.974 
Clerk 0.003 0.976 0.124 0.385 0.177 0.430 –0.372 0.143 
Service and sales worker –0.020 0.804 0.021 0.858 0.007 0.971 –0.234 0.245 
Agriculturist –0.270 0.147 –0.531 0.053 –0.055 0.912 –0.495 0.238 
Craft worker –0.047 0.515 –0.082 0.469 0.029 0.857 –0.234 0.191 
Plant and machine operator 0.095 0.252 0.081 0.544 0.285 0.116 –0.402 0.053 
Elementary occupation 0.003 0.968 –0.010 0.936 0.038 0.827 –0.138 0.467 
Main language Estonian 0.179 0.000 0.137 0.065 0.255 0.016 0.134 0.248 
Reason for unemployment: end of fixed-term contract 
Unsuitability for the job –0.030 0.812 –0.064 0.732 –0.548 0.086 –0.149 0.600 
Unsatisfactory results of a 
probationary period 0.011 0.881 –0.101 0.345 0.195 0.289 –0.027 0.888 
Bankruptcy 0.257 0.016 0.460 0.009 –0.132 0.559 0.081 0.729 
Liquidation 0.376 0.012 0.213 0.326 0.516 0.307 0.305 0.363 
Lay-off 0.207 0.000 0.106 0.124 0.214 0.067 0.118 0.375 
Long-term incapacity  0.216 0.388 0.661 0.157 0.393 0.533 –0.807 0.118 
Violation by employer 0.261 0.000 0.294 0.006 0.256 0.093 0.266 0.143 
Living in a town –0.005 0.901 –0.029 0.668 0.056 0.559 –0.018 0.870 
Region: Central and Western 
Northern –0.015 0.746 –0.007 0.927 –0.020 0.850 –0.098 0.377 
Southern 0.236 0.016 0.122 0.339 0.063 0.768 0.136 0.624 
North-Eastern 0.293 0.001 0.079 0.455 0.126 0.544 0.358 0.121 
Disabled –0.019 0.815 –0.014 0.914 –0.118 0.509 –0.010 0.959 
Tenure on prev. job < 1 year 0.025 0.602 0.107 0.319 –0.121 0.315 
Regional registered 
unemployment rate –0.051 0.000 –0.047 0.106 –0.006 0.845 
Knowledge of English –0.055 0.686 
Constant –4.619 0.000 –4.714 0.000 –6.116 0.000 –2.895 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.118 0.135 0.117 
LR chi2 816.9 0.000 391.3 0.000 211.7 0.000 142.6 0.000 
Number of observations 5437 2411 1135 928 
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Appendix 27. Unmatched and matched variables of UIB recipients with 
previous record of UI contributions of 32–79 months (job duration) 
  Model no. 1 (all) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.236 0.251 –3.7 0.236 0.237 –0.2 
III Q 2008 0.268 0.124 36.9 0.267 0.250 4.6 
I Q 2009 0.467 0.579 –22.7 0.467 0.485 –3.6 
Male 0.552 0.542 2.1 0.552 0.566 –2.8 
Age 41.5 35.6 55.9 41.5 41.0 4.5 
Previous wage (EEK) 12431 11404 13.6 12387 13068 –9.0 
Education:      
General secondary 0.300 0.303 –0.6 0.300 0.312 –2.7 
Elementary or less 0.006 0.017 –10.9 0.006 0.002 3.4 
Basic 0.132 0.158 –7.6 0.132 0.131 0.1 
Vocational secondary 0.313 0.302 2.5 0.314 0.307 1.5 
Professional secondary 0.082 0.067 5.9 0.082 0.087 –1.9 
Vocational higher 0.030 0.038 –4.0 0.030 0.028 1.3 
Bachelor 0.098 0.091 2.5 0.098 0.095 1.0 
Master or doctor 0.039 0.025 7.9 0.039 0.038 0.6 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.092 0.097 –1.7 0.092 0.095 –0.9 
Manager 0.105 0.087 6.1 0.104 0.112 –2.7 
Professional 0.065 0.058 2.8 0.065 0.063 1.0 
Clerk 0.050 0.061 –4.6 0.050 0.047 1.6 
Service and sales worker 0.113 0.133 –6.0 0.113 0.128 –4.6 
Agriculturist 0.013 0.010 2.4 0.013 0.012 0.6 
Craft and related trades worker 0.271 0.298 –6.0 0.271 0.276 –1.2 
Plant and machine operator 0.130 0.096 10.6 0.130 0.104 8.0 
Elementary occupation 0.161 0.160 0.4 0.161 0.162 –0.3 
Main language Estonian 0.611 0.573 7.7 0.610 0.614 –0.7 
Living in a town 0.684 0.720 –7.9 0.684 0.696 –2.7 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.318 0.387 –14.5 0.318 0.327 –2.0 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.3 5.9 –22.4 5.3 5.3 0.3 
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Appendix 27 (continued) 
  Model no. 2 (exit 1–150) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.206 0.217 –2.6 0.206 0.213 –1.7 
III Q 2008 0.336 0.160 41.6 0.331 0.312 4.5 
I Q 2009 0.435 0.582 –29.7 0.441 0.446 –1.1 
Male 0.491 0.485 1.3 0.488 0.512 –4.8 
Age 41.3 35.1 58.1 41.2 41.2 –0.2 
Previous wage (EEK) 12307 11270 13.5 11846 11974 –1.7 
Education:      
General secondary 0.286 0.293 –1.6 0.286 0.266 4.5 
Elementary or less 0.007 0.016 –8.0 0.008 0.011 –3.5 
Basic 0.116 0.151 –10.4 0.117 0.117 0.2 
Vocational secondary 0.310 0.284 5.8 0.312 0.328 –3.5 
Professional secondary 0.090 0.069 7.9 0.090 0.079 3.9 
Vocational higher 0.039 0.053 –6.3 0.039 0.050 –5.4 
Bachelor 0.109 0.103 1.9 0.108 0.098 3.2 
Master or doctor 0.042 0.031 6.0 0.041 0.051 –5.6 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.088 0.091 –1.0 0.090 0.086 1.3 
Manager 0.106 0.094 4.1 0.097 0.102 –1.8 
Professional 0.079 0.076 1.2 0.080 0.101 –7.9 
Clerk 0.059 0.066 –3.0 0.058 0.068 –4.1 
Service and sales worker 0.133 0.149 –4.8 0.135 0.134 0.2 
Agriculturist 0.010 0.013 –3.3 0.010 0.002 7.1 
Craft and related trades worker 0.249 0.267 –4.2 0.252 0.237 3.4 
Plant and machine operator 0.112 0.081 10.6 0.112 0.111 0.3 
Elementary occupation 0.164 0.163 0.4 0.166 0.158 2.2 
Main language Estonian 0.627 0.613 3.0 0.623 0.583 8.2 
Living in a town 0.682 0.720 –8.4 0.685 0.701 –3.5 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.340 0.410 –14.4 0.343 0.336 1.6 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.2 5.9 –26.3 5.2 5.4 –5.1 
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Appendix 27 (continued) 
  Model no. 3 (exit 151–240) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.249 0.248 0.1 0.251 0.264 –3.0 
III Q 2008 0.194 0.078 34.2 0.184 0.183 0.6 
I Q 2009 0.517 0.612 –19.2 0.523 0.523 0.0 
Male 0.598 0.609 –2.3 0.596 0.568 5.7 
Age 40.8 34.9 55.8 40.8 39.7 10.4 
Previous wage (EEK) 12949 11968 13.4 12553 12854 –4.1 
Education:      
General secondary 0.314 0.301 2.9 0.315 0.324 –2.0 
Elementary or less 0.005 0.020 –13.2 0.006 0.000 4.9 
Basic 0.137 0.165 –7.8 0.140 0.127 3.6 
Vocational secondary 0.318 0.327 –1.8 0.324 0.354 –6.4 
Professional secondary 0.088 0.048 16.0 0.084 0.086 –0.7 
Vocational higher 0.020 0.027 –4.7 0.019 0.011 4.9 
Bachelor 0.088 0.090 –0.8 0.086 0.082 1.3 
Master or doctor 0.029 0.022 4.5 0.028 0.017 7.1 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.086 0.102 –5.5 0.086 0.076 3.2 
Manager 0.104 0.100 1.3 0.102 0.089 4.3 
Professional 0.049 0.044 2.4 0.047 0.047 0.0 
Clerk 0.051 0.049 0.9 0.050 0.041 4.3 
Service and sales worker 0.099 0.112 –4.4 0.101 0.130 –9.7 
Agriculturist 0.011 0.005 6.6 0.011 0.009 2.1 
Craft and related trades worker 0.280 0.320 –8.7 0.283 0.304 –4.5 
Plant and machine operator 0.170 0.111 17.2 0.168 0.162 1.6 
Elementary occupation 0.150 0.156 –1.8 0.153 0.142 3.1 
Main language Estonian 0.654 0.587 14.0 0.650 0.663 –2.7 
Living in a town 0.671 0.690 –4.2 0.670 0.710 –8.4 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.335 0.364 –6.2 0.337 0.311 5.5 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.6 6.3 –26.2 5.7 5.6 2.7 
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Appendix 27 (continued) 
  Model no. 4 (exit 271–360) 
Variable  
Unmatched Matched 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Treated 
(270) 
Controls 
(180) 
%  
bias 
Beginning of benefit:     
IV Q 2008 0.255 0.294 –8.9 0.259 0.216 9.7 
III Q 2008 0.191 0.102 25.4 0.190 0.183 2.0 
I Q 2009 0.508 0.548 –8.1 0.504 0.570 –13.2 
Male 0.588 0.580 1.6 0.583 0.557 5.3 
Age 41.9 36.3 52.4 41.8 41.5 2.8 
Previous wage (EEK) 12627 10738 26.2 12174 11187 13.7 
Education:      
General secondary 0.292 0.324 –6.8 0.294 0.277 3.8 
Elementary or less 0.005 0.015 –9.6 0.005 0.005 0.0 
Basic 0.128 0.149 –5.9 0.130 0.125 1.5 
Vocational secondary 0.357 0.309 10.2 0.362 0.402 –8.5 
Professional secondary 0.068 0.085 –6.1 0.070 0.073 –1.3 
Vocational higher 0.032 0.026 3.7 0.030 0.037 –4.1 
Bachelor 0.079 0.079 0.0 0.075 0.061 5.2 
Master or doctor 0.038 0.015 14.5 0.035 0.021 8.7 
Previous occupation:      
Technician 0.109 0.087 7.4 0.110 0.089 7.0 
Manager 0.118 0.064 18.8 0.104 0.113 –3.0 
Professional 0.056 0.044 5.8 0.057 0.064 –3.2 
Clerk 0.039 0.055 –7.6 0.040 0.037 1.6 
Service and sales worker 0.096 0.140 –13.7 0.097 0.096 0.5 
Agriculturist 0.019 0.012 5.8 0.019 0.012 5.7 
Craft and related trades worker 0.280 0.303 –5.0 0.285 0.310 –5.4 
Plant and machine operator 0.106 0.122 –5.2 0.108 0.078 9.3 
Elementary occupation 0.176 0.172 1.1 0.179 0.202 –6.0 
Main language Estonian 0.591 0.534 11.7 0.584 0.551 6.7 
Living in a town 0.677 0.738 –13.4 0.678 0.663 3.4 
Tenure on previous job less than 1 year 0.277 0.394 –24.9 0.280 0.256 5.2 
Regional registered unemployment rate 5.6 5.6 –1.5 5.6 5.8 –6.6 
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Appendix 28. Estimation results from piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard models of post-unemployment job duration by the time of exiting 
unemployment 
Covariate Compared to 
All Exit 1–150 Exit 151–240 Exit 271–360 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
UIB 270 UIB 180 0.831 0.000 0.878 0.002 0.805 0.001 0.737 0.000 
Duration of 
unemployment   0.999 0.000 0.996 0.000 1.000 0.983 1.000 0.754 
Male Female 1.066 0.022 1.102 0.020 1.026 0.672 1.093 0.193 
Age 16–24 Age 25–54 1.089 0.041 1.138 0.038 1.106 0.213 1.107 0.372 Age 55+ 1.096 0.023 1.119 0.069 1.046 0.624 1.109 0.257 
Main language Estonian Other language 1.051 0.090 1.027 0.545 1.170 0.015 1.009 0.904 
Disabled Not disabled 1.259 0.000 1.425 0.000 1.266 0.041 1.169 0.201 
Living in a town Country-side 1.068 0.023 1.003 0.944 1.162 0.014 1.143 0.075 
Previous job: 
Technician
        
Manager 1.009 0.880 1.088 0.315 0.941 0.630 0.926 0.583 
Professional 1.056 0.402 1.111 0.256 1.067 0.672 1.051 0.763 
Clerk 1.049 0.454 1.116 0.237 1.007 0.961 1.213 0.227 
Service and sales worker 1.117 0.039 1.161 0.059 1.171 0.181 1.073 0.603 
Agriculturist 1.201 0.125 1.215 0.266 1.377 0.189 1.570 0.101 
Craft worker 1.026 0.603 1.075 0.339 1.056 0.603 0.991 0.936 
Plant and machine 
operator 0.958 0.451 1.036 0.680 0.950 0.661 0.862 0.301 
Elementary occupation 1.049 0.357 1.100 0.231 1.071 0.540 1.089 0.501 
Education: 
General 
secondary 
education 
        
Elementary or less 1.098 0.416 1.031 0.858 1.299 0.258 1.042 0.896 
Basic 1.051 0.214 1.027 0.668 1.191 0.037 1.044 0.669 
Vocational secondary 1.012 0.715 1.036 0.463 1.098 0.173 0.979 0.786 
Professional secondary 1.008 0.880 1.165 0.041 0.901 0.385 0.920 0.525 
Vocational higher 1.007 0.918 1.089 0.371 1.095 0.610 0.783 0.208 
Bachelor 1.043 0.392 1.036 0.628 1.030 0.787 1.451 0.002 
Master or doctor 1.028 0.698 1.213 0.050 1.062 0.742 0.813 0.282 
Tenure 1–5 years 
Tenure <1 
year 
0.835 0.000 0.872 0.001 0.807 0.000 0.821 0.006 
Tenure 5–10 years 0.803 0.000 0.829 0.009 0.770 0.017 0.748 0.011 
Tenure 10+ years 0.744 0.000 0.720 0.000 0.577 0.000 0.871 0.257 
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Appendix 28 (continued) 
Covariate 
All Exit 1–150 Exit 151–240 Exit 271–360 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Monthly regional registered 
unemployment rate (in 
percentage points) 
1.017 0.000 1.027 0.000 1.007 0.251 1.000 0.943 
Monthly change in registered 
unemployment rate (in 
percentage points) 
1.079 0.087 1.018 0.780 1.045 0.707 0.943 0.617 
Monthly inflow of registered 
vacancies (in hundreds) 1.003 0.413 1.002 0.715 1.031 0.004 1.017 0.178 
1. month of employment 0.137 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.148 0.000 
2. month of employment 0.063 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.081 0.000 
3. month of employment 0.065 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.091 0.000 
4. month of employment 0.057 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.079 0.000 
5. month of employment 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.073 0.000 
6. month of employment 0.048 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.074 0.000 
7. month of employment 0.037 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.052 0.000 
8. month of employment 0.036 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.043 0.000 
9. month of employment 0.033 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.046 0.000 
10. month of employment 0.032 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.051 0.000 
11. month of employment 0.034 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.035 0.000 
12. month of employment 0.038 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.049 0.000 
13. month of employment 0.040 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.063 0.000 
14. month of employment 0.030 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.041 0.000 
15. month of employment 0.036 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.050 0.000 
16. month of employment 0.026 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.038 0.000 
17. month of employment 0.028 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.038 0.000 
18. month of employment 0.035 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.039 0.000 
19. month of employment 0.024 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.015 0.000 
20. month of employment 0.025 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.041 0.000 
21. month of employment 0.022 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.017 0.000
0.000 0.979 22. month of employment 0.017 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.015 0.00023. month of employment 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.000
24. month of employment 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.013 0.000
25. month of employment 0.012 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 1.000 x x 
26. month of employment 0.017 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000 x x 
27. month of employment 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 1.000 x x 
28. month of employment 0.018 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 1.000 x x 
29. month of employment 0.012 0.000 0.010 0.000 x x x x 
30. month of employment 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.000 x x x x 
31.–33. month of employment 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000     
θ (variance of gamma shared 
frailty; Likelihood-ratio test of 
θ =0) 
0.000 0.903 0.000 0.924 0.000 0.971 0.000 0.965 
Wald test 48073 0.000 22524 0.000 10224 0.000 7405 0.000 
No. of observations 106521 52266 22376 16327 
No. of subjects  9523 4150 2013 1673 
No. of failures 6647 3032 1439 1067 
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Appendix 29. Estimation results from piecewise-constant proportional 
hazard models of post-unemployment job duration by the previous record of 
UI contributions 
Unemployment insurance record: 32–79 months 50–62 months 54–58 months 
Covariate Compared to 
Hazar
d ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
UIB 270 UIB 180 0.900 0.003 0.918 0.231 0.861 0.214 
Duration of unemployment   0.999 0.000 0.999 0.038 0.999 0.296 
Male Female 1.125 0.001 1.054 0.518 1.059 0.690 
Age 16–24 Age 25–54 1.098 0.135 1.063 0.684 1.315 0.291 Age 55+ 1.106 0.058 0.941 0.637 1.217 0.364 
Main language Estonian Other language 1.061 0.121 1.113 0.194 1.114 0.437 
Disabled Not disabled 1.271 0.000 1.124 0.467 1.182 0.479 
Living in a town Country-side 1.015 0.701 1.054 0.522 1.048 0.731 
Previous job: 
Technician 
      
Manager 1.019 0.807 1.260 0.160 0.886 0.665 
Professional 1.079 0.370 1.163 0.400 1.275 0.441 
Clerk 1.072 0.423 1.002 0.990 0.705 0.317 
Service and sales worker 1.133 0.083 1.256 0.149 1.283 0.319 
Agriculturist 1.262 0.136 1.210 0.749 1.579 0.659 
Craft worker 1.058 0.387 1.282 0.081 1.045 0.855 
Plant and machine operator 0.938 0.399 0.994 0.973 0.645 0.163 
Elementary occupation 1.014 0.842 1.047 0.761 0.951 0.832 
Education: 
General 
secondary 
education 
      
Elementary or less 1.533 0.003 1.147 0.692 0.845 0.782 
Basic 1.085 0.126 1.047 0.687 0.813 0.315 
Vocational secondary 1.068 0.118 0.992 0.932 1.089 0.575 
Professional secondary 1.020 0.763 1.072 0.653 0.953 0.866 
Vocational higher 1.013 0.888 0.710 0.071 0.731 0.311 
Bachelor 1.076 0.250 0.910 0.494 0.929 0.763 
Master or doctor 1.038 0.706 1.113 0.639 1.112 0.764 
Tenure 1–5 years 
Tenure <1 
year 
0.832 0.000 0.825 0.009 0.903 0.416 
Tenure 5–10 years 0.805 0.001 0.897 0.559 1.533 0.215 
Tenure 10+ years 0.749 0.000 0.651 0.213 0.637 0.536 
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Appendix 29 (continued) 
Unemployment insurance record: 32–79 months 50–62 months 54–58 months 
Covariate Hazard ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Hazard 
ratio P>z 
Monthly regional registered unemployment 
rate (in percentage points) 1.018 0.000 1.014 0.055 1.015 0.249 
Monthly change in registered unemployment 
rate (in percentage points) 1.037 0.533 1.082 0.536 1.024 0.912 
Monthly inflow of registered vacancies (in 
hundreds) 1.010 0.074 1.003 0.818 1.023 0.261 
1. month of employment 0.131 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.101 0.000 
2. month of employment 0.061 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.058 0.000 
3. month of employment 0.060 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.050 0.000 
4. month of employment 0.050 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.036 0.000 
5. month of employment 0.039 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.031 0.000 
6. month of employment 0.042 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.036 0.000 
7. month of employment 0.031 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.032 0.000 
8. month of employment 0.034 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.043 0.000 
9. month of employment 0.029 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.030 0.000 
10. month of employment 0.026 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.024 0.000 
11. month of employment 0.029 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.032 0.000 
12. month of employment 0.031 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.043 0.000 
13. month of employment 0.034 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.022 0.000 
14. month of employment 0.025 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.010 0.000 
15. month of employment 0.030 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.049 0.000 
16. month of employment 0.022 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.021 0.000 
17. month of employment 0.023 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.023 0.000 
18. month of employment 0.033 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.036 0.000 
19. month of employment 0.025 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.000 
20. month of employment 0.024 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.026 0.000 
21. month of employment 0.018 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.023 
0.018 
0.000 
0.025 
0.000 
0.000 
1.000 
0.000 
22. month of employment 0.017 0.000 0.018 0.000
23. month of employment 0.012 0.000 0.023 0.000
24. month of employment 0.013 0.000 0.022 0.000
25. month of employment 0.013 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 1.000 
26. month of employment 0.016 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 1.000 
27. month of employment 0.013 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.031 0.002 
28. month of employment 0.016 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
29. month of employment 0.013 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 1.000 
30. month of employment 0.007 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
31.–33. month of employment 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
θ (variance of gamma shared frailty; 
Likelihood-ratio test of θ =0) 0.000 0.953 0.000 0.961 0.000 0.973 
Wald test 27353 0.000 5821 0.000 2125 0.000 
No. of observations 60514 12564 4808 
No. of subjects  5437 1173 430 
No. of failures 3874 847 303 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN – KOKKUVÕTE  
Töötushüvitiste helduse mõju Eesti tööturu 
väljunditele kriisiperioodil 
Uurimistöö olulisus ja motivatsioon 
Globaalne finantskriis mõjutas kõikide Euroopa Liidu riikide tööturge. Enamikes 
riikides hakkas töötuse määr tõusma 2008. aasta teisel poolel ning mõnedes 
riikides, nagu Iirimaa, Kreeka ja Hispaania, tõusis töötuse määr veel ka 2011. 
aasta lõpu seisuga. Kõrge töötuse määr sundis riike panustama tööturupoliiti-
kasse, aktiivsete ja passiivsete tööturumeetmete pakkumisse. Enamik riike võttis 
kasutusele mõne konkreetsema kriisimeetme (töötushüvitise perioodi pikenda-
mine, aktiivsete meetmete osutamise mahu suurendamine, uute aktiivsete meet-
mete väljatöötamine jne), et peatada töötuse määra kasvu, lühendada töötuse-
perioodi kestust, vähendada töötusest tingitud kvalifikatsiooni ja oskuste aegu-
mist jne. 
Majanduskriis mõjutas Eesti tööturgu rohkem kui teiste Euroopa Liidu 
riikide omi. 2010. aasta esimeseks kvartaliks kasvas töötuse määr Eestis võrrel-
des 2008. aasta teise kvartaliga viiekordselt (4,0%-lt 19,8%-ni). Samal perioodil 
oli töötuse määra tõus suhteliselt kiire ka teistes Balti riikides (Leedus tõusis 
töötus 4 korda kõrgemaks ning Lätis 3,3 korda kõrgemaks). Teistes EL riikides 
oli töötuse määra tõus aga oluliselt madalam. Samas oli ka tööturuolukorra 
paranemine aastatel 2010–2011 Eestis palju kiirem kui teistes EL riikides. 
Selline äärmuslik turbulents tööturul teeb Eestist huvipakkuva juhtumi, mida 
uurida. Eesti andmetel on võimalik uurida tööturupoliitikate mõju tööturu väl-
junditele87 ja töötute tööturukäitumist äärmiselt raske tööturusituatsiooni tingi-
mustes. 
Üks rohkem arutluse all olnud teemasid kriisiperioodil on olnud töötushüvi-
tiste süsteemi helduse küsimus, eelkõige küsimus, kas majanduslanguse tingi-
mustes võiks töötushüvitiste süsteem olla heldem kui majanduskasvu ajal. Olu-
lisim teooria, millega saab käsitleda töötushüvitiste mõju tööturu väljunditele, 
on otsimisteooria. Teema olulisus peegeldub ka selles, et 2010. aasta Nobeli 
preemia laureaadid Peter A. Diamond, Dale T. Mortensen ja Christopher 
A. Pissarides on olnud just otsimisteooria arendajad. Otsimisteooria kohaselt on 
töötushüvitistel hüvitisesaajatele mittestimuleeriv mõju, mis tähendab, et 
suurema hüvitise või pikema hüvitise maksmise perioodi puhul on töötute tööle 
liikumine pärsitud ja töötuse periood pikeneb, ning kokkuvõttes tõstab see 
töötuse määra. Samas võib otsimisteooria edasiarenduste kohaselt olla töötus-
hüvitistel ka positiivseid mõjusid tööturu väljunditele. Samuti ei ole 
                                                 
87  Dissertatsioon uurib tööturu väljundeid mikrotasandil, seejuures eelkõige tööturuseisundit 
(hõives olek või hõiveta olek) ja palka. Lisaks hõlmavad tööturu väljundid endas ka teisi 
näitajaid, nagu töötundide pakkumine, tööjõu tootlikkus jne. 
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otsimisteooria kontekstis üheselt selge, kuidas muutub töötute tööturukäitumine 
ja töötushüvitiste mõju erinevas majandusolukorras. 
Kõige otsesem ja ka kõige rohkem empiiriliselt tõendatud töötushüvitiste 
mõju otsimisteooria kohaselt on hüvitiste mittestimuleeriv mõju, ehk et suure-
mad ja/või pikemad hüvitised vähendavad tõenäosust töötusest väljuda (vaata 
näiteks selliseid uurimusi: Meyer 1990; Katz ja Meyer 1990, Van Ours ja 
Vodopivec 2006). Lisaks tõuseb otsimisteooria kohaselt hüvitiseperioodi jook-
sul tööotsimise intensiivsus, reservatsioonipalk langeb ja töötusest tööle liiku-
mine tõuseb. Seetõttu on hüvitiseperioodi lõpus töötusest tööle liikumises hüpe. 
Teisest küljest võib töötushüvitiste süsteemi helduse suurendamine julgustada 
hetkel ilma hüvitiseta töötuid tööle liikuma, et kvalifitseeruda hüvitisele 
tulevikus. 
Majanduslangus tähendab otsimismudelis eelkõige madalamat tööpakku-
miste saabumise määra. Siiski ei anna otsimisteooria ühest vastust majandus-
tsükli mõjudele ei töötuse kestusele ega hüvitiste mittestimuleerivale mõjule. 
Ühest küljest majanduslanguse olukorras reservatsioonipalk langeb ning töötud 
muutuvad töökohtade suhtes vähem valivaks ning seega töötusest tööle liiku-
mine suureneb. Teisest küljest on tööpakkumiste saabumise määr madalam ehk 
on vähem võimalusi töötusest väljuda ning seega töötusest tööle liikumine 
langeb. Samuti võivad töötud vähendada tööotsimise intensiivsust, sest piirtulu 
tööotsimiseks tehtud pingutustest võib langeda. Üheselt ei ole ka määratud, 
kuidas võib muutuda töötushüvitise perioodi lõpus toimuv hüpe töötusest tööle 
liikumises. 
Seega on otsimisteooria-alases kirjanduses põhjalikult käsitletud nii töötus-
hüvitiste kui majandusolukorra mõju töötuse kestusele (töötushüvitised piken-
davad töötuse kestust ning majandusolukorra mõju pole üheselt määratletav). 
Mõne viimase aasta jooksul on hakatud uurima ka nende kahe teguri koosmõju. 
Ehk võib väita, et hüvitiste mittestimuleeriv mõju võib varieeruda majandus-
tsükli jooksul. Mittestimuleerivat mõju puudutavas teaduskirjanduses eel-
datakse, et kriisitingimistes on see mõju pigem väiksem, kuigi teooria ei anna 
selles küsimuses siiski päris ühest vastust (vaata näiteks Krueger ja Meyer 2002, 
Jurajda ja Tannery 2003, Landais et al. 2010, Kroft ja Notowidigdo 2011). 
Samas on ka empiirilisi uuringuid selles osas väga vähe tehtud. Üksikud uurin-
gud, mis selles vallas tehtud, leiavad, et hüvitiste mittestimuleeriv mõju võib 
olla majanduskriisi olukorras pigem väiksem (vaata näiteks Bover et al. 2002, 
Jurajda ja Tannery 2003, Schmieder et al. 2010, Kroft ja Notowidigdo 2011). 
Seni aga ei ole tehtud empiirilisi uuringuid, mis vaataks mittestimuleerivat mõju 
väga sügava majanduskriisi olukorras. 
Lühidalt kokkuvõttes eeldatakse otsimisteoorias töötushüvitistel olevat 
pigem negatiivne mõju tööturule, kuivõrd nad pikendavad töötuse kestust 
(vaatamata sellele, et see mõju võib olla kriisitingimustes väiksem). Samas 
toovad otsimisteooria edasiarendused välja, et heldemad töötushüvitised võivad 
leevendada piiranguid tööotsimisel ja niiviisi suurendada töötusjärgse töö 
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kvaliteeti88 (kõrgem palk, pikem hõive kestus, parem sobivus töökoha nõuete ja 
töötaja oskuste vahel jne.). Seetõttu võivad töötushüvitised pigem toetada töö-
otsinguid kui motiveerida jääma töötusesse (Burdett 1979). Teoreetilises kirjan-
duses näitavad hüvitiste positiivset mõju töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedile näiteks 
Marimon ja Zilibotti (1999) ning Acemoglu ja Shimer (2000). 
Samal ajal, kui töötushüvitiste mittestimuleerivat mõju on põhjalikult 
empiiriliselt tõendatud, on tähelepanu töötushüvitiste mõjule töötusjärgse töö 
kvaliteedile pööratud alles hiljuti. Lisaks on nende uuringute tulemused tihti 
vastakad ning ainult mõned neist kinnitavad töötushüvitiste positiivset mõju. 
Mõnevõrra rohkem on leitud töötushüvitiste positiivset mõju töötusjärgse hõive 
kestusele (näiteks Belzil 2001, Centeno 2004, Tatsiramos 2009, Caliendo et al. 
2009) kui töötusjärgsele palgale (näiteks Gangl 2002, Gangl 2006, Fitzenberger 
ja Wilke 2007). 
Kokkuvõttes on viimaste aastate tööturu olukord toonud kaasa suurema 
tähelepanu töötushüvitiste mõju uurimisele tööturu väljunditele. Kuigi on kinni-
tust leidnud, et töötushüvitised pikendavad töötuse kestust, on siiski nii teo-
reetiliselt kui empiiriliselt lahtine küsimus, kas selline mõju võib varieeruda 
koos majandusolukorraga. Samuti ei ole senini põhjalikku kinnitust leidnud, et 
töötushüvitised võivad suurendada töötusjärgse töö kvaliteeti. 
 
Uurimistöö eesmärk, ülesanded ja hüpoteesid 
Dissertatsiooni eesmärgiks on uurida, kuidas mõjutab töötushüvitiste heldus 
tööturuväljundeid sügava kriisi perioodil Eestis. Kuivõrd Eestis tõusis globaalse 
majanduskriisi tingimustes töötuse määr rohkem kui mujal Euroopa Liidus, on 
Eesti andmetel võimalik uurida hüvitiste mõjusid ekstreemses tööturu olukorras. 
Kriisiperiood on selles uurimistöös defineeritud kui periood, mil töötuse määr 
tõusis Eestis pidevalt ja kiiresti (2008. aasta kolmas kvartal kuni 2010. aasta 
esimene kvartal). Lisaks võimaldab töötushüvitise helduse mõjude uurimine 
Eesti töötushüvitiste süsteemis teha ettepanekuid süsteemi disaini parandamise 
kohta. 
Dissertatsiooni eesmärgi saavutamiseks on püstitatud neli põhilist uurimis-
ülesannet. Esimeseks ülesandeks on pakkuda välja teoreetiline taust läbiviida-
vaks uuringuks. Selleks on esitatud ülevaade otsimisteooriast, keskendudes eel-
kõige töötushüvitiste mõjule töötuse kestusele ja palgale, ning selle teooria järel-
dustele nende mõjude kohta majandusolukorra muutumisel. Samuti on esitatud 
diskussioon töötushüvitiste mõjude hindamiseks ning ülevaade varasematest 
teemakohastest uuringutest. 
Teine uurimisülesanne hõlmab endas Eesti töötushüvitiste süsteemi ning 
uurimistööks kasutadaolevate andmete kirjeldamist. Ülejäänud kaks uurimis-
                                                 
88 Otsimisteooria alases kirjanduses kasutatakse mõistet „töö kvaliteet“, viitamaks töötaja 
jaoks olulistele vastuvõetud töökoha tunnustele (palk, töölepingu kestus, oskuste ja töö-
ülesannete omavaheline sobivus jne). 
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ülesannet kätkevad töötushüvitiste mõjude hindamist. Esimeseks neist on 
hinnata töötushüvitiste mõju töötuse kestusele kriisieelsetel andmetel, kriisi-
aegsetel andmetel, ja võrrelda saadud tulemusi. Viimaseks uurimisülesandeks on 
hinnata töötushüvitiste helduse mõju töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedile, konkreetse-
malt töötusjärgsele palgale ja töötusjärgse hõive kestusele. 
Dissertatsioonis on püstitatud kolm hüpoteesi. Esimeseks hüpoteesiks on, et 
Eesti töötushüvitiste süsteem toob kaasa pikema töötuse kestuse. Sellist mõju 
eeldatakse otsimisteoorias ning selle mõju esinemist on empiiriliselt näidatud 
mitmete teiste riikide andmetel. Samuti viitavad sellistele mõjudele Eestis läbi-
viidud uuringud toimetulekutoetuse ja töötutoetuse kohta (Hinnosaar 2003, veidi 
vähem Kuddo et al. 2002). Kuivõrd praegu on Eesti töötushüvitiste süsteem 
heldem, peaksid töötushüvitiste mõjud veelgi tugevamalt avalduma. 
Teiseks hüpoteesiks on, et töötushüvitiste mõju töötuse kestusele on kriisi-
perioodil väiksem kui paremas majandusolukorras. Vähene olemasolev teoreeti-
line ja empiiriline kirjandus mittestimuleeriva mõju ja majandustsüklite kohta 
eeldab pigem väiksemat hüvitiste mittestimuleerivat mõju halvemas majandus-
olukorras. Kuivõrd Eesti majandust tabas kriis ülisuures ulatuses, peaks 
avalduma selles olukorras oluliselt madalam mittestimuleeriv mõju. 
Kolmandaks hüpoteesiks on, et heldemad töötushüvitised toovad kaasa kõr-
gema töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedi. Sellist positiivset mõju eeldatakse teoorias ja 
on näidatud ka mõnedes empiirilistes uuringutes. Seejuures võib eeldada 
töötusjärgse töö kestusele suuremat positiivset mõju kui palgale. Ka varasemates 
uuringutes on tihedamini leidnud kinnitust positiivne mõju töö kestusele. Posi-
tiivne mõju palgale võib olla tagasihoidlikum, sest eeldatakse, et töötushüvitised 
pikendavad töötuse kestust, aga pakutav palk (palgajaotus) võib töötusperioodi 
pikenedes langeda. 
 
Kasutatud meetodid ja andmed 
Dissertatsioonis kasutatavad andmed on pärit põhiliselt kahest allikast – Eesti 
Töötukassa andmebaasist ning Eesti Maksu- ja Tolliameti andmebaasist. 
Andmebaasid on ühendatud nii, et iga vaatluse jaoks on andmed olemas mõle-
mast andmebaasist. Töötukassa andmebaasist on pärit andmed registreeritud 
töötuse kohta, nagu näiteks info töötushüvitiste kohta ja aktiivsetes meetmetes 
osalemise kohta. Lisaks sisalduvad selles andmebaasis andmed eelneva hõive 
kohta ning andmed registreeritud töötute erinevate sotsiaal-demograafiliste 
tunnuste kohta. 
Töötusjärgse töö uurimiseks tulevad andmed Maksu- ja Tolliametist. Selleks 
on kasutada kuised palgaandmed, mida tööandjad on töötajate eest deklareeri-
nud. Seetõttu on tegelik töötuse kestus, hõive kestus ja ka palga tase andmetes 
väga hästi defineeritavad. 
Uurimistöö keskendub Eesti tööturule hiljutise globaalse majanduskriisi 
perioodil. Seega on vaatluse all eelkõige kiire töötuse kasvu periood, mis leidis 
aset 2008. aasta kolmandast kvartalist kuni 2010. aasta esimese kvartalini. 
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Põhiline vaatlusalune grupp on uurimistöös need töötud, kelle töötushüvitise 
perioodi algus jäi vahemikku kolmas kvartal 2008 kuni esimene kvartal 2009 
(ehk need inimesed, kes jäid töötuks kriisiperioodi alguses). Hõivesse liikumist 
on nende inimeste puhul vaadatud kuni 2010. aasta esimese kvartalini ehk ajani, 
kui töötuse tase jõudis kõrgeimasse punkti. Töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedi analüüsis 
on vaadatud pikemaid aegridu palgaandmete kohta, kuid siiski ainult nende 
isikute puhul, kes olid tööle liikunud hiljemalt 2010. aasta esimese kvartali 
lõpuks. 
Lisaks on dissertatsioonis analüüsitud töötushüvitiste mõju töötuse kestusele 
kriisieelsetel andmetel, et võrrelda hüvitiste mittestimuleerivat mõju kriisiajal ja 
kriisieelsel perioodil. Kriisieelse perioodi puhul on vaadatud neid töötushüvitisi, 
mille algus jäi 2007. aastasse. Palgaandmed on nende vaatluste puhul ühendatud 
kuni 2008. aasta lõpuni. Kriisieelse perioodina on vaadatud ainult 2007. aastal 
määratud hüvitisi, sest enne seda aastat ei ole hüvitiste maksimaalses potent-
siaalses perioodis varieeruvust. Tulenevalt Eesti töötuskindlustussüsteemi uud-
susest hakati alles 2007. aastal maksma lisaks 180-päevastele töötuskindlustus-
hüvitistele ka 270-päevaseid hüvitisi. 
Uurimistöös on kasutatud põhiliselt kolme meetodit töötushüvitiste mõjude 
hindamiseks: Kaplan-Meieri ellujäämismäärasid (Kaplan-Meier survival esti-
mate), tükiti konstantse proportsionaalse riskimäära mudelit (piecewise-constant 
proportional hazard model) ja tõenäosuse alusel sobitamist (propensity score 
matching). Lisaks kombineeritakse neid meetodeid sellise meetodiga, mis kasutab 
vaatlusi eelkõige selle kriteeriumi lõikepunkti ümber, mille alusel kvalifitseeruvad 
töötud kas lühemale või pikemale töötushüvitisele (regression discontinuity 
design). Selline metoodika vähendab potentsiaalset selektsiooniprobleemi. 
Töötushüvitiste mõju analüüsimisel töötuse kestusele kasutatakse Kaplan-
Meieri ellujäämismäärasid ning riskimäära mudelit. Kaplan-Meieri hinnangud 
võimaldavad heita esmase pilgu töötute tööturukäitumisele. Riskimäära mudeliga 
saab anda kvantitatiivse hinnangu hüvitiste mittestimuleeriva mõju suurusele, 
kasutades seejuures paindlikku mudelit, millega saab arvesse võtta ka ajas 
varieeruvaid muutujaid. 
Töötusjärgse töö kvaliteeti on uurimistöös hinnatud läbi kahe lähendi: töötus-
järgne palk ja töötusjärgse töö kestus. Töötusjärgse palga hindamisel on pea-
miseks kasutatud meetodiks tõenäosusel põhinev sobitamine. Pikema potent-
siaalse hüvitiseperioodiga inimesed on sobitatud lühema hüvitiseperioodiga ini-
mestega, et hinnata keskmist erinevust palgas. 
Töötusjärgse hõive kestuse analüüsis on kasutatud nii kestusanalüüsi meeto-
deid (Kaplan-Meieri ellujäämismäärad ja tükiti konstantse proportsionaalse 
riskimäära mudel) kui ka tõenäosusel põhinevat sobitamist. Sarnaselt töötusjärgse 
palga analüüsile on pikemale hüvitiseperioodile kvalifitseerunud inimesed sobi-
tatud lühema hüvitiseperioodiga inimestega. 
Kuigi kasutadaolevaid administratiivandmeid võib pidada väga heaks, kuivõrd 
saab väga täpselt jälgida hõive ja töötuse perioode ja palgataset, ei ole nende 
andmete põhjal võimalik hinnangutesse kaasata varimajandust. Samuti puuduvad 
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andmed näiteks tööotsimise aktiivsuse ja tööotsingute monitooringu kohta. Ka töö 
kvaliteedi hindamise võimalused on piiratud, sest võimalik on vaadelda ainult 
palka ja töö kestust. Samas peetakse just töö kestust suhteliselt heaks näitajaks töö 
kvaliteedi (ja töö sobivuse) kohta. 
 
Uurimistulemused 
Töötushüvitised kriisieelsel perioodil: mõju töötuse kestusele 
Töötushüvitiste kriisieelse mõju analüüsis töötuse kestusele analüüsitakse töötus-
hüvitiste mõju nii mitteparameetrilise kui parameetrilise meetodiga ning mõlema 
analüüsi tulemusel osutub, et töötushüvitistel on tõepoolest oluline mittestimu-
leeriv mõju töötusest hõivesse liikumisel. Hüvitise mõju töötuse kestusele osutub 
isegi olulisemaks kui enamik teisi tegureid. 
Uuring näitab, et keskmise hüvitise saamine vähendab hõivesse liikumist 
rohkem kui kahekordselt. Nende inimeste tööturukäitumine, kes saavad kõrgemat 
töötushüvitist, on veelgi rohkem hüvitisesaamisest mõjutatud (samas võib seda 
efekti mõjutada lisaks hüvitise tasemele see, et nad on saanud eelnevalt ka 
kõrgemat palka). Samuti näitab analüüs, et töötusest tööle liikumises toimub hüpe 
töötushüvitise saamise potentsiaalse perioodi lõpus. 
Uuringu tulemused näitavad, et baasriskimäär töötusest tööle liikumisel langeb 
vähehaaval töötuse perioodi jooksul. Samas toimub baasriskimääras mõningane 
tõus päris töötuseperioodi alguses. Tulemused viitavad sellele, et töötud ei pruugi 
hakata tööd otsima kohe töötuseperioodi alguses, olenemata sellest, kas nad 
saavad hüvitist või mitte. Hilisem langus baasriskimääras viitab sellele, et pikema 
töötuseperioodiga töötutele võidakse esitada vähem tööpakkumisi. 
Seega näitab uurimus kriisieelsetel andmetel hüvitiste tugevat mittestimu-
leerivat mõju (enamus aega vaadeldavast perioodist oli suhteliselt kõrge majan-
duskasvu periood). Küsimuseks jääb siin, kas selline mittestimuleeriv mõju esineb 
ka sügava majanduskriisi korral. Teiseks jääb küsimus, kas töötushüvitised samas 
ka toetavad töö otsinguid, ehk kas pikemate tööotsingute tulemusel leiavad ini-
mesed sobivama töö. Nende küsimustega tegelevad järgnevalt doktoritöös esitatud 
uurimused. 
 
Töötushüvitised kriisiperioodil: mõju töötuse kestusele 
Dissertatsioonis teisena esitatud uuring vaatleb hüvitiste mittestimuleerivat mõju 
väga kiire töötuse kasvu tingimustes, kasutades selleks Eesti andmeid hiljutise 
finantskriisi ajast. Nimelt oli töötute arvu kasv kriisi ajal Eestis kiirem kui 
üheski teises Euroopa Liidu riigis. Eestis kasvas töötute arv rohkem kui viis 
korda vähem kui kahe aasta jooksul, samal ajal kui teistes riikides kasvas töötute 
arv enamasti vähem kui kaks korda. 
Uuringu tulemused näitavad, et hüvitiste mittestimuleeriv mõju esineb isegi 
väga sügava kriisi tingimustel, kuid see mõju võib olla veidi väiksem ja hüvitise 
tasemeti homogeensem kui paremas majandusolukorras. Kuivõrd kriisiaja 
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andmemaht hüvitisesaajate osas on suhteliselt suur, on nende andmete põhjal 
võimalik detailsemalt vaadata nii hüvitise suuruse kui hüvitise pikkuse mõju 
töötusest tööle liikumisele. Tulemustest nähtub, et nii kõrgem hüvitise suurus 
kui ka hüvitise pikem kestus omavad kriisiperioodil mittestimuleerivat mõju 
töötute tööle liikumisele. 
Tulemused viitavad majanduslanguse olukorras pigem väiksemale mitte-
stimuleerivale mõjule, sarnaselt teistele vähestele uuringutele, mis arvestavad 
mittestimuleeriva mõju tsüklilisusega. Seetõttu võib eeldada, et kõrge töötuse 
korral on mõistlik suurendada või pikendada töötushüvitisi, kuivõrd heaolu efekt 
on sellisel juhul tõenäoliselt positiivne. 
Uuringus hinnatud mudelid sisaldavad lisaks hüvitisi puudutavatele muutu-
jatele ka aktiivsetes meetmetes osalemist (ja ka isikutunnuseid ning muutujaid 
majandusolukorra kohta). Aktiivsetes meetmetes osalemine on lisatud mude-
litesse ajas muutuvate tunnustena, näitamaks perioodi enne meetmes osalemist, 
meetmes osalemise perioodi ja perioodi pärast meetmes osalemist. Hindamis-
tulemused näitavad, et aktiivsetesse meetmetesse suunatud töötutel väheneb 
töötusest tööle liikumine just enne aktiivse meetme algust ning aktiivses meet-
mes osalemise ajal. Sellised tulemused on kooskõlas Eesti aktiivsete meetmete 
osutamise süsteemiga, kuivõrd vastupidiselt mitmetele teistele riikidele ei 
sunnita töötuid meetmetes osalema (hüvitisest ilmajätmise ähvardusel), vaid 
suunatakse eelkõige neid, kellel on endil valmisolek teenuses osaleda. Samas ei 
ole töötusest tööle liikumise määr peale meedet alati suurem. Neid meetmeid on 
tarvis põhjalikumalt analüüsida, et teha järeldusi nende mõju kohta hõivele. 
 
Töötushüvitised kriisiperioodil: mõju töötusjärgsele palgale 
Dissertatsioonis kolmandana esitatud empiiriline uuring vaatleb Eesti kriisiaja 
andmetel töötushüvitiste mõju palgale. Uuring näitab, et hüvitiseperioodi lõpus 
toimuv hüpe töötusest tööle liikumises on vähemalt osaliselt põhjustatud sellest, 
et hüvitiseperioodi lõpus muutuvad inimesed töökohtade suhtes vähem valivaks 
ja on sunnitud vastu võtma ka väiksema kvaliteediga (madalama palgaga) 
töökohti. Seega hüpe tööle liikumises ei ole põhjustatud ainult suurenenud 
tööotsimise intensiivsusest89. 
Uurimuses on võrreldud kahte gruppi töötushüvitise saajaid – töötud, kes 
kvalifitseeruvad 270-päevasele töötuskindlustushüvitisele ning töötud, kes 
kvalifitseeruvad 180-päevasele töötuskindlustushüvitisele. Oluline erinevus 
aktsepteeritud palgas avaldub perioodil, mil 180-päevast hüvitist saavad ini-
mesed on oma hüvitiseperioodi lõpetamas (ja tõuseb töötusest tööle liikumine), 
kuid 270-päevast hüvitist saavad inimesed saavad veel oma hüvitiseperioodi 
jätkata. Sellel perioodil on keskmine langus aktsepteeritud palgas võrreldes 
eelneva palgaga ligikaudu 10% võrra väiksem 270-päevast hüvitist saajate 
puhul. Need tulemused sarnanevad Gaure et al. (2008) tulemustele, kes 
                                                 
89 Kahjuks ei ole kasutada olevate andmete pinnalt võimalik teha järeldusi tööotsimise inten-
siivsuse muutumise kohta. 
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näitavad, et vastuvõetav palk langeb umbes 10% just enne hüvitiseperioodi 
lõppu. Samuti sarnanevad uuringutulemused Centeno ja Novo (2011) tule-
mustele, kes ei leia üldist olulist töötushüvitiste mõju töötusjärgsele palgale, küll 
aga ilmneb see mõju töötushüvitise perioodi lõpu ümbruses vastu võetud 
töökohtade puhul. 
Pikema hüvitiseperioodiga inimeste puhul on palga langus väiksem, sest 
nende hulgas on väiksem osakaal inimesi, kes aktsepteerivad väga suurt palga-
langust. 180-päevase hüvitise saajate hulgas on 34% neid, kes aktsepteerivad 
palgalangust 50% ulatuses või rohkem. 270-päevase hüvitise saajate hulgas on 
selliseid inimesi aga 22%. Samas ei osutu palgalanguse erinevus statistiliselt 
oluliseks üle kõigi töötusest väljumiste, sest töötuse algusperioodil tööle liiku-
jate puhul võtavad 180-päevase hüvitise saajad vastu suhteliselt väiksema 
palgalanguse, ning peale pikemat töötuseperioodi tööle liikujatel ei ole hüvitise 
liigiti erinevust aktsepteeritavas palgas. 
Saadud hinnangud üle sobitatud valimite näitavad, et pikema potentsiaalse 
hüvitiseperioodiga inimesed aktsepteerival tasapisi järjest suuremat palga-
langust, võrreldes nende eelneva palgaga üle hüvitiseperioodi, ning pärast seda 
palgalangus stabiliseerub. Kontrollgrupp lühema töötuskindlustushüvitisega 
inimestest aktsepteerib oma hüvitiseperioodi jooksul veidi väiksemaid langusi 
palgas. Hüvitiseperioodi lõpus aktsepteerivad nad aga väga suurt langust palgas 
ning samal ajal toimub hüpe nende töötusest tööle liikumises. Pärast seda nende 
aktsepteeritud palgalangus süveneb aeglasemalt ja stabiliseerub sarnasel tasemel 
nagu pikemat aega töötuskindlustushüvitist saanutel. 
Uuring näitab, et töötusest tööle liikumise määr ning vastuvõetav palk on 
omavahel väga tihedalt seotud. Kõrgem töötusest tööle liikumine ilmneb and-
metes alati suurema aktsepteeritava palgalanguse arvelt. Uurimistöö tulemusi 
saab tõlgendada kui tõestust otsimisteooriale, et töötushüvitised suurendavad 
reservatsioonipalka. Samal ajal töötavad töötushüvitised tööotsimise toetajana 
kuivõrd töötud saavad oma tööotsinguid pikendada, et leida enda jaoks kõrgema 
kvaliteediga töökoht. 
 
Töötushüvitised kriisiperioodil: mõju töötusjärgse töö kestusele 
Dissertatsioonis viimasena esitatud uuring näitab, et töötushüvitistel on posi-
tiivne mõju lisaks palgale ka töötusjärgse töö kestusele. Pikema potentsiaalse 
hüvitiseperioodiga inimesed jäävad vastuvõetud töökohale pikemalt töötama. 
Sarnaselt palgauuringuga võrreldakse töötamise kestuse analüüsimiseks 270-
päevast ja 180-päevast hüvitist saavaid inimesi. Mitteparameetriline hindamine 
näitab, et 270-päevast hüvitist saanutel on alati vastuvõetud töökohal kõrgem 
ellujäämismäär (suurem osakaal jääb töötama) ning madalam riskimäär töö-
kohalt lahkuda kui 180-päevast hüvitist saanutel. Sama kehtib ka siis, kui 
vaadata ainult väikest osa hüvitisesaajatest ümber 270-päevasele hüvitisele 
kvalifitseerumise tingimuse punkti (eelneva töötuskindlustusstaaži alusel). 
Mitteparameetriliste hinnangute alusel on suurim erinevus riskimäärades tööta-
misperioodi algusfaasis (seega on endiste 180-päevase hüvitise saajate hulgas 
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rohkem inimesi, kes lahkuvad uuelt töökohalt suhteliselt kiiresti). Selline erine-
vus töötamise algusperioodil on eriti suur nende inimeste puhul, kes võtsid uue 
töökoha vastu oma 151.–240. töötuse päeval. Samas jääb see erinevus suhteliselt 
kõrgeks ka nende puhul, kes uue töö veelgi hiljem vastu võtsid. Seega kujuneb 
mitteparameetriliste hinnangute põhjal erinevus töötamise kestuses välja nende 
töökohtade puhul, mis võeti vastu siis, kui 180-päevast hüvitist saanud olid oma 
hüvitiseperioodi lõpetamas ja nende töötusest tööle liikumise määr tõusis (270-
päevast hüvitist saanud aga said jätkata hüvitist). 
Sobitamisega saadud tulemused sarnanevad suuresti mitteparameetrilise 
hindamise tulemustele. Need hinnangud kinnitavad, et erinevus töötusjärgse töö 
kvaliteedis ei pruugi olla väga suur nende inimeste jaoks, kes võtavad töö vastu 
juba peale väga lühikest töötuse perioodi. 180-päevast hüvitist saavad inimesed, 
kes võtavad töö vastu alles hüvitiseperioodi lõpus, aktsepteerivad 10% võrra 
rohkem halvasti sobivaid töökohti kui 270-päevast hüvitist saavad inimesed 
samal töötuseperioodil. Halvaks sobivuseks on loetud neid töösuhteid, mis 
kestavad kuni neli kuud, mis on Eestis tavaline katseaja kestus. Sarnane erine-
vus töökoha sobivuses jääb alles ka sellel perioodil, kui mõlema grupi hüvitise-
periood on läbi saanud. Seetõttu aktsepteerivad 270-päevast hüvitist saavad 
inimesed 6% vähem halvasti sobivaid töökohti kui 180-päevast hüvitist saavad 
inimesed (arvestamata siin aega, millal töötuseperioodi jooksul töökoht vastu 
võeti). Sarnane erinevus nende kahe grupi vahel ilmneb ka siis, kui vaadata 
osakaalu, kui paljud jäävad samale töökohale töötama üle ühe aasta. Seega võib 
ka sobitamisega saadud tulemuste põhjal väita, et erinevus töötamise kestuses 
ilmneb juba töösuhte algusperioodil. 
Tükiti konstantse proportsionaalse riskimäära mudeli tulemused viitavad 
sellele, et 270-päevase hüvitise saajad lahkuvad vastuvõetud töölt 15% väik-
sema tõenäosusega kui 180-päevase hüvitise saajad. Saadud tulemused kinni-
tavad juba mitteparameetrilise hindamise ja sobitamisega saadud tulemusi, et 
erinevus vastuvõetud töö kvaliteedis ei pruugi ilmneda hüvitise saamise algus-
perioodil vastuvõetud töökohtade puhul. Küll aga ilmneb oluline erinevus siis, 
kui 180-päevase hüvitise saajad on lõpetamas hüvitiseperioodi, kuid 270-päe-
vase hüvitise saajad saavad hüvitist veel jätkata. Selline tulemus sarnaneb Belzil 
(2001) uuringutulemustele, kes näitab, et 5 nädala jooksul peale hüvitise lõppu 
vastuvõetud töökohti kiputakse suurema tõenäosusega varem lõpetama. 
Uuringu tulemused näitavad, et hüvitiseperioodi lõpus muutuvad inimesed 
töökohtade suhtes vähem valivaks. Ühelt poolt suureneb hüvitiseperioodi lõpus 
töötusest tööle liikumine ja suurem hulk inimesi võtab töökoha vastu. Teiselt 
poolt on vastuvõetud töökoht nende jaoks madalama kvaliteediga ja sobib neile 
vähem, võrreldes olukorraga, kui nende hüvitiseperiood oleks jätkunud ja neil 
oleks olnud seega rohkem aega sobivamat töökohta otsida. Seega on potentsiaal-
selt pikemat töötushüvitist saavatel inimestel pikem töötuse periood, aga ka 
pikem töötusjärgse hõive kestus. 
 
 257 
Järeldused 
Kokkuvõttes kinnitavad analüüsitulemused suuresti töös püstitatud hüpoteese. 
Hindamistulemused näitavad, et töötushüvitised pikendavad töötuse kestust 
oluliselt, nagu oli eeldatud esimese hüpoteesiga. Teine hüpotees eeldas, et 
selline mõju võiks kriisiperioodil olla oluliselt madalam. Kuigi mittestimuleeriv 
mõju osutus kriisiperioodil tõepoolest pigem madalamaks, osutus erinevus siiski 
suhteliselt väikeseks, mis oli ka dissertatsioonis kõige ootamatumaks hindamis-
tulemuseks. 
Kolmas hüpotees ootas, et heldemad hüvitised toovad kaasa kõrgema töötus-
järgse töö kvaliteedi ja eeldas, et see mõju võiks olla tugevam töötusjärgse töö 
kestusele kui palgale. Uuringutulemused kinnitavad, et hüvitiste positiivne mõju 
töötusjärgsele töö kvaliteedile tõepoolest esineb ning on tugevam töö kestusele 
kui palgale (mõju palgale avaldub ainult perioodil, kui pikema hüvitise-
perioodiga töötutel on võimalik jätkata hüvitise saamist, kuid lühema hüvitise-
perioodiga töötutel enam mitte). 
Uurimistöö tulemused on mõneti sarnased nende väheste uuringutega, mis 
seni sellel teemal on läbi viidud. Senised empiirilised uuringud töötushüvitiste 
mittestimuleeriva mõju kohta majandustsükli jooksul pigem arvavad samuti, et 
mittestimuleeriv mõju võib halvemas majandusolukorras olla väiksem (näiteks 
Kroft ja Notowidigdo 2011, Schmieder et al. 2010 ning Jurajda ja Tannery 
2003). Töötushüvitiste mõju osas töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedile on leitud posi-
tiivset mõju rohkem töötusjärgse töö kestusele kui palgale (näiteks Lalive 2007 
ning Fitzenberger ja Wilke 2007 leiavad, et esineb ainult väike mõju palgale; 
näiteks Tatsiramos 2009 ja Caliendo et al. 2009 leiavad aga olulise mõju hõive 
kestusele). Ka selles uuringus osutub töötushüvitiste mõju töötusjärgse tööta-
mise kestusele kõrgeks ja statistiliselt oluliseks. Positiivne mõju palgale avaldub 
ainult siis, kui vaadata detailsemalt töökoha vastvõtmise aega. 
Kokkuvõttes viitab analüüs töötushüvitise mõjude kohta tööturu väljunditele 
sellele, et majanduskriisi perioodil võib olla põhjendatud rakendada heldemat 
töötushüvitiste süsteemi. Töötuse kestuse analüüsid näitavad, et töötushüvitised 
pikendavad töötuse kestust isegi väga sügava majanduskriisi tingimustes. Samas 
võib selline mõju olla kriisiolukorras mõnevõrra väiksem kui paremas majan-
dussituatsioonis. Lisaks kinnitavad uuringud töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedi kohta, et 
pikenenud töötuse (töö otsimise) periood toob kaasa kõrgema töötusjärgse töö 
kvaliteedi. Seega pikendavad heldemad hüvitised pikema tööotsimise perioodi, 
kuid see-eest sobivad vastuvõetavad töökohad paremini töötaja oskuste ja vaja-
dustega. 
Vajadus pikema potentsiaalse hüvitise kestuse järele kriisiperioodil ilmneb 
ka siis, kui vaadelda hüvitisesaajate osakaalu registreeritud töötute hulgas. 
Kriisist paranemise tingimustes on kasvanud ilma hüvitiseta registreeritud 
töötute osakaal kõrgemaks kui kunagi varem. Seega on neil inimestel tõe-
näoliselt puudu vahendeid töö otsimiseks. Pikem hüvitise potentsiaalne kestus 
väldiks vähemalt mõningal määral nii suure hüvitiseta töötute osakaalu teket 
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(2011. aastal oli kaks kolmandikku registreeritud töötutest ilma ühegi töötus-
hüvitiseta). 
Samas on Eesti ka parema majandusolukorra ajal üks töötu kohta vähimate 
töötushüvitise kuludega riikidest Euroopa Liidus. Seega võib töötushüvitiste 
mõju töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedile, aga ka töökohtade ja töötajate omavaheline 
sobivus olla Eesti töötushüvitiste süsteemis rohkem takistatud kui teistes 
Euroopa Liidu riikides. Käesolev uurimus näitab eeskätt potentsiaalse hüvitise-
perioodi ja töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedi positiivset seost. Seega võib väita, et 
potentsiaalne hüvitiseperiood võiks olla pikem ka paremas majandusolukorras. 
Siiski võib ainult potentsiaalse hüvitiseperioodi pikendamine ilma teiste muuda-
tusteta hüvitiste süsteemis (näiteks suurem monitooring ja sanktsioneerimine) 
kaasa tuua töötuse perioodide pikenemise ja töötuse määra kasvu. 
Lisaks võib osa andmetes kajastuvas mittestimuleerivast mõjust olla põhjus-
tatud varimajandusest, kuivõrd dissertatsioon kasutab hõive kohta ainult 
administratiivandmeid (ametlikult deklareeritud palkasid). Mõned inimesed 
võivad asuda tööle ilma ametliku töölepinguta juba hüvitiseperioodi jooksul, et 
jätkata hüvitise saamist, ning ametliku lepingu sõlmida alles siis, kui hüvitise-
periood on läbi saanud. See seletaks, miks on hüpe töötusest tööle liikumises 
hüvitiseperioodi lõpus niivõrd suur ja miks tööle liikumine peale seda järsult 
langeb. Kui varimajandus mängib siin olulist rolli, siis pärsivad töötushüvitised 
tööle liikumist vähem, kui ametlikest andmetest välja paistab. 
Mõned eelnevad uuringud on näidanud, et hüvitiste mittestimuleeriv mõju 
võib olla väiksem, kui tööotsinguid monitooritakse (tööturuasutuse poolt) ja/või 
rakendatakse sanktsioone ebapiisava tööotsingu korral (näiteks Abbring et al. 
2005, McVicar 2008, Svarer 2011). Uurimistöös vaadeldud perioodil ei olnud 
tööotsingute monitooring Eestis eriti põhjalik. Samas ei ole täpsemad andmed 
monitooringu kohta kättesaadavad ja seetõttu pole võimalik hinnata monitoo-
ringu mõju töötuse kestusele. Samuti ei rakendata sanktsioone Eesti töötus-
hüvitiste süsteemis eriti tihti (eelkõige tehakse seda ainult konsultandi vastu-
võtule mitteilmumise puhul) ning santsioonide valik on väga piiratud. Töötus-
kindlustushüvitise puhul on ainsaks võimalikuks sanktsiooniks hüvitise maks-
mise lõpetamine. Lisaks aga, kui hüvitise maksmine on lõpetatud mitteilmumise 
tõttu, ei ole kasutadaolevate andmete alusel võimalik kindlaks teha, kas inimene 
ei tulnud vastuvõtule, sest ta oli juba töökoha leidnud või oli tõesti sanktsio-
neerimine see, mis andis impulsi tööle liikumiseks. Seega ei ole võimalik Eesti 
andmeid kasutades hinnata, kuidas monitooring ja sanktsioneerimine töötus-
hüvitiste süsteemis töötuse kestusele mõjub. Toetudes aga teiste riikide prakti-
kale, on tõenäoline, et suurem monitooring ja sanktsioneerimine töötushüvitiste 
süsteemis võib lühendada töötuse kestust ka Eestis. Teisest küljest võib suurem 
sanktsioneerimine kaasa tuua ka languse töötusjärgse töö kvaliteedis (seda näita-
vad näiteks Arni et al. 2009 ning Van den Berg ja Vikström 2009 uuringu-
tulemused). 
Veel on varasemates empiirilistes uuringutes täheldatud, et aktiivsed tööturu-
meetmed võivad töötada pigem piitsa kui präänikuna ja võib avalduda ex ante 
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mõju, mis paneb inimesed töötusest tööle liikuma, kui nad saavad teada, et peab 
osalema mõnel aktiivsel meetmel (näiteks Gaure et al. 2008, Geerdsen 2006, 
Black et al. 2003). Seda mõju ei pruugi aga avalduda, kui aktiivses meetmes 
osalemine ei ole kohustuslik. Eestis, kus töötuid pigem veendakse aktiivsetes 
meetmetes osalema, kui et sunnitakse selleks hüvitise sanktsioneerimise ähvar-
damisel, töötavad aktiivsed meetmed pigem präänikuna ning avaldub vastu-
pidine mõju. Nii kriisiaegsetel kui kriisieelsetel andmetel läbiviidud töötuse kes-
tuse analüüs näitab, et töötusest tööle liikumine kipub just enne aktiivsel meet-
mel osalemist ja meetmel osalemise ajal vähenema. Seega jääb küsimuseks, kas 
aktiivsed tööturupoliitikad võiksid toimida ka Eestis piitsana, kui neid kasu-
tataks laialdasemalt ja kohustuslikuna. 
Võttes lühidalt kokku dissertatsioonis esitatud analüüsitulemused, võiks 
kaaluda Eesti töötushüvitiste süsteemi heldemaks muutmist (eelkõige võiks 
pikendada potentsiaalset hüvitiseperioodi, mida ka analüüsiti töös detailsemalt). 
Sellega seoses, tuginedes eelnevatele uuringutele, võib olla samal ajal mõistlik 
suurendada töötushüvitiste süsteemis ka tööotsingute monitooringu ja sanktsio-
neerimise taset. See tähendab, et kui praeguses süsteemis on raske hüvitisele 
kvalifitseeruda, kuid kerge hüvitisel püsida, võiks süsteemi muuta nii, et hüvi-
tisele kvalifitseerumine oleks lihtsam, kuid sellel püsimine raskem. 
Dissertatsioonis uuritakse töötushüvitiste mõju tööturu väljunditele. Samas 
peab töötushüvitiste süsteemi mõju hindamisel majandusele tervikuna silmas 
pidama ka mitmeid muid olulisi aspekte. Kõige olulisem aspekt sealhulgas on 
see, miks töötushüvitiste süsteemid on üldse loodud – et tagada mingi sotsiaalse 
kaitstuse tase töötuse korral. Sisuliselt peaks töötushüvitised mõningal määral 
siluma kõikumisi inimeste sissetulekus ja seetõttu ka kõikumisi sisenõudluses. 
Seetõttu on töötushüvitised eriti olulisel kohal majanduskriisi olukorras, et 
mõningal määral säilitada sisenõudluse taset, ennetada vaesust ja ebavõrdsuse 
kasvu, hoida inimesed majanduslikult ja sotsiaalselt aktiivsed jne. Samas on 
need küsimused väljaspool teemade ringi, millega tegeletakse selles disser-
tatsioonis. 
  
 260 
CURRICULUM VITAE90 
Name  Anne Lauringson  
Address Tammsaare 8–18 
51006 Tartu (Estonia) 
Mobile +372 55 62 06 63  
E-mail anne.lauringson@tootukassa.ee 
Nationality Estonian  
Date of birth 08/04/1982 
Work experience 
Dates January 2010 – present 
Position held Head of Analysis Department 
Main activities and 
responsibilities 
–  Analysing developments on the labour market 
–  Forecasting 
–  Evaluation of labour market measures 
–  Developing statistical reporting 
Name of employer Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
 
Dates Autumn 2008 – end of 2009 
Position held Analyst 
Main activities and 
responsibilities 
–  Analysing developments on the labour market 
–  Forecasting 
–  Evaluation of labour market measures 
–  Developing statistical reporting 
Name of employer Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
 
Dates Summer 2007 – summer 2008  
Position held Head of Analysis Department (temporary replacement) 
Main activities and 
responsibilities 
–  Analysing developments on the labour market 
–  Forecasting 
–  Developing statistical reporting 
Name of employer Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund 
 
Dates Autumn 2003 – spring 2007  
Position held Research Assistant 
Main activities and 
responsibilities 
Participation in the following research projects: 
–  “Industrial relations, future trends and challenges of 
globalization in EU, U.S, Japan, China, India, Australia, 
Brazil and South-Africa” – a project of the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 
–   “The valuation of human capital in Estonian labour market: 
issues of overeducation and skill-mismatch” – a project of 
the Estonian Science Foundation 
                                                 
90  CV form: © Euroopa Liit, http://europass.cedefop.europa.eu  
 261 
 –  “EIRO Estonian correspondent “– a project of the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions; writing short articles on Estonian industrial 
relations and administrating a database of news about 
Estonian industrial relations 
–  Studies on the representativeness of the social partners at 
sectoral level in the European Union and monographs on the 
situation of the social partners in the candidate countries – a 
project of the Catholic University of Louvain and the 
Commission of the European Communities (DG 
Employment and Social Affairs) Conducting seminars in 
“Introduction to Business Administration” for Bachelor 
students 
Name of employer Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University 
of Tartu 
 
Dates Autumn 2004 – Autumn 2006  
Position held Assistant of the Vice Dean for Research 
Main activities and 
responsibilities 
–  Providing information about grants, scholarships, 
conferences, seminars, job vacancies etc. for faculty members 
–  Compiling reports concerning research activities in the 
faculty 
–  Taking part in organising conferences, seminars, summer 
schools 
–  Participating in activities of different administrative boards 
and committees 
Name of employer Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University 
of Tartu 
 
 
Education and training
Dates 2006–present 
Degree PhD (Economics) 
 –  Thesis Title: “The impact of the generosity of unemployment 
benefits on the Estonian labour market outcomes in a period of 
crisis” 
–  Main research areas: labour market, labour market policies, 
industrial relations and social dialogue, labour market flexicurity 
University University of Tartu 
Level of education ISCED 6 
  
Dates 2004–2006  
Degree Magister Artium (Economics) 
 –  Thesis Title: “Union’s Impact on Remuneration in the Estonian 
Public Sector” 
University University of Tartu 
Level of education ISCED 5A3 
  
66
 262 
Dates 2000–2004  
Degree Baccalaureus Artium (Economics) 
 –  Thesis Title: “The Impact of Unions on Enterprise Performance 
(on the Example of Estonian Textile Sector)” 
–  Econometrics as the major subject 
–  Finance as the minor subject 
University University of Tartu 
Level of education ISCED 5A1 
  
Personal skills and competences 
Mother tongue(s) Estonian 
  
Other language(s)  
Self-assessment  Understanding Speaking Writing 
European level (*)  Listening Reading Spoken interaction 
Spoken 
production  
English  C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 
French  A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 
Russian  B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 
German  A1 A2 A1 A1 A1 
 (*) Common European Framework of Reference (CEF) level  
Computer skills and 
competences 
Stata, MS Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, Visio), 
SPSS, EViews 
  
 263 
ELULOOKIRJELDUS91 
Nimi  Anne Lauringson  
Aadress Tammsaare 8–18 
51006 Tartu (Eesti) 
Telefon (+372) 55 62 06 63  
E-mail anne.lauringson@tootukassa.ee 
Rahvus Eestlane  
Sünniaeg 08/04/1982 
  
Töökogemus 
Aeg Jaanuar 2010 – praeguseni 
Amet Analüüsiosakonna juhataja 
Peamised 
töökohustused 
–  Tööturu trendide analüüs 
–  Prognoosimine 
–  Tööturumeetmete hindamine 
–  Statistilise aruandluse arendamine 
Tööandja Eesti Töötukassa 
 
Aeg Sügis 2008 – detsember 2009 
Amet Analüütik 
Peamised 
töökohustused 
–  Tööturu trendide analüüs 
–  Prognoosimine 
–  Tööturumeetmete hindamine 
–  Statistilise aruandluse arendamine 
Tööandja Eesti Töötukassa 
  
Aeg Suvi 2007 – suvi 2008  
Amet Analüüsiosakonna juhataja (asendaja õppepuhkuse ajaks) 
Peamised 
töökohustused 
–  Tööturu trendide analüüs 
–  Prognoosimine 
Tööandja Eesti Töötukassa 
 
Aeg Sügis 2003 – kevad 2007  
Amet Referent 
Peamised 
töökohustused 
Osalemine järgmistes teadusprojektides: 
–  “Industrial relations, future trends and challenges of globalization 
in EU, U.S, Japan, China, India, Australia, Brazil and South-
Africa” – Euroopa Elu- ja Töötingimuste Parandamise Fondi 
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions) projekt 
–  “Inimkapitali väärtustamine Eesti tööturul: üleharitus ja hariduse 
mittevastavus töökoha nõuetele” – Eesti Teadusfondi projekt 
–  “EIRO Eesti korrespondent “– Euroopa Elu- ja Töötingimuste 
                                                 
91 CV vorm: © Euroopa Liit, http://europass.cedefop.europa.eu 
 264 
Parandamise Fondi (European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions) projekt; Eesti töösuhetest 
lühiülevaadete kirjutamine ja teemakohaste artiklite andmebaasi 
haldamine 
–  Analüüside läbiviimine ja monograafiate kirjutamine 
sotsiaalpartnerlusest Eestis sektori tasandil – Louvain’i 
Katoliikliku Ülikooli (Catholic University of Louvain) ja 
Euroopa Komisjoni (DG Employment and Social Affairs) projekt 
 Seminaride läbiviimine aines „Sissejuhatus ettevõttemajandusse“ 
bakalaureuseõppe tudengitele 
Tööandja Majandusteaduskond, Tartu Ülikool 
  
Aeg Sügis 2004 – sügis 2006  
Amet Teadusprodekaani assistent 
Peamised 
töökohustused 
–  Teaduskonna liikmetele info edastamine grantide, stipendiumite, 
konverentside, seminaride ja tööpakkumiste kohta 
–  Teaduskonna teadustegevust puudutava aruandluse koostamine 
–  Konverentside, seminaride ja suvekoolide organiseerimises 
osalemine 
–  Teaduskonna nõukogu ja erinevate komiteede töös osalemine 
Tööandja Majandusteaduskond, Tartu Ülikool 
  
Haridus 
Aeg 2006–praeguseni 
Kraad PhD (Majandusteadus) 
 –  Dissertatsiooni teema: “ Töötushüvitiste helduse mõju Eesti 
tööturu väljunditele kriisiperioodil ” 
–  Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad: tööturg, tööturu meetmed, 
töösuhted ja sotsiaalpartnerlus, tööturu turvaline paindlikkus 
Õppeasutus Majandusteaduskond, Tartu Ülikool 
Tase ISCED 6 
  
 
Aeg 2004–2006  
Kraad Magister Artium (Majandusteadus) 
 –  Dissertatsiooni teema: “ Ametiühingute mõju töötasule Eesti 
avalikus sektoris ” 
Õppeasutus 
Tase 
Majandusteaduskond, Tartu Ülikool 
ISCED 5A3 
 
Aeg 2000–2004  
Kraad Baccalaureus Artium (Majandusteadus) 
 –  Lõputöö teema: “ Ametiühingute mõju ettevõtete tootlikkusele 
Eesti tekstiilisektori näitel ” 
–  Ökonomeetria peaerialaks 
–  Rahandus kõrvalerialaks 
Õppeasutus Majandusteaduskond, Tartu Ülikool 
Tase ISCED 5A1 
 265 
Oskused ja kompetentsid
Emakeel Eesti keel 
Võõrkeeled  
Enese-
hindamis-
skaalal (*)  
 
Arusaamine Rääkimine Kirjutamine 
  Kuulamine Lugemine Suuline suhtlus Suuline esitus  
Inglise keel  C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 
Prantsuse keel  A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 
Vene keel  B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 
Saksa keel  A1 A2 A1 A1 A1 
 (*) Common European Framework of Reference (CEF) level  
Arvutioskus Stata, MS Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, Visio), 
SPSS, EViews 
 
  
67
 266 
DISSERTATIONES RERUM OECONOMICARUM 
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
1.  Олев Раю. Экономическая ответственность и ее использование в 
хозяйственном механизме. Tartu, 1994. Kaitstud 20.05.1991. 
2.  Janno Reiljan. Majanduslike otsuste analüütiline alus (teooria, 
metodoloogia, metoodika ja meetodid). Tartu, 1994. Kaitstud 18.06.1991. 
3.  Robert W. McGee. The theory and practice of public finance: some 
lessons from the USA experience with advice for former socialist 
countries. Tartu, 1994. Kaitstud 21.06.1994. 
4.  Maaja Vadi. Organisatsioonikultuur ja väärtused ning nende vahelised 
seosed (Eesti näitel). Tartu, 2000. Kaitstud 08.06.2000. 
5.  Raul Eamets. Reallocation of labour during transition disequilibrium and 
policy issues: The case of Estonia. Tartu, 2001. Kaitstud 27.06.2001. 
6.  Kaia Philips. The changes in valuation of human capital during the 
transition process in Estonia. Tartu, 2001. Kaitstud 10.01.2002. 
7.  Tõnu Roolaht. The internationalization of Estonian companies: an 
exploratory study of relationship aspects. Tartu, 2002. Kaitstud 
18.11.2002. 
8.  Tiia Vissak. The internationalization of foreign-owned enterprises in 
Estonia: An extended network perspective. Tartu, 2003. Kaitstud 
18.06.2003. 
9.  Anneli Kaasa. Sissetulekute ebavõrdsuse mõjurite analüüs struktuurse 
modelleerimise meetodil. Tartu, 2004. Kaitstud 15.09.2004. 
10.  Ruth Alas. Organisational changes during the transition in Estonia: Major 
influencing behavioural factors. Tartu, 2004. Kaitstud 22.12.2004. 
11.  Ele Reiljan. Reasons for de-internationalization: An analysis of Estonian 
manufacturing companies. Tartu, 2004. Kaitstud 25.01.2005. 
12.  Janek Uiboupin. Foreign banks in Central and Eastern European markets: 
their entry and influence on the banking sector, Tartu, 2005. Kaitstud 
29.06.2005. 
13.  Jaan Masso. Labour Reallocation in Transition Countries: Efficiency, 
Restructuring and Institutions, Tartu, 2005. Kaitstud 7.11.2005. 
14.  Katrin Männik. The Impact of the Autonomy on the Performance in a 
Multinational Corporation’s Subsidary in Transition Countries, Tartu, 
2006. Kaitstud 29.03.2006. 
15.  Andres Vesilind. A methodology for earning excess returns in global debt 
and currency markets with a diversified portfolio of quantitative active 
investment models, Tartu, 2007. Kaitstud 13.06.2007. 
16. Rebekka Vedina. The diversity of individual values and its role for 
organisations in the context of changes, Tartu, 2007. Kaitstud 16.11.2007. 
17. Priit Sander. Essays on factors influencing financing decisions of 
companies: risk, corporate control and taxation aspects, Tartu, 2007. 
Kaitstud 19.12.2007. 
 267 
18.  Kadri Ukrainski. Sources of knowledge used in innovation: an example 
of Estonian wood industries. Tartu, 2008. Kaitstud 22.04.2008. 
19.  Kristjan-Olari Leping. Heterogeneity of human capital and its valuation 
in the labour market. Tartu, 2008. Kaitstud 14.05.2008. 
20.  Kadri Männasoo. Essays on financial fragility – evidence from the 
corporate and banking sectors in Central and Eastern Europe. Tartu, 2008. 
Kaitstud 26.05.2008. 
21.  Made Torokoff. Patterns of learning organisation – Estonian experiences. 
Tartu, 2008. Kaitstud 30.06.2008. 
22.  Helena Rozeik. Changes in ownership structures, their determinants and 
role in the restructuring of enterprises during transition: evidence from 
Estonia. Tartu, 2008. Kaitstud 31.10.2008. 
23.  Jaanika Meriküll. Technological change and labour demand. Tartu, 2009. 
Kaitstud 19.05.2009. 
24.  Anne Aidla. The impact of individual and organisational factors on 
academic performance in estonian general educational schools. Tartu, 
2009. Kaitstud 18.06.2009. 
25.  Alexander Gofman. Experimentation-Based Product Development in 
Mature Food Categories: Advancing Conjoint Analysis Approach. Tartu, 
2009. Kaitstud 21.09.2009. 
26.  Anne Reino. Manifestations of organizational culture based on the 
example of Estonian organizations. Tartu, 2009. Kaitstud 06.11.2009. 
27.  Krista Jaakson. Management by values: the analysis of influencing 
aspects and its theoretical and practical implications. Tartu, 2009. Kaitstud 
12.11.2009. 
28.  Eve Parts. Social capital, its determinants and effects on economic 
growth: comparison of the Western European and Central-Eastern 
European countries. Tartu, 2009. Kaitstud 18.12.2009. 
29.  Egle Tafenau. Welfare effects of regional policy in the constructed capital 
model. Tartu, 2010. Kaitstud 22.03.2010. 
30.  Epp Kallaste. Employee workplace representation: an analysis of selected 
determinants. Tartu, 2010. Kaitstud 21.06.2010. 
31.  Danel Tuusis. Interest rate influence on the behavior of economic 
subjects. Tartu, 2010. Kaitstud 22.10.2010. 
32.  Elina Kallas. Emotional intelligence, organizational culture and their 
relationship based on the example of Estonian service organizations. Tartu, 
2010. Kaitstud 17.11.2010. 
33.  Dorel Tamm. Alignment between the factors of the innovation process 
and public sector innovation support measures: an analysis of Estonian 
dairy processors and biotechnology enterprises. Tartu, 2010. Kaitstud 
16.12.2010. 
34.  Rasmus Kattai. The links between private sector indebtedness and 
banking sector vulnerability: An Estonian case study. Tartu, 2010. Kaitstud 
17.01.2011. 
 268 
35.  Kurmet Kivipõld. Organizational Leadership Capability and its 
evaluation based on the example of Estonian service organizations. Tartu, 
2011. Kaitstud 4.05.2011. 
36.  Janno Järve. Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in the Estonian Private 
Sector. Tartu, 2011. Kaitstud 21.06.2011. 
37. Kristina Toming. The impact of integration with the European Union on 
the international competitiveness of the food processing industry in 
Estonia. Tartu, 2011. Kaitstud 21.06.2011. 
38.  Andrus Kotri. Customer experience evoking and management in services. 
Tartu, 2011. Kaitstud 26.08.2011. 
39.  Andres Kuusik. Segmentation of repeat visitors using passive mobile 
positioning data: customer loyalty based approach. Tartu, 2011. Kaitstud 
31.08.2011. 
40.  Tuuli Pärenson. Social impact evaluation in social enterprises in Estonia: 
need, readiness and practices. Tartu, 2011. Kaitstud 21.09.2011. 
41.  Indrek Saar. Optimal alcohol taxation in Estonia. Tartu, 2011. Kaitstud 
25.11.2011. 
42. Kertu Lääts. Management accounting change in a dynamic economic 
environment based on examples from business and public sector 
organizations. Tartu, 2011. Kaitstud 30.11.2011. 
43. Reelika Irs. Teacher performance appraisal and remuneration aspects of 
performance management on the example of Estonian general educational 
schools. Tartu, 2012, 322 p. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
